

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION: CIMIC IN NATO

TOGETHER WE ARE STRONG, DIVIDED WE FALL

by

Edi Jurkovic
A Dissertation
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DEDICATION

To those who lost their lives in unnecessary conflicts all over the world.

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This dissertation is the product of five years of work, but this voyage started much earlier. I did not know that I was part of it until I came to the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. From there the path crystallized through knowledge and wisdom I collected from my professors and peers. This dissertation would not have been possible without them.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bosnia and Herzegovina	BiH
International Monetary Fund	IMF
Peace Support Operation.....	PSO
International Forces mission.....	IFOR
Stabilization Force	SFOR
European Forces - Operation Altea.....	EUFOR
Civil-Military Cooperation	CIMIC
Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska	NDH
Humanitarian Assistant Organization.....	HAO
Yugoslav Communist Party	CKKPJ
Peacekeeping operations	PKO
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.....	DPKO
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	OSCE
UN Security Council.....	UNSC
NATO's North Atlantic Council.....	NAC
Basic Human Needs	BHN
Relative Deprivation	RD
United Nations Protection Forces	UNPROFOR
Army of Repubika Srpska.....	VRS
Croatian Defense Assembly.....	HVO
Office of the High Representative	OHR
Serb Republic.....	RS
NATO Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps	ARRC
Formerly Warring Factions.....	FWF
Multinational Division-North	MND-N
Multinational Division-South West	MND-SW
Multinational Division-South East	MND-SE
United Kingdom.....	UK

ABSTRACT

**CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION, CIMIC IN NATO:
TOGETHER WE ARE STRONG, DIVIDED WE FALL**

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George Mason University, 2021

Dissertation Director: Professor Solon SimmonsSolon Simmons

Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in post-conflict environments is a practice of long-standing historical significance, but rigorous, outcomes-based research on the topic is relatively rare. Over the millennia of organized warfare, military forces have often been required to engage in certain civilian tasks in post-conflict societies, with responsibilities including building roads, bridges, and residences, as well as providing food, shelter, and medical attention to the local population. Beyond the altruism of such operations, the goals have often been to win the hearts and minds of the local population and to diminish the chances of a resumption of conflict. Local populations need that kind of aid, especially in conflict and post-conflict areas, where war has often devastated most of the infrastructure and local capabilities for self-sufficiency, prosperity and well-being.

However, in the rush to address pressing and poignant needs for post-conflict reconstruction, there is often a plethora of military and civilian government organizations (GO), international organizations (IO), and non-governmental organizations (NGO) conducting similar activities, with little or no coordination. This generates inefficiencies

and frictions between military components conducting Peace Support Operations (PSO) and their civilian counterparts. Conflict between military and civilian organizations (IOs, NGOs, and GOs) also adversely impacts on the efficacy of the reconstruction programs themselves, denying basic human needs of the local population which often loses the most during a war. In the absence of an overarching PSO management structure and mechanisms for practical cooperation between military and civilian PSO practitioners, individual projects are often not tailored to meet the actual needs of the local population, with projects being executed in the wrong places in an effort to address perceived needs that may not exist or are of low priority. Examples of such well-intentioned but misdirected projects abound, such as schools built in the middle of the jungle where there was a lack of not only teachers but children and building fishponds in mountainous regions where water is scarce.

Because of such disconnects, NATO devised Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine, with the aim of enhancing and formalizing cooperation between military and civilian organizations as they conduct PSO and associated projects. CIMIC focuses on recognizing the roles and missions of the military in PSO and ensuring that both civilian and military elements achieve synergy in reconstruction projects. While noble in intention, CIMIC sometimes founders on the reality that everyone likes coordination, but no one likes to be coordinated. The present research, based on post-conflict recovery in Bosnia, is designed to offer insights on why CIMIC is not more successful and then to

offer some possible recommendations on what needs to be done to increase cooperation between NATO military forces and their civilian counterparts in PSO.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

The 1970s and 80s were a time of global economic turmoil. While some countries managed to find a solution for it, some, including Yugoslavia, were deeply riddled with economic crises. The 1980 also marked the death of Yugoslav President Josip Broz “Tito,” the lifelong President who was considered the son of all ethnicities and nationalities of Yugoslavia. After Tito’s death, everyone knew that one chapter was finished and that nothing in Yugoslavia would be the same. And while some were crying over his death, others stood around confused and walked aimlessly. The soccer games were canceled, with players covering their faces with their hands, factories were shut down and workers were sent home. The army was mobilized and units were sent to fortified borders, since potential attacks were anticipated. In that moment, everyone was ready to fight and die for Yugoslavia, and no one was even able to fathom that ten years later they would fight each other and that all of them would hate Yugoslavia. After Tito’s death, payment came due for loans, and no one was willing to loan money to close a previous loan. Yugoslavia was faced with the IMF’s “shock therapy,”¹ which pushed the already-frustrated people over the edge.

¹ Egon Zizmond, “The Collapse of the Yugoslav Economy on JSTOR,” *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 1 (1992): 101–12; Nick Beams, “IMF ‘Shock Therapy’ and the Recolonisation of the Balkans,” 1999, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/04/imf-a17.html>; William F. Engdahl, *A Century of War: Anglo-*

After the establishment of democratic elections, many nationalist parties emerged and mobilized their followers in hate against Yugoslavia and each other. All those who were crying and walking aimlessly a decade before now had the singular aim of destroying Yugoslavia, and they succeeded. Bosnia was among the last republics to declare independence from Yugoslavia in spite of staunch refusal by Bosnia's ethnic Serb population. Suddenly Serbs went from being a majority group in Yugoslavia to a minority in Bosnia. Each ethnic group in Bosnia thought that they could rule, and each felt deprived, betrayed, and threatened by the others, or at least that was the message that was broadcast to ordinary people over every media outlet. After four long and painful years, at the end of 1995, Bosnia again had peace, but only because a Peace Support Operation (PSO) of over 60,000 troops was in place to maintain the peace.

The NATO International Forces mission (IFOR), which later became the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and, eventually, European Forces - Operation Altea (EUFOR), started from the separation of warring parties and finished as a monitor of democratic development and compliance by the local armed forces with the law. Yet the country remained deeply divided along ethnic and entity lines, with a destroyed economy and many lost lives, and with a foreign debt that exceeded that of all of Yugoslavia a few years before the conflict.

This study will focus on one segment of PSO, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), as a small but important factor of the PSO and peace processes. The role of

American Oil Politics and the New World Order, New, Revised, Unabridged Edition (Palm Desert, CA: Progressive Press, 2012), 283.

CIMIC is to help the military component of PSO to successfully conduct its own tasks, and to alleviate the basic problems of local population until civilian-led Humanitarian Assistant Organization (HAOs) can take over, or until local capabilities are rebuilt so that local institutions can step in. The concept of CIMIC is relatively unknown in academic literature, with only a few articles and even fewer books written about it. However, it has been a vital component of PSO since it was first used in Bosnia. Carl Bildt, the first High Representative in Bosnia, said in May 1996, “Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, they will require a civilian component and a civilian-military interface. That's been the case in all of these operations in the past and most certainly in Bosnia, and it will be one of the key lessons learned for the future.” His comments implied that PSO is in need of synergy of all contributors, and that only a holistic approach can work.

This study, through qualitative methods, will attempt to provide insight into the importance of CIMIC in Bosnia and to identify the obstacles to a holistic approach to conflict resolution. It is worth noting that the study of CIMIC is unique within conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) literature; this is a new area of focus for CAR, and CAR theories were not designed to answer directly the questions in this study. Therefore, this dissertation will attempt to provide a field of sensitivity for the phenomena in question.

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW

Section One: Background of the Conflict in Bosnia

Bosnia is a country with a long history and, unfortunately, a long tradition of warfare, and ethnic conflicts. First mentioned in *De Administrando Imperio*² in the 10th century by Eastern Roman Emperor Constantine VII, Bosnia's history is far older, beginning with the founding of a city from the Neolithic period near the modern-day Bosnian city of Visoko. Bosnia is located in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula, with Croatia on the west and north, Serbia on the east, and Montenegro on the southeast, with a small 48 kilometer coastline on the Adriatic Sea. The Balkan Peninsula itself is a relatively modern term, coined by German geographer Johann August Zeune in 1808. Another term sometimes used to describe the region is "South East Europe", but for political reasons, the term the *Balkans*, specifically the *Western Balkans*, is preferred in the circles of Western politicians.

Over time, many tribes, armed groups, and national armies have crossed over, and fought in, Bosnia, including the Romans, Crusaders, French, and Germans from the west; and the Huns, Saracens, Ottomans, and even Mongols from the east. Because of its unique geography, the Balkans, especially Bosnia, has been at the epicenter of a wide range of European and Middle eastern events. As groups crossed over Bosnia, they took what they wanted, but they also left something of themselves behind them. So, Bosnia

² Constantine, Gyula Moravcsik, and Romilly James Heald Jenkins, *De administrando imperio* (Washington, D.C.; Chichester: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies ; John Wiley [distributor, 2009).

was riddled with different cultures, religions, styles of cuisine, songs and music, and ways of life.

Bosnia was an independent state from 1180 until 1463,³ right before it was overrun and occupied by the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman rule would last for the next four centuries until 1879. Prior the invasion of the Ottomans, Bosnia had two predominant religions: Orthodox Christianity and, later, with the arrival of the Franciscan Mission in 1342, Catholic Christianity. After Bosnia's conquest by the Ottoman Turks and the imposition of *Pax Ottomanicum*, Islam became the third dominant religion in Bosnia. Ottoman sultans allowed a high level of decentralization and a measure of religious tolerance, but nevertheless, non-Muslims were treated as second class citizens, with extra taxes, a lack of standing in legal processes and virtually no representation in the organs of government.

Religious and cultural frictions were rampant throughout the Balkans. Christians were executed without the due process accorded Muslims, and high taxes were levied on non-Muslims. Particularly odious was the *Devshirme*, or child tax, in which Christians had to give a son to be trained as an elite Ottoman soldier called a janissary.⁴ These sorts of practices led to multiple rebellions in Serbia and Bosnia throughout the centuries of Ottoman domination of Bosnia.

Finally, in 1879, under the Treaty of Berlin which ended the Russo-Turkish war, Serbia was granted independence, and Bosnia fell under the control of the Austro-

³ Robert F. Baumann, George Walter Gawrych, and Walter Edward Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia* (DIANE Publishing, 2004), 4.

⁴ Владимир Ћоровић, Дубравка Тришић, and Саша Петковић, *Илустрована историја Срба*, 2015.

Hungarian Empire amidst its initiative to expand in Europe. The Hapsburgs of Austria-Hungary officially annexed Bosnia in 1908 and kept control of it until the end of World War I. During the Habsburg occupation, local nationalism started to develop, and many clear divisions solidified in Bosnia, especially between ethnic Croats and Serbs who were generally Catholic and Orthodox Christians, respectively. Muslims, on the other hand, often either identified themselves as Croats or Serbs or simply as Muslims. National identity closely resembled religious identity, a phenomenon that remains in place to this day. As Muslims benefitted from Ottoman rule, now Croats benefitted from Hapsburg rule, with Muslims being relegated to the second most privileged group.

After World War I and the great push by France and Great Britain to redraw the map of Europe, a new country was formed that was composed of former Hapsburg regions: modern-day Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia (which included Vojvodina), and Montenegro. The new kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was supposed to be a balance against the spread of Austria and Prussia toward the South. During the period between the two World Wars, the kingdom – which, after 1929, was renamed Yugoslavia – suffered from a constant struggle between Croats and Serbs. Serbs comprised close to 40 percent of the total population and occupied approximately 90 percent of the power and positions in the young country. For example, out of 165 generals in the Yugoslav armed forces, 161 were Serbs, and all but one Prime Minister were Serbs.⁵ At the same time, Muslims were often caught in the cultural and nationalist crossfire, with some

⁵ Robert F. Baumann, George Walter Gawrych, and Walter Edward Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia* (DIANE Publishing, 2004), 11.

families being torn between Serbs and Croats. Noel Malcolm identifies a clear example of this, in the persona of Spaho, who identified himself as Yugoslav, while one of his brothers identified as a Serb and another as a Croat.⁶

After April 6, 1941, Yugoslavia fell victim to the forces of Nazi aggression and ceased to exist for the next four years. In the aftermath of the “April war” in 1941, which lasted only 11 days because of betrayal of the government by pro-Nazi elements, most of whom were of Croatian descent,⁷ the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was dissolved. The erstwhile kingdom was divided between Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy. Germany took Slovenia and established a puppet government in Serbia. Croatia was accorded nominal independence but was, in fact, governed by a pro-Nazi regime that shortly thereafter committed significant crimes against humanity in the Balkans.⁸ Croatia lost most of the areas along the coast, but gained all of Bosnia. Serbia lost most of Vojvodina to Hungary; Kosovo and Montenegro were ceded to Italy, and Macedonia became part of Bulgaria.

Ante Pavelic, the head of the independent Croatia, soon endeavored to create a pure Croatian homeland, purging and forcibly dislocating non-Croats from the country. His campaign of ethnic purity, as vicious as it was, did not achieve its goals. Yet it sowed the seeds of ethnic cleansing which continued in earnest during the conflict in Croatia in the 1990s. With his army of 12,000 extremists called the *Ustashe*, Pavelic

⁶ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, Updated edition (NYU Press, 1996), 165–66.

⁷ BRANKO PETRANOVIC, *SRBIJA U DRUGOM SVETSKOM RATU 1939-1945* (VINC BEOGRAD, 1992), chap. 2.

⁸ Milorad Ekmečić, *Dugo kretanje između oranja i klanja* (Euro Giunti, Beograd, 2010), 381–449; Драган Цветковић, “Страдање Цивила Независне Државе Хрватске у Логору Јасеновац,” *Tokovi Istorije* 04 (2007): 158; Barry M. Lituchy, *Jasenovac and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia*, 1st edition (New York: Jasenovac Research Institute, 2006).

started a policy to “convert a third, expel a third, and kill a third,”⁹ mainly targeting Serbs, Jews, Roma, and communists. Of the Jewish population of 40,000 in Croatia and 12,000-17,000 in Bosnia, only five percent survived the war¹⁰, and out of approximately 1.5 million Serbs, between 700,000 and 800,000 perished in concentration camps or were brutally killed in the areas in which they lived.¹¹ 200,000 were converted to Catholicism. Croatia was the only country at that time that had a concentration camp for children, where more than 20,000 lost their lives.¹² Ironically, Muslims in Croatia were perceived as loyal and were included in the armed forces of the Independent Croatian State, (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska-NDH).

At the same time in Serbia, the remnants of the Yugoslav Royal Armed Forces expanded the *Chetniks*, units that were once used as the Yugoslav military police and now became a guerrilla movement that fought against occupying forces and communists and tried to protect the Serb population in eastern Bosnia along the border with Serbia. Muslims, especially from Hercegovina, were part of these forces as well.¹³ Also, some of the Muslims were loyal to Nazi Germany, and they formed the 13th Waffen Mountain Division of the SS “Handschar.”¹⁴ Handshar, or Khanjar, was a type of knife the

⁹ Nicholas A. Robins and Adam Jones, eds., *Genocides by the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 106; Steven L. Jacobs, ed., *Confronting Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 158.

¹⁰ Jacobs, *Confronting Genocide*, 160.

¹¹ Jacobs, 160.

¹² Jacobs, *Confronting Genocide*.

¹³ “Muslimani,a Cetnici: Borili se s Dražom za kralja, nikad s Titom! (FOTO),” *Telegraf.rs*, accessed April 8, 2020, <https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/813374-muslimani-a-cetnici-borili-se-s-drazom-za-kralja-nikad-s-titom-foto>.

¹⁴ George H. Stein, *The Waffen SS : Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945* (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1984), 184, <http://archive.org/details/waffenshitlers00stei>.

originated in Oman and was introduced into Bosnian tradition during the Ottoman Empire. The 13th division committed major atrocities against the Orthodox and Jewish populations, especially along the border and the Drina river and in Herzegovina.

The last movement that rose during World War II was that of the partisans, a communist movement that did not focus on ethnic and national intolerance but on the fight against the occupiers and their local allies. As it was a popular movement with good public relations, it attracted a lot of people, especially the young and educated. With the help of both Western and Eastern allies, the partisans expelled the German forces, subdued the puppet regimes and liberated all of Yugoslavia, including Slovenia. Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the partisans emerged with the aura of “greatest son of all nations and ethnicities.”¹⁵ Contrary to the Croat and Serb forces which were nationally-oriented, Tito’s partisan movement accepted all national and ethnic groups that were willing to fight against Nazi Germany and its allies. Tito ameliorated ethnic tensions over the period after World War II through the notion of “Brotherhood and Unity.” During Tito’s regime, on the surface, it did not matter who belonged to which ethnic or national group, but under the surface it was quite important. Most positions were acquired by an ethnic key, which was widely used in Bosnia between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.¹⁶

¹⁵ “Dan kada je došao maršal: Na današnji dan se rodio najveći sin naših naroda i narodnosti!,” *espreso.rs*, accessed April 8, 2020, <https://www.espreso.rs/vesti/drustvo/49712/dan-kada-je-dosao-marsal-na-danasnji-dan-se-rodio-najveci-sin-nasih-naroda-i-narodnosti>.

¹⁶ Raymond Taras, “Islamophobia Never Rests in the Balkans: Muslim Communities and the Legacy of Exclusionary Nationalisms and Ethnic Expulsions,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 39, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 260, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2019.1652411>.

But Tito found himself leading a shattered nation. With a death toll during the war of almost 1.7 million,¹⁷ the new country faced enormous challenges in the aftermath of the war. The loss of so many during World War II reinforced the devastation of World War I in which the old Kingdom had lost between 1.1 and 1.3 million people, of whom 60% were male.¹⁸

With losses of that magnitude, Tito achieved a remarkable economic recovery and, more importantly, instilled pride in the Yugoslav people. The Yugoslav passport became most desired of the time because its bearer could cross more borders without a visa than holders of any other passport. Almost one million workers, popularly called *Gastarbeiters*, were working abroad and sending foreign currency back to the country,¹⁹ and they were key in helping to fuel the post-war Yugoslav economy.

Yugoslavia's unique geographical position accorded Tito the opportunity to balance the West and East in his political relationships throughout much of the Cold War. For example, when there was a break in relations with the Soviet Union, he bought US tanks instead of Russian tanks. As Susan Woodrow stated, the three primary elements of Yugoslavia's stability were its unusual position in the international community during the

¹⁷ Lituchy, *Jasenovac and the Holocaust in Yugoslavia*, 3.

¹⁸ Čedomir Antić, "Sudnji rat," *Politika Online*, accessed April 8, 2020, <http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/55742/Tema-nedelje/Najveca-srpska-pobeda/Sudnji-rat>; "Najveća srpska pobeda," *Politika Online*, accessed April 8, 2020, <http://www.politika.rs/sr/rubrika/444/Najveca-srpska-pobeda>.

¹⁹ "Gastarbeiter | Meaning of Gastarbeiter by Lexico," *Lexico Dictionaries | English*, accessed April 8, 2020, <https://www.lexico.com/definition/gastarbeiter>.

Cold War; the constitutional structure of the federation, and the security, both economic and political, provided to all people in the country.²⁰

But despite Tito's efforts, ethnic and religious identities remained within the DNA of the new country. The notion of being Yugoslav was the overall policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party (CKKPJ), and it advanced this radical agenda through culture, media, and education. From the beginning, the CKKPJ believed that Muslims should stop identifying themselves by religion and declare themselves as Serbs, Croats, or Yugoslavs.²¹ Based on the book "Who is Who"²² (Ko je ko), 62 percent of Yugoslavs with Muslim names identified themselves as Serbs and 17 percent as Croats.²³ For those Muslims who identified themselves as neither Croat nor Serb, a new term emerged: *Bosniak*. On September 27, 1993, the first Bosniak assembly convened in Sarajevo, and its 352 representatives of the political and intellectual elite voted to replace the then-national name "Muslims" (Muslimani) with "Bosniaks" (Bošnjaci).²⁴ As a Bosnian-Muslim journalist in 1993 stated, "We fell asleep as Muslims; we woke up as Bosniaks."

Since then, the term Bosniak has caused some misconceptions about the history of settlers in Bosnia. With its similarity to the country's name, "Bosniak" create the illusion that Bosniaks should have primacy in Bosnia over the other two groups, the Serbs and

²⁰ Thomas George Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*, New Millennium Books in International Studies (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 102.

²¹ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 18.

²² Grupa autora, *Ko je Ko u Jugoslaviji : Biografski Podaci o Jugoslovenskim Savremenici* ("Sedma sila" - Beograd, 1957).

²³ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 18.

²⁴ Cyrill Stieger, *Wir wissen nicht mehr, wer wir sind: vergessene Minderheiten auf dem Balkan* (Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2017); Christiane Dick, "Die bošnjaštvo-Konzeption von Adil Zulfikarpašić," doc-type:book, 2002, <https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.549>.

Croats. That sense of historical identity – inaccurate though it may be – has been one of the sources of fuel for ethnic/religious conflict that exists today.

It is ironic to note that most Bosnian Muslims stem from families that were previously Christians and were forced to convert to Islam during the Ottoman period. Examples of the overlap in religious identification among Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism and Islam abound; in downtown Sarajevo, one of the oldest sacral objects is the Old Orthodox Church, which was first mentioned in Ottoman records in Istanbul in 1539, and it is assumed that it was built in the 14th century on the foundation of a church that dated back to the 6th-10th century.²⁵ The oldest mosque in Sarajevo was built in 1492 during Ottoman rule.²⁶ The oldest Catholic church was built in Vares, a small town in Bosnia, in 1643.²⁷ These data points emphasize that the conflict in the 1990s was among groups that had been living in Bosnia for centuries, rather than between invaders and natives, as it is sometimes portrayed. Moreover, individual Bosnians today can often trace their ancestral roots to all three of the religious and ethnic groups.

After Tito's death in 1980 and the mourning period that lasted less than a year, the first cracks in Yugoslavia started to form. Riots in Kosovo in the spring of 1981²⁸ became the overture for the breakup of the country. Without a charismatic and ruthless leader to

²⁵ "Pravoslavni Hram Iz 14 Veka u Sarajevu," *Srpska Televizija -USA*, April 28, 2017, <https://srpskatelevizija.com/2017/04/28/pravoslavni-hram-u-sarajevu-iz-14-veka/>.

²⁶ "Najstarija u Sarajevu: Gerdeni hadži Husejinova džamija otvorena samo tokom ramazana," *Klix.ba*, accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/najstarija-u-sarajevu-gerdeni-hadzi-husejinova-dzamija-otvorena-samo-tokom-ramazana/160607046>.

²⁷ "Znate Li Gdje Se Nalazi Najstarija Katolička Crkva u BiH?," accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.croexpress.eu/hr-iseljenistvo/13137/znate-li-gdje-se-nalazi-najstarija-katolicka-crkva-u-bih/>.

²⁸ Niall Mulchinock, *NATO and the Western Balkans: From Neutral Spectator to Proactive Peacemaker* (London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 97.

succeed Tito, the centrifugal political, ethnic and economic forces gathered momentum, and the splintering began in earnest. Yugoslavia was beset with a series of economic crises, staggered under massive foreign debt and began to lose its political importance in a redefined bipolar world. Not surprisingly, the six constituent republics started looking toward their local rulers rather than Belgrade for solutions. With inflammatory rhetoric claiming that the rulers in Belgrade could not help the republics and that Serbs wanted to rule over everyone, the republics, starting from the westernmost Slovenia, began to seek independence. Many in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) hoped that wars of secession that had briefly plagued Slovenia and then Croatia would not come to them and that the political future of BiH could be determined at the bargaining table. However, scars from the last wars, economic crises, inflation, and the megalomaniac goals of the Croatian and Serbian presidents were too strong for BiH, and the war spilled over into the republic in 1992.

Theories abound as to who started the war in Bosnia and when the seeds for conflict were sown, but one could argue that war started when Bosnia plunged headlong into the trappings of democracy without a mature political infrastructure, and then was overrun by “political elites” who had ethnic and nationalistic goals of their own. Although the guns fell largely silent after the Dayton Accords in 1995, the impact of the war reverberates today, with each side trying to present itself as a victim and all others as invaders.

The costs of the war are well-documented. The reported number of those who were killed generally ranges from 67,530 to 102,261, depending on the source.²⁹ The Correlates of War Project, however, talks of only 48,953 deaths.³⁰ PRIO claims that, at best, there were 20,825, and at worst, there were 65,900 deaths. The existence of other numbers that vary based on which side the researchers or authors support, leaves a lot of space for manipulation of the opinion of today's citizens in Bosnia. Most authors round up³¹ to the number of deaths during the four years of conflict. The number of displaced and refugees also varies, but based on UNHCR sources, over two million people³² fell in this category, with over 750,000 finding refuge in North America, Australia, and Europe.³³

The financial cost of the war is even harder to determine for many reasons, with estimates ranging from hundreds of billions to over one trillion dollars. During the three years of war, the GDP per capita in Bosnia plummeted from \$2,719 to just about \$250. Some 45% of industry was destroyed because of combat activities, but even more was

²⁹ Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, "War-Related Deaths in the 1992-1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results," *European Journal of Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie* 21, no. 2/3 (2005): 187–215.

³⁰ "Intra-State War Data (v5.1) — Correlates of War," File, accessed April 10, 2020, <https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/intra-state-wars-v5-1.zip>.

³¹ Michael F. Harsch, *Bosnia: From Intervention to the Dayton Agreement, 1992–1995, The Power of Dependence* (Oxford University Press), accessed April 13, 2020, <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722311.001.0001/acprof-9780198722311-chapter-3>.

³² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina Reach 1 Million," UNHCR, accessed April 10, 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2004/9/414ffeb44/returns-bosnia-herzegovina-reach-1-million.html>.

³³ Vesna Bojicic, Mary Kaldor, and Ivan Vejvoda, "Post-War Reconstruction in the Balkans: A Background Report Prepared for the European Commission" (Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex, Arts A Building Falmer: Brighton BN1 9QN, 1995), <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/sei-working-paper-no-14.pdf>.

plundered, even in areas where there was no fighting. Out of over 1,000 kilometers of railroad tracks, only 30% was still usable after the war. Damages to the road network were estimated at \$350 million, and it took years for certain bridges to be reopened. Roads deteriorated significantly because of the lack of repair material, which caused additional losses and damage that are often not included in the overall cost. Furthermore, the electrical network was devastated; before the war, Bosnia exported electricity into its neighboring republics. When the war gutted Bosnia's power sector, some of its neighbors complained about not receiving electricity, creating a range of subsequent legal issues.³⁴ Other areas such as agriculture and telecommunications also suffered major losses, which forced Bosnia to find aid from outside.³⁵

Beyond the economic and infrastructure damage, though, lay the brutality of ethnic cleansing and the butchery that was visited on all sides by all sides. The deep-seated and often artificial dividing lines between and among ethnic and religious groups – so effectively suppressed by Tito – found their expression in levels of atrocities unseen since the worst days of Nazi Germany. In the words of Dutch Commander LTC Thom Karremans, who was stationed in the little Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica before the Serb

³⁴ "Slučaj 'TE Ugljevik: Slovenci Traže Od BiH 758 Miliona Eura Odštete," slobodna-bosna.ba, accessed April 13, 2020, http://www.slobodna-bosna.ba/vijest/31259/sluchaj_te_ugljevnik_slovenci_traze_od_bih_758_miliona_eura_odstete.html; Danijel Kovacevic, "Croatia Pressures Bosnia Over Lost Power Plant Investment," *Balkan Insight* (blog), May 24, 2017, <https://balkaninsight.com/2017/05/24/croatia-moves-to-settle-its-pre-war-bosnia-investment-05-24-2017/>.

³⁵ Bojicic, Kaldor, and Vejvoda, "Post-War Reconstruction in the Balkans: A Background Report Prepared for the European Commission."

attack, “You cannot speak of good guys and bad guys in this war. The Muslims previously burned 192 villages to the ground. They are all the same to me.”³⁶

Section Two: Peace Support Operations in Bosnia

Peace Support Operations as a Concept

It was into this environment of carnage and cruelty that the international community thrust itself, with a variety of nations and international organizations undertaking well-meaning but unevenly effective PSO. PSO on the scale assumed in Bosnia were almost unprecedented, opening a new chapter in the use of military forces and in civil-military cooperation.

Academic literature uses different terms and definitions for PSO, and they are occasionally used in ways that lead to confusion and ambiguity. The most widely used term that is sometimes used interchangeably with PSO is peacebuilding, but that represents only a segment of PSO. At their most basic level, PSO are designed to achieve a long-term political settlements in order to prevent conflict, control its scope or reduce the probabilities of resuming conflict once a political settlement is reached. Under the PSO umbrella are supporting operations such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and humanitarian relief.³⁷

³⁶ Ward op den Brouw and Harry Meijer, “Dossier Affaire Srebrenica,” accessed April 14, 2020, <https://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Srebrenica/couzy.html>.

³⁷ “NATO Peace Support Operations Doctrine AJP-3.4.1” (NATO Military Agency for Standardization, July 2001), <https://publicintelligence.net/nato-peace-support-operations-doctrine/>; NATO, “NATO Peace Support Operations Doctrine - AJP-3.4.1” (NATO HQ, May 31, 2012), <https://publicintelligence.net/nato-peace-support-operations-doctrine/>.

Ramsbotham³⁸ noted—based on Johan Galtung’s³⁹ discussion—that sustainable peace depends on the establishment of systems that are capable of addressing the underlying or “root” causes of the conflict. He points out that “peace has a structure different from, perhaps over and above, peacekeeping and *ad hoc* peacemaking ... the mechanism that peace is based on should be built into the structure and be present as a reservoir for the system itself to draw upon ... more specifically, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.”⁴⁰ Lederach asserts that peacebuilding “is more than post-accord reconstruction” and “is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a condition. It is a dynamic social construct.”⁴¹ He also points out that “building peace in today’s conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an

³⁸ Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall, and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, 3rd ed (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), chaps. 8 and 9.

³⁹ Galtung Johan, “Three Approaches to Peace : Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,” in *Peace, War and Defense : Essays in Peace Research*, vol. II (Copenhagen: Ejlers, n.d.), 282–304, http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_law/users/vessier9/public/Galtung%20-%20Three%20Approaches%20to%20Peace.pdf.

⁴⁰ Johan, 297–98.

⁴¹ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 20.

infrastructure that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside.”⁴²

Another term often used interchangeably with PSO is peacekeeping operations (PKO), which the UN mainly defines as “operation[s] led by [the UN’s] Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), [which] works to create the conditions for lasting peace in a country torn by conflict. ... A peacekeeping operation consists of military, police, and civilian personnel, who work to deliver security, political, and early peacebuilding support.”⁴³

This study will use the NATO term “PSO” because it encompasses all aspects of activities necessary for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. PSO also can apply to the engagement of NATO resources in natural catastrophes, since a state can be in peril or labeled as a weak or failed after an earthquake or tsunami, as Indonesia experienced in 2004. According to Apte and Heath, during that humanitarian crisis, the military delivered critical material and services to enable, augment, or improve the assistance provided by HAOs.⁴⁴ Thus, students and practitioners of PSO must carefully define their terms in order to understand the scope and magnitude of the PSO envisioned.

NATO defines PSO as “multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in support of an internationally recognized organization such as the UN or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), involving military forces

⁴² Lederach, xvi.

⁴³ “What Is Peacekeeping? United Nations Peacekeeping,” accessed December 13, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml>.

⁴⁴ Aruna Apte, and Susan Heath, “Request and Response Processes for Department of Defense Support during Domestic Disasters,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 8, no. 1 (2011), <https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/jhsem/8/1/jhsem.8.issue-1.xml>.

and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies.”⁴⁵ Within the framework of the United Nations, PSO do not technically fall under Chapter VI or VII, which deal respectively with peaceful settlement of disputes and the UN Security Council (UNSC’s) powers to maintain peace. However, Bakradze, Cessase, and Bring, based on the definition of late UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, suggest that they could be labeled as “Chapter VI ½.” This concept would mean, as Usden and Juergenliemk state, that a UN mission would be deployed for observation as it would under Chapter VI, but if there is violence on the ground, Article 42 of Chapter VII,⁴⁶ which authorizes the use of force (with UNSC approval) to stop or prevent the escalation of violence, could apply. Therefore, it would be a hybrid mission of Chapters VI and VII.⁴⁷

Regardless of the term that is used, the deployment of PSO forces is a highly political decision at the regional or international level, and the organizations that conduct PSO are often driven by the interests of their most influential members. At the regional level, organizations such as the African Union,⁴⁸ the Foreign Affairs Council for the European Union,⁴⁹ or NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) formally decide whether to

⁴⁵ Ole Boe, Johan Bergh, and Rino Johansen, “Leadership Challenges for Joint Force Commanders during the Transition from a High-Intensity to a Low-Intensity Conflict,” *Arts and Social Sciences Journal* 08 (January 1, 2017): 3, <https://doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000281>.

⁴⁶ “Chapter VII of UN Charter,” June 17, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>.

⁴⁷ “Charter of the United Nations | United Nations,” accessed December 13, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>.

⁴⁸ “African Union Decides against Peacekeepers for Burundi,” accessed May 8, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/african-union-decides-peacekeepers-burundi-160131102052278.html>.

⁴⁹ “Military and Civilian Missions and Operations - Eeas - European Commission,” eeas, accessed May 8, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military_and_civilian_missions_and_operations.

deploy PSO forces, although the decision-making authority rests with the member states. At the international level, the UNSC members, especially the permanent five, take the lead on these decisions.⁵⁰

Moreover, PSO can often be motivated by political or public opinions rather than the needs of the people. For example, Autesserre points out, “*The New York Times* or *The Washington Post* had much more influence in setting the mission’s agenda [in the UN Mission in the Congo] than local counterparts... troops feared particularly the reactions of their home countries; the whole mission also worried about the opinions of the Security Council countries.”⁵¹

After the wars of the 1990s, UN and NATO PSO mainly focused on promoting liberal democracy as the ultimate approach to conflict resolution – clearly a long-term and altruistic goal requiring an enduring and often expensive commitment on the part of the supporting states. While such goals may have been – and perhaps continue to be – overly optimistic, they represent a significant improvement over how the success of PSO was measured prior to 1990 with success was measured solely in terms of separating warring parties and conducting elections. As Paris points out, right after international peacebuilders left Cambodia in 1993, former members of the peacebuilding mission and the international community were surprised when the country became dominated by a local strongman.⁵²

⁵⁰ “Forming a New Operation. United Nations Peacekeeping,” accessed May 8, 2017, <https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newoperation.shtml>.

