

ALLIANCE POLITICS IN UNIPOLARITY

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Marietta Elizabeth Sanders
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Committee:

<u>Colin Duesch</u>	<u>April 29, '08</u>	Director
<u>Therese J. Carter</u>	<u>4/29/08</u>	
<u>Frances J. Hulson</u>	<u>4/29/08</u>	
<u>Robert L. Judd</u>	<u>4/29/08</u>	Department Chairperson
<u>Jamie S. Cozart</u>		Dean, College of Humanities and Social Sciences
Date: <u>April 29, 2008</u>		Spring Semester 2008 George Mason University Fairfax, VA

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at George Mason University

By

Marietta E. Sanders
Bachelor of Science
United States Military Academy, 2003

Director: Dr. Colin Dueck, Assistant Professor
Department of Public and International Affairs

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my husband.

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I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Colin Dueck. His advice and direction were instrumental in guiding the thoughts in this thesis. I would also like to thank my husband for the countless hours spent reading and discussing each new version of the paper.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of Figures	vi
Abstract	vii
Chapter 1	1
Chapter 2	20
Chapter 3	34
Chapter 4	54
Chapter 5	78
List of References	88

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
Figure 1 Bilateral Relations in Unipolarity.....	25
Figure 2 Bilateral Relations During Negotiations on Missile Defense	56

ABSTRACT

ALLIANCE POLITICS IN UNIPOLARITY

Marietta E. Sanders, M.A.

George Mason University, 2008

Thesis Director: Dr. Colin Dueck

Throughout the Cold War the United States' relationship with its allies was primarily based on its ability to defend them against the Soviet Union. The US would bear the military burden for their safety in exchange for their support and special economic relationships that would allow the US to continue to prosper and pay for the expense of the military burden. After the Cold War ended these relationships continued to exist, but under different international pressures. The US needs allied involvement in order to build a more robust and complex international missile defense system designed to counter any nation or group seeking to use ballistic missiles against the US or its friends and allies. However, some US allies differ on the need for this type of protection and the attention it brings to them as a close ally of the United States. States may feel the threat has not yet materialized for this type of system, that building this system only further instigates arms races and leads to greater instability, or cooperation with the US on this system will make them more of a target to terrorist organizations or states hostile

to American interests. This dynamic has brought out interesting reactions among the US' allies on its pursuit of a robust missile defense system.

This paper seeks to develop and test a theory that explores the patterns of alliance behavior in a unipolar system and use the issue of missile defense between the United States and its European allies as a case study. This new theory is a combination of components of Glenn H. Snyder's and Stephen M. Walt's theory of alliances under assumptions of William Wohlforth's observations about unipolarity. With this mid-range theory I will seek to better explain the dynamics of the relationships between the United States and European allies through the issue of missile defense in the current international system structure. Additionally, this theory will attempt to determine the most important causal factor behind states' decisions within an alliance; whether autonomy or perceptions of threat are a bigger influence in state decisions on security.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

The Debate

The debate over a state's needed offensive and defensive capabilities to maintain security and survival has occurred over centuries. As one tribe, city-state, or nation could never continuously bear the burden of a large enough offense and strong enough defense to deter all enemies, partnerships inevitably developed between groups in order to share the burden. Alliances and friendly relationships between states are based on perceptions of strength and the ability to aid the state's survival. How one perceives its enemies' strengths and intentions as well as their own deterrent capabilities will affect these alliances. Above all, the structure of the international system has the greatest and most influential impact on alliance relationships and states' decisions within an alliance.

This paper seeks to develop and test a theory that explores the patterns of alliance behavior in a unipolar system and use the issue of missile defense between the United States and its European allies as a case study. This new theory is a combination of components of Glenn H. Snyder's and Stephen M. Walt's theory of alliances under assumptions of William Wohlforth's observations about unipolarity. With this mid-range theory I will seek to better explain the dynamics of the relationships between the United States and European allies through the issue of missile defense in the current international system structure. Additionally, this theory will attempt to determine the most important

causal factor behind states' decisions within an alliance; whether autonomy or perceptions of threat are a bigger influence in state decisions on security.