⁵¹ Séverine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 210.

⁵² Roland Paris, ed., “Critiques of Liberal Peace,” in *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed Books, 2011), 34.

Over time, many military leaders, academics, diplomats, and PSO practitioners have debated the best way to eliminate structural and direct violence as a path to positive peace. Eventually, as Ramsbotham et al. points out,⁵³ focusing solely on separating the warring parties and holding elections ceased to be the only viable option, and perhaps was not even the best approach, since negative peace did not transition to positive peace and conflicts recurred.

Meanwhile, new prominent thinkers with fresh ideas came to light, such as Crane Brinton (analysis of political revolution), Kurt Lewin (social psychology), and, later, Johan Galtung (positive and negative peace and conflict triangle), John Burton (multidisciplinary insight), Edward Azar (protracted social conflict), Louis Kriesberg (sociology of social conflict), Chris Mitchel (structure of international conflict), and many others.⁵⁴ They devised numerous theories that offer pragmatic guidance on how to deal with complex conflicts that PSO are designed to resolve. These theories include basic human needs, frustration-aggression, relative deprivation, social identity, chosen trauma and others.

Invariably, conflicts to which PSO are committed are quite complex,⁵⁵ and in order for PSO to be useful, a wide range of issues needs to be addressed often simultaneously. So most, if not all, of these theories and their associated measures should

⁵³ Oliver Ramsbotham, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, 3rd ed (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), chap. 2.

⁵⁴ Louis Kriesberg, "Contemporary Conflict Resolution," in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 455–76; Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, chap. 2.

⁵⁵ Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 135.

be applied to reach some version of positive peace, a term that Galtung coined.⁵⁶ He described peacemaking⁵⁷ as a process in which the parties in a conflict come together to resolve a “perceived divergence of interest,”⁵⁸ usually with the help of a third party. According to Galtung, peacemaking was just an initial phase of the overall peacebuilding process, and “we have to turn toward deeper-lying factors in the relations between the parties, in order to arrive at some ideas about how a self-supporting conflict resolution can be found. And this is what we refer to as *peacebuilding*.”⁵⁹

Galtung also talked about negative peace, which he defined as the “absence of violence,”⁶⁰ as opposed to positive peace, the “absence of structural violence [and the presence of] social justice.”⁶¹ The importance of this distinction is clear when PSO focuses exclusively on stopping violence and does not go through the process of transformation from negative to positive peace or eliminating the sources of structural violence. Under such conditions, a resumption of violence becomes highly probable.

The theory of basic human needs, developed by John Burton who was also a founding father of the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, gives insight into those underlying issues that push people into conflict. He based his research on American psychologist Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, but Burton differentiated material from non-material needs. For Burton, material needs are

⁵⁶ Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (September 1, 1969): 167–91, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600301>.

⁵⁷ Galtung.

⁵⁸ Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, 3rd ed, McGraw-Hill Series in Social Psychology (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 8.

⁵⁹ Johan, “Three Approaches to Peace : Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,” 297.

⁶⁰ Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 183.

⁶¹ 183.

causes for dispute, since the parties can bargain over them, while non-material, or “basic human needs (BHN)”—security, recognition, identity and personal development—are causes of conflict.⁶² (Burton’s idea was that every material/tangible cause of conflict is actually not a conflict but a dispute, since the parties could negotiate over it and even substitute different solutions for different issues. Based on Burton, on the other hand, conflict arises when issues are not material/tangible but underlined as human needs.) The benefit of BHN is that they give rise to different approaches to conflict resolution, providing an “alternative to the prevailing paradigms of postwar social science: mechanistic utilitarianism, behaviorism, cultural relativism, and Hobbesian “realism,” as pointed out by Richard Rubenstein.⁶³ Rubenstein also identified the virtues and limitations of Burton’s BHN, and one of the limitations is that it mainly focuses on only three aspects of identity, recognition, and security, but not on others such as welfare and freedom.⁶⁴

Relative deprivation (RD), a theory by Ted Robert Gurr, was the next level of the frustration-aggression theory created by Dollard and his colleagues in 1939.⁶⁵ Gurr in his book *Why Men Rebel* asks whether men are inherently aggressive or whether their aggressiveness is a product of the situation.⁶⁶ A similar question was posed by Burton,

⁶² John W. Burton, *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention*, Political Analyses (Manchester ; New York : New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed exclusively in the USA by St. Martin’s Press, 1997), chaps. 3 & 4.

⁶³ “Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory Development - Richard E. Rubenstein,” accessed May 9, 2017, https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_1/Rubenstein.htm.

⁶⁴ “Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory Development - Richard E. Rubenstein.”

⁶⁵ J. Dollard et al., *Frustrations and Aggression* (Pub. for the Institute of human relations, 1939), <https://books.google.com/books?id=oG0rAAAAIAAJ>.

⁶⁶ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Pub., 2011), 30.

who believed that men are inherently aggressive.⁶⁷ Gurr's theory claims that actors will behave violently if the perception of discrepancy (relative deprivation) between what they have (value capabilities) and what they think they should have (value expectations) changes.⁶⁸ He identified three types of relative deprivation: decremented, aspirational, and progressive. The type depends on the progression or stagnation of value expectations and the stagnation or decrease of value capabilities.⁶⁹ This theory is helpful in dealing with the local population or with humanitarian assistance counterparts who come from a less fortunate situation compared to other members of the PSO.

Social identity theory is based on the idea that every person has an identity. Vamik Volkan noted that each person has at least two identities: his personal identity, which covers him like clothes, and a group identity, which covers him like a tent held by the whole group and erected above them by their leaders as an "ethnic pole."⁷⁰ Coser,⁷¹ Tajfel and Turner⁷², Tajfel,⁷³ and others also explored social identity and the role of the individual as a part of the group. They assessed that, besides his own identity, an individual has multiple identities drawn from the group to which he belongs. Tajfel also

⁶⁷ Burton, *Violence Explained*, 17.

⁶⁸ Ted Robert Gurr and Woodrow Wilson, *Why Men Rebel*. (School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies., Princeton, N.J.: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University [by] Princeton University Press, 1970), 37.

⁶⁹ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 46.

⁷⁰ Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride To Ethnic Terrorism* (Boulder, CO: Basic Books, 1998), 27–28.

⁷¹ Lewis A Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*. ([New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), chap. 2.

⁷² Henri Tajfel and John Charles Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Inter-Group Behavior," in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 2nd ed, The Nelson-Hall Series in Psychology (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1986).

⁷³ Henri Tajfel, "Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour," *Information (International Social Science Council)* 13, no. 2 (April 1, 1974): 65–93, <https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847401300204>; Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 1. paperback printing, European Studies in Social Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press [u.a.], 2010).

contended that groups go through a categorization process with identification comparison, creating a mentality of “us vs. them.”⁷⁴ Brown discussed the nation and the process of the idealization of one’s own group while denigrating others, who are often scapegoated for real or perceived ills.⁷⁵ Coser assessed that the “absence of conflict does not indicate the absence of feeling of hostility and antagonism”⁷⁶ between groups, which shows an example of negative peace.

Volkan also introduced the terms “chosen trauma” and “chosen glory.”⁷⁷ The process of mourning a loss by a group is similar to the process of mourning for an individual, and Volkan noted that if the mourning process is not completed or resolved, it can give rise to a transgenerational passing of the pains and even can lead the group to continue to harbor animosity toward those who they believe created the pain, even if they existed centuries ago.⁷⁸

The theories of conflict – and its handmaiden conflict resolution – are thus varied and multifaceted. Theoreticians and practitioners alike must recognize the wide range of policy implications inherent in each theory and apply theoretical constructs to the complex realities on the ground. And this was proven true in Bosnia.

⁷⁴ Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict.*, 35.

⁷⁵ David Brown, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Nationalism,” in *Identity Matters: Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict*, ed. James L. Peacock, Patricia M. Thornton, and Patrick B. Inman (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 15–33; Rupert Brown, *Group Processes: Dynamics within and between Groups*, 2nd ed (Oxford, UK ; Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).

⁷⁶ Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict.*, 82.

⁷⁷ Volkan, *Bloodlines*, chap. 3.

⁷⁸ Volkan, chap. 3.

Subsection: UN Led Mission- UNPROFOR

On February 21, 1992, the UN Security Council agreed to establish a UN mission in Croatia in order to divide the warring Croatian and Serb parties. UN Security Council Resolution 743⁷⁹ established the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR)⁸⁰, which was approved by UNSC Resolution 749 on April 7, 1992. Initially, UNPROFOR was composed of only 6,500 peacekeepers with a headquarters in Bosnia, but after the conflict in Bosnia intensified, it grew to 38,000-39,000. As the conditions in Bosnia deteriorated, the mission expanded to Bosnia in addition to Croatia, and some say that UNPROFOR was trying to plug another finger that it did not have into a sinking boat already riddled with holes. The UN did have support from NATO through the implementation of a no-fly zone over Bosnia, which aided UNPROFOR's mission because the Bosnian Serb armed forces, known as the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske-VRS), had significantly more rotary and fixed-wing capabilities compared to the Bosniak armed forces, known as the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Bosne i Hercegovine), and the Croats' Croatian Defense Assembly (Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane-HVO). NATO shot down four Galeb/Jastreb VRS airplanes in late February 1994.⁸¹ UNPROFOR rarely used this capability, however, because they were afraid of possible retaliation against troops on the ground.⁸² Despite the Chapter VII

⁷⁹ "Security Council Resolution 743 - UNSCR," accessed April 13, 2020, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/743>.

⁸⁰ "UNPROFOR," accessed April 13, 2020, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unprof_p.htm.

⁸¹ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 65.

⁸² Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 47; Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*, 1 edition (New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin Books, 1997).

mandate, UNPROFOR focused mostly on protection of international personnel with limited use of force.⁸³

Unfortunately, as LTG Francis Briquemont said, “There is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field.”⁸⁴ Between 1991 and November 1995, when the General Framework Agreement for Peace (the Dayton Accords) was signed and the war ended, there were 83 UNSC resolutions on the former Yugoslavia. Between 1947 and 1988, there were 348 resolutions on peacekeeping, and from 1989 to 1994, there were 296 resolutions. UNSC resolutions on the former Yugoslavia comprised 41 percent of all resolutions between 1991 and 1996.⁸⁵

With the constant adjustment of the mandate, increases in tasks, money and troops often arrived too late or, in some cases, not at all.⁸⁶ Even those that did arrive were not adequate, as Canadian General Lewis MacKeznie noted: “How many troops it would take to defend the safe havens ... ‘Somewhere in the neighborhood of 135,000 troops,’ I replied. ... The Security Council approved a force of 12,000, and, six months later, fewer than 2,000 additional soldiers had been added to UNPROFOR for the safe-haven tasks.” After the mortar shelling at Markale market in Sarajevo, the siege of Srebrenica, the Croatian invasion in western Bosnia in 1995, and the NATO bombing of Serbs, all parties

⁸³ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 27.

⁸⁴ Reuters, “U.N. Bosnia Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions,” *The New York Times*, December 31, 1993, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/31/world/un-bosnia-commander-wants-more-troops-fewer-resolutions.html>.

⁸⁵ Karin Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 137, <http://site.ebrary.com/id/2000826>.

⁸⁶ Joachim Alexander Koops, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, First edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 390.

were forced to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio. The UNPROFOR mission concluded with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords on November 1, 1995, and it transformed from a UN-led UNPROFOR to the NATO-led IFOR.

Subsection: Office of the High Representative (OHR)

Annex 10 of the Dayton Accords established the position of High Representative, an ad hoc institution whose task was to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspect of the peace agreement.⁸⁷ The responsibilities of the High Representative at the beginning focused primarily on supervising and reporting about the implementation of the peace agreement. After the Bonn agreement in 1997,⁸⁸ the High Representative's responsibilities increased to include actively intersecting with the local political scene and even removing politicians from office whom the High Representative deemed dangerous to the peace process. In 1999, OHR removed the elected president of the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska – RS),⁸⁹ as well some other politicians. In 2002, OHR removed 58 politicians en masse from different positions. OHR was also able to push certain laws to be accepted, and OHR between 1999 and 2002 brought 246 laws in Bosnia.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ "Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina," accessed March 20, 2012, <http://www.ohr.int/>.

⁸⁸ Tim Banning, "The 'Bonn Powers' of the High Representative in Bosnia Herzegovina: Tracing a Legal Figment," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, August 16, 2015), <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2860899>.

⁸⁹ Banning, 267.

⁹⁰ "BRITANSKI BULDOZER U BOSNI," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, accessed May 5, 2020, <https://iwpr.net/sr/global-voices/britanski-buldozer-u-bosni>.

Subsection: NATO-Led Missions

IFOR was a military mission initially designed to take a more assertive approach to peace enforcement than UNPROFOR. The planning for the deployment of IFOR started as early as October 1995 by the NATO Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).⁹¹ The actual deployment, after a small delay, started on December 16, 1995, and it was based on UNSC Resolution 1031 and Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 1a.⁹²

When IFOR took over, some forces who had been part of UNPROFOR simply changed their shoulder patches and their helmet linings, and the number of military personnel peaked to 55,000 from 35 nations.⁹³ After the deployment of IFOR, its mission was divided into two phases. In phase one, the local HVO, BiH and VRS forces – or Formerly Warring Factions (FWFs) - had 30 days to withdraw their forces, create a buffer zone, and disarm and disband all armed paramilitary and civilian groups. Also, the FWFs had to withdraw two kilometers from the borders. In phase two, the FWFs had 90 days to park their heavy weapons in designated areas and 120 days to store all weapons with a caliber of over 20 millimeters and move their forces to their designated barracks. During the process, the timeline was extended for 60 days because the initial plans were deemed too ambitious, so the final stage was 180 days after the deployment of international forces.

⁹¹ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 70.

⁹² "Dayton Peace Agreement," accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.osce.org/bih/126173>; "Security Council Resolution 1031 - UNSCR," accessed April 22, 2020, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1031>.

⁹³ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 79.

Bosnia was divided into three sectors with oversight by the international community: the United States in Multinational Division-North (MND-N), the United Kingdom in the southwest (MND-SW), and France in the southeast (MND-SE). (See Figure 1.)

IFOR also conducted announced and unannounced inspections of weapon depots. One of the novelties of IFOR was that it had, as a part of its mandate, an order to arrest anyone who was accused of crimes, although the arrests were mainly carried out by the International Police Task Force (IPTF), supported by IFOR.




Figure 1 IFOR Deployment, December 1995

Under IFOR, reconstruction began, and, at the time, IFOR battalion commander LTC Cuculo considered himself as a “quasi-mediator” between his unit, the local police, NGOs, politicians, and others, which was the first instance of CIMIC in PSO.⁹⁴ Also, IFOR was much better than UNPROFOR at winning the hearts and minds of the local population as well as the local political elites.

Furthermore, US elements of the mission, based on previous and negative experiences in Somalia, deeply followed force protection measures. US forces could not leave the base with fewer than four vehicles, and all personnel had to wear flak jackets, helmets, and rifles.

“US troops wear helmets and body armor—hence their nickname, “ninja turtles.” They travel in convoys with guns manned and ready. When they stop, they disperse to over watch positions, ready to apply defensive force. At night most retire to fortified camps or outposts as Romans did on campaigns, cut off from the people they came to protect.” – LTC Richard R. Caniglia, US Army.⁹⁵

On the other hand, British, French, Dutch, Canadian, and Scandinavian troops replaced the hard cover with a soft one,⁹⁶ and while, at least not initially, they did not abandon their rifles, they carried them on their shoulders or on their backs rather than in their arms.

After establishing relative peace, less than a year after IFOR’s deployment, the goal of IFOR was to help with the local elections in 1996. Bosnian Serb wartime president Radovan Karadzic was forbidden to participate as a candidate, since he had

⁹⁴ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 101.

⁹⁵ Richard R. Caniglia, “US and British Approaches to Force Protection,” *Military Review* 81, no. 4 (August 7, 2001): 73.

⁹⁶ In the armed forces, a hard cover is a helmet, while a soft cover is any type of cap, beret, etc.

been indicted for war crimes, and there was a hope that a more moderate candidate might be elected. His party, however, was permitted to participate, as were other parties that were in power during the conflict, which engendered anger among the people. Ultimately, each group voted for its nationalist parties in each of its entities, and the three winning candidates – one from each ethnic group – formed the tri-presidency. After the war, as part of the Dayton Agreement, three entities were created. One was the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Croats and Bosniaks constituted a majority, among whom the Bosniaks were the most numerous. The other entity was the Republika Srpska, with a Serb majority. The last area that was established was Brcko District, which was autonomous from both Republika Srpska and the Federation. Brcko was a post-war disputed area by all three sides, but it does not belong to anyone.⁹⁷ Some argue that the present organization of Bosnia, with its three main ethnic groups, is just a micro Yugoslavia. While Bosnia is divided into two entities and one district, the Federation is divided into 10 cantons and further divided into municipalities, while the Republika Srpska is only divided into municipalities.⁹⁸ Each of the cantons has its own government led by a Prime Minister and his/her deputy and other ministries. Many argue that this organization has led to a bloated bureaucracy throughout the country; for example, there are 13 Ministers of Health in Bosnia: one in each of the 10 cantons, one in each entity, and one at the state level. When it comes to voting for the BiH presidency,

⁹⁷ Peter Geoghegan, "Welcome to Brčko, Europe's Only Free City and a Law unto Itself," *The Guardian*, May 14, 2014, sec. Cities, <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/may/14/brcko-bosnia-europe-only-free-city>.

⁹⁸ Fran Markowitz, *Sarajevo: A Bosnian Kaleidoscope*, Interpretations of Culture in the New Millennium (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 82.

residents of the RS are permitted to vote only for the RS representative, who can only be a Serb. Residents of the Federation may vote for either the Bosniak or the Croat representative, and the candidate must come from the Federation. Therefore, a Serb living in the Federation cannot vote for the Serb representative of the presidency and cannot run for the presidency herself.

This restriction also applies to all other minorities, such as Roma and Jews, who also may not run for president. That was one of the reasons for a lawsuit against Bosnia by Sejdic and Finci,⁹⁹ which despite a legal ruling in their favor by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, did not lead to any changes in Bosnia. At that time, the local Serbs harbored enormous animosity toward the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action, which was in power during the war, considering its leadership liars and war profiteers.¹⁰⁰

In the elections of 1996, IFOR again had a support role, and OSCE was responsible for securing ballot boxes and ensuring free and fair elections.¹⁰¹ Unfortunately, the results were disappointing to the whole international community; in two of the three ethnic groups, the winners came from the nationalist parties that led the

⁹⁹ "Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina," accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.justiceinitiative.org/litigation/sejdic-and-finci-v-bosnia-and-herzegovina>.

¹⁰⁰ Timothy Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia* (London, UNITED STATES: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), chap. 6, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gmu/detail.action?docID=238729>; Boris Divjak and Michael Pugh, "The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3 (June 1, 2008): 373–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802058927>; Peter Andreas, "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (March 2004): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00290.x>.

¹⁰¹ "General Elections, 14 September 1996 | OSCE," accessed April 14, 2020, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/bih/111430>.

country into the war in the first place. This was a clear example that one year after a conflict was insufficient for elections to take place, but IFOR only had a one-year mandate. Later, in Iraq, that timeline was almost two years, and in Afghanistan, it was three years.

After the elections, the ARRC decided to update the mandate and extend the mission, changing it to SFOR and transforming PSO from peace enforcing to peace building, even though, on the ground, it was still considered a peace-enforcing entity.

SFOR

UNSC Resolution 1088 on December 12, 1996, extended the NATO mission in Bosnia and transformed IFOR into SFOR. The mandate also slightly changed, even though the previous and current mandates came under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.¹⁰² The biggest change was the shift in focus from peace enforcing to peace building, since NATO assessed that there was some peace in Bosnia, albeit nowhere near a positive peace.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, SFOR significantly contributed to the disarming of the formerly warring parties, as well as the reduction of illegal weapons among the civilian population, especially through Operation Harvest and, later, Project Harvest. It is estimated that over 20,000 small arms and light weapons were collected and destroyed, including over 7,500,000 rounds of ammunition.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² "Security Council Resolution 1088 - UNSCR," accessed April 15, 2020, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1088>.

¹⁰³ Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research."

¹⁰⁴ Jennifer Perry, "Small Arms and Light Weapons Disarmament Programs: Challenges, Utility, and Lessons Learned," 2004, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA457802>.

SFOR's mission¹⁰⁵ had three components:

- 1) To deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace;
- 2) To promote a climate in which the peace process could continue to move forward;
and
- 3) To provide selective support to civilian organizations within its capabilities.

Due to a positive trend in levels of violence and general if sometimes begrudging compliance with Western norms, the number of troops in SFOR initially was reduced to 32,000 and, eventually, to approximately 12,000. The forces came from 18 NATO member states, 15 non-member countries including New Zealand, and Australia, which had a special agreement with NATO. Interestingly, Slovenia, a former Yugoslav republic, participated in SFOR as a non- member country.¹⁰⁶

As part of peacebuilding, CIMIC was introduced into SFOR's purview as its focus shifted from military to civilian issues. The initial definition of CIMIC was "the means by which the military command establishes formal relations with national and local authorities, the civilian population, international organisations and non-governmental organisations within its Area of Responsibility."¹⁰⁷ Over time, the definition was updated, and the NATO CIMIC Doctrine defines it as "the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international,

¹⁰⁵ "SFOR Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina," accessed April 15, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ "SFOR Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

¹⁰⁷ "CIMIC Introduction," accessed June 5, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic/introduction/cimic.htm>.

national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”¹⁰⁸ In 2019, NATO released a new definition: “a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.”¹⁰⁹ In 1997, NATO indefinitely extended SFOR’s mission, originally 18 months.¹¹⁰ By 1999, most of the nations lowered the force protection requirement to a soft cover and no flak jackets, as well as relying on foot patrols rather than armored vehicles, reflecting an assessment that the immediate danger to NATO personnel had decreased. This new routine occasionally changed to a more serious posture depending on situation within or outside the country. For example, when the United States fired cruise missiles into Afghanistan in 1998 to attack Al Qaeda, the level of protection of US soldiers in Bosnia returned to flak jackets and helmets.¹¹¹

During SFOR, NATO applied more active psychological operations (PSYOPS) and information operations. These efforts ranged from sharing pamphlets at local markets to broadcasting music on its own radio station, Mir (Peace), with messages of peace and land mine awareness notifications. SFOR began to implement the concept of CIMIC, with almost every nation implementing it in its own way. A new concept was introduced – a Liaison Observation Team (LOT), which was a predecessor of Provincial

¹⁰⁸ “AJP 9 Nato Civil Military Cooperation Cimic Doctrine,” accessed May 26, 2012, <http://kecubung.webfactional.com/ebook/ajp-9-nato-civil-military-co-operation-cimic-doctrine.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ “AJP 3.19 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation,” November 2018, <https://www.handbook.cimic-coe.org/8.-annex/reference-docs/ajp-3.19-eda-v1-e.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 124.

¹¹¹ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 139.

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were successfully used later in Afghanistan and Iraq. LOTs and PRTs were interagency groups of subject matter experts focused on economic development, political institution building and security. Nations such as the United Kingdom regarded the LOT as an important aspect of their efforts, probably because of their experience with peacekeeping in Northern Ireland.¹¹²

“Trained to kill in combat, tactical commanders now had to practice the art of street diplomacy and a graduated escalation in the use of force according to strict rules of engagement.”¹¹³

Subsection: European Union-Led Missions

EUFOR and EUPM

The transition from SFOR to EUFOR took place in December 2004, under UNSC Resolution 1551. Prior to that, the EU decided to take over from NATO based on a decision by the Council of the European Union on November 25, 2004. According to Javier Solana, who was then the High Representative in Bosnia, “For the first day, we, the EU, take a major responsibility in a peacekeeping operation,” and it was an “important day” for the European Union and a “moving day” for the people of Bosnia.¹¹⁴ The EUFOR mission was the first long-term mission run by the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as part of the EU.

¹¹² Cornelius Friesendorf and Susan E. Penksa, “Militarized Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 5 (November 1, 2008): 686, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802396277>; Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 193.

¹¹³ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 126.

¹¹⁴ “NATO Speech: Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the EU High Representative Javier Solana at the SFOR Transfer of Authority Ceremony - 2 December 2004,” accessed April 21, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s041202d.htm>.

The initial EUFOR comprised three Multinational Task Forces in the Bosnian cities of Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Sarajevo with 1,600-1,800 troops each, as well as 44 LOT houses. Eventually, the number of LOTs reduced to 29, and the Multinational Task Forces were reorganized into a Multinational Maneuver Battalion located in Sarajevo with fewer than 2,000 troops.¹¹⁵ In 2007, the number of forces was further reduced to 1,600, and again in 2012 to 600, which is the current figure.¹¹⁶

The EUFOR mission had a budget of 14 million euros, a small fraction of the CSDP's annual budget of 327 million euros. The mission budget was significantly lower than that of IFOR, which had billions of dollars.¹¹⁷ Correspondingly, this mission transitioned from peace building to peacekeeping, since there was now some peace to keep.¹¹⁸ The mission of EUFOR is to be "new and distinct,"¹¹⁹ as Javier Solana told the then-EUFOR Commander, General David Leakey, who, in turn, said:

"Eager to satisfy this key military task, I looked in the High Representative's Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) for areas in which EUFOR's military capability could give 'support', as ordered. The MIP was in four sections, dealing respectively with: the economy, the rule of law, the police, and defense reform. The first two seemed unlikely areas for military engagement. The police section seemed to be more properly a concern of the EU Police Mission. Finally, assisting the defense reform process was the main role reserved for the small residual NATO presence in [Bosnia]. So how could EUFOR appropriately give its military 'support' to the MIP?

¹¹⁵ Sigrí Ünsal, Caforio Giuseppe, and Basar Ufuk, "Do Peacekeepers' Soft Skills Matter? The Case of EUFOR Operation Althea," *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 5, no. 2 (2014): 47–56.

¹¹⁶ "European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - ABOUT EUFOR," accessed April 22, 2020, <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor>.

¹¹⁷ "European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - EUFOR Fact Sheet," accessed April 22, 2020, <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/84-about-eufor/1798-fact-sheet>.

¹¹⁸ Julie Kim, "Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping," 2006, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA464684>.

¹¹⁹ Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer, "Securing Europe?: Implementing the European Security Strategy" (ETH Zurich, 2006), 59, <https://doi.org/10.3929/ETHZ-A-005269287>.

In other words, how could EUFOR be ‘new and distinct’ and ‘make a difference’?¹²⁰

EUFOR made a significant improvement in the area of demining. The mission organized multiple tools for combating land mines, from mine awareness and training to demining projects.¹²¹ According to EUFOR’s Mine Information Coordination Cell (MICC), over 20,000 civilians went through the program, but every year, most victims of these silent predators were civilians. The chart shows some improvement, since the number of victims has reduced almost every year. The victims are usually either men stealing timber or children playing.

Table 1 Mine Casualties in BiH¹²²

Casualties	Killed	Injured
2008	34	30
2009	9	19
2010	6	8
2011	9	14
2012	9	3
2013	3	10

¹²⁰ Deighton and Mauer, 61.

¹²¹ GICHD, “Mid-Term Review of the UNDP Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP),” *Center for International Stabilization And Recovery*, Summer 2007, 67; Christoph Frehsee, “Humanitarian Mine Clearance in the Balkans,” *The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction* 11, no. 1 (January 26, 2016), <https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol11/iss1/46>.

¹²² Taken from MICC, EUFOR website

2014	6	11
2015	1	0
2016	6	6
2017	3	4
2018	1	3
2019	2	3




Figure 2 Mine Casualties in BiH¹²³

¹²³ "European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Mines Information Coordination Cell (MICC)," accessed April 22, 2020, <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/micc>.

By 2019, over 3,000 square kilometers were cleared of land mines, but there are still about 1,000 square kilometers of suspected minefields.¹²⁴ Since 1996, 673 people have died and 1,769 have been injured in land mine incidents.¹²⁵

Section Three: Comparison between UN and NATO/EU Missions

Despite the successes in preventing a resumption of conflict, the missions during the war and post-war period in Bosnia shared some negative trends. For example, the politicians who pushed the country into war continued to lead after the war. During the war, some claim that the members of the three main political parties were criminals who used the war for illegal activities.¹²⁶ After the war, these leaders expanded these activities to the whole country, making crime even more organized. It became a common thread of wisdom that organized crime in Bosnia was the best-organized agency, more organized than any government entity. Numerous authors such as Andreas, Pugh and Divjak, and Donais stated that these leaders were directly and indirectly supported by international elements, both military and civilians, who had the mission to help ordinary people.¹²⁷

The UN mission cost the EU some \$2.4 billion from 1991 to 1994, while the NATO mission cost approximately \$3 billion annually. For the United States Department

¹²⁴ "Wartime Landmines Still Taking Lives in Bosnia," *Balkan Insight* (blog), September 2, 2019, <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/09/02/wartime-landmines-still-taking-lives-in-bosnia/>.

¹²⁵ "Wartime Landmines Still Taking Lives in Bosnia."

¹²⁶ Peter Andreas, *Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo*, 1st edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 28.

¹²⁷ Andreas, chap. 6; Divjak and Pugh, "The Political Economy of Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina"; Donais, *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*; Andreas, "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia."

of Defense, the cost was \$2.23 billion for 1996 and \$2.09 billion for 1997.¹²⁸ In both NATO and EU missions, each participating country was responsible for the cost of its own troops. One key difference between the NATO and EU missions was that the United States participated in IFOR and SFOR, and EU international forces are not restricted by narrowly-written rules of engagement as they were under the UN mission from 1991 to 1994.¹²⁹

What all missions have in common is an extremely low level of casualties among mission personnel. For example, from 1992 to 2019, 59 British soldiers died in Bosnia¹³⁰, mainly because of bad road conditions in the winter, land mines, or involuntary weapon discharges.¹³¹ Except for some rioting and destruction of property, the locals did not harm any of the international forces.

The mission significantly changed for every phase of the overall peace operation. While all missions were based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only NATO and the EU were ready to use weapons if needed. IFOR focused more on the separation of warring parties, while SFOR focused on cooperation and assistance to civilians, including arresting those accused of war crimes. EUFOR continued SFOR's tradition but was more engaged in training security forces and helping combat illegal activities, such as unlawful logging. Another important difference was that, under UNPROFOR, IFOR, and SFOR,

¹²⁸ Frank H. Columbus, ed., *Central and Eastern Europe in Transition. Vol. 3: ...* (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publ, 1999), 212.

¹²⁹ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia*, 2004, 95.

¹³⁰ "Bosnia | National Army Museum," accessed June 5, 2020, <https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/bosnia>.

¹³¹ "Bosnia | National Army Museum," accessed April 22, 2020, <https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/bosnia>; Chris Hedges, "Bosnia Land Mine Kills U.s. Soldier," *The New York Times*, February 4, 1996, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/04/world/bosnia-land-mine-kills-us-soldier.html>.

little attention was paid to prostitution and human trafficking. Unfortunately, some international forces even availed themselves of those industries. In the early 2000s, EUFOR clamped down by putting pressure on the local legal and court systems to rein in these illegal activities. The number of brothels significantly reduced, but human trafficking remained a problem. Additionally, the UN mission, because of its limited mandate, was not able to collect illegal weapons – a key activity under IFOR and SFOR.

Section Four: Outcome of the Missions

Overall, the outcome of these missions can be assessed as a success because they prevented the formerly warring parties from reengaging in full-scale violence. These missions also made significant progress in repatriating internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, even though many of them still have not returned to their former homes and many may not want to go back, since they have created a new life for themselves. Additionally, large parts of the country have been demined, but there is still more to be done, and unfortunately those mines still claim the lives of innocent people. A lot of work on reorganizing, training, and educating the security sector has been handed over to the local forces, with occasional augmentation from NATO and EU, such as in cases of a pandemic outbreak or natural catastrophe. For example, the EU provided significant aid to Bosnia to assist with managing the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in Bosnia.¹³²

¹³² “EU Mulls 57 Mln Euro Assistance to Bosnia to Tackle COVID-19 Crisis,” accessed May 4, 2020, <http://seenews.com/news/eu-mulls-57-mln-euro-assistance-to-bosnia-to-tackle-covid-19-crisis-692160>; EWB, “The EU Will Maintain Its Commitment to BiH during COVID-19 Crisis,” *European Western Balkans*

However, no international mission has succeeded in uniting Bosnian society, and Bosnia is still a deeply divided country with two entities and three predominant ethnic groups. Corruption is widespread and generally accepted at every level of society, most visibly among politicians. Politics are a tool for division between the parties, and many decisions are stymied by political leaders' inability or unwillingness to cooperate, especially if one party assumes that a decision could benefit another ethnic group. The government apparatus is bloated and slow, which further impedes decision-making in the government and has slowed the recovery of the devastated Bosnian economy.

The EU mission is still present almost a decade and the half after the war. The key change is that only a fraction of forces remains, and they are more integrated with the local population than were the forces in any of EUFOR's predecessors. EUFOR's mandate since its inception has shifted from peace building through separating warring parties, to peacekeeping through improving local capacities.

Section Five: CIMIC in NATO

In the NATO context, effective CIMIC centers on the Alliance's efforts to coordinate the work of NATO and sometimes non-NATO military forces with "national and local governments as well as both International Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)."ⁱ Bosnia is perhaps illustrative in that regard. As

(blog), April 7, 2020, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/04/07/the-eu-will-maintain-its-commitment-to-bih-during-covid-19-crisis/>; EWB, "EU to Assist BiH with Provision of Medical Equipment and Mitigation of the COVID-19 Impact on the Economy," *European Western Balkans* (blog), March 24, 2020, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/03/24/eu-to-assist-bih-with-provision-of-medical-equipment-and-mitigation-of-the-covid-19-impact-on-the-economy/>.

retired Supreme Allied Commander Europe General George Joulwan noted,¹³³ CIMIC in Bosnia got off to a slow start, and there were many gaps and seams in and among the various intervention actors. But Bosnia has been at peace for 20 years, going from one of the worst humanitarian disasters and massacres in the second half of the twentieth century to a nation on the fringes of joining NATO and the European Union. NATO handed its mission in Bosnia over to the EU after 12 years, but in reality, the units just changed their shoulder patches from NATO's SFOR to EUFOR, which remains in place today.¹³⁴ The progress that Bosnia has made towards a stable market economy and a representational form of government has been due, in no small measure, to the success of CIMIC and the integration of military and civilian programs throughout the past generation. To be sure, Bosnia continues to confront a wide range of challenges. But, as this study illustrates based on the literature and participants' comments, CIMIC has worked in Bosnia and can serve as an analytical and policy model in a wide range of post-war environments. When CIMIC succeeds, the results are security, justice, and well-being for entire populations.

To be sure, CIMIC and PSO are not limited to NATO. Indeed, the United Nations is perhaps the world's largest manager of PSO. Examples include the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),¹³⁵ which has been

¹³³ George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, *Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention of Deadly Conflict* (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998).

¹³⁴ "European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Mission Background," accessed September 4, 2016, <http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor/background>.

¹³⁵ "United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara," accessed March 31, 2017, <https://minurso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9533&language=en-US>.

in place since 1991, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)¹³⁶ since 2004, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)¹³⁷ since 1948, and the United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL)¹³⁸ since 2011. At present, the two largest UN missions are the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)¹³⁹ and United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).¹⁴⁰ The UN is currently conducting 15 peacekeeping missions,¹⁴¹ and other organizations as well as individual countries engage in at least as many.¹⁴²

Although all types of missions, whether led by NATO or not, are worthy of in-depth research, this study focuses on NATO-led CIMIC in PSO. Moreover, the scope of this research encompasses a representative sample of NATO PSO, examining CIMIC at the working level, between the civilian and military operators “on the ground” in a

¹³⁶ “United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),” accessed March 31, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/>.

¹³⁷ “All NGOs in Cyprus,” accessed March 31, 2017, <http://www.ngosincyprus.org/All-NGOs/>; “UNFICYP,” UNFICYP, accessed March 31, 2017, <https://unficy.unmissions.org/>.

¹³⁸ “United Nations Support Mission for Libya,” accessed March 31, 2017, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3544&language=en-US>.

¹³⁹ “MONUSCO,” Tableau Software, accessed November 15, 2017, https://public.tableau.com/views/MONUSCO/MONUSCO?:embed=y&:showVizHome=no&:host_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.tableau.com%2F&:embed_code_version=2&:tabs=no&:toolbar=no&:animate_transition=yes&:display_static_image=no&:display_spinner=no&:display_overlay=yes&:display_count=yes&publish=yes&:loadOrderID=0.

¹⁴⁰ “UNMISS,” Tableau Software, accessed November 15, 2017, https://public.tableau.com/views/UNMISS/UNMISS?:embed=y&:showVizHome=no&:host_url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublic.tableau.com%2F&:embed_code_version=2&:tabs=no&:toolbar=no&:animate_transition=yes&:display_static_image=no&:display_spinner=no&:display_overlay=yes&:display_count=yes&publish=yes&:loadOrderID=0.

¹⁴¹ “Where We Operate | United Nations Peacekeeping,” accessed November 15, 2017, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>.

¹⁴² “Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands,” accessed April 28, 2016, <http://www.ramsi.org/>.

conflict or post-conflict area. From this sample, persuasive “lessons learned” and prescriptive recommendations can then be developed.

This study focuses on local-level and horizontal cooperation between NATO military forces and accredited humanitarian organizations that are working in the same area of operations. Within this framework, I examine: to what extent do civilian and military organizations cooperate in PSO, and what is the nature of their cooperation? If cooperation is less than needed to sustain peace, what might be done to improve cooperation and thereby improve prospects for peacebuilding? Specifically, I look at the barriers to effective CIMIC, examine why cooperation between military forces and civilian organizations might be difficult to maintain, and suggest measures that can be taken in the future to improve NATO CIMIC and, more importantly, advance the cause of sustainable peace.

For example, CIMIC arguably fits into what Severine Autesserre calls “Peaceland”, a metaphorical world inhabited by both a transnational community of interveners for whom peace is the primary objective (e.g. peace forces) and those who advance a broader set of goals (e.g. development workers). Autesserre contends that the way in which conflict resolution practitioners interact with the host society, including their social practices and general understanding of their environment, deeply affects their success. In her view, international peacebuilders do not fully understand the conflicts they are trying to resolve because they do not include local leaders in decision making, do not speak the local language, and do not stay in the country long enough to implement

effective change.¹⁴³ This study explores this concept as one of the possible barriers to effective CIMIC.

My findings regarding NATO CIMIC in Bosnia have implications for the larger question of peacebuilding. On the surface, it is difficult to understand the failures of civil-military coordination in peacebuilding. After all, NATO as an organization constantly draws lessons from its shortcomings in other missions through a rigorous process of After-Action Review (AARs), imported from the United States. Moreover, NATO studies PSO in great detail. NATO has two centers—the NATO School Oberammergau in Germany and the CIMIC center of Excellence in Enschede, Holland—dealing with this issue, as well as national CIMIC centers in Germany, Bosnia, France, Turkey, the UK, the United States, and elsewhere. Yet, NATO still struggles with CIMIC, and that underscores how difficult it is to institutionalize sound doctrinal and training practices across the Alliance.

Section Six: Humanitarian Assistance Organizations

Modern HAOs do not just deliver humanitarian aid (providing food and water, shelter, medical assistance, etc.); they also advocate for the disenfranchised and minorities, provide legal assistance, promote human rights, and even engage in scientific projects. HAOs are usually divided into three main groups:¹⁴⁴ IOs, NGOs, and GOs.

¹⁴³ Séverine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 6.

¹⁴⁴ Hugo Slim, "The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 3, no. 3 (1996).

International organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are formed by intergovernmental agreements and operate at an international level. They can be part of umbrella organizations such as the UN, or they can be independent and recognized by other nations and organizations.¹⁴⁵

Non-governmental organizations such as CARE¹⁴⁶ usually operate outside the scope of any government. They are an element of civil society.¹⁴⁷ Even though NGOs can be the recipients of funds and grants from governments, they do not advocate a particular political stance for those governments. Their spectrum of activity generally includes providing humanitarian assistance, advocating for the disempowered, serving as human rights observers, and protecting indigenous animal life forms. NGOs usually fall into two categories: mandated (officially recognized by the lead international organization), or non-mandated (not recognized by an IO but can be sub-contracted by an IO or another mandated NGO).¹⁴⁸

Governmental organizations, such as the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), are designed to provide

¹⁴⁵ ICRC has an observation seat in the UN General Assembly.

¹⁴⁶ “CARE,” accessed March 11, 2013, <http://www.care.org/about/index.asp>.

¹⁴⁷ Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., “Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transitions,” in *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 182–210; Paul van Tongeren and European Centre for Conflict Prevention, eds., “Weaving the Web: Civil Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace,” in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*, A Project of the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (Boulder, Colo: L. Rienner Publishers, 2005).

¹⁴⁸ S. J. H. Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?* (Brill Academic Pub, 2008), http://www.amazon.com/Civil-Military-Cooperation-Response-Complex-Emergency/dp/9004163271/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1338064483&sr=1-5.

humanitarian assistance. Many, including scholars, see such organizations as *de facto* governmental organizations.

Section Seven: Military

The armed forces, composed of one or all three branches (air, land, and maritime) of one or more contributing countries, often intervene in crises with the authorization by the UN to implement the will of the international community. Another option is for the host country to request military assistance from another country or regional organization in a bilateral agreement.¹⁴⁹ Since the level and type of engagement varies depending on the situation in the mission area, forces are tailored to optimize the accomplishment of the mission.

To allow for a quick deployment to prevent a major violation of human rights and help people in need, some countries and organizations, including NATO, have created Rapid Reaction Forces.¹⁵⁰ The majority of those forces have logistical support from, or are attached to, the forces of a country that can provide support—usually through a Memorandum of Understanding and a Military Technical Agreement—so that they can operate autonomously for a certain period of time. After a successful mission, these forces return to their home countries, or they can be reinforced with additional elements if the mission becomes protracted. Since they are tailored to specific missions, they can perform a variety of tasks. However, since all UN and/or coalition forces are composed

¹⁴⁹ Rietjens.

¹⁵⁰ “NATO Response Force (NRF)” (NATO HQ, February 2013), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_02/20130220_130220-factsheet_nrf_en.pdf.

of personnel from many different nations, their size, capabilities, competence, and professionalism can vary. As Weiss and Collins said:

Less developed countries are less able to provide their troops with what is needed for a multinational peacekeeping operation, including appropriate clothing and equipment. In the middle of Croatia's winter, Pakistani troops arrived in summer uniforms. ... In Bihac, four Bangladeshi soldiers shared a single rifle.¹⁵¹

Section Eight: Host Nations

In response to complex emergencies, both military and humanitarian organizations operate in unfamiliar surroundings, often without the support of a functioning local government. Sometimes the whole government has collapsed and is non-existent, and sometimes it is hostile toward all or part of its own population, neighboring countries, or the whole region. Libya during Muammar Gaddafi's regime, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and Afghanistan under Taliban rule are key examples.

There are several key factors at play when considering the manner in which the military and HAOs interact with host governments and populations.¹⁵² First, cooperation is crucial for long term success in reviving a war-torn economy and establishing or reestablishing sustainable government. Post-conflict economies usually are either in complete shambles or hindered by instability, poor infrastructure, and a corrupt government. The government often is formed from the winning side, not representing all members of society, so minorities often are ignored. Nonetheless, host governments in

¹⁵¹ Thomas George Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000).

¹⁵² John Mackinlay, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (Brown University: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1996).

whatever form are ultimately responsible for the security, justice, and well-being of their people, so they need to be seen as serious actors by all participants in peace building and conflict resolution.¹⁵³

Second, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is often an important part of stability in the host country, and effective host country military forces can be important contributors to providing a secure environment in which HAOs can operate. Often, SSR requires Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) for the local military, paramilitary, and other armed forces, eventually allowing for the creation of modern and functional armed forces¹⁵⁴ that can take over as a guarantor of security when international forces eventually withdraw.

Third, the local population, including IDPs and refugees, often carries the most tragic personal burden in a complex emergency. The natural and humanitarian impulses of the international community are to provide immediate and significant aid to such people, particularly those in refugee camps. Such aid, however, needs to be accompanied by a resettlement and reintegration program that helps reduce long-term dependency on international aid. People in need should not only be seen as victims but must also be empowered to build up their own capabilities to feed, house, and clothe themselves.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Larry Minear and Thomas George Weiss, *Mercy under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

¹⁵⁴ Author of this Thesis was part of Building Integrity in Defense Establishment (BIDE), program created by NATO, UK Defense College and Amnesty International as a part of SSR development in Armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹⁵⁵ *The Do No Harm Handbook - The Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict* (Cambridge, USA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2004), <http://www.cdainc.com/dnh/docs/DoNoHarmHandbook.pdf>; D. Hilhorst and G. Frerks, "Local Capacities for Peace: Concepts, Possibilities and Constraints, Paper Presented at the Seminar" ('Local Capacities for Peace, Utrecht: Pax Christi, Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Disaster Studies Wageningen, 1999).

Households often develop their own way of operating in a crisis, as did the citizens of Sarajevo during the 1992-95 wartime siege, who developed intricate social connections. Aid should not damage those social connections but widen them through education. As one of the participants in this study stated:

How that changed, and how Korea got to where it is today ... the answer that anyone will give you about that is education, education, education. The sense that Afghan parents do not want education for their children is absolutely wrong. You think that any farmer in rural parts of Afghanistan does not want to educate his child? He absolutely wants to educate his son, and I think there are now three million girls in high school, and more and more it is accepted that “yes, there is value in educating the girls.”¹⁵⁶

Organizations, therefore, need to provide enough aid for basic existence, especially for IDPs and refugees, and at the same time provide help for society to function sustainably on its own. According to Ritchie, “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; show him how to catch a fish, and you feed him for a lifetime.”¹⁵⁷ Asif Sheikh, the former president of the International Resources Group, added “help him build a fishing industry, and he will feed the entire country.”

Section Nine: Media

Over the last few decades, the media have become an important factor in conflict, as well as disasters both man-made and natural. Media are especially vital for HAOs, which use the media to promote themselves and generate more donations for their programs. Also, media coverage of human suffering develops more interest within an

¹⁵⁶ Interview with NGO workers, 2013.

¹⁵⁷ Anne Isabella Ritchie, “Give a Man a Fish, and You Feed Him for a Day; Show Him How to Catch Fish, and You Feed Him for a Lifetime.,” 1880, <http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/give-a-man-a-fish.html>.

HAO toward a specific area; a refugee camp in Tanzania in 1994 and 1995 with almost no media coverage received only a fraction of HAO resources compared with Great Lakes areas Kigali and Goma, which received extensive media attention during the conflict in Rwanda.¹⁵⁸

Military actions are always on the media's radar. After the highly adversarial relationship between the US media and the US military during the Vietnam War, US military personnel decided that embedded journalism would help them win the hearts and minds of not only the local population, but their compatriots at home.¹⁵⁹ During the first Iraq war, the media crew followed only a handful of units, but today the practice has expanded. Its merits are debated, and the media are not always viewed as objective.¹⁶⁰ Nonetheless, the omnipresence of the media and the immediate global news cycle underscore the importance of a strategic communications program as an integral element of successful CIMIC operations.

Section Ten: CIMIC Definitions and References in Academic Literature

NATO Definition of CIMIC

NATO defines CIMIC as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population

¹⁵⁸ Pär Eriksson, “Civil-Military Co-Ordination in Peace Support Operations – An Impossible Necessity?,” September 14, 2000, <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1469>.

¹⁵⁹ Terence Smith, “Embedded Journalists in Iraq: War Stories | PBS NewsHour | April 1, 2003,” April 1, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june03/embeds_04-01.html.

¹⁶⁰ David Ignatius, “The Dangers of Embedded Journalism, in War and Politics,” *The Washington Post*, May 2, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/30/AR2010043001100.html>.

and local authorities, as well as international, national, and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”¹⁶¹

UN Definition of CIMIC

The UN refers to Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.”¹⁶²

EU Definition of CIMIC

According to the EU, “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”¹⁶³

US Model of CIMIC

The United States declares that CIMIC includes “those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces

¹⁶¹ “AJP 9 Nato Civil Military Cooperation Cemic Doctrine,” accessed May 26, 2012, <http://kecubung.webfactional.com/ebook/ajp-9-nato-civil-military-co-operation-cimic-doctrine.pdf>; *CIMIC Field Handbook* (Enschede, Netherlands: Civil – Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, n.d.), <http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/cfh/cimic-handbook.pdf>.

¹⁶² UN OCHA, *Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook*, E 1.0 (United Nations, 2007).

¹⁶³ European Union Military Staff, *EU Concept for Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) for EU-Led Military Operations* (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2008).

and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) and Civil Military Operations (CMO).¹⁶⁴

One Academic Definition of CIMIC

According to Volker Franke:

“Cooperation between the civilian and military elements involves integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human need. At the outset, civilian and military actors share the long-term goal of promoting human security and developing the conditions for societies marked by conflict to transition back to peaceful and stable structures. Initially, civil-military relationships were formed in the field, when troops stepped in to fill gaps in civilian capabilities. In response to the growing complexity of operational requirements, states are increasingly recognizing the intensifying working relationship between military and civilian actors and are now developing their own doctrines specifying the nature of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).”¹⁶⁵

Although the concept of CIMIC is almost as old as military warfare, academic research on the topic is relatively recent and, therefore, modest. The academic literature on CIMIC is limited to a few books, dissertations, and theses, as well as a significant number of reports, anecdotes and individual papers.¹⁶⁶ Yet CIMIC feeds into

¹⁶⁴ *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures - FM 3-05.401* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003); *Civil Affairs Operations - FM 3-05.40* (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 2006).

¹⁶⁵ Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2006), http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf.

¹⁶⁶ Robert M Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him ?* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

frameworks of peacebuilding such as those outlined by Diamond and McDonald, who suggest that the path to sustainable peace is woven with interconnecting “tracks” that incorporate both government—including military—and non-government civilian components.¹⁶⁷ As CIMIC is widely acknowledged as a vital tool in conflict resolution, it warrants comprehensive research with a methodology that can capture the essence of the problems CIMIC faces and suggest sustainable solutions. The first steps of contemporary CIMIC started in Bosnia in 1997, when then-High Representative Carl Bildt required assistance from NATO forces in dealing with civilian issues. At the time, the military did not focus on such issues except to collect data; the hope was that OHR would deal with civilian issues. As Baumann et al. said:

Many IFOR officers apparently presumed that the OHR would operate as a parallel headquarters for civil implementation. At the same time, lacking even a common NATO doctrine, the different national contingents had yet to arrive at a shared definition of civil affairs operations. However, with the theater calm by D+120 and military objectives largely fulfilled, the ARRC and HQ IFOR looked to press ahead with civil progress.¹⁶⁸

And while certain countries were not interested in CIMIC,¹⁶⁹ British and Canadian forces relied heavily on it from the start. Both nations also included their International Development Agencies for funding projects in local communities in Bosnia. According to Baumann et al., “This support included a modest allowance for each battle

¹⁶⁷ James Notter and Louise Diamond, “Occasional Paper: Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice” (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, October 1996), <http://www.imtd.org/publications/occasional-papers/building-peace-and-transforming-conflict-multi-track-diplomacy-in-practice/>.

¹⁶⁸ Robert F. Baumann, George Walter Gawrych, and Walter Edward Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia* (DIANE Publishing, 2004), 192.

¹⁶⁹ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 193.

group to undertake simple projects such as purchasing soccer balls for local schools and so forth.”¹⁷⁰

Much of the literature on CIMIC and PSO recognizes that PSO has yet to evolve, since the nature of warfare itself is dynamic. This literature fits into the debate surrounding the liberal democratic model of peacebuilding; in one view, liberal democracy is a reasonable goal, but the process of reaching it needs to be revisited. Older ideas of conducting peacebuilding through “slow democratization”—which focuses on building a society, even if it is run by a “benevolent dictator,” before introducing democratization through elections¹⁷¹—or “democratization first,” which makes conducting fair elections the first priority and then building a society afterward, have, in the past, led to failures or limited successes. UN missions that mainly focus on the process of elections with limited DDR or on the development of enduring political institutions quite often just put a Band-Aid on the overall underlying issues,¹⁷² which leads to a protracted social conflict¹⁷³ and a resumption of war. Critics of liberal peacebuilding, such as Campbell, Chandler, and Shabaratanam,¹⁷⁴ as well as MacGinty

¹⁷⁰ Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik, 193.

¹⁷¹ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, “Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding,” *IPI - International Peace Institute* (blog), accessed July 13, 2015, <http://www.ipinst.org/2007/11/managing-contradictions-the-inherent-dilemmas-of-postwar-statebuilding>.

¹⁷² Roland Paris, ed., “Critiques of Liberal Peace,” in *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed Books, 2011), 34.

¹⁷³ Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* (Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Brookfield, Vt., USA: Dartmouth ; Gower Pub. Co, 1990).

¹⁷⁴ Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratanam, eds., *A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding* (London: Zed Books, 2011).

and Richmond,¹⁷⁵ contend that the liberal democratic model has a strong Western bias and does not address the needs and requirements of the locals.

The US Army, as a part of NATO, came up with the doctrine of “three block war,” which suggested that military forces, particularly at the small-unit level, conduct three activities: combat operations – dealing with insurgents, peacekeeping – patrolling, and humanitarian work – providing humanitarian assistance to the local population. They conduct these activities at the same time, but in different parts of the conflict area.¹⁷⁶ In 2005, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signed DOD Directive 3000.05, which stated that stability operations would be a core military mission.¹⁷⁷ Indeed, most democratic countries, including relatively new democracies such as Bosnia, list peace operations as one of the three core tasks of their armed forces.¹⁷⁸

However, in a post-conflict area, humanitarian and diplomatic organizations operate in the same space with the military, sometimes doing similar jobs. Aiding the local population thus becomes exhaustingly complex without CIMIC, especially when HAOs originate from a nation that the local people consider controversial or when

¹⁷⁵ Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P Richmond, “The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace” 34 (June 2013): 763–83, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750>; Oliver P. Richmond, “The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace,’” *Conflict, Security & Development* 6, no. 3 (October 2006): 291–314, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600933480>; Oliver P. Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, “Where Now for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 2 (June 1, 2015): 171–89, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836714545691>.

¹⁷⁶ Max Boot, “Beyond the 3-Block War,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/beyond-3-block-war/p10204>.

¹⁷⁷ “DoD Directive 3000.05 STABILIZATION - Default,” accessed April 23, 2020, <http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/resources/pksoi-publications/articles/dod-directive-3000-05-stabilization/>.

¹⁷⁸ MOD, “AF BiH until 2015” (MOD BiH, n.d.), 23, <http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/1809-Engleski%20jezik%20.pdf>.

animosity exists between the military and civilian organizations. One of the consequences of the lack of effective CIMIC is the duplication of aid or providing aid to a region where it is not needed and depriving another area where the aid is crucial.¹⁷⁹ Lack of cooperation can prolong the misery of a post-conflict area and slow its recovery and sustainable development. As John Burton noted, not addressing Basic Human Needs can lead to a protracted conflict or deeper complex emergency in an area of operation.¹⁸⁰ These studies seem to suggest that deeper coordination between civilian and military actors would result in greater CIMIC success.

Section Eleven: Civil-Military Cooperation as a Concept

As has been evident in past NATO missions, the military—in addition to providing forces to stop a conflict—is often responsible for security in a post-conflict area as the peacebuilding process unfolds and building a sustainable political and economic infrastructure that can provide for lasting peace gathers momentum¹⁸¹ Most activities conducted by the military that are connected with CIMIC take place in the context of PSO, although CIMIC can also be conducted in a country that is not enmeshed

¹⁷⁹ J. Seipel and Graham Heaslip, “The Impossible Interface? Combining Humanitarian Logistics and Military Supply Chain Capabilities,” *Humanitarian Logistics: Meeting the Challenge of Preparing for and Responding to Disasters*, 2014, <https://harisportal.hanken.fi/en/publications/the-impossible-interface-combining-humanitarian-logistics-and-mil>; Catriona Gourlay, “Partners Apart: Managing Civil-Military Co-Operation in Humanitarian Interventions,” *Disarmament Forum*, 2000, 33–44.

¹⁸⁰ John W. Burton, “Needs Theory,” in *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and Their Prevention*, Political Analyses (Manchester ; New York : New York: Manchester University Press ; Distributed exclusively in the USA by St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

¹⁸¹ James Notter and Louise Diamond, “Occasional Paper: Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice” (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, October 1996), <http://www.imtd.org/index.php/publications/papers-and-articles/81-publications/144-occasional-paper-building-peace-and-transforming-conflict-multi-track-diplomacy-in-practice>.

in conflict but is recovering from a natural catastrophe.¹⁸² There is no universally accepted list of assignments by the military in humanitarian activities, but they can generally be divided into three categories: security, assistance to HAOs, and direct aid to people in need.

Some HAOs that are based in or supported by certain countries, especially in the West, are immediately seen by the host nation or violent rebel or terrorist groups as biased even if they are not.¹⁸³ These perceptions are often culturally based. HAOs are sometimes perceived as neo-colonial forces, replacing missionaries who spread religion in the name of King and country throughout the European imperial era. Moreover, the policies and practices adopted by HAOs – particularly those related to a devolution of existing centers of power – are often viewed by indigenous actors as infringing on their prerogatives and threatening their bases of economic, political, or military power.

Therefore, HAOs are not inviolate and have been attacked on numerous occasions. As Duffield notes, some level of military suppression of the agents of local violence is necessary so that development can follow behind and take root.¹⁸⁴ HAOs have learned, sometimes the hard way, that they must have security if they are to

¹⁸² Jean- Loup Samaan and Laurent Verneuil, "Civil–Military Relations in Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study on Crisis Management in Natural Disaster Response," in : *Enhancing Transatlantic Governance on Disaster Relief and Preparedness*, 2009.

¹⁸³ Abby Stoddard, "With Us or against Us? NGO Neutrality on the Line," *Humanitarian Practice Network*, December 2003, <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-25/with-us-or-against-us-ngo-neutrality-on-the-line>; Nadia Schadlow, "There Is No Neutral," March 16, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/16/there_is_no_neutral; Kenneth Anderson, "Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003–2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 17 (2004): 41–74.

¹⁸⁴ Mark R Duffield, *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007).

accomplish their humanitarian missions.¹⁸⁵ According to Pugh and Williams, the most important PSO task for the military is to provide security to the host nation and HAOs and to protect them from opposing military or paramilitary forces.¹⁸⁶ Michael Pugh stated that “experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and the Great Lakes have taught that civilian organizations cannot do their job effectively without military/police operations to provide security.”¹⁸⁷

Beyond security, military assistance to HAOs involves activities that support HAOs in their tasks, often focused on logistical and/or technical support such as heavy lifting, road transportation, and air transportation.¹⁸⁸ According to Bollen, “The civil-military alliance is essentially demand driven,”¹⁸⁹ which means that where there is demand for help, an alliance will form between two entities. Both sides require assistance from the other side. HAOs need security to be able to operate, while military units need HAOs to accomplish development work that the military itself is ill-prepared to do. In some instances, the composition of PSO is driven by political decisions taken far outside of the conflict area and for reasons that may have little to do within the efficacy of PSO on the ground. And that places a burden on the military. According to Rosa Brooks, “...many military personnel [in the first Gulf War] grew frustrated with the

¹⁸⁵ Anderson, “Humanitarian Inviolability in Crisis: The Meaning of Impartiality and Neutrality for U.N. and NGO Agencies Following the 2003–2004 Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts.”

¹⁸⁶ Garland H Williams, *Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005).

¹⁸⁷ Michael Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: Hegemony or Emancipation?” (London: ODI, 2001).

¹⁸⁸ Dick Zandee, *Building Blocks for Peace: Civil-Military Interaction in Restoring Fractured Societies* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 1998); Dick Zandee, “Civil-Military Interaction in Peace Operations,” *NATO HQ 47*, no. 1 (1999): 11–15; Williams, *Engineering Peace*.

¹⁸⁹ Myriame Bollen, “Working Apart Together” (2002).

humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in which they suddenly found themselves engaged.”¹⁹⁰

The role of the military in PSO has often been the source of philosophical and practical debate. Samuel Huntington, a respected professor at Harvard University and National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, wrote, “The mission of the Armed Forces is combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the United States. The military must be recruited, organized, trained, and equipped for that purpose alone. ... A military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: its purpose is to kill people in the most efficient way possible.”¹⁹¹ On the other hand, British army officer T. E. Lawrence in 1920 pointed out that “the printing press is greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander,”¹⁹² suggesting that winning the hearts and minds of the people was at least as important as inflicting casualties on the enemy. Some policymakers and military officers from the US Army have long advocated for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in military training.¹⁹³

However, the use of the military for these time-urgent requirements is not without its downsides; using the military for construction, for example, can alienate the local workforce, which often has a high unemployment rate in a post-conflict area. According to Volker Franke, “In Somalia, the U.S. military deployed its own engineers and support

¹⁹⁰ Rosa Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon*, First Simon&Schuster hardcover edition (New York London Toronto Sydney New Delhi: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 80.

¹⁹¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “New Contingencies, Old Roles - ProQuest,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 34 (Spring 2003): 6–11.

¹⁹² Sarah Sewall, John A. Nagl, and David H. Petraeus, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, Reprint ed. edition (Place of publication not identified: Echo Point Books & Media, 2015), 7.

¹⁹³ Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, 81.

troops to rebuild roads and other infrastructure at a time when Somalis desperately needed jobs.”¹⁹⁴ The UN mission in Somalia, where one might expect effective integration of military and civilian actors, nevertheless failed to provide quality support to people in need.

Finally, direct assistance from the military to people in need is necessary when there are no appropriate HAOs to provide aid. In some cases, the security situation is too unstable for HAOs to operate, so the military needs to do some of the standard work of the HAOs on top of its military duties. HAOs often balk at the military’s efforts to protect them and the local population, and some accuse the military of using them to achieve military or political goals.¹⁹⁵ Some assess that the military, by performing traditionally civilian tasks, is hiding behind basic humanitarian principles to further military goals, thereby hindering real humanitarian work.¹⁹⁶ As Rietjens stated, in some cases, even with numerous organizations in the area, there are gaps in cooperation due to poor organization or inadequate resources.¹⁹⁷ During any catastrophe, manmade or natural, resources are limited, and many organizations converge in the same areas.

Therefore, the managing organizations must know the capabilities of every organization involved in humanitarian assistance. For example, the World Food Program (WFP) is recognized as the leading HAO for eliminating hunger in the world. UNICEF is largely connected with vaccination of children in poor and undeveloped areas. The

¹⁹⁴ Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations.”

¹⁹⁵ Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.

¹⁹⁶ Rietjens.

¹⁹⁷ Rietjens.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) built its reputation in the area of helping refugees and IDPs.

These studies suggest that the involvement of every aspect of assistance to people in need makes PSO forces more effective and can shorten the time that the military and HAOs need to operate in the country. While there are often some benefits to long-term engagement from HAOs, in general, PSOs are most successful when they are of limited duration, particularly if they include the rudiments of long-term institution building.

Also, the level of involvement of external actors – in this case, HAOs – through the dilemmas that Paris and Sisk¹⁹⁸ outline, can affect the success of the mission. By incorporating the capabilities of all third parties, the duration and dependency dilemma may be minimized. Integrated and mutually reinforcing operations by all external actors can accelerate the transition from the conflict to negative peace and eventually some kind of positive peace, and resources can be used more transparently so that everyone will benefit equally and have the capability to develop self-sustaining institutions and infrastructure.¹⁹⁹

Subsection: The Need for CIMIC and Its Initial Challenges

One of the most important catch-phrases in conflict resolution and development can be borrowed from the medical profession: “First, do no harm.”²⁰⁰ Yet, as can be

¹⁹⁸ Paris and Sisk, “Managing Contradictions,” 5–7.

¹⁹⁹ Paris and Sisk, “Managing Contradictions.”

²⁰⁰ Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace--or War* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

seen in a wide array of conflicts, foreign intervention by both military and civilian organizations can paradoxically result in greater conflict and instability. This is particularly the case when the goals and objectives of an intervention are not clearly articulated, not broadly shared, or not realistically achievable by the intervening nations or international organizations based on the resources they are willing to commit.

Two examples demonstrate the hazards of poorly planned interventions: Libya in 2011 and Darfur, Sudan, from 2003 to 2007. In Libya, the United States and NATO committed significant military forces, primarily in the form of air power, with the initially limited goal of preventing the massacre of anti-Qaddafi rebels in Benghazi. As the operation progressed, the mission expanded to include, at least implicitly, regime change and driving Qaddafi from power. NATO was singularly successful in both of these objectives.²⁰¹ Yet, because of the time-limited and narrowly focused set of objectives, the Libyans were then left with no government – not even one as authoritarian as Qaddafi’s – and no humanitarian or civilian interventions to assist the Libyans in establishing the foundations for security, justice, and well-being. As a result, NATO’s military intervention produced an environment of chaos and violence in which the Libyan people are arguably worse off today than they were under Qaddafi’s rule.²⁰² To be sure, NATO probably achieved its stated objectives – at least in the beginning – but it failed to commit itself, economically or politically, to addressing the clearly foreseeable

²⁰¹ Karl P. Mueller, ed., *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War*, Research Report, RR-676-AF (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2015).

²⁰² “Four Years After Gaddafi, Libya Is a Failed State - FPIF,” Foreign Policy In Focus, April 6, 2015, <http://fpif.org/four-years-after-gaddafi-libya-is-a-failed-state/>.

implications of its military actions. NATO was willing to bomb but not to build. Thus, the old saw about the surgeon proved true: “The surgery was a success, but the patient died.”²⁰³

In Darfur, we find the opposite side of the same coin. The United States, the United Nations, the Arab League, and a variety of other GOs, IOs, and NGOs undertook a wide range of humanitarian and capacity building programs on the ground. But, in the absence of any kind of international military force to establish a modicum of security, these programs were largely ineffective and, indeed, led to the displacement of thousands of Darfuris and the establishment of a semi-permanent refugee population and dynamic. Moreover, the inability of these various interventions to control violence led to the deaths of some 200,000-300,000 local people.²⁰⁴ In order to accomplish HAO objectives, a significant military force would have been required with a range of unintended consequences that could have resulted in many more deaths. Lesson learned: PSO – proposed or actual – are by no means guaranteed to be successful.

In both cases, the objectives of the organizations and governments conducting the intervention proved either too limited or unachievable and exacerbated the conflicts and humanitarian crises they were designed to alleviate. In order for interventions to succeed in arresting, controlling, or preventing the recurrence of deadly conflict, there must be a clear articulation of achievable objectives, associated timelines and milestones, and a

²⁰³ Jonathan Whittall, “The Operation Was Successful, But the Patient Died,” *The Huffington Post UK*, accessed March 14, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/jonathan-whittall/afghanistan-humanitarian-aid_b_4993451.html.

²⁰⁴ Gérard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, Crises in World Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 193; David Petraeus and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “America’s Awesome Military” (Brookings Institution, September 30, 2016), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/americas-awesome-military/>.

commitment by the intervening nations or organizations to dedicate the requisite resources – talent, time, and treasure. Those requirements must be dispassionately assessed prior to an intervention, and sometimes the conclusions may be that an intervention – even with the noblest of motives – would do more harm than good.

Whether in planning or execution, according to Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam, “Political and academic literature on violent conflict and peacebuilding is tempted to see ‘systems’ and rational patterns in the midst of the conflict. ... Such an approach risks being overly reductionist.”²⁰⁵ Successful conflict prevention, management, and resolution requires a hybrid operation of military and humanitarian organizations, as was the case in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. The needs in conflict are themselves dynamic in nature, and they generally begin with establishing a modicum of security so that longer-term capacity building and associated conflict resolution measures can be implemented.²⁰⁶

Thus, at the beginning of a joint military-civilian intervention, military personnel make up the core of the forces in order to provide security and to enable humanitarian organization operators to function in a safe environment. As time passes, the balance between military and civilians could shift toward civilian operators as a core group while the military would just provide a sufficient number of personnel to ensure continued security. If an integrated intervention is successful, the ultimate outcome will be an

²⁰⁵ Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam, *A Liberal Peace?*, 210.