Structural Components of International System

Anarchy

The international system in which states exist is structurally made up of two constants, anarchy and polarity. These structural characteristics exert limitations on states and account for the main motive of allying. The first structural characteristic is anarchy, the lack of a higher sovereign to enforce rules above the level of the state. This anarchy means states are naturally insecure and must be self-interested in order to ensure their survival. This anarchy affects alliances in the form of the security dilemma. The uncertainty of the international system means that security measures taken by one state are inherently perceived as threatening to the other states, whether intended or not, and so the natural reaction is for the other states to build up their own security in order to not be threatened by the first state. This build up of security by the other states then confirms the first state's beliefs that they are indeed threatened and so it works to increase its security even more and thus the security spiral goes on. This same phenomenon is true of alliances, even if meant for mutual defense, they seem threatening to states outside of the alliance and a counter-alliance is likely to form, which confirms to the first alliance the aggression of their adversaries. Working alongside the security dilemma are the effects of the tendency to balance power. The competitiveness of the international system, which is driven by the security dilemma, naturally works toward equilibrium. As one

state or alliance gains power other states will move to counteract that power.¹ The anarchic nature of the international system also means that any alliance, even if bound by treaty, is ultimately unenforceable. Whether or not states observe the bounds of the agreements depends on the self interest of the states. This means an alliance is only as strong as the risk that one or more of the states would defect is low. However, the risk of having states within an alliance defect and thus leave the remaining states more vulnerable actually works to hold the alliance together. It is the paradox of anarchy that “...simultaneously makes the cohesion of alliances problematic and makes holding them together a primary policy task.”²

Polarity

The other constant of the international structure is polarity or how power is distributed amongst states within the system. Power will never be evenly distributed and so its relative distribution remains a constant factor in state decision making. The international system can be multipolar, consisting of three or more great powers, bipolar, or unipolar. The system today is unipolar, with the US being the single superpower, but could shift to a bi- or multipolar system either as states such as Russia, China, and India use their rapidly growing economies to build up military strength, especially nuclear capabilities, or the power of the US declines. Most neorealist’s discussion of unipolarity focuses on rising powers as mentioned above and the ultimate downfall of the single superpower as the other great powers inevitably balance against any concentration of

¹ Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 17.

² Ibid., 18.

power and the system turns either bi- or multipolar.³ However, this time the international system is different as the current polar structure has lasted for over a decade and it appears it will continue to remain unipolar for some time.⁴ What is different about unipolarity today versus other points in history is the breadth and depth of US dominance. The gap between the US and the next most powerful state is substantial and significantly different from previous superpowers. For the first time in modern international history, the US enjoys a lead in all underlying components of power including economic, technological, and geopolitical.⁵

Unipolarity in the international system is the point at which one state's capabilities are beyond counterbalancing, but not so concentrated as a global empire. This structure is different from a bi- or multipolar system that contains an unusually strong polar state or an imperial system with one great power. In those systems the ability for other great powers to rival the superpower in some capacity exists, whereas it is nearly impossible in a truly unipolar system.⁶ The reason this current system is unique, as mentioned above, is the manner in which resources are concentrated by the United States. During previous points in history with a single great power there was not a complete concentration of resources as exists today with the United States. In areas where the single power lacked strength, ambiguities were created. Ambiguities about

³ William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 5.

⁴ William Wohlforth, "Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis," Harvard International Review 29, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 45.