²⁰⁶ Harvey J. Langholtz, “Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution” (Peace Operations Training Institute, 2015), 27, http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course_promos/picr/peacekeeping_and_international_conflict_resolution_english.pdf.

environment in which the host nation's rebuilt government can fulfill its responsibilities without extraordinary external involvement.²⁰⁷

The literature suggests that CIMIC composes a small, yet critical, piece of the puzzle, since PSO are quite complex and require a lot of different elements to be successful. Military intervention by itself can accomplish a number of important objectives but generally cannot achieve long-term stability in the absence of civilian intervention as well. Solely relying on interventions by NATO PSO or national military forces – or UN peacekeepers, who are sometimes known as Blue Helmets – with long-term objectives of conflict resolution is likely to be futile and disappointing. With this in mind, and after some significant failures of UN missions, especially in the 1990s, the UN issued the Brahimi reports,²⁰⁸ named after Lakhdar²⁰⁹ Brahimi,²¹⁰ an Algerian UN diplomat who served as chair of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, which produced these influential reports. The purpose of these reports was to review “lessons learned” from previous Blue Helmet operations and to generate recommendations on possible improvement in UN PSO, particularly in light of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which accorded the UN additional requirements to protect indigenous populations,

²⁰⁷ Winrich Kuhne, “Peace Support Operations: How to Make Them Succeed,” *Internationale Politik Und Gesellschaft* 4 (1999), http://www.fes.de/ipg/ipg4_99/ARTKUEHNE.PDF.

²⁰⁸ William J. Durch et al., “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations” (The Henry L. Stimson Center: UN DPKO, 2003), <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/BR-CompleteVersion-Dec03.pdf>.

²⁰⁹ John F. Hillen III, “UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half - ProQuest,” accessed February 8, 2016, <http://search.proquest.com/openview/ee54c05cf655f3f226e4fe489acd1cda/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=1819217>.

²¹⁰ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Right Strategy, Wrong Place-Why Nato’s Comprehensive Approach Will Fail in Afghanistan,” *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no. 22 (January 2010): 78–90.

sometimes from their own governments, as in Libya.²¹¹ The Brahimi reports were not without controversy; the harsh reality is that peacebuilding programs are often driven as much by international political expediency as by genuine humanitarian requirements.

Humanitarian intervention is equally subject to uneven outcomes; it both affects and is affected by the conflict to which it is dedicated.²¹² Indeed, every action by HAOs becomes a part of the conflict itself, with unintended consequences in each program undertaken.²¹³ HAOs attempt to be “neutral and nonpartisan toward the winner and loser of the war,”²¹⁴ but the very nature of their interventions inevitably favors one side or the other. Measures taken to effect near-term improvements in local economies, for example, tend to favor the side of the conflict that is in military control of the area. In addition, humanitarian interventions affect the region through extraordinary economic measures instead of “normal peacetime economic activities.”²¹⁵ In the beginnings of an intervention, particularly when a military operation is still ongoing, humanitarian and economic actions tend to focus on a specific war-related enterprise such as convoy protection by hired local military or paramilitary forces, which can fuel conflict participants.²¹⁶

As Anderson points out, and even the UNSC discussed in 2015, humanitarian interventions need to be tailored to a specific mission, and each mission to a specific

²¹¹ “The Responsibility To Protect - Report.Pdf,” accessed May 6, 2012, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.

²¹² Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace--or War* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 37.

²¹³ Anderson, 1.

²¹⁴ Anderson, 1.

²¹⁵ Anderson, 44.

²¹⁶ Anderson, *Do No Harm*, 1999.

conflict, since conflicts are themselves unique, and every region has its own culture, history, personages, values, and tensions.²¹⁷ In addition, humanitarian interventions cannot operate in a vacuum, since they depend on the security provided by international military forces as well as local actors' political and economic priorities and capabilities. Indeed, HAOs must accommodate themselves, at least in the near-term, to the demands of local actors who may be motivated by less-than-noble objectives.

Today's PSO as part of peacebuilding are becoming more complex, since practitioners increasingly recognize the need for a more comprehensive approach to address underlying issues in fragile states in conflict environments.²¹⁸ Previous PSO aimed to be "quick and dirty,"²¹⁹ as Paris points out, where missions were designed to minimize their duration but, as noted above, often resulted in an exacerbation of the very conflict the PSO was designed to stop.²²⁰ Also, in contemporary missions, there are many more actors involved in peacebuilding, which further complicates an already inherently complex situation. Paris identifies four key obstacles to turning war-torn nations into successful societies: 1) lack of field-level cooperation between different actors, 2) bureaucracy of agencies involved and a tendency to pursue incompatible goals, 3) bureaucratic infighting, rivalries, and turf battles, and 4) the added layer of coordination with headquarters of all the agencies, international and national.²²¹

²¹⁷ Anderson, 2; "To Strengthen United Nations Peace Operations, General Assembly Urges Replacing Template Approaches with Targeted Efforts, Tailored Mandates, Focus on Dialogue | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases," accessed March 13, 2016, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11703.doc.htm>.

²¹⁸ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations*, Security and Governance Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009), 55.

²¹⁹ Paris and Sisk, 55.

²²⁰ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*.

²²¹ Paris and Sisk, 56–57.

To Paris's first point, NGOs have often sustained criticism for their inability to self-coordinate. According to the Utsein Study²²² of peacebuilding, which analyzed 336 PSO projects in the 1990s led by Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Norway, researchers discovered that more than 55% of the projects did not have any link with a country strategy and that the interventions lacked coherence.²²³ Second, at the bureaucratic level, the definition of PSO "strategy" is often a wish list of projects based on the interests of different departments, funds, and programs, which are often incompatible.²²⁴ This kind of rivalry often leads PSO implementers to lose sight of the needs of the people in the country as they look increasingly inward. According to Kaspersen and Sending, a UN observer noted that everything that happened in the field started in New York.²²⁵

Third, donors' tendency to fund specific programs in PSO often sparks a turf battle between agencies that fight for the same donations. As Kaspersen and Sending pointed out, "It is a recipe for continued bureaucratic infighting and turf battles over scarce resources, which is encouraged by donors' tendency to earmark funding for specific agencies and projects rather than pooling resources to a central trust-fund

²²² Dan Smith, "Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together," accessed April 21, 2018, <https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=153>.

²²³ Smith; Cedric de Coning, "Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions - A Norwegian Perspective," ReliefWeb, accessed April 21, 2018, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/coherence-and-coordination-united-nations-peacebuilding-and-integrated-missions>; Anja T. Kaspersen and Ole Jacob Sending, "The United Nations and Civilian Crisis Management" (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 2005), <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c3b4/33717aaa640f1675a233be0511c4d9b94444.pdf>.

²²⁴ Kaspersen and Sending, "The United Nations and Civilian Crisis Management," 14.

²²⁵ Kaspersen and Sending, 19.

mechanism managed by the UN."²²⁶ Finally, over-coordination is also unproductive, since most agencies do not have enough personnel to attend all coordination meetings, and as a member of a UN country mission pointed out, a 10-hour workday could easily pass just by participating in different coordination meetings.²²⁷

The military often does not have this problem. With a significant number of personnel and a large budget, military units are much easier to deploy to a conflict area. By way of example, the US State Department, an agent of soft power, has 13,000 Foreign Service employees, 11,000 Civil Service employees, 45,000 local employees working at Embassies, and a total budget of \$52.4 billion (FY 2018).²²⁸ At the same time, the US military has 1.3 million personnel, with a budget of \$686.1 billion and 20 aircraft carriers. Each aircraft carrier houses approximately 6,000 sailors, which means that two aircraft carriers have as many personnel as the State Department deploys to diplomatic posts all over the world. Moreover, 10 percent of State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) are home for training, medical or other leave, or a transition between posts at any given time and are, therefore, unavailable for diplomatic missions.

Within PSO, a lack of coordination at all levels stems from a “multitude of peacebuilding actors, overlapping or duplication of mandates, time and money entailment, competition for influence and visibility... and general unwillingness to sacrifice autonomy.”²²⁹ Even when agencies, organizations, and nations share common

²²⁶ Kaspersen and Sending, 19.

²²⁷ Kaspersen and Sending, 20.

²²⁸ Tracy Wilkinson, “Tillerson Trims State Department Staff and Vows to Make Diplomacy More Efficient,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 14, 2017, sec. World & Nation, <https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fg-pol-state-department-plan-20170915-story.html>.

²²⁹ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 58.

objectives, obstacles to successful cooperation emerge from different or contradictory policies and policy goals of agencies involved.²³⁰ Finally, while long-term engagements are generally beneficial to long-term stability, donor weariness sometimes produces a desire to “cut and run,” leaving economic and political institution building extraordinarily fragile and the prospects for “positive peace” bleak.

Section Twelve: CIMIC as Geopolitical Tool

CIMIC as a part of PSO could also be a geopolitical tool. While most contributing countries may have had genuine altruistic intentions, some saw CIMIC as an opportunity to advance their own national interests. Even if they were not overtly destructive toward one of the groups, they might have treated another group more favorably. For example, Russia had a long-lasting friendship and kinship with the Bosnian Serbs. Turkey shared a similar bond with Bosniaks, owing to their mutual Islamic faith.

During the conflict in Bosnia, both Russia and Turkey saw Bosnia as an opportunity to reinsert themselves into the international stage and to build their national credentials,²³¹ for Russia as a comeback and for Turkey as a new regional player. While Russia deployed troops in Bosnia only until 2003, Turkey was a part of UNPROFOR and remained in EUFOR as of 2021.

²³⁰ Paris and Sisk, “Managing Contradictions”; Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, chap. 11.

²³¹ “US-Russian Military Cooperation and the IFOR Experience,” 1245, accessed April 8, 2021, <https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/Kipp98.htm>.

The Russians had always viewed the Serbs as “little brothers,”²³² and Moscow was unwilling to take any action that could harm the Russian position in the conflict in Bosnia, and later on in Kosovo. After the Serb-led massacre of Bosniaks at Srebrenica in 1995, NATO launched air strikes against Serb communication points and antiaircraft positions, forcing the Serbs to participate in the Dayton Agreement and agree to a cease fire and, later on, the peace accord. Turkey assisted in bombing the Serbs as a part of the Coalition forces, including the British, US, French, Germans, and other Western forces,²³³ but the Russians did not support it. While the United States led most of the air sorties, the Turkish Air Force played a nominal role.

After signing the peace agreement and after IFOR launched in Bosnia, both Turkish and Russian troops were deployed in areas in which they ethnic groups they supported held a majority. Turkish forces were deployed in central Bosnia, which was populated mostly by Bosniaks, while the Russians were mainly sent to the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska in northeastern Bosnia, close to the border with Serbia.²³⁴

Whatever interests these contributing nations may have had, the soldiers on the ground played an important part in PSO and CIMIC. Until the completion of the Russian deployment in 2003, Russian CIMIC operators provided support to the local population, including medical assistance, demining and destruction of unexploded explosive

²³² “SRBI SU MALI RUSI I DOŠLI SU SA SEVERNOG POLA?! Zaprepašćujuća izjava direktora Rusko-srpskog humanitarnog centra u Nišu!,” *kurir.rs*, accessed April 12, 2021, <https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/politika/2948607/srbi-su-mali-rusi-i-dosli-su-sa-severnog-pola-zaprepascujuca-izjava-direktora-ruskog-centra-u-nisu-evo-sta-na-to-kazu-nasi-politicari-sociolozi-i-istoricari>.

²³³ Brookings, “Bosnia, 1995—Operation Deliberate Force: The Value of Highly Capable Proxy Forces,” n.d., 23, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/9780815732419_ch1.pdf.

²³⁴ “SFOR - The Last Farewell from the Russians,” accessed April 8, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/articles/030620c/t030620c.htm>.

ordnance, building roads, and collecting illegal weapons and ammunition. Also, the Russians took a unique approach to force protection and interaction with the local population; the Russians kept their barracks open for the locals to enter, and they often shared medical support as well as camp bars.²³⁵

Likewise, at the beginning of the PSO, Turkish forces were mainly stationed around Zenica, a predominantly Bosniak area, and they later moved to Camp Butmir in Sarajevo as part of an international battalion with Austria and Hungary. Currently, they are in charge of five out of 17 LOT houses, which is a significant presence among the local population. All of those LOT houses are located in areas with a predominantly Bosniak population. Since their arrival in Bosnia, Turkish forces have completed numerous CIMIC projects, including refurbishing and reequipping schools, planting trees, training the local population, and building water tanks, all mainly in the areas where they were stationed.²³⁶

As these two nations were unique in their support for a particular ethnic group in Bosnia, one can theorize that because of their long-term identification with certain elements of the local population, they would not have been as successful in their endeavor and approaches if they were stationed in areas dominated by the opposing ethnic group.

On the other hand, although Athens did not publicly endorse any particular Bosnian group, Greece can be seen as aligned with the Serbs because of their common

²³⁵ "SFOR - The Last Farewell from the Russians."

²³⁶ "Nations of SFOR: Turkey," accessed April 8, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/nations/turkey.htm>.

Orthodox faith, but the Greek unit was stationed in Visoko, which was predominantly Bosniak, until their departure in 2003.²³⁷ The Greek area of responsibility was mainly of a logistic nature, providing transportation for both military and HAOs throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of nationality and ethnicity. The Greek unit therefore embodied the notion of neutrality and impartiality in PSO.²³⁸

Section Thirteen: The Impact of CIMIC

For all the noble intentions of CIMIC practitioners, the inability of military and civilian organizations to work together has the potential to exacerbate the very conflicts they intend to reduce. If CIMIC cannot effectively coordinate and support humanitarian activities and aid, PSO will be unable to relieve suffering of people in need. Indeed, some local people will get more than they need while others will get not enough, which occurred during post-tsunami operations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.²³⁹ This creates frictions and resentments that do little to ameliorate long-term animosities.

Also, the lack of CIMIC decreases the flow of accurate information, so organizations with adequate capabilities could be under-used when there is a real need for their assistance. So, by not addressing internal CIMIC issues, PSO costs invariably increase, and programs are unnecessarily prolonged (both in time and in human resources). In an era of increasingly constrained PSO-related resources, and with new conflicts seeming to emerge every day, wasteful and ineffective CIMIC processes and

²³⁷ "Greece," accessed April 8, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/nations/greece.htm>.

²³⁸ "SFOR Informer Online: HELBA: The Last Journey," accessed April 8, 2021, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/158/p08a/t02p08a.htm>.

²³⁹ Clifford Oliver, *Catastrophic Disaster Planning and Response* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2011), 37, <http://www.books24x7.com/marc.asp?bookid=36912>.

PSO cannot be sustained. Consider the UN mission in Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA). This mission annually costs \$923,305,800,²⁴⁰ which is almost 10 percent of Mali's GDP,²⁴¹ not including \$267 million²⁴² spent by the French, who are also actively involved in Mali. Of even greater importance, the UN has lost some 63 persons²⁴³ in Mali. Even though most PSO missions cost a lot of money, the source of that money is finite – and good coordination is key to preventing wasteful spending and effective use of all resources: material, monetary, human, and time.

Subsection: The Role of Humanitarian Assistance Organizations

As mentioned above, modern HAOs do not just deliver humanitarian aid (providing food and water, shelter, medical assistance, etc.); they also advocate for the disenfranchised and minorities, provide legal assistance, promote human rights, and even engage in scientific projects. They generally fall into several categories: donor-organized NGOs (DONGOs), environmental ENGOs (ENGOs), government-operated NGOs (GONGOs), market advocacy NGOs (MANGOs), technical assistance NGOs (TANGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), international NGOs (INGOs), Community Health and Rural Development Society (CHARDS), and others.²⁴⁴ HAOs

²⁴⁰ "Peacekeeping Fact Sheet. United Nations Peacekeeping," accessed December 17, 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>.

²⁴¹ "Mali GDP | 1967-2015 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News," accessed December 17, 2015, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/mali/gdp>.

²⁴² Amy Svitak in Ares, "The Cost of Operation Serval," accessed December 17, 2015, <http://aviationweek.com/blog/cost-operation-serval>.

²⁴³ "Peacekeeping Fact Sheet. United Nations Peacekeeping."

²⁴⁴ Renee Kumor Boards R. Us, "Spelling Maze for Nonprofits," *Times News; Hendersonville, N.C.*, February 21, 2011, <http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/docview/853094953/abstract/2443E03507DD4D31PQ/6;>

are also differentiated by the timeframes in which they pursue their objectives. USAID illustrates this differentiation. The Disaster Assistance Relief Teams (DARTs) and the venerable Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) focus on making an immediate impact, then turning over HAO missions to the regional bureaus for longer-term development tasks.²⁴⁵

The taxonomy of HAOs mentioned above into IOs, NGOs, and GOs is by no means clean, certainly not in the eyes of host governments and other internal actors. For a variety of reasons, non-governmental HAOs are often perceived by indigenous actors as *de facto* governmental organizations, creating suspicion and a lack of credibility.²⁴⁶ Also, they are often financially or materially supported by national governments; for example, USAID has over eighty implementing partners just in Afghanistan,²⁴⁷ and it has a budget of almost four billion dollars in 2011 for its top 25 partner organizations,²⁴⁸ excluding other, smaller partners or grants. The number of NGO projects has exploded over the last few decades. By the 1990s, the World Bank was involved in only 12% of projects with NGOs, but in the mid-1990s that number rose to 48%.²⁴⁹ According to

Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond, eds., *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, The Cass Series on Peacekeeping 12 (London ; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2003); "Types of NGOs, Non-Governmental Organization, Different Types of NGOs," accessed May 8, 2017, <http://www.ngo.in/types-of-ngos.html>.

²⁴⁵ Marian Leonardo Lawson, "USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives After 15 Years: Issues for Congress [May 27, 2009]," May 27, 2009, 8, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=>.

²⁴⁶ Tongeren and European Centre for Conflict Prevention, "Weaving the Web: Civil Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace," 22.

²⁴⁷ "USAID Implementing Partners - Afghanistan," accessed April 24, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/implementing-partners>.

²⁴⁸ "USAID Implementing Partners - 2011," accessed April 24, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/get-grant-or-contract/usaid-implementing-partnerships>.

²⁴⁹ "The Bank's Relations with NGOs: Issues and Directions," Social Development Papers (World Bank, August 11, 1998), 4, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDP-28.pdf>; "Cooperation between the World Bank and NGOs FY96 Progress Report" (World bank, August

World Bank data, the gross financial capability of NGOs was roughly \$165.8 billion in the 1990s,²⁵⁰ and in the 2000s, NGOs were responsible for \$3.4 trillion in assets and \$295 billion in charitable giving,²⁵¹ which rose to \$390.05 billion in 2016.²⁵²

HAOs can also be divided in other ways. For example, in the World Bank typology, NGOs are divided into operational types, advocacy types, and those that are large enough to have both operational and advocacy arms.²⁵³ Operational NGOs mainly design and operate development-related projects; advocacy NGOs promote a specific cause by raising of awareness through lobbying, media, public events and other activities.

Also, some authors define NGOs based on their country of origin, such as Northern NGOs (NNGOs), which are created in countries that are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) such as the UK or France, and Southern State NGOs (SSGOs), which are created in OECD non-member countries such as Bolivia or the Congo.²⁵⁴ NNGOs and SSGOs usually benefit from

1997), <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/873204-1111663470099/20489539/FY96NGOProgRpt.pdf>.

²⁵⁰ Mordecai Lee, "Public Reporting: A Neglected Aspect of Nonprofit Accountability," *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*; *San Francisco* 15, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 172.

²⁵¹ Christine Petrovits, Catherine Shakespeare, and Aimee Shih, "The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit Organizations," *The Accounting Review* 86, no. 1 (2011): 325.

²⁵² "Giving Statistics," Charity Navigator, accessed April 24, 2018, <http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?>

²⁵³ Carmen Malina, "A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration between The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations," March 1995, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/814581468739240860/pdf/multi-page.pdf>; "The Bank's Relations with NGOs: Issues and Directions."

²⁵⁴ Alan Fowler, "Distant Obligations: Speculations on NGO Funding and the Global Market," *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 55 (1992): 9–29; "To What Extent Is The Relationship Between Northern NGOs and Southern NGOs Based On Partnership and Free From Local and International Agendas?," *E-International Relations* (blog), accessed April 24, 2018, <http://www.e-ir.info/2008/12/12/to-what-extent-is-the-relationship-between-northern-ngos-and-southern-ngos-based-on-partnership-and-free-from-local-and-international-agendas/>; David Lewis and Babar Sobhan, "Routes of Funding, Roots of Trust? Northern NGOs, Southern NGOs, Donors, and the Rise of Direct Funding (Voies de Financement, Racines

donations and grants from their respective countries, and OECD countries directly or indirectly benefit from NNGOs.²⁵⁵

The relationship between NGOs and donors can be challenging. As Biswas²⁵⁶ pointed out, the “funding question” can be polarized based on the NGOs’ perceptions of the donors’ ulterior motives. During the Cold War, donor organizations often harbored political motives as they aided the United States in the fight against communism by assisting in the development of market-based economies in the developing world. Today, countries like Russia prevent the activity of foreign NGOs on their soil through the “Foreign Agent Law,”²⁵⁷ which stems from a fear of influence from foreign entities which the ever-suspicious Russians perceive as agents of U.S. or western intelligence services.

According to Ebrahim, “there is ... a resource *interdependence* (albeit often asymmetric) in which NGOs rely on donors for money, and donors rely on NGOs to buttress their reputations in development.”²⁵⁸ But donors also play an important role in keeping NGOs accountable; as Petrovis et al. pointed out, “Donors use available information from the organization's Form 990 [a form that small, tax-exempt

de La Confiance? Les ONG Du Nord, Les ONG Du Sud, Les Bailleurs de Fonds et Le Progrès Du Financement Direct / Rotas de Financiamento, Raízes Das Confiança? ONGs Do Hemisfério Norte e Do Hemisfério Sul, Doadores e a Expansão Do Financiamento Directo / Rutas de Financiación, ¿raíces de Confianza? ONGs Del Norte, ONGs Del Sur, Donantes y El Crecimiento de La Financiación Directa),” *Development in Practice* 9, no. 1/2 (1999): 117–29.

²⁵⁵ Lewis and Sobhan, “Routes of Funding, Roots of Trust?”

²⁵⁶ Nilanjana Biswas, “On Funding and the NGO Sector,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 41, no. 42 (2006): 4406–11.

²⁵⁷ “Five Years of Russia’s Foreign Agent Law,” openDemocracy, August 11, 2017, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/daria-skibo/five-years-of-russia-s-foreign-agent-law>.

²⁵⁸ Alnoor Ebrahim, “Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs,” *World Development* 31, no. 5 (May 1, 2003): 815, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X\(03\)00014-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(03)00014-7).

organizations fill out²⁵⁹] to distinguish higher-quality nonprofit organizations from lower-quality nonprofit organizations and make their giving decisions accordingly.”²⁶⁰ It is important to note that NGOs are not a monolith,²⁶¹ but most of them are often accountable only to themselves and/or their donors.²⁶² They can fire their workers without any murmur of protest²⁶³ or pursue whichever projects interest them or their donors. This sort of flexibility is both an asset and a detriment to PSO and CIMIC. NGO flexibility provides a unique ability to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats, while at the same time making institutional cooperation with Governmental Organizations problematic.

Subsection: The Role of the Military

As mentioned above, the armed forces, composed of one or all three branches (air, land, and maritime) of one or more contributing countries, intervene in crises usually with authorization from the UN or other organizations like the African Union (AU), EU, and NATO to implement the will of the international community. That will, of course, is the product of multiple factors, only some of which relate to the situation on the ground. Of note, some interventions can be led by one country with or without the support of other countries, as in the mission in East Timor led by Australia, based on a UNSC

²⁵⁹ “Search for Forms 990 N Filed by Small Tax Exempt Organizations | Internal Revenue Service,” accessed May 15, 2018, <https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/search-for-forms-990-n-filed-by-small-tax-exempt-organizations>.

²⁶⁰ Petrovits, Shakespeare, and Shih, “The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit Organizations,” 333.

²⁶¹ Biswas, “On Funding and the NGO Sector,” 4409.

²⁶² Biswas, “On Funding and the NGO Sector.”

²⁶³ Biswas.

mandate,²⁶⁴ but in the context of PSO, military intervention requires some kind of regional or international legitimacy.

In addition, military forces may be committed as a result of a host country's direct request in the context of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements or as a result of *ad hoc* emergency requests.²⁶⁵ Since the level and type of engagement vary depending on the situation in the mission area, ideally forces are tailored to optimize mission accomplishment .

In the case of a rapid deployment to prevent a major violation of human rights and help people in need, some countries and organizations such as NATO have created Rapid Reaction Forces.²⁶⁶ The majority of those forces have organic logistical support or are attached to the forces of a country that can provide logistical support – usually through a Memorandum of Understanding and a *Military Technical Agreement* – so they can operate autonomously for a certain period of time. After a successful mission, these forces return to their home countries, or they can be reinforced with additional elements if the mission becomes protracted. Since such forces are tailored to specific missions, they can perform a variety of tasks. However, since all UN and/or coalition forces are composed of personnel from many different nations, their size, capabilities, competence, and professionalism can vary. According to Weiss and Collins:

²⁶⁴ "Australia's 1999 Mission to East Timor Part 1: The Decision to Intervene," *The Strategist*, October 2, 2015, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-1999-mission-to-east-timor-part-1-the-decision-to-intervene/>.

²⁶⁵ Rietjens, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency*.

²⁶⁶ "NATO Response Force (NRF)."

“...less developed countries are less able to provide their troops with what is needed for a multinational peacekeeping operation, including appropriate clothing and equipment. In the middle of Croatia’s winter, Pakistani troops arrived in summer uniforms. ... In Bihac (Bosnia), four Bangladeshi soldiers shared a single rifle.”²⁶⁷

Section Fourteen: Barriers to Cooperation

The UN Peacebuilding Support Office states that “experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace-building effort is needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict.”²⁶⁸ Yet there are significant barriers to achieving even fundamental cooperation among the various institutions and organizations involved in a particular PSO. Military and civilian CIMIC personnel are often encouraged to cooperate on the surface but not required or prepared to synchronize their operations. According to Zaalberg,²⁶⁹ “Poor adaptation while fighting irregular opponents can also be traced to the complexity of the necessary methods, which depend on a delicate balance between civil and military measures and therefore cooperation with, and support of, the civilian ‘other.’ As we have seen when looking at military governance, soldiers prefer to operate in what they hope or expect to be an exclusively military domain.” This reality manifests itself in challenges in achieving unity of effort,

²⁶⁷ Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*.

²⁶⁸ “UN Peacebuilding: An Orientation” (Peacebuilding Support Office, UN, September 2010), 48, https://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf.

²⁶⁹ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, ed., “Supporting the Civil Power:: Counterinsurgency and the Return to Conventional Warfare,” in *Soldiers and Civil Power, Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 45–72, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mxbz.6>.

the will of commanders or managers, national instructions, and the individual chemistry of those on the ground making tactical decisions.²⁷⁰ Moreover, effective CIMIC does not occur simply because leaders at the tactical level make it work. Indeed, tactical commanders and their civilian counterparts are often at odds because the mandates from their respective governments under which they are operating diverge from one another. These divergences are highly situation-dependent but underscore that successful CIMIC begins – and is institutionalized - at the top.

Even when there is relative unanimity in national goals and objectives for a particular PSO, significant barriers remain at the tactical level. These tactical barriers that inhibit cooperation between civilians and the military can be divided into several categories: culture, training, communications, organization, security, socio-economic awareness, rotation, and funding.

Subsection: CIMIC Institutional Cultures

It is hardly surprising that the military culture is radically different from the cultures of the myriad organizations and individuals that comprise the civilian component of CIMIC. Autesserre stated that primary fractures run along “national, regional, professional, and organizational lines” and that these rifts prevent successful cooperation and coordination.²⁷¹ Moreover, the cultures of the civilian side of CIMIC often differ

²⁷⁰ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, ed., “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Widening the Civil-Military Gap in Bosnia,” in *Soldiers and Civil Power, Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mxbz.12>.

²⁷¹ Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 170.

radically one from another, particularly between GOs, NGOs, and IOs. Further complicating culture gaps, military branches themselves have their own cultures that include “specific rituals, hierarchies, myths, practices”²⁷² and, maybe most importantly, standard operating procedures. While there may be some bridges that can cross these cultural divides – such as the argument for a more universal culture of “Peaceland” – CIMIC experiences in PSO underscore the challenges that cross-cultural clashes create.

Lange identifies the “Clash of Culture,”²⁷³ in his article about the US military involvement in “Operation Support Hope” in Rwanda in July 1994, as one of the core roadblocks to cooperation between military and humanitarian organizations. According to Lange, the military saw the humanitarian mission as secondary in importance to its basic mission of warfighting.²⁷⁴ Not surprisingly, this emphasis was in contradiction to the priorities held by humanitarian organizations involved in the Rwandan crisis.

In the words of Admiral Michael Mullen, former Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy, with operational responsibility for NATO missions in the Balkans, Iraq, and the Mediterranean, “Our work is appreciated, of that I am certain. There isn’t a town or a city I visit where people do not convey to me their great pride in what we do. But I fear they do not know us. I fear they do not comprehend the full weight of the burden we carry or the price we pay.”²⁷⁵

²⁷² Autesserre, 48.

²⁷³ John E. Lange, “Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda,” *Parameters* 28, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 118.

²⁷⁴ Lange, 107.

²⁷⁵ “Joint Chiefs Chair to Graduates: ‘I Fear They Do Not Know Us,’” accessed April 23, 2020, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/21/new.york.mullen.military/index.html>.

Ironically, both military and civilian organizations often come from the same country and therefore from a similar national culture, but their institutional cultures often trump cultural similarities and get in the way of effective cooperation. These institutional cultures are indeed powerful – both in substance and in perception. The military “can-do” culture often leads soldiers, units, and leaders to accept and undertake missions for which they are woefully unprepared, simply because they are told to do so or they recognize a need. In post-Saddam Iraq, infantry company commanders who were trained in fire and maneuver were given missions to bring water to villages, establish schools, and serve on PRTs alongside their civilian counterparts²⁷⁶ in capacities for which they were not prepared. While the main role in PSO for a military unit is to provide security, these military units often fulfill other tasks as well.²⁷⁷ Not surprisingly, many resented what they saw as having to do the jobs of civilians whom they perceived as unwilling to go into harm’s way.²⁷⁸

The AARs that followed PSO concluded that the military needed to learn about the importance of understanding the local culture and the skill sets needed to improve the lot of the people once the fighting had abated. As Rosa Brooks pointed out,

“More culturally attuned soldiers will be better equipped to identify brewing conflicts *before* they get out of hand, enabling more timely and effective

²⁷⁶ “Oral Histories: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams (2008-2009),” United States Institute of Peace, accessed April 25, 2018, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2009/02/oral-histories-iraq-provincial-reconstruction-teams-2008-2009>.

²⁷⁷ Michael Casiano, “The S-4 in a Provincial Reconstruction Team,” *Army Sustainment* 44, no. 2 (April 2012): 7–9; “Provincial Reconstruction Team Uses Infantry Soldiers to Bolster Joint,” CENTCOM, accessed April 25, 2018, <http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/884381/provincial-reconstruction-team-uses-infantry-soldiers-to-bolster-joint-patrols/>.

²⁷⁸ Capt Kapualani Ampong-Duke, “Fort Bliss Infantry Platoon Secures Area for Hhumanitarian Aid Water Delivery Mission | Article | The United States Army,” accessed March 12, 2016, <http://www.army.mil/article/126286/>.

“shaping” and deterrence activities. “Shaping” means activities designed to make conditions favorable for U.S. military success, and can include efforts to influence local populations, establish friendly relations with host populations and local leaders, strengthen military-to-military cooperation, and the like. If conflict breaks out, soldiers with a deeper understanding of local cultural dynamics will have both a better understanding of the enemy and a greater ability to work effectively with the host population, making tactical, operational, and strategic success more likely.”²⁷⁹

The institutional divides between military units and civilian organizations bears further discussion because it is of singular importance in the success – or failure – of CIMIC. Most combat units are trained for war – to fight and win and then go home.²⁸⁰ That orientation leads to a focus on short-term outcomes: a skirmish, a battle, a hot meal. Combat support and combat service support units (such as medical units and civil affairs) may have a broader view of PSO, but they are shackled to the operational requirements driven by the divisions, brigades, and battalions they support as well as by their institutional focus on “hurting people and breaking things.” As Zupancic says, the military is in favor of short-term, quick-impact humanitarian projects.²⁸¹ As a result, the military is often a reluctant participant in long-term PSO. Yet, in the process of democratization, the military is the only viable source of security and stability in a fragile state, especially in the *security first* option versus *fast or slow democratization*.²⁸² Thus,

²⁷⁹ Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, 144.

²⁸⁰ Chris Hedges, *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning*, 1. Anchor Books ed (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2003), 38.

²⁸¹ Rok Zupančič, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Conflict and Post-Conflict Zones: Needed Marriage Also for Small States? The Case Study of Slovenian Armed Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 28, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 465, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2015.1061821>.

²⁸² James Manor and Weltbank, eds., *Aid That Works: Successful Development in Fragile States*, Directions in Development Public Sector Governance (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007); Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, “Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate,” in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 679–700.

the military can find itself in a quasi-Leninist “crooked position” of having to fulfill roles and missions that theoretically and philosophically belong to civilian experts who, by dint of their very nature and national force protection issues, are unable to surge into areas of active combat or non-permissive environments.²⁸³ Soldiers, units, and military leaders are often criticized for not being culturally sensitive to the area where they are operating as well as for their involvement in humanitarian, development, and governance work.²⁸⁴

Civilian organizations, on the other hand, tend to focus on building long-term capabilities – political, economic, social, educational, and medical – that are oriented on the unique history and culture of the people they are sent to assist. They often see themselves as the antithesis of the “hurting people and breaking things”; their tasks focus on healing people and building things. Among the greatest critics of military involvement are the HAOs Doctors Without Borders, the Red Cross, and Save the Children, which have characterized the military’s role as “militarization of aid.”²⁸⁵ Also, military action is often reactive rather than proactive, as was the case in Iraq, where early military decisions right after the successful removal of the Ba’athist party and Saddam

²⁸³ Jennifer N. Broome, “Military Humanitarianism in Historical Perspective: The Militarization of International Humanitarian Aid and the Humanization of the United States Military” (M.A., United States - Indiana, Indiana University, 2006), <http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/305309623/abstract/3F776050343446APQ/1>; Jaime Antoinette Wilke Corvin, “The Role of Organizational Culture in the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance and Inter-Organizational Collaboration” (Ph.D., United States -- Florida, University of South Florida, 2006), <http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/305269752/791F2D9CBDC04EDDPQ/1>; James L. Narel, “Humanitarian and Military Organizational Cultures and the Challenges of Contemporary Complex Emergencies” (Ph.D., United States -- Virginia, George Mason University, 2007), <http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/304734935/abstract/8EA35FF4181949D6PQ/1>.

²⁸⁴ Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, 95.

²⁸⁵ Brooks, 96.

Hussein from power only led to chaos, “revenge killings and a government that cannot provide basic services.”²⁸⁶

Subsection: Training and Education

Military personnel, units, and leaders are trained first and foremost in combat, combat support, and combat service support – all designed to defeat the enemies of the nation on the battlefield and advance vital national security objectives. Only a small portion of scarce training time is generally devoted to PSO-related skills. Some countries such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Canada invest more time and effort in training their soldiers for PSO, but only through the pre-deployment phase.²⁸⁷ In Eurasian countries alone, there are more than 60 PSO training centers of different levels and profiles.²⁸⁸ Some countries, such as Germany and Bosnia, provide training for civilian, police, and military elements of PSO, while some countries train for just one element; for example, Serbia trains only for the military component of PSO.²⁸⁹ One can debate the quality of this training based on the reality that soldiers carry guns; these swords are not easily beaten into plowshares when PSO are undertaken. Military forces cannot be effectively trained to successfully undertake tasks and responsibilities in which civilian organizations are organized and trained. Optimized CIMIC training is more appropriately

²⁸⁶ Brooks, 97.

²⁸⁷ “Introduction to UN Peacekeeping Pre Deployment Training Standards, Specialized Training Modules for Military Experts on Mission 1st Edition 2010,” n.d.

²⁸⁸ “Peace Operations Training Institutions in Europe.”

²⁸⁹ “Peace Operations Training Institutions in Europe.”

seen as an overlap of responsibilities with the intersection described as “development security.”




Figure 3 Development Security

Recognizing that the primacy of the mission sets for both the military and civilian components of CIMIC are sometimes wildly divergent, both elements can and must be trained in Development Security. The military must be trained and ready to execute near-term development tasks to get a broken society functional again in meeting basic human needs. Military units must also be immediately capable of providing area security for civilian professionals, once the area is sufficiently secure to allow civilians to operate in a semi-permissive environment and assume responsibility for more enduring development.

Based on guidelines on operational readiness for troop-contributing countries, some of the training for development security will be informal, such as in the norms,

standards of conduct and discipline while serving in areas transitioning from active war to peace. This is particularly true for younger soldiers who often lack the experience and maturity necessary to ingrain basic values – the, “do’s and don’ts” with regard to conduct.²⁹⁰ This informal training can be left to the interpretation of the country and probably varies widely.

As a result of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military doctrine and associated training has evolved as combat units have become increasingly involved in PSO. Joint Publication 3-07.3, initially published in 2007 and updated on a periodic basis, lays out U.S. military doctrine for Peace Operations. In the mid-2000s, the U.S. Army’s National Training Center in the California desert radically redesigned its training regimen from an exclusive focus on high-intensity combat on the central front of Europe to the complexities of PSO. All that said, the culture of the military remains overwhelmingly fixed on land, air, and sea combat – as it must surely be.

As Mockaitis argues, military units deployed in a PSO must be better educated in the history and culture of lands where they will be deployed.²⁹¹ Also, military units must be prepared to take on missions that are the institutional responsibilities of civilian agencies, at least in non-permissive environments. The UN Office for Humanitarian Coordination says that “the humanitarian community may at times need to acknowledge that the military has assumed a number of responsibilities due to lack of other

²⁹⁰ “Guidelines on Operational Readiness Preparation for Troop Contributing Countries in Peacekeeping Missions,” October 13, 2017, 7, <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/400690>.

²⁹¹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo* (U.S. Army War College, 2004), http://www.amazon.com/Civil-military-Cooperation-Peace-Operations-Kosovo/dp/1584871687/ref=sr_1_8?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1338064483&sr=1-8.

organizations willing or able to do so.”²⁹² To do this, military units and especially their leaders – officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) – must be better trained in a broad spectrum of PSO-related tactics, techniques, and procedures before they are sent to the PSO. Yet, notwithstanding the gradual shift of U.S. military training, most soldiers, units and leaders have only “specialized, albeit short, peacekeeping training,”²⁹³ so the lack of specialized PSO-related training and education means that the soldiers have to rely primarily on knowledge from experienced officers and NCOs or learning as operations progress.²⁹⁴

At the same time, civilian personnel must be equally well-trained in development security. They must know what their military partners are required to do to establish and sustain a security environment in which civilian organizations and personnel can effectively do their jobs. Yet civilians get little pre-deployment training; they are expected to learn on the job. As Arbuckle states, this is a particularly acute problem for NGOs. He says, “Donor funding was often earmarked, and donors commonly expected that all or nearly all their contributions would go directly to a target beneficiary population” essentially precluding rigorous pre-deployment training for civilians. The expectation was that around 90% of donations would reach the beneficiaries, which left

²⁹² “Guidelines for Humanitarian Organizations on Interacting with Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq” (UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, October 20, 2004), <http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/guidelines-humanitarian-organizations-interacting-military-and-other-security-actors>.

²⁹³ Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power : Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005), 257, <http://dare.uva.nl/aup/nl/record/173213>.

²⁹⁴ Paul Johnston, “Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies,” *Parameters*, 2000, 30–39.

almost no funding for personnel support, and usually none at all for training.”²⁹⁵ While resources for PSO are generally inadequate for the overall requirements that PSO engender, there is also the acute issue of the prioritization of those scarce resources.

Even so, the payoffs for civilian training in development security are clear. Autesserre points out that with some training, interveners would gain a clear understanding of some issues such as “social, ethnic, political, religious, economic, and other significant lines of fracture in the society.”²⁹⁶

In order to begin to address the training problem in both civilian and military organizations, Mockaitis suggests that “personnel exchanges in which members of these organizations and military officers attend each other’s training course could further enhance communication and cooperation.”²⁹⁷ This is an important first step that must be further augmented by integrated training on the unique political, economic, and cultural environments in which specific PSOs must be executed.

Subsection: Communication

Diop writes that the military views communications as a “strategic tool all sectors use in order to increase their visibility, better explain their missions and share their

²⁹⁵ James V. Arbuckle, *Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No Job for a Soldier?*, Contemporary Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2006), 150.

²⁹⁶ Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 259, 267.

²⁹⁷ Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations*, 31.

perspectives, and, most important, preserve the confidence others have in them.”²⁹⁸ Such a perspective requires all CIMIC elements to act with trust and confidence in all others. However, Miller argues that CIMIC agencies often appear to be disconnected from other agencies operating in the same area of operations and have little knowledge of each other’s activities.²⁹⁹ Groves suggests that reaching specific objectives by each agency is particularly problematic without proper communication between military and civilian organizations, including NGOs.³⁰⁰ But such communication is often lacking; communication between military and NGOs is often limited to weekly briefings by military officers to those present on what their units will do next week, as was the case in NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the French contingent deployed in North Mitrovica, Kosovo.³⁰¹ Poor communication leads to sometimes superficial analysis and planning, which, in turn, often leads to inefficient and ineffective projects.³⁰² There is also an institutional reluctance of the military to share intelligence³⁰³ due to concerns about the leaking of collected and sensitive information.³⁰⁴ Moreover, CIMIC-related

²⁹⁸ Biram Diop, “Civil-Military Relations in Senegal,” in *Military Engagement, Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions* (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 252, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt4cg8dn.14>.

²⁹⁹ Jeffrey Miller, “Analysis and Process Model Development for Situation Awareness During Military Humanitarian Assistance Operations” (Ph.D., United States -- District of Columbia, The George Washington University, 2013), 5, <http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/docview/1346231055/abstract/9F188A0A20D94A89PQ/4>.

³⁰⁰ Brendan Groves, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations: Lessons Learned from the Azizabad Attack,” *The Air Force Law Review* 65 (2010): 37.

³⁰¹ Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, ed., “The Tools at Hand:: Civil-Military Cooperation in Kosovo,” in *Soldiers and Civil Power, Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 402, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt46mxbz.17>.

³⁰² Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 57.

³⁰³ Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and The Military In Humanitarian Crises,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 7, no. 2 (2002): 35–55.

³⁰⁴ Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations*, vii.

communications between military and NGO operators often take place through intermediaries,³⁰⁵ which creates a host of misunderstandings. Finally, there is a reluctance on the part of some civilian PSO organizations to become too informed on military operations, lest they be perceived as agents of the military.

The hazards of poor communication between and among the agencies involved in PSO were evident in Kosovo. In 2002, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) wanted to arrest persons of interest in northern Mitrovica. UNMIK personnel came under attack and found themselves without support. The local KFOR military unit claimed that no one informed it of UNMIK's plans, so they did not know that they were required to provide assistance or even be in a state of higher readiness.³⁰⁶

Another example was the case of Kotor Varos in Bosnia in 1999, when a Canadian-led SFOR team had decided to stop further humanitarian aid until the Bosnian local leadership accepted the return of ethnic minorities. That action was undermined a few days later when an NGO announced a major donation of money and material to the town, effectively negating the effects of the SFOR embargo.³⁰⁷

Subsection: Organization

Military and HAOs differ dramatically in their structure and organizational discipline. Humanitarian organizations, including NGOs and IOs, are often horizontally

³⁰⁵ Zaalberg, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," 278.

³⁰⁶ Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations*, 10.

³⁰⁷ Christopher Ankersen, *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation: Canada in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

structured, with more emphasis on decentralization.³⁰⁸ Moreover, because of the heavy reliance on volunteers in many organizations, especially smaller ones, and the absence of mandatory postings even in USAID, it is often difficult to identify a formal and useful decision-making structure in civilian organizations.

By contrast, the military is a hierarchical structure, with uniform tables of organization and equipment, as well as a clearly defined and disciplined chain of command.³⁰⁹ It is rarely difficult to identify who the decision maker is in any military organization, and military leaders are often frustrated by the lack of a clearly-defined civilian counterpart with all of the requisite decision-making authorities to which military leaders are long accustomed. Colonel Bob Stewart, the commander of the first British deployment in Bosnia in 1992, stated, “The military is hierarchical, authoritarian, centralized, large, and robust, while [the civilian structure] is flat, consensus-based, with highly decentralized field offices.”³¹⁰

³⁰⁸ Victoria Metcalfe, Stuart Gordon, and Simone Haysom, “Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordinatio,” HPG Working Paper (London UK: Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute, May 2012), 5, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7679.pdf>; Walter Clarke, “The Humanitarian Dimension in Kosovo: Coordination and Competition,” in *Lessons From Kosovo: The KFOR Experience*, 2002, 207–32, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf; HPG, “The Humanitarian System: How Does It Affect Humani-Tarian Space?” (London, UK: Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute, 2011), <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-documents/4652.pdf>; “Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues,” HPG Working Paper (Humanitarian Policy Group Overseas Development Institute, April 2012), <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7643.pdf>; Collins Guyton Shackelford, “The Politics and Dilemmas of Humanitarian Assistance” (Ph.D., United States -- Illinois, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1995), <http://search.proquest.com.mutex.gmu.edu/docview/304219041/abstract/9F188A0A20D94A89PQ/5>.

³⁰⁹ Winslow, “STRANGE BEDFELLOWS,” 39; Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” 15.

³¹⁰ Michael C. Williams, *Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper 321 (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 36.

Franke points out that the military decision-making process includes finite deadlines and mission-specific rules of engagement that guide the entire structure from top to bottom, introducing a measure of centralization that is necessary to maintain a consistent level of coordinated support to civilian authorities but also can stifle small-unit adaptability.³¹¹ In general, the military's structure does not lend itself to rapid changes in mission, particularly when tasked to undertake missions that lie outside of its primary warfighting focus.

Additionally, the military structure sometimes inhibits the process of passing along CIMIC-related lessons learned from one operation to another. Zaalberg argues that, despite years of PSO experience, "American commanders in Haiti were hardly better informed than their European Commanders about the role and value of [CIMIC]."³¹² In order to mitigate that organizational dilemma, the US Army – with the support of the other uniformed services – developed the Center for Army Lessons Learned, part of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. These are designed to rapidly assimilate experiences in the field and produce changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures that can help the military adapt more quickly to changes in the operational environment.³¹³ Civilian organizations, alas, are not part of the JLLIS, except when invited. To be sure, as Autesserre points out, there are exceptions in many HAO that are willing to share their

³¹¹ Franke, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations"; John G. Cockell, "Civil-Military Responses to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo," *Global Governance* 8, no. 4 (December 2002): 483–502.

³¹² Zaalberg, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," 278.

³¹³ Paul P. Reese, "Center for Army Lessons Learned Services," 2015, <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/15-11.pdf>.

knowledge, but the sharing takes place more on an individual level than as an organized activity.³¹⁴

Organizational discontinuities are further exacerbated by the plethora of nations and IOs that often contribute to PSO. In NATO's KFOR mission after the war in 1999-2000,³¹⁵ there were more than 500 NGOs and IOs, and that number rose to 2,394 by 2004,³¹⁶ with more than 40 nations contributing forces to both KFOR and UNMIK.³¹⁷ It is hard to determine the sizes of the HAOs, since most of them are mainly staffed with part-time workers and usually only a small staff of full-time employees, and their number depends on the organizational budget and number and size of the projects.³¹⁸ In 2005, less than half (48.3%) of organizations were paying their staff, both part- and full-time.³¹⁹ Additionally, in a study by Gardner and Weichin, 15% of NGOs had only one staff member, and about half had between three and six staff members, with an average of five staff members.³²⁰ This sort of civilian proliferation is not unusual. With such a high number of participants coming from different backgrounds and nationalities, it is hardly surprising that misunderstandings and mission and organizational over- and underlaps occurred.

³¹⁴ Autesserre, *Peaceland*, 89.

³¹⁵ Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations*.

³¹⁶ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 268.

³¹⁷ Human Rights Watch | 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor | New York, and NY 10118-3299 USA | t 1.212.290.4700 f 1.212.290.4700, "Failure to Protect," Human Rights Watch, July 25, 2004, 14, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/07/25/failure-protect/anti-minority-violence-kosovo-march-2004>.

³¹⁸ Rebecca Gardner and Yang Weichih, "Mapping and Analysis of Kosovo Civil Society" (Kosovo Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), September 2005), 40, http://www.kcsfoundation.org/repository/docs/03_03_2014_4035052_KCSF_2005_Mapping_and_analysis_of_Kosovo_civil_society.pdf.

³¹⁹ Gardner and Weichih, 40.

³²⁰ Gardner and Weichih, 41.

Subsection: Security

Because traditional military missions focus on combat operations and not on PSO, the military often concentrates on force protection when not involved in active warfare. Absent clear mission requirements, there is little incentive for military units and personnel to interact directly with the indigenous population, so the military frequently isolates itself from the local environment, placing first priority on force protection. Those who do have contact with locals do so primarily through their daily job, such as CIMIC operators, patrol/transport leaders, and military unit leaders. The life of the soldiers was satirically presented in the movie *War Machine*, which portrayed them as disconnected from the local population and their needs.³²¹

In Bosnia, for example, military units in NATO's IFOR, which in 1996 became SFOR, seldom worked directly with the Bosnian people. In 1996, LTG Sir Michael Walker, who commanded a multi-national division in IFOR, told Ambassador Richard Holbrooke that IFOR "intended to take a minimalistic approach to all aspects of implementation other than force protection." IFOR units, particularly those from the United States, were seen as "hunkering down in large bases"³²² with almost no contact with the local population, and when they left the base, they were under so much protection that they got the nickname "ninja turtles"³²³ because of their ever present flak

³²¹ Peter Bradshaw, "War Machine Review – Brad Pitt Goes over the Top in Afghan War Satire," *The Guardian*, May 22, 2017, sec. Film, <http://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/may/22/war-machine-review-brad-pitt-afghanistan-stanley-mcchrystal-david-michod>.

³²² Zaalberg, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," 261.

³²³ Zaalberg, 261.

vests, Kevlar helmets and other protective equipment. This significantly changed after transition to SFOR and even more after EUFOR took over the mission.

Military emphasis on force protection sometimes results in the establishment of bases that simplify security but complicate CIMIC. In the early days of IFOR, for example, military forces near Tuzla, Bosnia, were stationed more than 20 minutes away from civilian counterparts downtown, significantly complicating the mechanics of CIMIC.³²⁴ In Iraq and Afghanistan, where the military missions were changed to embrace a wider range of PSO, force protection was accorded a lesser priority. Base camps were adjusted accordingly, and military units were heavily involved with the local populations.

Yet, significant challenges to CIMIC remained, even when military units were successfully and deeply involved in humanitarian relief or development projects.³²⁵ Civilian perceptions of security requirements vary depending upon the nature of the civilian organization and its composition. Formal governmental and international organizations, such as USAID and the US Department of State, as well as elements of the United Nations, are often limited in their ability to execute PSOs until a permissive or semi-permissive security environment is established, or there is an extensive military presence to provide protection. Just like the military, these formal organizations are governed by force protection priorities established by their parent governments. In Iraq,

³²⁴ Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*.

³²⁵ Joint Doctrine and Concepts, "The Military Contribution to PSO - JWP 3-50" (Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, June 2004), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/437446/20130402-jwp3_50_ed2_pso-Archived.pdf.

US government rules for the security of civilian development and governance personnel meant that positions within the PRTs that were earmarked for civilians were often filled by reserve military personnel³²⁶ with no particular expertise in those disciplines.³²⁷

Other civilian organizations, such as NGOs that are composed of dedicated volunteers, will often “go in harm’s way,” operating from a perspective that personal security is secondary to saving the lives of local civilians.³²⁸ These NGOs are not bound by constraints imposed by governments and often depend upon their manifest neutrality and impartiality to act as shields.³²⁹ NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders, or Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) have suffered fatalities when their operators have ventured into non-permissive environments and been forced to withdraw under fire.³³⁰

NGOs often have an ambivalent relationship with military forces. In Afghanistan, for example, MSF lost five members in a Taliban ambush. Subsequently, MSF accused US military units in the area of provoking the Taliban to indiscriminate attacks by operating in civilian vehicles and wearing civilian clothing.³³¹ These accusations greatly

³²⁶ Caries Abalo, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams - Reservist Playing Major Role in Effort to Rebuild Afghanistan,” *Citizen Airman: The Official Magazine of the Air National Guard & Air Force Reserve* 61, no. 5 (October 2009): 16–19.

³²⁷ Olga Oliker et al., eds., “Assistance in Times of Conflict:: The Pre-September 11 Experience,” in *Aid During Conflict*, 1st ed., Interaction Between Military and Civilian Assistance Providers in Afghanistan, September 2001-June 2002 (RAND Corporation, 2004), 7, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg212osd.9>.

³²⁸ Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin, and Sabine Selchow, “Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for Europe,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 83, no. 2 (2007): 273–88.

³²⁹ Brendan Groves, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations: Lessons Learned from the Azizabad Attack,” *Air Force Law Review* 65 (January 2010): 1–50.

³³⁰ Christopher Holshek, “Looking Beyond the ‘Latest and Greatest,’” in *The Pulse of Humanitarian Assistance* (Fordham University, 2007), 276, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x07g6.10>; Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil - Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 11, no. 2 (2006): 11.

³³¹ Holshek, “Looking Beyond the ‘Latest and Greatest,’” 276; Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil - Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” 11.

complicated CIMIC, undermining trust and confidence between civilian and military operators.³³²

Friction between the military and civilians in PSO can be evident in more mundane tasks as well. In East Timor as in Kosovo, civilian organizations sought military protection for their convoys. Military regulations required at least a 48-hour advance notification in order to put together such convoys – a requirement that NGOs considered impractical.³³³ So in some cases,³³⁴ NGOs such as ICRC would hire local security forces for their convoy protection requirements, as in Afghanistan, the Congo, Somalia, and Yemen.³³⁵

Additionally, many HAOs “argue that military complicates their work because, in the short run, it works against impartiality, neutrality, and consent that have traditionally underpinned their work; and in the long run, it addresses none of the structural problems or root cases that had led to the eruption of violence.”³³⁶

³³² Holshek, “Looking Beyond the ‘Latest and Greatest,’” 276.

³³³ Oliner et al., “Assistance in Times of Conflict,” 19.

³³⁴ Andrew Harris and Peter Dombrowski, “Military Collaboration with Humanitarian Organizations in Complex Emergencies,” *Global Governance* 8, no. 2 (June 2002): 159; John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 25; John G. Sommer and Carole C. Collins, “Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role of the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance” (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group under a contract with the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, November 1994), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACA865.pdf.

³³⁵ Malcolm Hugh Patterson and Ebooks Corporation, *Privatising Peace: A Corporate Adjunct to United Nations Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 72.

³³⁶ Thomas George Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*, New Millennium Books in International Studies (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 3.

Subsection: Rotation, Longevity, and Staying Power

In PSO, combat units normally remain in an area of operations for four to six months, and staff members stay up to one year.³³⁷ Requirements are driven by macro-training schedules, other global requirements, and individual professional development. So, as a participant in a study by Rietjens et al. said, “As soon as you have learned enough, it is time to return home.”³³⁸ Many HAO personnel, by contrast, stay for at least 18 months, and members of some organizations stay for five or more years.³³⁹ As a result, military organizations are much more interested in quick impact projects that only last up to a few months and can show immediate results.³⁴⁰ Military leaders, who are often not well versed in economic development, undertake projects based on negotiations with local populations that may address a personal “hot button” issue but not lay the foundation for long-term stability nor respond to enduring local needs.³⁴¹

Many projects HAOs conduct, by contrast, are designed to last for years and are based on long-term engagement and in-depth knowledge by the civilian organizations involved. When the Dutch Government wanted to conduct a development project in Afghanistan costing 126 million euros, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted Afghan NGOs, and, “through their local contacts and in-depth knowledge of the local

³³⁷ Arbuckle, *Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations*, 59; Miller, “Analysis and Process Model Development for Situation Awareness During Military Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” 41; Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations*, 9.

³³⁸ Bas Rietjens et al., “Enhancing the Footprint: Stakeholders in Afghan Reconstruction,” *Parameters* 39, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 30.

³³⁹ Arbuckle, *Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations*; Sebastiaan Rietjens et al., “Meeting Needs: Value Chain Collaboration in Stabilisation and Reconstruction Operations,” *Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management* 4, no. 1 (2014): 50.

³⁴⁰ Rietjens et al., “Meeting Needs,” 49–50.

³⁴¹ Rietjens et al., 50.

situation, they were able to portray a perspective from the Uruzgani population,” according to a participant in the study by Rietjens et al.³⁴²

The issue of “staying power” affects CIMIC directly. Because the military is “in and out,” there is seldom time for soldiers and civilians to develop the kinds of personal, long-term relationships that produce the trust and confidence necessary for truly effective CIMIC.

Subsection: Socio-Economic Awareness

While it is self-evident that a deep understanding of the socio-economic environment in which PSO are conducted is key to enduring success, PSO practitioners – military and civilian – are often deficient in that sort of understanding. Rietjens contends that without a sophisticated situational awareness, leaders will invariably make questionable decisions.³⁴³ For instance, KFOR military leaders were reluctant to hire local help in Kosovo because they believed that the Kosovars were untrained and sometimes unwilling to work, which, in turn, would cause a specific project to be unnecessarily delayed in its completion and be of questionable quality.³⁴⁴ Yet, the Kosovars needed work more than they needed the project.

Indeed, by involving the local work force, development projects create self-sustainability for the local population in the region.³⁴⁵ With high local unemployment in

³⁴² Rietjens et al., 50.

³⁴³ Sebastiaan J. H. Rietjens, “Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan,” *Armed Forces & Society* (0095327X) 34, no. 2 (January 2008): 181.

³⁴⁴ Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” 14.

³⁴⁵ Luis Peral et al., eds., *Afghanistan: 2011 - 2014 and beyond ; from Support Operations to Sustainable Peace ; Joint Report*, ISS Report (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2011).

Kosovo, hiring 50,000 local personnel as part of NGOs and IOs would have had a significant impact, not only in the ability to complete their projects but also in reducing unemployment.³⁴⁶ The issue of hiring local nationals is by no means limited to Kosovo. In Somalia, the military used “... military engineers to build roads ... while hundreds of local men remained unemployed.”³⁴⁷

Inadequate engagement of local nationals has other effects as well. Mockaitis³⁴⁸ pointed to one case in which a KFOR officer made a decision to paint a youth center in Kosovo the “wrong color,” “leaving the NGO to spend the next month sorting out the mess.”

But the military is not alone in its sometimes spotty decision-making. An NGO in Afghanistan hired a local armed militia group to provide the NGO with security, and that militia turned out to have direct connections with local insurgents.³⁴⁹

Subsection: Funding

NGOs and IOs operate strictly on donations by individuals, organizations/corporations, or governments, but in some instances they are obliged to refuse specific contributions if the donating agency or individual conflicts with one of

³⁴⁶ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 268.

³⁴⁷ Miller, “Analysis and Process Model Development for Situation Awareness During Military Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” 4.

³⁴⁸ Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations*, 17.

³⁴⁹ Jonathan Goodhand, “Contested Boundaries: NGOs and Civil–Military Relations in Afghanistan,” *Central Asian Survey* 32, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 294, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2013.835211>; Patterson and Ebooks Corporation, *Privatising Peace*, 72.

their core beliefs or attempts to infringe on their independence.³⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, many HAOs receive most of their funding based how they are perceived by donors, and this reality has forced some NGOs to stray from strict adherence to their independence. Some have been targeted by local insurgents based on a perceived lack of neutrality, since they accepted donations from political or military components.³⁵¹

The military bases its humanitarian aid on national government support, as exemplified by the US involvement in Colombia,³⁵² when Congress approved \$1.3 billion for military assistance. Also, during the US involvement in Operation Support Hope in Rwanda,³⁵³ the military was able to conduct development projects as big as \$100 million. As retired Major General Paul Eaton said, "Give money to the military and let them deal with it. But the more military's role expands, the more civilian agencies such as State Department and USAID find themselves sidelined."³⁵⁴ This issue has led to the concept of "Walmartization,"³⁵⁵ or having everything under one roof. Further complicating the issue are politicians who would like to cut costs for everything but while still demanding everything.

³⁵⁰ Eva Wortel, "Humanitarians and Their Moral Stance in War: The Underlying Values," *International Review of the Red Cross* 91, no. 876 (December 2009): 789, <http://dx.doi.org/mutex.gmu.edu/10.1017/S181638310999052X>.

³⁵¹ Holshek, "Looking Beyond the 'Latest and Greatest,'" 111–12.

³⁵² Frank O. Mora and Michelle Munroe, "Congress and Civil-Military Relations in Latin America and the Caribbean: Human Rights as a Vehicle," in *Congress and Civil-Military Relations* (Georgetown University Press, 2015), 183, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0dpq.14>.

³⁵³ John E. Lange, "Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda," *Parameters* 28, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 108.

³⁵⁴ Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything*, 102.

³⁵⁵ Brooks, 317.

Similarly, civilian agencies that are involved in PSO are generally funded by their parent governments, but this funding is often dwarfed by budgets for the military. In the United States, money for USAID – the USG’s primary agency for international assistance – comes from the annual Foreign Operations budget. In the 2015 budget request, non-military development funding was some \$20 billion, or about four percent of the \$500 billion budget for the Department of Defense. To be sure, only a small portion of the \$192 billion “operations and maintenance” portion of the DoD budget is devoted to PSO, but the sheer magnitude of the defense budget underscores the importance that the military plays – at least in the United States – in supporting PSO.³⁵⁶

Military forces usually build their logistics infrastructure to support their primary warfighting mission. Therefore, most of the items in military warehouses are weapons, ammunition, and explosives, as well as large quantities of items that could have a dual function such as communications equipment, tents, blankets, water purifiers, sand, and construction lumber, in addition to seemingly small items such as toilet paper and socks. Many of those items can be used to advance humanitarian assistance in addition to supporting combat operations.

Supplies for HAOs, on the other hand, are either purchased for their specific area of expertise or donated, and the latter sometimes cannot be effectively used or does not have the same value. A simple example is the US Food Bank and its campaign for monetary donations rather than actual cans of food so that they could buy fresh food for

³⁵⁶ The Secretary of the State, “Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs - Fiscal Year 2015” (Department of State, March 4, 2014), 62, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222898.pdf>.

people they are helping.³⁵⁷ Therefore, donations can be both a blessing and a curse, depending on the type, quality and quantity that is donated. According to research performed by Berckmans, Dawans, Schmets, Vanderberg, and Autier, between 27,800 and 34,800 metric tons of drugs and medical materials entered Bosnia between 1992 and mid-1996, but 50 to 60 percent of it was either not useful or had expired. By mid-1997, there were 17,000 metric tons of medicine that had to be destroyed at cost of over \$34 million, which put an additional burden on Bosnia's already-devasted economy.³⁵⁸ Unfortunately, certain organizations and/or individuals used the medicine donation project as an opportunity to dump medicine that would soon expire, while at the same time collecting tax breaks in their own countries.³⁵⁹ Additionally, transporting logistical support can be expensive and sometimes even infeasible, so alternative approaches need to be implemented in order to provide humanitarian assistance.

Finally, there is the problem of the "footprint dilemma,"³⁶⁰ in which the local population becomes overly dependent on humanitarian aid, which hinders the local economy and impedes a sense of accomplishment on the part of the local population, which eventually creates a long-term problem.

³⁵⁷ "Donating Food to a Food Bank? Consider Cash Instead of Canned Goods | Feeding America," accessed April 23, 2020, <https://www.feedingamerica.org/hunger-blog/donating-food-food-bank-consider-cash-instead-canned-goods>.

³⁵⁸ "Inappropriate Drug-Donation Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992 to 1996 | NEJM," accessed April 23, 2020, <https://www-nejm-org.mutex.gmu.edu/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199712183372512>.

³⁵⁹ "Pharmaceutical Donations by the USA: An Assessment of Relevance and Time-to-Expiry - ProQuest," accessed April 23, 2020, http://search.proquest.com/docview/229575627?accountid=14541&rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo.

³⁶⁰ Paris and Sisk, "Managing Contradictions."

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Section One: Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to identify whether and how CIMIC increases the likelihood that PSO will be successful. To what extent does CIMIC serve as the bedrock upon which PSO initiatives and programs can be implemented to reduce the probability of conflict, limit the scope of conflict already underway, and prevent the resumption of conflict in the future?

I searched for answers to these questions through a within-case comparison of three different periods of peacebuilding in Bosnia from 1995 to 2020.

Section Two: Research Method

I used a multidisciplinary comparative case study, whose aims were to answer *whether* and *why* cooperation is not adequate,³⁶¹ and what measures can be implemented to ensure that CIMIC succeeds. I conducted this research in three phases.³⁶² Phase one consisted of academic research on the topic, a review of media and other reports pertaining to CIMIC, and refining the research questions.³⁶³ In phase two, I conducted research on three case studies.³⁶⁴ Kaarbo and Barsley³⁶⁵ argue that a “case” can be a

³⁶¹ David de Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research*, 1 edition (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2001), 1.

³⁶² Stephen Gorard, *Research Design: Creating Robust Approaches for the Social Sciences*, 1 edition (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2013).

³⁶³ Gorard, chap. 3; Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research*, 17.

³⁶⁴ Gorard, *Research Design*, chap. 6.

³⁶⁵ Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan K. Beasley, “A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology,” *Political Psychology* 20, no. 2 (June 1999): 372.

single data point: a historical event, a geographical location, or a person. I researched three discrete CIMIC operations that composed a singular historical event in one geographic location (PSO in Bosnia). My goal was for this approach to illustrate how cooperation improves or diminishes over time. In the final phase, I conducted interviews and analyzed the findings, which I then compared with the findings from the first two phases of my research.

Section Three: Reasons for the Case Study Approach

My primary research methodology was the use of case studies. In general, a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and multiple sources of evidence are used.³⁶⁶ I chose the case study method because it allows for “addressing qualitative variables, individual actors, decision-making processes, historical and social contexts,”³⁶⁷ all of which I explore in this study. Also, this method provides a tool for testing simple theories.³⁶⁸ Since it directly involves that set of preconceived ideas, the case study is meant to be an end in and of itself. There are several approaches to case studies, such as using theories to explore cases, using cases to develop a theory, or using cases to explore, refine, or test a theory.³⁶⁹ I focused primarily on the development of theories.

³⁶⁶ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Fifth edition (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 23.

³⁶⁷ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Fourth Printing edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2005), 9.

³⁶⁸ George and Bennett, 116.

³⁶⁹ Kaarbo and Beasley, “A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology,” 373–75.

The case study method also allows the usage of a smaller number of cases, compared with statistical methods, which require larger numbers of “instance of phenomenon.”³⁷⁰ According to Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, “Case studies are frequently used in sociological research, sometimes as the preliminary to more extensive investigation but often as the primary research method. In the latter case, shortage of resources or difficulties in gaining access to research subjects are often reasons for this choice.”³⁷¹

The case study is the most flexible of all research designs, allowing the researcher to retain the holistic characteristics of real-life events while investigating empirical events. Some researchers believe that a case study is not appropriate for research but only for the exploratory phase, while surveys and histories are more appropriate for the descriptive phase, and an experiment is the only way of pursuing explanatory or causal inquiries.³⁷² However, Yin points out that a case study helps the researcher to carry out an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon under study.³⁷³

Another reason I chose the case study approach is because I wanted to describe *how* and *why*.³⁷⁴ Indeed, due to the nature of CIMIC, I believe that other methods, especially quantitative methods such as surveys, are not appropriate for this kind of research. CIMIC is quite specific, and the population of its practitioners – military and civilian – is quite small. Also, the field is relatively new, and there is an absence of a

³⁷⁰ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 17.

³⁷¹ Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner, *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, 3rd ed., New ed, Penguin Reference Books (London ; New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 45–46.

³⁷² Yin, *Case Study Research*, 7.

³⁷³ Yin, *Case Study Research*.

³⁷⁴ Yin, 9.

large pool of data from which to glean meaningful analysis using quantitative methods. In addition, the use of case studies is not as logistically daunting as other methods such as ethnography or participant observation.³⁷⁵ Such methods would be impractical, since they would have required me to be embedded in the NGO/IOs or military forces, which was not realistic.

The case study can be seen as an instance of a “class of events,” a phenomenon of scientific interest that the researcher seeks to explore.³⁷⁶ The aim is to develop a theory regarding the causes of similarities or differences among cases. In this study, the cases focused on a small part (CIMIC) of the bigger whole (conflict). They also provided a higher level of conceptual validity³⁷⁷ by only measuring the variables that were relevant and should be measured. Since some variables, such as security or cultural understanding, are difficult to measure and depend on the individual perception of each participant, the case study approach seems appropriate. Additionally, case studies are helpful in exploring causal links,³⁷⁸ since each case can provide a large number of intervening variables that can be observed, allowing the researcher to inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular causal mechanism and also to use the causal mechanism “to give a historical explanation of cases.”³⁷⁹ This study employed a controlled comparative case study,³⁸⁰ or a comparison of similar cases that are

³⁷⁵ David de Vaus, *Te*, 1 edition (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2001), 11.

³⁷⁶ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 17.

³⁷⁷ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005.

³⁷⁸ George and Bennett.

³⁷⁹ George and Bennett, 21.

³⁸⁰ George and Bennett, 81.

comparable in all respects except for their independent variable, which in this case was the obstacles to effective CIMIC.

Subsection: Focus on NATO in Bosnia

This case study focused on a country in which CIMIC has been the cornerstone of peacebuilding and peacekeeping after a conflict, highlighting instances in each time period in which CIMIC was successful and in which it was not. I conducted the research through three consecutive cases in Bosnia when CIMIC was used as part of PSO, two NATO-led missions (IFOR and SFOR) and the current EUFOR. I also conducted extensive research for the period before IFOR, led by the UNPROFOR mission, to get an idea of how CIMIC was conducted then and how everything led to the involvement of NATO. While many actors – both institutional and individual – are involved in CIMIC and PSO, my study focused on NATO because of the organization’s long history and concomitant procedural discipline, its involvement in a number of important PSO over the past twenty years, and the high probability that NATO will expand its role in PSO in its increasingly expanding geo-political reach. Since CIMIC is a NATO approach, I did not include the UN mission in this study. I chose Bosnia because it was a birthplace of CIMIC as a tool in PSO. And while this tool evolved and developed over time, CIMIC in Bosnia has been explored very little through academic research. Also, Bosnia offered and still offers a lot of lessons to be identified and subsequently learned.

Even though my primary organizational focus is NATO, there is sufficient overlap between NATO and the EU to learn lessons from both. Also, the notion of the

mission has drastically changed since the 1990s; in the early days of the first mission, most military units were moving in convoys wearing full battle dress, but today, PSO operators not only move freely among the locals but also live among them as part of LOTS.³⁸¹

Throughout the case studies, I focused particularly on the nations that contribute to NATO-led PSO as well as civilian international and nongovernmental organizations that are involved in humanitarian assistance; even though every military involved in NATO PSOs participates in CIMIC, there are fundamental differences in their approaches to it. For simplicity, I limited my research to three nations whose militaries are heavily involved in CIMIC: France, the Netherlands, and the US. I chose these countries primarily because of their major involvement in CIMIC. Similarly, I examined a few civilian HAOs, some of which favor CIMIC and at least few of which do not; while some civilian HAOs are heavily inclined toward cooperation, some refuse any kind of contact. The choice of HAOs was based on their responsiveness. In the pilot study conducted in 2013, out of 61 HAOs approached in the first attempt only 11 responded, which is only a 6.71 percent rate of responsiveness; out of those, nine replied that they do not cooperate with the military, leaving only 1.2 percent of the HAOs approached satisfying the basic requirement for an interview.³⁸² I cast my initial net with HAOs more widely in this study to increase the number of responses.

³⁸¹ Maj. Gen. Virgil L. Packett et al., "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Coalition Doctrine and LOT Houses" (Military Review, April 2005), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/packett.pdf>.

³⁸² Edi Jurkovic, "Civil-Military Cooperation: When The Military Drops Rifles and Picks Up Wrenches" (Thesis, 2013), <http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/8313>.

George and Bennett suggest that “cases should not be chosen [solely] because they are interesting or because ample data exist for studying,”³⁸³ but rather because they are most relevant to the study. In the case of Bosnia, this was one of the challenges for this study. As previously explained, not much has been written in academic literature about CIMIC in Bosnia, but also, it was hard to find participants who were in PSO at the beginning. Also, overall data on CIMIC are not plentiful because CIMIC is a small segment of PSO, but these cases can offer insight into how CIMIC has developed over time since it was first used in Bosnia in 1995.³⁸⁴

As part of phase two, I conducted interviews with military and civilian CIMIC operators. In phase three, I analyzed the data and, through comparison of the data in the selected cases, I proposed potential solutions for CIMIC operators and researchers, which are in the discussion section of this study.

Subsection: Phase 1 - Research

In phase one, I conducted in-depth literature and document research, with access to the lessons learned/identified compiled by both military and civilian organizations. Some authors such as Brewer and Hunter consider this approach nonreactive, since there is no direct contact with the participants.³⁸⁵ It can be conducted by observation without participants’ knowledge or indirectly through the archives, artifacts, or literacy.³⁸⁶ I was

³⁸³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 69.

³⁸⁴ William R. Phillips, “Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia,” *NATO Review*, Spring 1998.

³⁸⁵ John Brewer and Albert Hunter, *Foundations of Multimethod Research : Synthesizing Styles* (Thousand Oaks [etc.]: Sage Publ, 2006), 2.

³⁸⁶ Brewer and Hunter, 61.

aware that problems could arise if I focused too much on one source, so I tried to avoid that. Another issue was not to try to find too many resources, since that would also be counterproductive. And while I was successful in avoiding a limited number of sources, from time to time I fell into the trap of constantly searching for additional sources. Through research, I was able to identify a database on military lessons identified/learned, but no civilian counterpart. This may have led my research to lean to one side, in the same way as measuring crime only by researching police records, which are based on just reported crimes. How can a researcher gauge the true level of crime, including non-reported crimes?³⁸⁷

Subsection: Phase 2- Interviews

Since my pool of potential participants was somewhat narrow, I interviewed an initial sample and then tried, through the snowballing technique,³⁸⁸ to get access to a much larger sample of available participants. This also posed a challenge because only a limited number of secondary participants agreed to talk with me. All participants and material were non-randomly chosen, since they needed to satisfy certain criteria, such as involvement in PSO and experience in CIMIC. The goal was to develop a theory through inductive reasoning³⁸⁹ that spoke to the obstacles to CIMIC.

In this case, random sampling would have been very difficult or impossible due to the participants' professional orientation. I used interviews³⁹⁰ because I was interested in

³⁸⁷ Brewer and Hunter, 2–3.

³⁸⁸ Gorard, *Research Design*, 83.

³⁸⁹ Vaus, *Research Design in Social Research*.

³⁹⁰ Irving Seidman, *Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences*, 3rd ed (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006), 7.

what others could say about the research topic. Interviews gave a human aspect to the case study findings. According to Seidman,³⁹¹ “Telling stories is essentially a meaning-making process. When people tell stories, they select details of their experience from their stream of consciousness.” As Flick stated, by analyzing experience of individuals or groups it can be related to biographical life histories.³⁹² Also, the “interview is one of the major approaches in collecting data in qualitative research, and specific ways of documenting what happened in the single interview.”³⁹³ That is what I was interested in: experience of what worked and what did not, with the goal of gaining insight into prescriptive solutions for the future, including how to fix something that is not working, or to improve what is working. As Flick et al. stated, “If you want to know how people understand their world and their lives, why not talk with them?”³⁹⁴ Participants also provide a unique perspective about the research problem, which—although subjective—is a valuable means of better understanding the problem. So an interview helps with understanding the world from the participants’ point of view.³⁹⁵ For example, according to some sources, even Thucydides conducted interviews with participants from the Peloponnesian War in order to write the history of the war.³⁹⁶

Other common methods did not seem appropriate for this type of study. The sample size would have been too limited for me to apply quantitative methods, and

³⁹¹ Seidman, 7.

³⁹² Uwe Flick et al., *Doing Interviews* (London: SAGE, 2007), X.

³⁹³ XV.

³⁹⁴ Flick et al., 1.

³⁹⁵ Flick et al., XV.

³⁹⁶ Flick et al., 5.

ethnography and participant observation also would not have been the best fit.³⁹⁷ In that scenario, I would have been required to identify myself as a member of either an HAO or a military force, so it would have been difficult to maintain even the appearance of researcher impartiality.

I conducted interviews with NATO CIMIC personnel from the United States, France, and the Netherlands who had field experience in Bosnia and with representatives of civilian organizations who operated alongside the military. Because the range of participants was limited to those who have experience with the interaction between HAOs and military operators in areas of conflict, the sample size was low, so this method seemed appropriate.

In order to get insightful answers, I asked semi-structured questions,³⁹⁸ which allowed for open-ended interviews, which left the interview as an open dialogue between egalitarian partners.³⁹⁹ Since the plan was to interview civilian and military PSO personnel, semi-structured questions helped me gather specific data about their respective professional experiences. As stated above, civilians and military operators have different cultures, so I slightly adjusted my interview questions to capture and account for those differences. In some cases, some of the questions were not applicable, so I did not use them with all participants.

³⁹⁷ Allaine Cerwonka, *Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in Ethnographic Fieldwork* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

³⁹⁸ Nigel King and Christine Horrocks, *Interviews in Qualitative Research* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2010), 75.

³⁹⁹ Flick et al., *Doing Interviews*, 14.

Some interviews were conducted through modern methods of communication, such as Skype, particularly to reach participants who do not live in the area or who preferred to avoid in-person contact because of COVID-19. In one case, neither in-person nor Skype communication was possible, so I corresponded with the participant via e-mail. In general, that method risks slowing the process of gathering data if participants do not respond quickly, but in this case, the participant was really swift to respond. All but one participant agreed to let me record the interview, so I recorded all in-person and Skype interviews but also took very careful notes.

I asked interviewees the following questions:

- 1) How long have you been serving in your organization?
- 2) What is your nationality?
- 3) Do you have both military and civilian experience?
- 4) Do you think that PSO in this capacity is serving its purpose?
 - a. How can it be improved?
- 5) Do you think that PSO is a job for:
 - a. Military?
 - b. Humanitarian assistance organizations?
 - c. Both
- 6) What is your experience working with:
 - a. International military forces?
 - b. Local military forces?
 - c. International humanitarian assistance organizations?

- 7) Do you think that either or both military and humanitarian assistance organizations (HAOs) had an ulterior motive?
- 8) Were projects really tailored toward the needs of the local population?
- 9) Of the places you have served in any capacity, where have you been involved in cooperation with both civilian and military structures?
- 10) What do you believe are the goals of CIMIC?
- 11) What is your view on cooperation between military and civilian humanitarian assistance organizations?
 - a. In your experience, has it been successful?
 - b. Why or why not?
- 12) Do you think that actions of military and/or humanitarian assistance organizations were fair toward all sides in PSO?
- 13) Can you give a few examples of positive and/or negative cooperation between the military and humanitarian assistance organizations?
- 14) Based on those examples, how can that cooperation be expanded?
- 15) Do you think that some of following areas can be improved, or they are functioning well? Organization, security, socio-economic awareness, funding, communication
 - a. Is there any other area that needs improvement?
 - b. Is there any area that works well but is not mentioned?

- 16) What are the long-term implications of cooperation or lack thereof between military and humanitarian assistance organizations, particularly as they pertain to people in need?
- 17) Did you witness any cases of institutional jealousy between the military and humanitarian assistance organizations?
- a. If so, how did it affect their ability to help people in need?
- 18) Do you believe that PSO brought a positive outcome (social justice, long lasting peace etc.)?
- a. If yes, why?
 - b. If not, why?
- 19) Is there anyone else that you could recommend or even refer me to talk with about my research?

All elements of this questionere should help answer the main research question: whether and how CIMIC increases the likelihood that PSO will be successful, what are the obstacles to CIMIC, and how those obstacles affected the peace process in Bosnia.

Subsection: Phase 3- Data Analysis through Comparison

In the final phase, I conducted a comprehensive qualitative data analysis and presented my findings to discover the major themes that directly connected to my research question. This process helped me drive my final research findings, conflict analysis and resolution practices. It also shed some light on, and helped create, key recommendations to those concerned with CIMIC and conflict analysis and resolution.

I analyzed the data I collected on military and civilian participants and compared them with my review of the academic literature and media reports. That gave me a solid basis for theory development, or what Lijphod called "hypothesis generating."⁴⁰⁰ The initial stage of data collection did raise more questions, which I explored through phases two and three. However, this was not a strictly linear project; the later phases of research also posed new questions that I explored in part through academic research. By comparing data from both civilian and military respondents and case studies, I hope that I succeeded in finding information that intersects and information that is unique to each side, which indicated different perspectives.

Section Four: Prescription

Based on my research, I developed a series of specific recommendations that address each of the major areas of challenge: culture, training, communications, organization, security, socio-economic awareness, rotation, and funding. These recommendations aligned within each of the functional silos but also included cross-cutting mechanisms to underscore the interrelationships in and among these areas and the need for a comprehensive, international approach to CIMIC in support of PSO. During phase two, I actively solicited recommendations from scholars, experts, and individuals who have "been there and done that." I also took a great care to advance recommendations that are politically, organizationally, and economically feasible. While

⁴⁰⁰ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 682–93.

not prejudging the outcome, I anticipate that many of these recommendations will be phased – starting with modest and achievable objectives and building outward from there.

Section Five: Challenges and Validity

Although I approached this research problem with several sound techniques, it was not without its challenges. The case studies lacked independence,⁴⁰¹ which risked leading to false conclusions; however, by implementing process-tracing methods, I hope I minimized this problem.⁴⁰² Additionally, there could be a perception of bias in the selection of the case studies, but I was limited by the number of recent conflicts in which CIMIC has been employed, so there was a lack of representativeness.⁴⁰³ It is possible that I subconsciously chose certain cases to justify my own theory, but selecting two very different cases should mitigate that concern.

Because my primary research approach included interviews, which are entirely subject to human error and judgment, the reliability of the data might not have been as high as in a study that does not focus on human subjects. In the interviews, each participant provided a subjective, possibly politically directed, opinion about each issue. Some respondents maybe – even subconsciously – gave answers they believed I would like to hear, so there was no way to guarantee that the responses accurately reflected a participant's real opinion. Also, some participants knew or found out that I am a former

⁴⁰¹ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 33.

⁴⁰² George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005; Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013).

⁴⁰³ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 31.

military officer and may have assessed, even though they did not indicate as such, that I am biased toward the military.⁴⁰⁴

Since there was only one researcher, comparative case studies were easier to achieve, as George and Bennett suggested.⁴⁰⁵ The internal validity of the study depended heavily on my findings in the interview phase and whether the findings validated the quality of the questions. Coding findings from the interviews was also subject to internal validity and researcher bias,⁴⁰⁶ especially since I knew who the participants were and because participants helped select other participants through the snowballing method. Furthermore, there was no control group that I could use as a basis for testing the validity of the study, so I needed to be careful not to deviate from the research strategy. During the interview process, I did not encounter variables that the majority of participants did not perceive as relevant, which did not require me to return to phase two and repeat the case study research with new parameters.

All of my participants spoke either English or one of the versions of the Balkan language, which is my native tongue. All participants from outside of Bosnia spoke English, as it is the universal language of humanitarian workers and military officials who are involved in NATO operations, but English was not all participants' first language and is not my first language, so some elements of the discussion may have been

⁴⁰⁴ Brewer and Hunter, *Foundations of Multimethod Research*, 41.

⁴⁰⁵ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 2005, 71.

⁴⁰⁶ Gorard, *Research Design*.

lost in translation. Even talking with native English speakers risked certain challenges, given the different dialects and slang terms, as Winchatz pointed out.⁴⁰⁷

Establishing initial contact with the participants was difficult, but the snowballing technique partly helped, as participants identified others who they assessed would be willing to participate. Unfortunately, the responsiveness of those secondary participants was limited. Additionally, conducting the interviews was time consuming, since they took place one at a time. Creating a transcript of the interview for in-depth analysis also required a lot of time, but by applying some ideas from Graham Gibbs's book, *Analyzing Qualitative Data*, that part was not as challenging as I initially estimated.⁴⁰⁸ The system was quite simple, using a pair of headphones and a modern version of the Microsoft Word dictate option. By listening to the interview and repeating it into the microphone, with occasional correction of certain words and numbers, transcribing was much more manageable.⁴⁰⁹

While some authors present the interview approach as mining and/or traveling,⁴¹⁰ I had quite a different experience. Throughout the process, I felt like a scout or even a native American pathfinder. While a "miner" digs deep to the point of unconsciousness, and a "traveler" knows not only the destination but also the path to get there, I just partially fit into those roles. Even though I knew my destination, due to the objective challenge to find participants to interview, I was always trying to find the path toward the

⁴⁰⁷ Michaela R. Winchatz, "Fieldworker or Foreigner?: Ethnographic Interviewing in Nonnative Languages," *Field Methods* 18 (February 2006): 83–97.

⁴⁰⁸ Graham Gibbs et al., *Analyzing Qualitative Data* (London: SAGE, 2007), 18.

⁴⁰⁹ Gibbs et al., 18.

⁴¹⁰ Steinar Kvale, *Doing Interviews* (1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road, London England EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom: SAGE Publications, Ltd, 2007), 19, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849208963>.

destination, or to strip the surface of conscious experience.⁴¹¹ Some of the reasons that it was hard to find the participants was the length of time between the original event, especially UN and NATO missions, and this study. Also, despite recommendations and snowballing, numerous people whom I contacted did not want to participate, and many of my e-mails were ignored. On the other hand, during the archive research, I did feel like a miner, and I sometimes even felt the danger of being carried away before going back to the path. That was perhaps the biggest challenge of phase one. Also, there were some issues with finding relevant literature. However, after a deeper search I was able to find what I needed, even though it was much harder to “separate the wheat from the chaff.”

Section Six: Ethical Issues

As I expected, there were no ethical issues in this study, but I did take some steps to satisfy ethical aspects inherent in interview techniques. According to King and Horrocks,⁴¹² my questions should be designed and framed carefully so they would not harm participants, and I paid a lot of attention to this. Participation was voluntary; participants were recruited either directly through e-mail, telephone, or in-person contact. All participants were adults with years of experience as part of a military or HAO. I guaranteed confidentiality to each participant,⁴¹³ and I recorded interviews only with the participants’ explicit consent. However, since I conducted most interviews either face-to-

⁴¹¹ Janet Salmons, *Qualitative Online Interviews: Strategies, Design, and Skills*, Second edition (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2014).

⁴¹² King and Horrocks, *Interviews in Qualitative Research*, chap. 7.

⁴¹³ King and Horrocks, 117.

face or over Skype, I was aware of who they were, so I was not able to guarantee absolute anonymity. As Parker stated, “To conceal the identity of research participants might be the most convenient and easiest option, but not actually the most ethical one. One of the effects of the attempt to conceal a participant’s identity is that they are thereby denied the very voice in the research that might originally have been claimed as its aim.”⁴¹⁴ So I was careful to give participants a voice in the research while still protecting their identity. Even though the interview method was attractive because of the opportunity for openness and intimacy, none of the participants disclosed information that they are likely to regret later.⁴¹⁵ In a few cases, the participants said that the conversation evoked fond memories of their time spent in the Balkans.

I guaranteed the respect of each person⁴¹⁶ through informed consent and a detailed explanation of the purpose, goals, and intended outcomes of the study. Each participant had an option to stop the interview, and they were informed as much, but none of them took that option. All interview data, either written or audio/video, are stored on separate, external hard drives that are not accessible through the network, and the personal data⁴¹⁷ are in my research journal and therefore completely separate from the interview data.

⁴¹⁴ Ian Parker, *Qualitative Psychology: Introducing Radical Research*, Repr (Maidenhead: Open Univ. Press, 2011), 19.

⁴¹⁵ Flick et al., *Doing Interviews*, 28.

⁴¹⁶ King and Horrocks, *Interviews in Qualitative Research*, 106.

⁴¹⁷ King and Horrocks, 118.

Section Seven: Looking Ahead

Conflict analysis and resolution practitioners often are directly or indirectly involved in conflict and post-conflict areas as members of humanitarian agencies, advisers to the military, or academics doing research. Practitioners are called upon to find the best *modus operandi* that will maximize the efficiency of resources, both human and material, and complete their tasks in the shortest period of time. This study is intended to be a resource for scholars and practitioners who seek to understand the lessons learned from NATO/EU CIMIC in PSO to emphasize the importance of a multi-track approach to peacebuilding, and as a foundation for the development and implementation of practical measures to improve CIMIC in the years ahead.

This study has significant implications for the discipline of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. As CAR matures and expands its intellectual influence, a growing number of CAR students will emerge as practitioners in the field. Many will become directly or indirectly involved with HAOs, while others will work for governments through the military, the State Department or Foreign Ministry, or other agencies that assist populations abroad. By bringing the seemingly unrelated military and civilian entities closer and providing new generations of CAR practitioners with new tools, the length of time it takes to learn and apply new knowledge could be shortened, which would not only enable practitioners to adjust more quickly in the field but also benefit local populations struggling to recover from war.

The goal of this study, therefore, was to identify the obstacles to CIMIC, how those obstacles thus far have affected the countries in which civilian and military organizations operate, and what measures could be taken to effect greater CIMIC in the years ahead. The following section will try to shed some light on the causes of these obstacles.

CHAPTER FOUR RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The main purpose of this chapter is to present the findings from the study and characteristics of the participants.

Section One: Interview Results

Subsection: Participants' Characteristics

The participants in this study were professionals in the field of PSO, and most had significant experience with it. They can be divided into two categories: current and former military members and current and former HAO operatives. Due to the specific nature of this research, the sample size was relatively small.

Table 2 Participants Approached for an Interview by Organization

Who was approached	Total number	Accepted	Refused	Never Responded	Interviewed	Total approached/ Interviewed
Organizations Military	8	4	0	4	4	8/4
		50%	0%	50%	100%	50%
Organizations Civilian	20	8	3	9	8	20/8
		40%	15%	45%	100%	40%
Individuals (Military & Civilians)	14	9	0	5	9	14/9
		64%	0%	36%	100%	64%

All participants had the opportunity to review the questions prior to the interview, excluding the initial few placement questions, such as nationality, category (military, HOA or both), years of experience, etc., as well as the final question, which was a request

for recommendations of other potential interviewees. Based on their recommendations, new potential participants were contacted.

Table 3 Snowball Effect – “Chain Sampling” with Subsequent Interviewees Based on Recommendations from Initial Respondents

Who was approached	Snowballed	Accepted	Refused	Never Responded	Interviewed	Total Snowballed/Interviewed
Organizations Military	8	5	0	3	4	8/4
		63%	0%	38%	80%	50%
Organizations Civilian	5	3	0	2	2	5/2
		60%	0%	40%	67%	40%
Individuals (Military & Civilians)	8	2	0	6	2	8/2
		25%	0%	75%	100%	25%

Table 4 shows the number of participants who were contacted initially and those whom initial participants recommended through the snowball effect. The ratio of individuals approached and those interviewed is close to 50%, which was higher than I expected, based on prior research projects.

Table 4 Total Approached and Interviewed

Who was approached	Totally approached	Accepted	Refused	Never Responded	Interviewed	Total Snowballed/Interviewed
Organizations Military	16	9	0	7	8	16/8
		56%	0%	44%	50%	50%
Organizations Civilian	25	11	3	11	10	25/11
		44%	12%	44%	40%	40%
Individuals (Military & Civilians)		11	0	11	11	22/11
		50%	0%	50%	50%	50%

Gender plays an important role in PSO, and overall, most military members are men, in spite of UNSC Resolution 1325, which came out during the SFOR mission and which recommends an increase of female members in PSO. Due to the specific nature of the research and how participants were contacted, these results might not take into account the female perspective in the military side of PSO in Bosnia.

Table 5 Gender – Total Number Interviewed

Male	Female	Total
22	7	29
76%	24%	100

Even though many HAOs embrace gender equality, 76% of the participants were male, while only seven women were interviewed. This fits with the overall notion that, despite greater female engagement in HAOs, the most important positions were held by men.⁴¹⁸

The total number of interviewed participants is split almost exactly 50-50, which offered balanced results from the interviews.

Table 6 Organization

HAOs	Military	Both	Total
13	14	2	29
45%	48%	7%	100%

⁴¹⁸ "Facts and Stats about NGOs Worldwide," accessed September 16, 2020, <http://www.standardizations.org/bulletin/?p=841>.

My initial idea was to conduct interviews with PSO participants from France, the Netherlands, and the United States, which are the leading Western CIMIC countries, but it was challenging to find participants from France and the Netherlands. Most of the participants (52%) were from the United States, and the next highest percentage came from Bosnia and Canada, each with 17%. Other nations were represented with one participant each.

Table 7 Nationality

Nationality	#	%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	17
Serbia	1	3
United States	15	52
Germany	1	3
Hungary	1	3
Canada	5	17
The Netherlands	1	3
Total	29	100

My initial plan was to conduct most of the interviews in person, but because of the COVID-19 pandemic, most interviews were conducted through Internet tools such as email, Zoom, and Skype.

Table 8 Type of Interview

Type of interview	#	%
In Person	5	17
Email	2	7
Skype, Zoom, WhatsApp	22	76

The majority of participants were highly experienced and knowledgeable about PSO, and some had experience in both the military and HAOs (Table 6).

Table 9 Years of Expertise of Respondents

<5	5-10	11-20	20+	Retired	Total
4	5	1	12	7	29
14%	17%	3%	41%	24%	100%

Subsection: Themes

The interviews underscored and reinforced the evolution of PSO in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The initial evolution was the transition of PSO responsibilities from the UN to NATO and the range of organizational and operational PSO doctrine and methodologies of each. Beyond that transition, perhaps the most important evolution lay in the achievements of PSO. NATO’s IFOR, with a much more robust and militarily powerful presence than the UN’s UNPROFOR, managed to separate the warring parties and establish conditions for new democratic elections. NATO as a regional political-military organization with the main goal of defense of its own members, the alliance was relatively new to the unique challenges of PSO and developed doctrine and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures on the ground. As it has evolved, NATO PSO doctrine now recognizes five different approaches, conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace building and humanitarian relief, to operations to help

keep or create peace.⁴¹⁹ In Bosnia, three types of operations were implemented: Peace Enforcing, Peace Building, and Peace Keeping. The other two types of operations, Conflict Prevention and Humanitarian Relief, were not implemented in Bosnia, but NATO did put them into force in other areas, such as Indonesia after the tsunami in 2004.⁴²⁰

Approach to Interviews

The initial interviews were initially conducted face-to-face. However, when the COVID-19 pandemic greatly limited the opportunity for in-person interviews, all subsequent interviews took place through e-mail, Zoom, Skype, and in one case, the commercial messaging application WhatsApp. These relatively new means of conducting interviews were both effective and efficient, and underscored a “new normal” in research interview techniques.

The researcher always sent the question to the participants, and most participants chose first to answer them in text form, and later to elaborate in depth during the interview section. The researcher then expanded the responses previously sent by

⁴¹⁹ NATO, “NATO Peace Support Operations Doctrine - AJP-3.4.1” (NATO HQ, May 31, 2012), 37–44, <https://publicintelligence.net/nato-peace-support-operations-doctrine/>.

⁴²⁰ “Tsunami in South-East Asia” (Den Haag: Nederlands Institute voor Militaries Historie, n.d.), [http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/12/1227_041226_tsunami.html](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiG3v7O58zJAhVLWD4KHf_hD6YQFgg0MAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.defensie.nl%2Fbinaries%2Fdefence%2Fdocuments%2Fleaflets%2F2013%2F02%2F05%2Ftsunami-in-south-east-asia-pdf%2Ftsunami-in-south-east-asia-pdf.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFmSfKOsPSt3wKnQBUwhGsPI4BIXw&sig2=ViTd5MNxdZ_7EP3UkwNULQ&bvm=bv.109332125,d.cWw; “The Deadliest Tsunami in History?,” accessed October 29, 2012, <a href=).

participants, focusing on elaborating and elucidating particular issues or observations initially submitted in writing.

Subsection: Evolving Role of PSO in Bosnia

As the PSO missions of NATO and, later, the EU changed, the role of CIMIC reflected those changes. During the time of IFOR, most of the CIMIC activities were based on the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), popularly known as the Dayton Agreement – signed in 1995 and implemented in 1996. The focus was on such immediate needs as the release of prisoners, national elections, DDR of the former warring factions, infrastructure projects, and similar activities in which civilian organizations were oriented toward the continuation of humanitarian activities.⁴²¹

“We were providing protective detail for the first [post war] elections. My unit was responsible for preventing entrance to the city of Banja Luka to anyone from outside. Everyone was supposed to vote in their settlement. ... With our vehicles we were driving slowly in front the column of buses to slow them down. ... At a narrow area, we stopped and pretended that one of our vehicles broke down, and we blocked the road so that no one could pass. After a while, they turned around and went back.”

Interview with military participant

“Our unit was responsible for taking down the Sarajevo TV tower; they were broadcasting pro-war messages.”

Interview with military participant

“For NGOs [needed] to understand the role of international military forces and their role in creating a safe and secure environment ... after that, it is easy to be a tree hugger.”

⁴²¹ Col. William R. Phillips, “Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia,” *NATO Review*, Spring 1998.

Interview with HAO participant

“PSO could be done by a humanitarian assistance organization if no threat of violence existed. That is almost never the case, so PSO should be done via an international mandate, hopefully from the UN.”

Interview with HAO participant

“Specifically, HAOs would notify [the military] on short notice of a convoy or operation that they were conducting, and we would establish fire support coordination measures to prevent fratricide. Additionally, we were required to coordinate all of our non-lethal messaging with the US Ambassador.”

Interview with HAO participant

“We also collaborated with local police and international police organizations to restore rule of law. At first, we led this effort, and once the various police units approved by the Dayton Accords came, my unit provided support only.”

Interview with military participant

“Boots on the ground [sometimes resulted in] not understanding what the efforts of the HAOs could be. The military believes they are the solution to the entire conflict. They don’t understand the army cannot deliver daily food to 50,000 refugees or build and sustain a refugee camp. When OCHA [Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] calls in despair for immediate convoy protection, the force would deliver ASAP.”

Interview with HAO participant

As participants’ comments illustrate, the most important components of PSO should be cooperation, neutrality, and impartiality. This is especially important during the initial phase of the PSO, when security is low and the number of HAOs available to provide assistance to the locals is also low. A number of participants agreed that Peace Support Operations are a job for both military and HAOs, and by using a whole-of-government approach they could make great strides in conflict resolution. However, the respondents also agreed that not all of the organizations participating in PSO can or should do the same job. In the beginning, most PSO activities in Bosnia (and in other

PSO sites) focused primarily on security and force protection. PSO activities depended heavily on the military to establish an environment in which economic and political recovery and development could thrive. By increasing security, the territory became much safer for HAOs to operate. That was extremely important in the initial PSO period, when tensions were high, and there was limited or no control over local units, especially paramilitaries. This was also the time when force protection was especially necessary in order to ensure the safety of HAO personnel.

“An overall mission will not succeed if there is no solid stability operations work to complement that of the security operations.”

Interview with military participant

“Protection in a non-safe environment, the IO/NGO community could perform. If the threat level rises, the force can contribute by delivering protection (protect refugee camps or aid convoys or increase security patrols in unsafe areas, deliver transport as a last resort).”

Interview with military participant

“A large PRT outreach team suddenly appeared at dawn, heavily protected by military units, in a village or town and was able to help as many locals as possible before departing at dusk. ... A second organization would be a Liaison Observation Team (LOT) location. This would often contain a compound with a few buildings surrounded by a protective parameter and some defensive positions. These LOT teams lived partially from the local economy and were very visible and approachable by local populations. Their task was like the CIMIC operators to report constantly to the higher command structure. This system proved to be quite useful in Bosnia.”

Interview with military participant

“HA organizations, whether they are governmental, inter-governmental, or non-governmental, can be expected to play a role during PSO. They will likely be dependent on military forces to ensure the necessary security environment, but even this can be mitigated by employing the principle of impartiality.”

Interview with HAO participant

Most participants agree that security is a crucial part of PSO because, without it, HAOs could not operate in the region.

Subsection: Concerns about Impartiality and Cultural Differences

Because the respondents had all been active participants in PSO at different points in post-war environments, their comments were focused on their individual experiences. These raise cautions about impartiality, particularly with respect to the nexus between security and HAO. There were no recorded cases in Bosnia of locals targeting HAOs because they were escorted by PSO military forces, so respondents with Bosnian experience have different slants on the security-HAO interaction than respondents with experience in PSO elsewhere. MSF left Afghanistan in 2004 after five of their members were killed, because of fear that their personnel would be targeted by a local insurgency. As MSF press explained, “Five of our colleagues were mercilessly shot in the attack. This targeted killing of five of our aid workers is unprecedented in the history of MSF, which has been delivering medical humanitarian assistance in some of the most violent conflicts around the world over the last 30 years.”⁴²² MSF did not have adequate security, in part due to its own internal concern that having military protection would undermine its credibility.

“I dealt with international humanitarian organizations extensively in Bosnia. NGOs that worked in these areas generally maintained their distance from the military to preserve their neutrality, as did the International [Committee of the] Red Cross.”

Interview with military participant

⁴²² “MSF Pulls out of Afghanistan | MSF,” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International, accessed May 28, 2020, <https://www.msf.org/msf-pulls-out-afghanistan>.

The respondents consistently argued that PSO strive to be as neutral and impartial as possible. However, they also recognized that, as in any other process that involves human beings, there is space for human emotions, cognitive dissonances, biases, and prejudices, so PSO cannot always be fully impartial and neutral. As Scheltinga et al. stated, “Reconciliation of cultural differences can be achieved through structured intergroup interactions. This is likely to facilitate the formation of a ‘common group identity, which encompasses both groups.’ Such a recategorization process can reduce intergroup bias.”⁴²³ Gideon further stated, “The term biases discussion in favor of foreign military commitments that can be terminated easily and against those that appear more open-ended.”⁴²⁴

“Some partners showed more sympathy to the locals and the causes of conflict. Being impartial was a challenge for them. The HAOs at times identified or showed sympathy to those whose suffering was caused by an opposing enemy and came to believe that such an enemy was mostly at fault in creating or expanding the conflict and its atrocities. Their partiality and probable bias were carried with them back to the international community, its news media and politicians and the affected diaspora.”

Interview with HAO participant

“None of the IFOR nations provided support to any of the Srpska villages and towns, so my engineer battalion rebuilt and painted a school that had been badly damaged. Additionally, the engineer battalion removed obstacles from the two wrecked bridges over the Sava [River] at Zupanja and Brcko. That led to those bridges being rebuilt.”

Interview with military participant

⁴²³ Tjallie A. M. Scheltinga et al., “Cultural Conflict within Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study in Bosnia,” *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 13, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662840500223606>.

⁴²⁴ Rose Gideon, “The Exit Strategy Delusion - ProQuest,” *Foreign Affairs; New York* 77, no. 1 (February 1998): 59.

“The commanding officer uses the CIMIC operators to give him the number of beds in the local hospital. Why does he need that? The operator should help the operational commander to understand background, culture, historical issues...”

Interview with military participant

While the respondents supported the concepts of neutrality, they also recognized that some of the favoritism toward one group over another was due to measures beyond their control, such as the media labeling one group as invaders even if they had been living in the area for centuries, or more exposure to one side’s story. As Cross said, “Reports of favoritism among locals may have more to do with common language, customs, and familiarity than deliberate inconsistency or lack of professional interaction.” Based on the NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP-3.4.1) Peace Support Operations, “PSO must be conducted impartially, in accordance with the mandate, and without favor or prejudice to any party. Whenever possible, accusations of partiality should be refuted and actions taken to demonstrate and convey the impartiality of the PSF.”⁴²⁵ That is often easier said than done.

“The international community reps perceived the Serbs as the “bad guys.” All of the factions were the bad guys in my opinion. The Muslims had the most effective information operations effort in the area of operations. US policy definitely chose sides for good or ill.”

Interview with military participant

“In my opinion, it was more a political question about Serbs returning to their homes, but those who left their homes were locally integrated into a new area. Also, some areas did not treat all minorities equally. Maybe they could give more coordination and information, so all sides are informed properly.”

⁴²⁵ NATO, “NATO Peace Support Operations Doctrine - AJP-3.4.1,” 45.

Interview with HAO participant

PSO operators from different cultures see the parties in the conflict differently. Sometimes their views are derived from national policy, other times from individual experiences. PSO operators are driven by their own perception of what is fair, what should be done, and how it should be done.

“The French are maybe part of NATO. The French officer was showing up when wanted. He had an appreciation for partnership with Serbs from World War II. His actions showed that he was working with the Serbs. Nations have intent.”

Interview with military participant

“Everybody is different, and you have to invest time into understanding what their motivation is. Understanding, being honest, having common ground, [my counterpart] wanted all of them to have peace. So let’s focus on peacekeeping and how to help all of them. Let’s find common ground.”

Interview with military participant

Each organization bases its culture on the region from which it comes. That also affects how they use aid and CIMIC as a whole in PSO. This comment reflects the reality that perception of the parties drastically changed after time spent on the ground. For example, Commanding Officer Col. Thomas Karremans of the Dutch UNPROFOR battalion that was trying to protect Srebrenica, albeit quite unsuccessfully, when it fell into Serb hands used the similar words. He stated during a press conference in Zagreb, Croatia, that there were "no good guys and no bad guys"⁴²⁶ in the Bosnian war. In a similar case, after calling for air support, a forward air

⁴²⁶ “Dutch Commander Says UN Air Strikes Could Have Saved Srebrenica,” accessed May 29, 2020, <https://www.spacedaily.com/2002/021118132657.2jivrsuw.html>; Uriel Rosenthal, Arjen Boin, and Louise K. Comfort, *MANAGING CRISES: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities* (Charles C Thomas Publisher, 2001), 69.

controller commented to a pilot over the radio just before a bombing, “Good luck girl ... they are all bad guys.”⁴²⁷ Those negative perceptions couldn’t help but influence the level of assistance by both military and HAOs.

Moreover, the different mission sets between the military and HAOs reinforced stereotypes of each. According to the SFOR press release website, for example, the most repeated words after “SFOR” were: “unannounced searches,” “investigations,” and “inspections,”⁴²⁸ indicating that most SFOR activities were associated with protection and operational security, as well reducing the local potential for resurrection of conflict. Another common word was “detaining,” which referred to arresting persons accused of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Subsection: Practical Successes of PSO

Over time as the security situation stabilized, IFOR and later SFOR engaged HAO-type activities such as the construction of roads and bridges, electrical power, natural gas, bridges, telecommunications, water, IPTF training, legal/property rights, refugees and displaced persons, and NGO liaison.⁴²⁹ CIMIC personnel worked with the local electrical distribution company *Elektroprivreda* by providing security while workers were fixing hydro turbines and electrical transformers. Also, they helped facilitate the gas lines and restored natural gas for more than 50% of households in

⁴²⁷ Michael Dobbs, “How a ‘dumb Blonde’ Took on the Serbs,” *Foreign Policy* (blog), accessed May 29, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/02/how-a-dumb-blonde-took-on-the-serbs/>.

⁴²⁸ “NATO/SFOR: Press Releases 2004,” accessed May 20, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/2004/p2004e.htm>.

⁴²⁹ Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 122.

Sarajevo. They facilitated the repair of roads and bridges and coordinated activities between the World Bank, the International Management Group (IMG), IFOR ARRC engineers, and local agencies, including by conducting surveys and prioritizing repairs. They also coordinated activities with IPTF for reorganizing police forces in Republika Srpska and the Federation, and they worked closely on freedom of movement and coordinated activities with USAID, UNHCR, and OHR. CIMIC teams provided administrative and logistic support, to include performing an infrastructural assessment.⁴³⁰

“We had to put the ponton bridge [over the Sava River] until the main bridge was fixed. By the time we removed it, thousands of the people used it to cross from Croatia.”

Interview with military participant

“I had a great experience working with the US military. They helped us with preventing looting, human trafficking ... also, they helped us transport people. Some others tried to use those people as media propaganda, labeling them as guerrillas.”

Interview with HAO participant

“CIMIC [operators] did several things over the year my brigade served in Bosnia. They responded to civilian concerns, supported rebuilding via USAID, coordinated demining with various NGOs, and provided data to a Bosnia-wide demining data base. My brigade focused the faction military on clearing routes through the Zone of Separation to enable movement. CIMIC in some instances worked contracting of local nationals and local companies to support IFOR units and rebuild within the limits of money available and authorities that we had.”

Interview with military participant

⁴³⁰ Wentz, 122–23.

Participants highlighted that the military did get involved in helping the local population but through indirect means, such as building temporary bridges, providing transportation of goods and people, and providing protection for the regions and convoys. Later in the PSO in Bosnia, respondents reported that there was a push by HAOs for certain activities to be performed by the military, even those that typically fell under civilian responsibility. As previously stated, when there is no HAO counterpart, then the military may be called upon to assist even if it is not best equipped to do the job.

“One problem I recall clearly is that organizations mobilized to support particular aspects of the Dayton Accords sometimes wanted the Army to do their job for them. On 26 March 1996, I wrote a note in my daily journal that, with respect to the International Police Task Force, our ‘strategic intent is to find a way to shift responsibility to the IPTF; must achieve this. Lots of folks would like to give us the job for doing these things [dealing with faction police misdeeds]. We should support, not lead, in all of these matters.’ In short, the Army should not be running the show; civilians should. We led in the beginning because we had the capability and capacity until the civilians could get in.”

Interview with military participant

From time to time, for multiple reasons, HAOs could require assistance from the military even in areas in which the HAOs themselves could solve the problem, or that were the HAOs’ responsibility. Based on the interviews and research materials, those cases are rare and sporadic, indicating a lack of experience or poor planning on the part of the requester. Since CIMIC was relatively new, respondents reported a great deal of divergence in approaches by participating nations. This divergence led to identifying the pressing need for reconciliation of national CIMIC doctrines, which in turn led to the

development of AJP-9, NATO CIMIC Doctrine.⁴³¹ A few participants point out that the CIMIC doctrine is not without flaws:

“What can be improved is doctrine - understanding how to do it. There is a lot of understanding from the peace side of the house, and there is a lot from the military side. Practically it is COIN [counterinsurgency]. There is no bridge between those.”

Interview with military participant

“A common strategy [doctrine] developed and agreed to by all partners serving in any area of operations (is essential).”

Interview with HAO participant

A few participants pointed out that doctrines and Rules of Engagement (RoE) did not reflect the needs of the operation, which affected the outcome. Although this shortcoming was identified, it takes time to become a “lesson learned” and be parlayed into a new doctrine. It took around 15 years, from 2003 to 2018, for the CIMIC doctrine to be updated. Respondents agreed that, despite its shortcomings, PSO in Bosnia was generally a success, since there has been no resumption of violent conflict in the past three decades.

Participants highlighted that military and HAOs can achieve a great deal through synergy. While the military was providing security and initial humanitarian assistance in Bosnia, HAOs were able to expand and enhance their activities after a reasonable level of security was established. However, both before and after HAOs took over, the military remained heavily involved, successfully “opening 2,500 km of roads, repairing or

⁴³¹ “AJP 9 Nato Civil Military Cooperation Cimic Doctrine.”

replacing over 60 bridges, and freeing up the Sarajevo airport and key railway lines.”⁴³²

Despite this “mission creep”, the relative stability in the security environment led to a reduction in the number of personnel during the transition from IFOR to SFOR to approximately 25% of the initial number. Over time, that number reduced further.

Table 10 Number of PSO Military Personnel⁴³³

Mission/Year	Number in country (approx.)	Reserve (approx.)	Total (approx.)
IFOR – 119-96	54,000	26,000	80,000
SFOR – 1996-03	32,000	KFOR (from 2000) and Germany	32,000
SFOR – 2003-04	12,000	KFOR and Germany	12,000
EUFOR – 2004-07	7,000	KFOR and Germany	7,000
EUFOR – 2007-09	2,500	KFOR and Germany	2,500
EUFOR – 2009-11	2,000	KFOR and Germany	2,000
EUFOR – 2011-15	1,000	KFOR and Germany	1,000
EUFOR – 2015-Present	600	KFOR and Germany	600

“The closer the PSO is to the peace or competition end of the spectrum, the more likely it is that military forces will play a supporting role.”

Interview with military participant

⁴³² “SFOR Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” accessed May 27, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm>.

⁴³³ Kurt Bassuener, “EUFOR: The West’s Potemkin Deterrent in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Atlantic Initiative & Democratization Policy Council, 2015), <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20180418/108176/HHRG-115-FA14-20180418-SD014.pdf>.

One of the issues respondents flagged in CIMIC was that, at the beginning, before civilian organizations were established who would do such activities, IFOR was responsible for providing gas, electricity, water, and other infrastructure needs.⁴³⁴ As one participant pointed out, when the capabilities of the HAOs and locals increase, military operators reduce their humanitarian aid and focus mainly on supporting their civilian counterparts. After the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established, it was expected to take over the responsibility, but OHR expected IFOR to continue to take the lead. As one participant said:

“Everyone likes coordination; no one likes to be coordinated. ... They [HAOs] often resented being told what to do and where.”

Interview with military participant

However, respondents agreed that civilian elements such as HAOs also played an important role in Bosnia, especially because that conflict was unique at the time. It began with roots in politics and economics but transformed into an ethnic and national war, with each side hungry for more territory.

“You need CIMIC in BiH because of the history of war. Goals are political, not military. [CIMIC] is a tool, and it has to be done with the civilian part of the dialogue, so that is why we have to cooperate. “

Interview with HAO participant

“The understanding that one needs another will lead to closer cooperation; however, it depends on the knowledge of both parties, the military commanders and the International Organization (IO) community. And the level of experience from the CIMIC staff and field workers.”

Interview with military participant

⁴³⁴ Wentz, *Lessons From Bosnia*, 133.

“From my point of view, there is a need for explanation (of CIMIC) for the upcoming generation of military leaders within education and training at the staff officer level.”

Interview with military participant

Participants pointed out that cooperation is essential and that both military and HAOs operators should understand that.

Subsection: Communication and Leadership

All respondents agreed that communication in and among the various PSO organizations is extremely important. However, communication between compatriots from different organizations and especially between military and civilian counterparts is often lacking. It was an obstacle identified during the IFOR/SFOR mission, and the mission made efforts to address it. According to Ramarajan et al., “Training regular troops in cooperation and conflict resolution, management, and communication becomes important when the odds and necessity of their being placed in peacekeeping operations has increased considerably.”⁴³⁵

“Although friction will always be present between organizations, in my experience there was generally a failure to establish Unity of Effort based on the common objectives that we did possess. The most import things are communication and transparency.”

Interview with military participant

⁴³⁵ Lakshmi Ramarajan et al., “Successful Conflict Resolution between Peacekeepers and Ngos: The Role of Training and Preparation in International Peacekeeping in Bosnia,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, January 1, 2002), 5, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.305206>.

This comment suggests that unity of effort is of paramount importance and only can be achieved through communication and cooperation. One way to attain that goal is through proper training and education of CIMIC operators from both military and HAOs.

Another important aspect is clear leadership from the top and the identification of “chains of command” formalizing responsibility, authority and accountability.

”Leadership – [OHR High Representative Paddy] Ashdown understood problems. You need leadership from the top.”

Interview with HAO participant

“The regional coordinator is the only one who has all the pieces of the puzzle and who should be able to expel [an organization from the country or region].”

Interview with HAO participant

“The UN is pretty well organized. Report to OCHA, you will get the cluster [all activities are divided into clusters such as food and shelter, communication, advocacy, medical, etc.] and then operate in the area.”

Interview with HAO participant

Most participants understood and agreed that leadership within the PSO should exist, and leaders should have the power to coordinate efforts to the point of being able to require an organization to leave the area if is not playing by the rules. This approach would result in a reduction of duplication of efforts and undermining of each other’s authority, as well as a better understanding of the needs of the local population, since oversight would, ideally, facilitate information sharing.

Communication was one of the problems that respondents identified as having resurfaced, especially in the first few years of the PSO, partly because of the size of the military, and later, the number of the HAOs in the region.

“CIMIC operator ... explaining the situation and what was needed. I contacted a medical supply company in Saskatchewan, Canada. They had refurbished and medically certified equipment that the company was willing to donate. The only thing that could not be supplied was the electrical converters to match the local current. I found that they were readily available for \$40 apiece. The PRT agreed. The Canadian military gave me a 25-foot container. With volunteers, we loaded the equipment. Two PRT members came to help! Once tightly stored inside (not [even] a mouse could fit anymore), I attached a large sign on the load inside to inform the PRT that converters were needed, their cost, and where to get them, plus I sent an e-mail with the same information. ... Here an NGO took over and arranged the transfer to the hospital. It was a joyful occasion with celebrations. Somewhere along the transfer, the sign indicating the need for converters was lost. There was anger and disappointment in the hospital. The equipment would not work on the local current. The PRT was informed and e-mailed me. I resent the earlier e-mail about the converters and where to get them. I could raise the funds to purchase them if needed. The hospital folks and the NGO were informed of this AND DID NOTHING. I was later told that the equipment worth over \$100,000 was dumped somewhere. The next rotation of PRT personnel arrived and was lectured about how idiotic this whole affair was because we in Canada sent the wrong equipment and obviously had no idea of how things worked.”

Interview with military participant

“For NGOs to understand the role of international military forces and their role in creating safe and secure environment, and after that it is easy to be a tree hugger.”

Interview with military participant

A lack of proper communication between the different elements of PSO can result in a loss of contacts and projects. In this case, it led to a loss of focus on an existing project, which failed only because someone did not coordinate a small but crucial part, namely the electricity transformers from 110 to 220 volts.

Subsection: Challenges in Implementation of Projects

Several working-level respondents discussed detailed PSO projects. According to multiple respondents who worked in PSO at the tactical level, projects were not always tailored to the needs of the locals. One of the reasons was the lack of effective communications. Additionally, a lack of understanding of the situation, or even trying projects that worked in a different type of conflict but did not apply to Bosnia, contributed to the failure of certain PSO-led projects.

“[Projects] are not [tailored to the specific needs]; it is one size fits all. It should have, if properly designed, set up a program for the local community. ... National programs like Canada’s ‘Signature Projects’ ... seemed more concerned with raising Canada’s international profile.”

Interview with military participant

“Not very often, projects were started without a good common operational picture or situational or cultural understanding.”

Interview with HAO participant

Most participants agreed that projects were not well designed at the tactical level. By contrast, most of the senior-level respondents assessed that projects were generally effectively tailored toward the needs of locals. The reason for this difference in perspective between tactical and strategic leaders might be that the higher-level officials only heard about the successes, not the failures, so that the organizations could justify their activities in the country or a bid for funds for new projects. All of those projects whose failure did not result in significant loss of human lives or materials would be filtered out of the reports as they were sent to the higher levels. Additionally, several participants pointed to jealousy of other organizations’ capabilities as a contributing

factor in inter-organizational problems; jealousy might have led some organizations to downplay their failures.

“I did not see jealousy in the sense of the word, but if you had one organization that had good personnel, enough resources, and the means to deliver them, while another one did not, it could cause some jealousy. On the other hand, the military, when deployed, would bring everything, resources, transportation, and manpower, so they could be perceived as a threat.”

Interview with military participant

“I don’t think this necessarily constituted jealousy; however, the competition for scarce resources sometimes came at the expense of all parties.”

Interview with HAO participant

“Not jealousy, but arrogance; some NGOs are better funded than others, so looking down on those [smaller NGOs], and big NGOs were dismissive of those small ones, since they had big budgets. Institutional tunnel vision.”

Interview with HAO participant

“I had sand, lumber, and a vehicle to deliver them, but if I used them [for humanitarian projects], my unit would not have it if we needed it for the military tasks.”

Interview with military participant

“Some NGO – HAOs – had motives that were not always pure, in my opinion, but they almost always meant well.”

Interview with military participant

Even though the literature suggests that jealousy between military and HAO operators is a major issue, the participants did not indicate as such. The reality is that the military has a lot of items in its own warehouse, but they are there for the military’s primary role, warfare. Most participants understood that. On the other hand, most of them acknowledged that PSO resources are limited, which necessitates better coordination in delivering them to the people in need. As several participants outlined, these resource

limitations can cause arrogance on the part of organizations that are better equipped than those with smaller budgets.

Inter-Organizational Misunderstandings

Conflict between organizations, even those coming from the same country, was visible in Bosnia as in all PSO. Respondents noted that the conflict was based not in hate or animosity, but in a mutual lack of understanding, even if everyone spoke the same language. As Elgoibar et al. said, “The issue of trust, considered on the ground of the theory of management and organization, comes across paradoxes which we propose to deal with in a manner similar to how the antinomies are regarded in the philosophical tradition; that is, as the inevitable contradiction arising from immanent limits of the human mind and language which break formulaic patterns as a result of reflections upon them.”⁴³⁶ Rahim also stated, “The effectiveness of the formulation of a problem depends to a great extent on the language that one uses.”⁴³⁷ They added, “With strong social dialogue institutions and well-functioning industrial relations, where there is strong trust and constructive conflict management, [there are] the most competitive economies.”⁴³⁸

“Misunderstanding [affected the organizations’ ability to help people in need], plenty of times.”

Interview with HAO participant

“The concept of peace bridging, to direct everyone to an individual problem. We do not have a fully compatible language for peace bridging.”

Interview with military participant

⁴³⁶ Patricia Elgoibar, Martin C. Euwema, and Lourdes Munduate, eds., *Building Trust and Constructive Conflict Management in Organizations*, Industrial Relations & Conflict Management (Springer International Publishing, 2016), 172, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31475-4>.

⁴³⁷ M. Afzalur Rahim, *Managing Conflict in Organizations* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 72.

⁴³⁸ Elgoibar, Euwema, and Munduate, *Building Trust and Constructive Conflict Management in Organizations*, vi.

“There is always friction between organizations. The key is working through that.”

Interview with HAO participant

Misunderstandings usually come from poor cooperation and coordination. While the reasons for poor coordination can vary, one of the issues could be the lack of a common language. Although most operators use English to communicate, occasional misunderstandings of certain terms can be expected.

Changing Conditions on the Ground

The positive outcome of a PSO and the role of both the military and HAOs will almost certainly shift depending on the evolving conditions in the country. As conditions in the country improve, the interest in the mission slowly shifts. As Martin and Miller said, “As the situation in Kosovo intensified, donor and implementation organizations (involved in Bosnia) started to look south. ... As negative and pessimistic progress reports emerged, oversight, scrutiny, criticisms and recommendations for improvements increased. The flurry of activity that made Bosnia the “darling of the development world” quickly eroded.”⁴³⁹ Also, when other parts of the world become hotspots, most HAOs transfer the best people there, leaving less experienced staff to fill the gap. According to Martin and Miller, “Donors don’t see it, but as soon as Kosovo started, the big agencies moved all their good staff to Kosovo, which slowed down the Bosnian process.”⁴⁴⁰

“By the time I arrived in Bosnia, the media and HAOs had mostly left for other places like Afghanistan. The UN office was a powerless organization with nothing to do but sit and collect pay. During a media tour to our base

⁴³⁹ Eric C Martin and Judith L Miller, “NGOs and the Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Understanding Large-Scale Interorganizational Systems,” 2003, 147.

⁴⁴⁰ Martin and Miller, 155.

in Banja Luka, they explained that Bosnia “was not sexy anymore.” Development organizations were shifting funding to Afghanistan and other places such as Iraq. Yet the Banja Luka police and hospital badly needed help.”

Interview with HAO participant

“They have lost a lot of interest since the world is changed. BiH is quiet, and people are assuming it is Ok now. A lot needs to be done. One thing that needs to be [resolved] – politicians who are still there since the war.”

Interview with HAO participant

After an operation succeeds or a larger conflict erupts elsewhere, a PSO often loses interest from the media, investors, and both military and HAO operators, which leads to a reduction in size and capabilities. More experienced operators would be sent to new conflict zones, and those with less experience would take over the existing PSO. Over time, PSO organizations would close their offices, handing over the responsibility for ongoing projects to smaller HAOs or local counterparts before they were ready to take on those duties.

Coordination

The respondents consistently pointed to two challenges in CIMIC: cooperation and effective communication. Many CIMIC contributors espoused the need for coordination but did not like another organization effecting that coordination. They preferred to be informed. However sometimes, overly eager personnel, claiming security concerns, prevented useful information from being disseminated to operators outside of their organizations.

“We got information from the locals that our intelligence officer would put a “Secret” stamp on. After that, we could not use it anymore. ... Good

integration and cooperation [were necessary], albeit with the military often having more resources than the civilian ones.”

Interview with military participant

“To work as military personnel with civilian organizations sometimes [requires] a lot of patience and endurance. First of all, in the military you have to convince everybody that you are not the evil, bad, killing machine. The next step is to share information as far as possible within the military regulations and borders. In every setting you meet people whom you like and accept as well as people you can’t handle. In the end, only the result counts.”

Interview with military participant

“Military cannot resolve a crisis or conflict by itself. Modern crises and conflicts are often not related to the military and therefore require assistance from outside the military. The operating environment involves complex and interlinked areas such as ethnic, religious, ideological, and technological issues. Crisis management requirements have expanded in terms of duration, tasks carried out, actors involved, complexity, and multitude of factors (social, economic etc.). Achieving acceptable and sustainable solutions requires capabilities that the military alone cannot provide. A comprehensive approach (political, civilian, military) is necessary to effectively manage these challenges. And CIMIC is the tool to do this.”

Interview with military participant

The respondents indicated that the goal of CIMIC from a military perspective is to achieve the necessary level of cooperation and coordination between military forces and civilian authorities to realize the objectives of the military operations. This goal can only be accomplished through proper information sharing, which can be hindered if one side, for any reason, withholds crucial information. Attaining that cooperation results in the greatest chance for a successful post-conflict reconstruction. In spite of many unfulfilled expectations PSO, it was the only option for Bosnia to progress into some version of peace. As Novosseloff said, “Whether peacekeeping missions are ‘fit for purpose,’ and

what this actually means in practice, are questions numerous governments, delegations in New York, departments of the UN Secretariat, experts on the matter, non-governmental organizations and at times, international public opinion, have kept asking for years and even decades.”⁴⁴¹ Late former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld attempted to answer this question by opining that PSO is not a job for conflict resolution but PSO is the only way to achieve it. CIMIC is integral to PSO work.

“Despite some historical failures, there are countless examples of how PSOs have alleviated human suffering and contributed to long term stability. The challenge is translating that stability into a lasting peace.”

Interview with military participant

“Failure to improve civil-military cooperation will prolong human suffering and impact the effectiveness of military operations and their ability to realize their objectives. These failures will continue to impact the legitimacy of PSOs in general.

Interview with HAO participant

Even though CIMIC was in the development phase at the time, it achieved positive results and helped the local population.

Interpersonal Relationships

In PSO where post-war institutions are either non-existent or suboptimal, interpersonal relationships become crucial to success. These interpersonal relationships – both between members of the CIMIC team and with local leaders – do not happen overnight. They are the products of demonstrated trust and confidence. As Schelting et

⁴⁴¹ Alexandra Novosseloff, “Can We Make UN Peacekeeping Great Again? | Global Peace Operations Review,” *Global Peace Operation Review*, May 9, 2017, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/can-we-make-un-peacekeeping-great-again/>.

al. stated, “Departing personnel should introduce their successors to the organizations with which they will be cooperating to ensure that the informal personal relationships get off to a good start.”⁴⁴²

“Some military [personnel] see us as lazy or disorganized, but they do not understand that I was there for a couple of years, and some of my colleagues even longer. They were just [there] for half a year or maybe a year, and they did not understand what was going on.”

Interview with HAO participant

“We [in the] military had a procedure for who would do things. A lady [from OSCE] came in with one piece of paper, and we said, ‘Those are just good ideas.’”

Interview with military participant

“We only come for four to six months and then leave; they are there for years. They are heroes in my eyes.”

Interview with military participant

“I worked with all of them. I think I was less efficient than my colleagues two years later. Everything is about understanding the capabilities.”

Interview with HAO participant

Most participants agreed that remaining in the area for a longer period of time offers professional perks, while a rotation of personnel every six months leads to a loss of contacts and supervision of projects. These issues can prolong the overall operation because certain tasks need to be repeated multiple times. A proper handover-take over (HOTO) process could help overcome this issue and preserve institutional memory.

⁴⁴² Scheltinga et al., “Cultural Conflict within Civil-Military Cooperation,” 60.

It is also essential to understand the capabilities of the organizations, and it is perhaps even more important to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each of them, including their operators.

“To understand what the roles of this organizations are, and what they can bring to the table. So, members of organizations need to be vetted, and they act differently.”

Interview with military participant

Capitalizing on the strengths of all organizations would better address the needs of the population.

Varying Organizational Goals and Mandates

Most respondents did not attribute arcane or malign ulterior motives to military units or HAOs in Bosnia, but they did observe different interests from the various CIMIC actors. Sometimes these interests were connected with the goal of finding donors; other times from an altruistic desire to help people in need.

“My opinion is that ulterior motives may be bit strong of a term, but I have witnessed both acting in support of their own interests, be it national or organizational. Sometimes in conflict of the interests of the host nation, or the deployed area, sometimes counter to the outcomes of the multinational force. Multi-national CIMIC works well when common interests are the reason for involvement.”

Interview with military participant

“If some HAO’s have a hidden agenda, it is fine for me, as long as they do not endanger the mission. Within my responsibilities during SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF/RSM, there was no ulterior motive. I don’t want to estimate other nations in this context, but I believe that there are some occurrences pointing in that direction.”

Interview with military participant

The concepts of conflict prevention and peace building have been researched in detail, but effective measures to bring these concepts to bear are not always implemented. Often, the separation of the warring parties and the implementation of democratic elections are the top priorities. These goals are then expanded to include disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration process as well as the return of refugees. IFOR is a clear example of this recipe, where separation, DDR, and elections were finished in less than a year. The return of refugees was a much harder process, and it was never fully completed. Participants generally agreed that these short-term goals are not enough.

“We still have an over-simplified notion of order and peace. Social order [needs] to be built.”

Interview with HAO participant

Paris and Sisk identified three approaches to resolving the conflict: security first, slow democratization, and fast democratization.⁴⁴³ Bosnia is a clear example where all of those approaches were used through all three peacekeeping missions. IFOR was a combination of security first and fast democratization. Under SFOR, security was also important at the beginning, but over time it faded away, which coincided with a reduction in international personnel. One of the projects was the demobilization of the local armed forces, which was led by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

“One of our success stories was demobilization of local soldiers. That happened in three waves. Each time they would get money, training, and/or supplies for starting the business.”

Interview with HAO participant

⁴⁴³ Paris and Sisk, “Managing Contradictions.”

Also, after the elections, OHR and the High Representative played a significant role in the democratization process, to “the point where Bosnia and Herzegovina is able to take full responsibility for its own affairs.”⁴⁴⁴ As such, OHR played an integral part of the peace process, and PSO played – and continues to play – a supervisory role, with the possibility of control functions.

The question of mandates surfaced in multiple interviews. Some interviewees discussed the general mandate of PSO, others that of the military or HAOs.

“[HAOs need a] more robust mandate with solid measures to keep the warring factions in line with the mandate. ... [HAOs have the] best people ever, worst mandates ever.”

Interview with HAO participant

Most mandates were not tailored to PSO, especially during UN-exclusive peacekeeping operations. With the involvement of regional organizations, such as NATO and the EU, the overall success of missions was much higher due in part to detailed and transparent mandates. Respondents seemed to agree that Bosnia was one of the positive examples of PSO, even though the process of establishing peace and transitioning from negative to positive peace has been protracted.

Conclusion:

Based on the interviews, I needed to expand this study to cover areas that I had not initially considered. The literature suggested that problems arising from culture, training and education, communication, organization, security, rotation, longevity, socio-economic awareness, and funding are the main obstacles of successful cooperation

⁴⁴⁴ “OHR General Information,” Office of the High Representative, accessed June 2, 2020, <http://www.ohr.int/about-ohr/general-information/>.

between military and HAOs. While the interview participants did identify some of those issues as obstacles, they labeled others as a necessity. For example, security on the ground is not an obstacle but a need by both the military and HAOs for successful fulfilment of the goals and plans of the PSO. Participants from both sides agreed on that. Also, participants identified issues that were not included in the literature, and I considered them important to include in the study.

Also, my research slightly shifted to include the utility of PSO in providing security in a post-conflict area rather than focusing only on obstacles to cooperation between military and HAOs. One of the important questions that arose during the research centered on impartiality, which had to be considered because many HAOs pride themselves on that ideal. Most participants emphasized neutrality and impartiality as crucial elements of most HAOs. Moreover, participants emphasized the role of practical successes as one of the critical elements of the overall effectiveness of PSO. Another item that the literature did not address is the crucial role of leadership in cooperation between HAOs and military operators. Also, each organization, including the military, has its own goals and mandates that dictate how that entity deals with problems, but they were not covered in existing academic literature. Only through comments by participants was their importance identified. These findings indicate that more research will be necessary in the future to address fully the keys to effectiveness in PSO.

CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION

The interviews, combined with the academic literature on conflict resolution, indicate that CIMIC in PSO is a *sine qua non* for security, justice and well-being a post-conflict environment. The results of this study also show a generally positive perspective on CIMIC among PSO practitioners as well as areas that need improvement. Finally, the data from this study on PSO in Bosnia identified a new perception on PSO, one that suggests a more realistic view of conflict development and resolution. This concluding chapter highlights the challenges in the process of developing experience-based conclusions about CIMIC and the chief findings of the overall study.

Section One: Challenges with Participant Interviews

The most significant challenge in this study was finding participants who served with HAOs or the military in Bosnia and who had practical experience with CIMIC. The beginning of my search for participants was exceptionally challenging, but as I progressed with my research, I managed to get in touch with a range of PSO participants with widely different profiles, responsibilities and experiences in Bosnia. Some were leading officials in small NGOs; others led mid- and high-level HAOs and military units. Participants also included the present head of the CIMIC unit of the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as former U.S. ambassadors, high-level U.S. officials who served in Bosnia at some point in their careers and the Supreme Commander, Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) who oversaw IFOR at its inception. Most participants were seasoned

and experienced professionals, some of whom have since retired but remained active in the political or academic sphere. The only downside is that only one participant remained involved in Bosnia from the beginning of the war until the time of this interview. While his role and the role of his organization were significant during and shortly after the war, the change of the situation in Bosnia also changed the role of both the head of the organization and the organization itself. During the war, his organization provided medical aid and food, and a few years after the war, its role changed to focus more on building sustainable infrastructure and economy.

I communicated with most participants over e-mail, Skype, and Zoom, and I also met with four interviewees in person during a trip to Banja Luka, Bosnia, in November 2019. The primary obstacle to in-person meetings was distance, as the participants were located on three continents (one participant was stationed in Afghanistan during the interview, and another was driving from Thessaloniki to Athens, Greece), but restrictions on personal interactions as a result of COVID-19 also hindered one-on-one meetings.

Subsection: Obstacles to Effective CIMIC

The respondents and scholars answered the research question: to what extent does CIMIC serve as the bedrock upon which PSO initiatives and programs can be implemented to reduce the probability of conflict, limit the scope of conflict already underway, and prevent the resumption of conflict in the future? All respondents agreed that there is a significant need for PSO in conflict and in post-conflict countries, and that CIMIC is an integral and important part of PSO. Words and phrases such as “hero(es),

importance, necessary, and ‘only they can do it’” were prominent during the interviews of military personnel describing their civilian counterparts, which reinforces the notion that PSO is not a job only for soldiers but rather a holistic project.

As one of the participants noted, CIMIC is an important wheel of conflict resolution in PSO, but it is not the only wheel. The involvement and cooperation of all nations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector involved in PSO in any post-war environment is extremely important. There are areas for improvement, and multiple participants indicated that better training, clear doctrine active and effective communications, as well as more transparent sharing of information, are essential for swift and high-quality PSO and long-term stability.

Participant interviews generally revealed a high degree of mutual respect between military and HAO officials. Most military officers and civilian operators used positive terms to explain or paint a picture of their counterparts. Some participants did cite examples of CIMIC gone awry, but they always attributed them to individuals, rather than to organizations or to CIMIC as a whole and labeled them as exceptions rather than the rule. Most participants shared good memories about their counterparts, in spite of occasional misunderstandings.

In the aggregate, there were major areas in CIMIC requiring comprehensive, pragmatic, and imaginative solutions.

Subsection: Lack of CIMIC Doctrine and Uniform Rules of Engagement

Researchers, scholars, and respondents alike all highlight the need for doctrine in CIMIC. Doctrine is so pervasive in the literature that it is often accepted without being defined. So it is useful to begin a discussion of CIMIC doctrine with the NATO definition. Doctrine consists of “the fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” Put differently, doctrine provides the overarching framework for leaders to make decisions in specific cases. NATO has developed a doctrine for PSO, but there is no companion doctrine for HAO and practitioners thereof. Developing such doctrine is no simple task; unlike NATO, HAO is implemented by a wide range of nations and organizations that do not align under any single chain of command.

Because of the importance of doctrine, however, this task must be undertaken across multiple HAO organizations. The UN can and should take the lead in this essential mission.

Growing from doctrine should be a comprehensive set of ROE – a common theme across multiple CIMIC respondents. NATO defines RoE as “the internal rules or directives among military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied.” RoE thus help define specific authorities and responses to PSO-related events and stimuli.

RoE are also practical applications of international and organizational mandates. The research showed that PSO mandates often do not reflect the overall situation in a

country that is enmeshed in or recovering from conflict. PSO mandates are developed at a political or strategic level, while RoE are implemented at the operational and tactical levels. RoE therefore reflect the requirements of the international mandate for PSO with a national twist for each participating nation. Most respondents stated that the existing RoE were not appropriate for the type of PSO mission in which they served, as the RoE did not always reflect the needs on the ground.

Moreover, some nations such as Germany had highly restrictive RoE that prevented them from leaving the base during the night, significantly hindering effective PSO, as the German contingent was less able to help other units or the local population, and they were not visibly present after dusk. Changes to RoE do happen over time, but due to size of the PSO, they can take a lot of time. As this study showed, the CIMIC doctrine and associated RoE in Bosnia were eventually changed in 2019, focusing more on a holistic approach to peacebuilding.

Also, new doctrinal concepts were identified and implemented during the PSO in Bosnia, including the LOTs, which as a concept were a predecessor of the PRT. Three participants served in both LOTs and PRTs, and their interviews reflect the importance of intertwinement between the military forces, their civilian counterparts and the local population rather than segregation through protective walls. Also, there is less stigma and more approachability in cases when the local population requires help or provides information.

Subsection: Lack of Information Sharing

While Miller argued that military operators often appear disconnected from HAOs, the interviews did not fully reflect that idea. Most participants pointed out that they often had productive communications with their counterparts, usually through face-to-face meetings. They also recalled some disconnects in communication but attributed those to a lack of experience of some of the operators, rather than systemic issues. One problem that was mentioned in both the interviews and the literature was the sharing of classified information. A few military participants stated that some information should have been not be classified . Classification often prevented information from being shared with civilian counterparts. The respondents did not indicate that this was a frequent issue, but it was identified as an obstacle to coordination. Another issue that respondents pointed out was a lack of mutual understanding. According to them, sometimes forming a common understanding is not as easy as it seems, even when the various actors speak the same language. The military in particular has its own array of jargon, acronyms and abbreviations that present major obstacles to communications.

In addition, this study shows that sharing information between – and sometimes within – military units and HAOs does not always take place respectfully. Respondents pointed out that the decision not to share the information was made by others in their organization, and they were not able to change it. Often these decisions were rooted in institutional biases rather than on the “need to know” axiom. These results indicate that that every conflict, especially one marked by violence, is complex and requires a

comprehensive approach to resolution, as Autesserre pointed out. Trust, transparency and communications become key.

According to respondents who served with IFOR, the main role of IFOR was peace enforcement, or what Galtung called establishing negative peace, by separating the warring parties and forcing them to pull back from the separation lines. In Bosnia, that was conducted in multiple phases. After establishing the negative peace, as academic research shows and respondents recollect, the next step was holding elections. After successful elections, the mandate of the PSO changed, as did its force size, name, and eventually tasks. One respondent recalled that his unit was not allowed to leave the base because they did not have proper stickers with the new name on their vehicles, and they could not leave with the old ones.

Subsection: Varying Buy-In from Contributing Nations and PSO Participants

Respondents also discussed the will of the people in the home country, or the home country politics, to cooperate with, fund and support PSO. Autesserre identifies the importance of the reaction of the contributing country toward the PSO, as did the respondents in this study. That support can often be identified by a country's willingness to provide troops to the PSO, both in the immediate aftermath of conflict and over the long-term. For example, the United States committed a significant segment of IFOR but was then eager to reduce the size of the forces as the immediate military threat from the formerly warring factions abated. Other IFOR and NATO nations followed suit. The

initial forces of over 50,000 eventually reduced to slightly more than 600, with the budget decreasing from billions of dollars to 10.2 million euros⁴⁴⁵.

Another issue respondents raised was time differential between military and civilian PSO participants. While many HAO personnel remain in the area of operation for years, most military personnel spend an average of only six months on the ground. The turnover process is often not long enough, so as one participant stated, “A huge pile of information and/or projects are lost.”

Personnel turbulence also impacts on the development and dissemination of a common operating picture (COP). Interestingly, both civilian and military operators agreed that there were instances when operators from both sides were not aware of the situation on the ground. Autesserre raised similar points, stating that international peacebuilders do not fully understand the conflicts. She also made the case that operators should remain in the country long enough to actually understand the local culture, which some of respondents confirmed.

While the literature illustrates cases of overlapping activities between military and civilians, known as the duplication of aid, only a couple of participants identified that as a problem. This study shows that as HAOs established their presence in a certain region of the country, the military starts reducing its assistance, handing over responsibilities to the HAOs or, even better, the local community. Since many of these activities depend on

⁴⁴⁵ “EUFOR Fact Sheet,” accessed March 20, 2012, http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134.

resources, of which sometimes the military just has more, it could be that some activities were duplicated, offering more than the HAOs.

Subsection: Troubled Relationship with Local Population

The literature indicates the potential for animosity by locals toward both military personnel and HAOs, perceiving them as neocolonial and arrogant. In the case of Bosnia, however, unofficial conversations with locals did not reflect that animosity. In most cases, the local operators regarded both the military and HAOs as helpful. There were a few instances when local operators were a bit reserved with some international operators, in one case calling one of them a leech, but those were sporadic.

There is a significant difference between purported resentment of “big brother” international HAOs and local exploitation and crime. One local HAO operator said that while military forces were present there would be almost no issues, but the moment they left, the local HAOs were subject to the oversight of unelected, self-styled and corrupt representatives of the government, who required one third of all goods to be given to them. These sentiments reinforced Pugh’s point that organizations cannot be effective without military or police support.

Another local HAO operator made the similar point that, depending on the location or whether the locals viewed the organization as friendly, local HAO operators would have an “easier or [more] complicated day.” While it was a practice for HAOs to hire local guards to protect their resources and personnel, in Bosnia there was no indication that any of HAOs did so. Most HAOs depended on the protection of international forces or local armed forces or police. In one case, HAOs from one ethnic

group received military police protection from another ethnic group, and those two ethnic groups were in constant fights.

Subsection: Stymied Coordination and Competition

Both military and HAO respondents contended that there is a need for cooperation and joint activities, but they advocated for each side to engage in the activities for which it is best suited. A few operators discussed the concept of a head organization coordinating other organizations; one HAO participant was adamant about the importance of having such an organization. The study showed the effectiveness of recent trends towards a cluster approach, in which one major organization takes over the leadership for a certain type of assistance, such as food, shelter, or medical needs. The respondents also noted that it is important to follow the rules on which all organizations agreed, to the point of expelling an organization that breaks the rules. While Paris and Sisk did identify the importance of a joint approach, no other academic authors suggested such a rigorous measure as expelling an organization.

While Paris identified four key obstacles to successful peacebuilding, this study shows that those key issues were relevant for the initial PSO in Bosnia, but over time, the situation changed. Paris identified: 1) lack of field-level cooperation between different actors, 2) bureaucracy of agencies involved and a tendency to pursue incompatible goals, 3) bureaucratic infighting, rivalries, and turf battles, and 4) an added layer of coordination with the headquarters of all of the agencies, international and national.⁴⁴⁶ Most

⁴⁴⁶ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 56–57.

respondents stated that there was some competition across agencies, but it was not based on jealousy but on a desire to maximize the limited resources available. Kaspersen and Sending identified the same notion, calling it turf battles over scarce resources.

The interviews indicated that most organizations were trying to do the best with what they had so that they could prove their worth and get more resources. One of the issues that arose during the interviews but not in the literature review is the notion of arrogance of larger or wealthier organizations toward small and less-supported organizations. Another point the respondents raised pertained to the role of the motives of the organization; however, most respondents agreed that the other organizations meant well.

The notion of a lack of field coordination was raised by respondents who served in the initial IFOR mission, while participants from later missions discussed joint meetings with other players. Some respondents criticized other organizations as not being very well organized, but they acknowledged that there was an ongoing commitment to cooperation.

Notably, neither the literature nor the respondents identified the need for civil-military cooperation; it was accepted as an axiom. This indicates that, on a strategic level, it was already known that there is a need for cooperation, and the concept was effectively operationalized on the ground.

Subsection: Insufficient Resources

Funding was another issue that most respondents identified. While some said that they could have benefitted from additional funding, others cautioned that there was animosity based on the amount of resources; organizations with bigger budgets would occasionally look down on smaller groups with more meager budgets. Interestingly, there were no remarks from HAOs regarding military budgets; rather, the HAO respondents complained about other HAO groups within their respective disciplines having more resources. On the other hand, the literature painted a picture more of military-HAO disputes over funding.

Subsection: Clash of Organizational Cultures

Respondents discussed some of the obstacles to CIMIC identified in the literature – culture, training, communication, organization, security, socio-economic awareness, rotation, and funding – but not others. For example, the clash of institutional cultures, which was a prominent theme in the academic literature, was not directly identified as an issue in the interviews. No respondent complained that the military could act without limits; one participant commented that the military could do a lot, but that also would mean that the military would use resources that could be needed elsewhere.

One of the reasons for this is that all military participants were experts in or at least familiar with CIMIC, so they did not see it as a burden but as part of their jobs. Even senior military officers who were interviewed recognized the importance of CIMIC, and no one expressed any doubt about it. All military respondents were consistent in

their praise for CIMIC and the HAOs. That is not to say that there were not weaknesses in CIMIC and PSO. Some respondents, for example, pointed out a lack of understanding of the local cultures and needs, which could lead to the creation of projects that were not fully tailored to the needs of the local population.

The literature does not tend to emphasize the differences between and among nations and their perception of CIMIC. According to the respondents, different nations have different understandings of the goals of CIMIC and how it should be conducted. Even though CIMIC is defined and goals are stated, different nations have different approaches to CIMIC and interpret it differently. For example, while some nations were eager simply to give aid to the local population, others took a more holistic approach and incorporated the efforts of the local population into their aid projects, akin to the old adage, “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime,” extended to “teach a man to develop a fishing industry, and you feed the nation.”

Subsection: Insufficient Training and Education

Both the literature and the respondents identified inadequate training and education as key obstacles to successful PSO. As this study showed, there are over 60 PSO training centers around the world, and there are also numerous centers that offer training and education in CIMIC, either by itself or as part of their overall curriculum. The most well-known centers for CIMIC are in the United States, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France, and Turkey, while other learning centers such as those in Bosnia,

Serbia, Sweden, Norway, and Poland included it as part of their curriculum in close cooperation with the main CIMIC training centers.

Most respondents pointed out that, despite the existence of these training centers, better training and education of both military and civilian operators is needed. Such training and education needs to be based on a global PSO doctrine that does not yet exist.

Some respondents suggesting joint and combined training – joint training within the military branches and combined training between the military and HAOs. Indeed, Mockaitis suggested that joint/combined training courses would increase communication and cooperation as well as reducing institutional and cultural misunderstandings. While some military operators stated that they passed their knowledge through debriefings to their superior officers or to their headquarters, no civilian operator stated the same. As civilian operators usually stay longer in the area than military personnel, they have fewer requirements to pass along knowledge than their military counterparts, who rotate every six to 12 months with multiple tours.

Subsection: Organizational Difficulties

No respondent identified the composition of their organization as an issue, even though Metcalfe, Gordon, Haysom, Winslow, Williams and Franke mentioned its importance. It is possible that organization and capabilities became better tailored over time and stopped being an issue as the situation on the ground stabilizes.

Subsection: Lack of Security

Both the literature and respondents stressed the importance of security in PSO. While most HAOs would not operate in an area or even a country without a certain level of security, or they would hire local security assistance (which did not take place in Bosnia), the military also had some security restrictions. During the initial phase of PSO, military personnel were not allowed to leave the base without a sufficient number of vehicles, and they had to wear body protective armor and maintain constant communication with their base. On the other hand, HAOs would not provide any aid when a minimum level of security could not be achieved. Based on the literature and interviews, there were no incidents when HAOs left Bosnia due to security reasons, as was the case of Afghanistan, when the HAO Doctors Without Borders left the country due to the low level of security. However, there were cases when HAOs would be threatened and “taxed” by local “dignitaries”⁴⁴⁷ who demanded a percentage of the supplies, as one HAO participant recalled. Again, the participants indicated that these were exceptions, and in Bosnia they took place during the war, not after the peace agreement was signed. After the war, most of the incidents that took place were usually in an unorganized cluster of individuals, such as an intoxicated, unemployed local group of people who attempted to extort money from people crossing the bridge between Bosnia’s two entities and who was subsequently arrested by the local police.

⁴⁴⁷ These individuals were not warlords but mostly petty criminals. Usually they were not present when any type of authority was evident.

Subsection: Rotation of Personnel

Both literature and respondents raised the rotation of both military and HAO personnel. The literature viewed that as an obstacle to enduring cooperation, and respondents confirmed that it had a large impact on PSO. One respondent stated that, due to the short period of time that military personnel stayed in Bosnia, the institutional memory of the projects and contacts were lost, which slowed the PSO process. Most military participants said that it would have been better if they could have stayed longer, implying a certain jealousy of their civilian counterparts. According to the participants, as the situation improved in Bosnia, the more-experienced operators were transferred to new conflict areas, while less-experienced personnel replaced them. Projects were often then passed to smaller HAOs or local partners.

Subsection: Impartiality

One issue that arose extensively in the interviews but not as much in the literature review was impartiality. The PSO in Bosnia brought together different people from different nations, with different understandings of the local situation. Multiple participants stressed that, even though PSO should treat all participants in the conflict equally, the people who are part of the missions would consciously or subconsciously act favorably toward one side or the other. These participants generally cast PSO as less impartial than it should be.

Section Two: A New Approach to Measuring Conflict and Role of PSO

This study presented sobering data on the path and speed of conflict resolution, indicating that conflict can be presented differently from how it is traditionally laid out, such as in the conflict diagram proposed by Ramsbotham et al. Conflict is not necessarily like a hike to the top of a hill, with conflict resolution like a hike down at the same distance and speed. Research on Bosnia shows that the country plummeted into conflict fast – in a matter of months – and then lasted for four years. By contrast, the resolution process has lasted for decades with no end in sight. Looking at most post-conflict countries, including Bosnia, the reconciliation process always looked like Zeno’s dichotomy, also known as a racetrack. In the story, the racer never reaches the destination but always crosses half of the distance between him and his goal, which renders his race a never-ending story or an infinite game.

In reality, PSO may be an infinitive game yet with finite goals.⁴⁴⁸ While the process of peacebuilding or transformation from negative to positive peace⁴⁴⁹ is long and painful, sometimes seemingly infinite, the actions used to reach the end are usually finite and with time limits, with intermediate and achievable objectives along the way. This reflects the reality of global politics; the operators can only remain in a country for a certain amount of time; resources are finite, and sometimes there is no interest in investing in the reconstruction of a conflict-torn country. Additionally, new conflicts

⁴⁴⁸ Simon Sinek, *The Infinite Game* (New York: Portfolio, 2019).

⁴⁴⁹ Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (September 1, 1969): 167–91, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336900600301>.

occur regularly, and the media and political priorities dictate a shift in attention and resources elsewhere.

Ramsbotham et al. outlined the model below of violent conflict (Figure 2⁴⁵⁰), which illustrates a wave of escalation and de-escalation. Based on that picture, one can consider the steps of the escalation process sequentially,⁴⁵¹ as Ramsbotham et al. suggested.




Figure 4 Conflict Escalation and De-escalation⁴⁵²

⁴⁵⁰ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Fourth edition (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016), 15.

⁴⁵¹ Andrea Bartoli, Andrzej Nowak, and Lan Bui-Wrzosinska, "Mental Models in the Visualization of Conflict Escalation and Entrapment: Biases and Alternatives," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, June 25, 2011), 8, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1872605>.

⁴⁵² Oliver Ramsbotham, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, 3rd ed (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2011), 11.

This picture seems to indicate the same level of effort in conflict escalation and de-escalation, as though escalation were akin to climbing a hill and de-escalation to going down the hill.

However, the reality appears different. Based on the academic literature and interviews, this study would suggest a different way of presenting conflict (Figure 4).




Figure 5 Proposed Conflict Escalation and De-escalation

While the steps for conflict escalation and de-escalation are the same, the path to conflict is slightly different. Per Pruitt and Kim's spiral cycle of conflict escalation, Figure Four shows that, as conflict escalates, the parties dive deeper, greatly elongating the path to de-escalation and the normalization of relations between the parties. Additionally, post-conflict relations never return to the same level as before the conflict;

there is invariably a “new normal”. This model appears applicable to the pre-conflict and post-conflict situation in Bosnia, where most interethnic relations remain far below the levels before the war. Also, the preponderance of the youth, most of whom were born after the war, are much more affected by the animosity between parties, as they are growing up in an environment more segregated than that of their parents and grandparents.




Figure 6 Types of PSO in Correlation with Conflict Escalation and De-escalation

Adding the types of peacebuilding proposed by NATO⁴⁵³ and presented in Figure 4 indicates that each type of PSO depends on the phase of the conflict. Based on that, it is evident that conflict prevention is the focus until war breaks out, and peace enforcement – including conflict limitation - begins at the outset of the war lasts until a peace agreement is signed. Peacekeeping is undertaken when there is peace to keep, or in a post-agreement period, and finally, peacebuilding becomes part of the normalization of

⁴⁵³ “Peace Support Operations AJP-3.4.1” (NATO, July 2001), <http://www.osrh.hr/smvo/Library/ajp-3.4.1.pdf#>.

relations and stabilization of the situation. The involvement of the military and HAOs depends on the progress of the conflict.




Figure 7

After the conflict, and especially before the peace agreement is signed, the local capabilities are quite low. Basic services, such as medical care or public safety, are mainly subordinated to the war effort, if they exist at all. HAO capabilities are in direct proportion to safety and need, but predominately safety. The only real capabilities are of those of the military personnel who are part of the PSO, and especially of one segment – CIMIC. The rest of military personnel engage in such tasks as separating the warring parties, DDR, and policing. PSO forces focus on helping the local population by utilizing some of the military personnel with niche capabilities, such as medics or engineers. Their role is extremely important until HAOs are able to start to operate and, eventually, local institutions can take over.




Figure 8 Role of PSO Participants in Different Phases of Conflict

As time passes and the capabilities of HAOs and, eventually, local institutions improve, and security stabilizes at an acceptable level, the military contingent reduces in size and engagement. Over time, the role and size of the HAOs should reduce as they hand over their responsibilities to the local institutions. Depending on the situation, the PSO will either conclude or stay present with a modest representation, as is the case in Bosnia. When most international HAOs left the country, most of their responsibilities and capabilities are transferred to local HAOs, which mostly emerged after the conflict, with the exception of the local Red Cross. Approximately 600 PSO forces from 20 nations remain in Bosnia as of September 2020. When the situation is deemed safe, those last elements of the PSO will leave the country.

Subsection: Next Steps

The research process evokes a clear picture of how PSO operations really operate, and especially how all agents involved play their roles over time. In Bosnia, many issues

– both internal and external – caused the conflict, and many ongoing issues continue to preclude a stable, long-term reconciliation⁴⁵⁴ and a transition from negative to positive peace.⁴⁵⁵ Unless those issues are resolved, Bosnia will stay in limbo, beset by corruption, latent ethnic hatred, and a sense of hopelessness.

Regarding the success of PSO, while the mission is still ongoing after 24 years and peace is firm and stable, there is occasional saber-rattling by the local politicians. Most of their activities seem aimed at separating people and creating animosity and xenophobia. Many Bosnians of all ethnic groups have left the country with no intention of returning, and Bosnia’s leaders do not show any interest in making the transition from




Figure 9 CIMIC Interdependence

negative to positive peace. This issue is not only a concern of PSO but of the holistic approach to the peace process, but it is one of the issues that should indicate a lesson for the next PSO, and how to prevent it.

In Bosnia and in PSO around the world, the theoreticians, system designers, political leaders and practitioners alike must take the next steps in developing acceptable

PSO doctrine, training and educating to doctrine-driven standards and establishing effective CIMIC on the ground. Both the military and

⁴⁵⁴ John Paul Lederach, “Reconciliation: The Building of Relationship,” in *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 23–36.

⁴⁵⁵ Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.”

civilian components of PSO are mutually interdependent and cannot succeed without the others.

Interaction between military and HAO operators in PSO will continue as long as there is a need, and there is always likely to be a need. Recent history illustrates that there is no shortage of conflicts as well as natural and man-made catastrophes. At the same time, there are fewer and fewer resources available, especially as time passes and more crises emerge in other parts of the world. Bosnia was a clear example of this chain of events. In order for PSO to be successful and efficient, some practices will need to change, while others will need to be reinforced and institutionalized.

Cooperation and Coordination

This study shows that cooperation and coordination are imperative in PSO. While both military and HAO participants agree with this notion, they acknowledge that there is still room for improvement. Most participants agree that communication struggles did affect the success of PSO in Bosnia. Despite the common language in communication, the existence of multiple meanings for the same terms can lead to misunderstandings. Also, willingness to share information, rather than unnecessarily labeling it confidential, would greatly help in this endeavor. As most practitioners agree that having regular military-HAO meetings greatly aids in the process of cooperation and coordination, this practice should be institutionalized in the future, with leadership based on a cluster approach.

Cluster Approach Based on Capabilities

The cluster system used by the UN during peace operations, humanitarian crises, or natural or man-made disasters should be a common practice. Assigning one lead organization to each sphere of responsibility, such as medical, shelter, food and water, and eventually security, would allow for better coordination of efforts and less duplication. Unfortunately, negative past experiences demonstrate that sometimes the best intentions can cause problems. Also, this approach to leadership would keep each side from undermining each other's positions in the area, especially if a long-term goal needed to be achieved at the expense of a short-term accomplishment. Of course, proper communication and planning would be essential to ensuring that all organizations involved understood what the long-term achievement was.

Proper Handover/Takeover

Because organizations and operators cannot stay in PSO indefinitely, a formal HOTO process should be developed and properly used. Over time, many PSO activities and contacts have been lost because of improper and haphazard HOTO processes. Countless hours and resources were lost, and the PSO was less successful as opportunities were lost to provide adequate help to the local population. Additionally, botched HOTO efforts rendered the new rotation unable to capitalize on the success of the previous rotation. In the future, each PSO could develop its own approach to HOTO, based on culture, language, goals, etc.

The following two recommendations are most crucial to the success of PSO; arguably, if properly implemented, they could eliminate all other major obstacles to PSO effectiveness.

Joint Training

In his book, “The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions,”⁴⁵⁶ Chris Seiple advocates for the establishment of cooperation and coordination between military and HAOs prior to deploying to a crisis scene, whether natural or man-made. Also, all military and HAO organizations could benefit from an inter-agency planning and execution process.⁴⁵⁷ Nicola Spence recommends that each side be given an opportunity to become familiar the other side and to identify mutual capabilities.⁴⁵⁸ This study showed that even though some progress in this area has been made since the dawn of modern CIMIC, there is not enough joint training that includes both military and HAO members. This lack of training results in a lost opportunity to overcome some initial pre-deployment confusion and duplication of effort or, even worse, the inability to address the needs of those who require PSO assistance.

Lead organizations such as NATO and the UN, through their departments, centers, or any other parts of their structure that are in charge of PSO, have organized periodic training and education on PSO for their own personnel, as well as joint training

⁴⁵⁶ Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/Ngo Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Peacekeeping Institute Center for Strategic Leadership U. S. Army War College, 1996), http://globalengage.org/attachments/429_Seiple-%20The%20U.S.%20Military-NGO%20Relationship%20in%20Humanitarian%20Interventions.pdf.

⁴⁵⁷ Seiple, 193.

⁴⁵⁸ N. Spence, “EYEWITNESS - Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: More than a Field Application,” *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 1 (March 1, 2002): 165–71, <https://doi.org/10.1080/714002699>.

for both military and HAO operators. In many instances, that training is provided to the military, while HAO members serve as military role-players or outside contractors are hired to role-play HAO members. Through the use of realistic scenarios with realistic players, the operators would get a sense for how the other organizations approach a problem and, more importantly, how they can work together to resolve it. Also, scenarios-based joint training would help bridge cultural differences in a real PSO by anticipating and addressing problems before the mission begins. Moreover, it would allow operators to learn from each other not only about solutions, but also the methods of operation, such as analysis, communication, planning, and eventually execution. Finally, operators could establish cross-organizational contacts for future engagement in conflicts and natural and/or man-made catastrophe zones.

Appropriate Doctrine

This study showed that, even though the military has a doctrine for PSO, there is still room for improvement. The doctrine must be designed so that it can robustly answer the questions that could arise during the deployment. However, it should leave space for its own improvement. A civilian counterpart of that doctrine should also be developed, and it should serve as a cornerstone for engagement with HAOs in areas of conflict or catastrophe.

NATO is responsible for its own PSO doctrine, but I am not aware of a similar doctrine for HAOs. The UN created a CIMIC doctrine for its own civilian and military personnel, while other HAOs, both international and domestic, are not required to abide by the UN standards. Based on the doctrines for each side, both military and HAO

organizations could clarify which tasks are the responsibility of each side and why, and more importantly, who can step in when the other side is not present or not able to assist the local population.

Realistically, this goal would be difficult to achieve because there is no overarching organization responsible for all NGOs, international or otherwise, that operate in a particular area. Since the goal of the UN OCHA is to organize these HAOs, it could coordinate a process of creating a doctrine with major HAOs, such as the ICRC, IMF, and IOM, which could lead to a mandate to all organizations in a particular area to abide by the doctrine.

This is a task that must be high on the agenda of governments, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector.

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this research has been to draw attention to and seek insight on the role of the CIMIC in PSO, which is an integral part of the PSO military component.

Experience in recent years has shown that traditional peacekeeping, in which military forces maintain the singular goal of keeping the warring forces from fighting again, does not produce the same enduring results as an integrated CIMIC approach. Also, there have been more intrastate wars in the last few decades than during the Cold War. This study did not seek to answer that question, but it does highlight that new approaches to the PSO are needed. The war in Bosnia was a clear example. The democratization approach that Paris and Sisk⁴⁵⁹ suggested is not the only option for helping Bosnia recover and succeed. Bosnia was a young democracy when it plunged into war. UNPROFOR was deployed shortly after the war erupted, but it did not stop the war. A comprehensive approach involving cooperation between all actors involved in PSO, or a more holistic approach, was needed. Since the military could not fix Bosnia by themselves, they came up with CIMIC as a small but important part of peacebuilding. As former IFOR Commander Admiral Smith said, “In November [1995], we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did... now we can't live without you.”

⁴⁵⁹ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*.

CIMIC was established in the first days of the IFOR deployment. As one of the participants in this study stated, “The Brigade CIMIC established itself at 11:00 on Christmas Eve in [a] partially destroyed hotel in Zupanja, Croatia. We attempted to move on two major lines of approach simultaneously—working with local authorities and addressing our chief tasks prescribed by the Military Chapter of the Dayton Accords.” As the situation in Bosnia developed and evolved, so did the NATO and, later on, EU missions. With the change of requirement, the mandate changed, and with the mandate change, the mission changed, which led to the establishment of CIMIC as part of the PSO.

While UNPROFOR was trying to keep the peace in a country without peace, IFOR, SFOR, and eventually EUFOR came to the scene after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed. Just after Dayton was signed, IFOR mainly focused on the separation of the formerly warring parties and support for upcoming elections. SFOR and, later, EUFOR expanded their role from controlling local armed forces, DDR, and training and helping local armies to providing aid to the local population through medical care, food, and shelter until the level of security sufficed for the HAOs to step in. After that, the military component of the PSO would, through CIMIC, find new avenues to provide assistance, not only to the local population but also to the HAOs in order to create sustainable peace.

However, the fact that PSO is composed of many nations with different cultures, languages, and visions of humanitarian assistance significantly influenced the nature of the PSO over time. Those differences brought different ideas, but they also caused rifts between the parties involved in PSO. The rifts most commonly focused on culture,

training, communication, organization, security, socioeconomic awareness, rotation, and funding.

This research was conducted through the qualitative methods of archive research on cases and interviews. The interview method was chosen because the type of participants and their locations would have made any other method difficult or impossible. This study focused on three cases in Bosnia: IFOR, SFOR, and eventually EUFOR. At the beginning, the research was conducted face-to-face, but the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated the shift of almost all subsequent interviews to e-mail, Skype, Zoom, or WhatsApp. One benefit of this approach was that most participants gave the interview from the comfort of their homes all over the world, including the United States, Canada, Germany, and France. One of the participants was part of the PSO in Afghanistan at the time of interview, and he took some of his rare free time to engage in this interview. All participants were helpful and insightful, and they shared a range of interesting points and stories. All participants were highly experienced in their field, and some were retired professionals who had led long and fruitful careers. Some of the participants, like the researcher himself, had multiple careers and are now successful in their new careers. Some had personal issues to deal with but still allocated time for the interviews, and I am grateful to all of them.

The research on archival records was challenging because of the lack of available documentation. Unfortunately, CIMIC as an approach is not well known, so there was a dearth of specialized literature about CIMIC in Bosnia. Therefore, more generic literature had to be researched and extrapolated to CIMIC. Additionally, the number of

books on the topic is limited, and most articles were of a military nature. At the same time, it was a challenge to find adequate participants who both have experience in CIMIC and were part of PSO in Bosnia as a member of either the military or an HAO.

Participants pointed out difficulties with PSO and CIMIC doctrine. Even though NATO and national CIMIC doctrines exist, it is common for participating nations to interpret them in their own way. Sometimes those interpretations can differ significantly from each other. Second, information sharing – or the freedom to share information – can be a challenge. Most participants identified this as one of the major challenges in CIMIC. Most participants claimed that the reason is their inability to share information due to security reasons, which can be objective, but there were also instances in which the participants assessed that the reasons were subjective to the point of being irrational. Third, the reaction from the contributing nation also affects PSO. Certain countries do not see PSO as their problem, or they have their own interests in the PSO, which significantly affects the outcome of the PSO. Fourth, time spent in the mission varies from nation to nation and from organization to organization. While the military usually sends troops for six to twelve months, their civilian counterparts in HAOs spend years in the area of responsibility (AoR). Fifth, the troubled relationship between CIMIC operators and the local population, or the perception by the local population of PSO members, was a challenge. Based on the culture and historical relationships, members of the PSO from certain countries were more or less successful depending on their country of origin. While American or Turkish PSO operators would be less welcomed in the

Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS) than in the Bosniak- and Croat-dominated Federation of BiH, Russian or French operators would be greeted more warmly in the RS.

A sixth challenge in CIMIC that participants identified was coordination and cooperation, as well as the role of the overall overseeing organization whose responsibility should be to supervise and direct the efforts of all organizations in a certain AoR. Seventh, the lack of necessary resources and pursuit of available resources are an additional challenge. Most HAOs depend on donations from their home countries and/or international organizations, so from time to time there is competition between HAOs for those resources. Eighth, the lack of appropriate training and education is an ever-present issue. While the military tries to mitigate this issue through pre-deployment training and organizing centers of excellence (COE), such as CIMIC's COE in The Hague, the capacities of such centers are limited, and requirements are tremendous. HAOs do not have such facilities, so they opt for more hands-on learning for new operators. Ninth, lack of security is an ever-present issue, especially for HAOs but also for the military components of the PSO. No projects can be conducted until a certain level of security is established. The security level needs to be even higher for HAOs to be able to conduct their projects. Therefore, until it is achieved, the entire burden rests on the military. Finally, the perception of the development and resolution of the conflict was overly linear and simplistic. Successful PSO requires a more holistic, all-hands-on-deck approach. This research shows the importance of cooperation at every level and in any setting.

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BIOGRAPHY

Edi Jurkovic is a native of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he witnessed civil war first-hand and committed his life to finding peaceful ways to resolve conflict. He received a commission as a military officer from the then-Yugoslav Military Academy in Belgrade, Serbia, in 1998. He served with distinction in the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, bringing his unit into compatibility with NATO standards and designing training courses for military officers from Bosnia and from NATO Member States. He retired as a Major in 2011 when he came to the United States, and shortly thereafter he enrolled in the Master of Science program in conflict analysis and resolution at George Mason University. He graduated in 2013 and began his PhD in the same field that fall. After graduation, he looks forward to building a career in public service.

Edi and his wife Melissa have four daughters: twins Elena and Ana, age 7; Mia, age 5; and Olivia, age 3. They also have two Bosnian cats, Adele and Natasha.

ⁱ “NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine - AJP 9” (NATO, June 2003), <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf>.