⁵ William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

capabilities in the international system will inevitably lead to conflict.⁷ Some political theorists have attempted to explain the current system as not unipolar and instead the result of a fundamental change in world politics thanks to globalization and democracy. However, it is far more likely “that any effort to compete directly with United States is futile, so no one tries.”⁸

The Unique Effects of Unipolarity

The polarity of the system specifically affects alliance patterns. In a bipolar system the two superpowers are inherently competitive because there is no other greater threat against them than the other superpower. Alliances will form on each rivals side such that even non-aligned countries are generally seen as being for one side or the other as their security will depend in some measure on one of the superpowers.⁹ In a multipolar system states choose alliances based on the major threat perceived. According to Stephen Walt, this threat can push the state to either balance, ally in opposition to the threat, or bandwagon, ally with the threat.¹⁰ The tendency of all states is to maximize power while avoiding subversion by a stronger state. This leads to the predominant form of alliance patterns as balancing.¹¹ If states do nothing in the face of a rising power they risk missing the opportunity to confront it before the rising state becomes too strong. Choosing to ally with the rising power means the state has to trust that down the road it will not find itself a victim of the expanding power. Moreover, to ally with the weaker

⁷ Ibid., 20.

⁸ Ibid., 17-18.

⁹ Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 19.

¹⁰ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 4.

¹¹ Ibid., 5.

side means the state will have more relative power among its new allies than it would alongside the greater power and thus the ability to better maintain its position in the international arena.¹² Walt characterizes bandwagoning as either a form of appeasement or strategy to share in the “spoils of victory.”¹³ In a unipolar system the choices for alliances are extremely limited. A state has only a few choices once the system has become unipolar. It can maintain its current alliances with the single pole, whose alliance framework is the only one in a unipolar system. It can join with the single pole in a new alliance if it previously belonged to a defeated alliance, as was the case for countries of the Warsaw Pact. Finally, it can choose to remain outside the alliance structure of the single pole such as Russia, China, or Iran.

The current system is unipolar, but not hegemonic. Hegemony refers to an unequal political or political-military influence relationship between a superpower and other states. A hegemonic world system would consist of a unipolar structure of both capability and influence.¹⁴ But this is not the current system. While the US is the dominant power with considerable influence it does not have the ability to force the next four greatest powers (France, Britain, Russia, China, and increasingly India) to do something they truly do not want to do. Most evidence of US hegemony occurs in relationships with “small or middle powers.”¹⁵ While the US does behave as a hegemon in some relationships sometimes, it does not do so on a scale to consider the system

¹² Ibid., 6.

¹³ Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁴ David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1999):142.

¹⁵ Ibid., 144.

hegemonic.¹⁶ This is important because it means while the US is the single pole, it can not always get its way when disputes arise. This gives other states in the system room to bargain with the single pole and receive concessions which would not be possible in a true hegemonic system.

Even more unique about this system of unipolarity without hegemony is that it could be somewhat self-sustaining as a good balance between a global order and complete anarchy because it affords some autonomy to the other states without threatening the single pole.¹⁷ The single pole, seeking to maintain the status quo and its position, will ensure weaker states have security from stronger neighbors in an effort to prevent wars it would be dragged into that could weaken its position. This security guarantee prevents traditional balancing on a regional scale which could eventually threaten the single pole. Furthermore, this creates a system where most states feel they have the room to diplomatically negotiate without directly confronting or threatening the single pole.

The Durability of Unipolarity

According to William Wohlforth, unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful state for the international system for two reasons. First, the single pole's undisputed concentration of resources removes the problem usually seen among major states, rivalry over relative power within the international system. Second, the risks of balance of power politics are significantly lowered since bandwagoning becomes the predominant

¹⁶ Ibid., 145.

¹⁷ Ibid., 165-6.

alliance pattern.¹⁸ The first proposition rests on hegemonic stability theory which proposes that significantly powerful states can foster international orders which are stable until growth and power of other states leaves them dissatisfied with the current system and capable of challenging the hegemon for leadership. According to this theory, the more clear and undisputed the concentration of power, the more peaceful and stable the system will be.¹⁹ What is crucial about this theory is the stipulation that conflict among the hegemon and another power only occurs when they disagree about their relative power. This means the hegemon has to be confident in its ability to defend the status quo at the same time the lesser power believes it can threaten it.²⁰ But at the point that one or more powers can rise and challenge the hegemon, the system has become multipolar. A system is only unipolar so long as the single pole maintains a significant concentration of power. Based on the hegemonic stability theory, so long as the hegemon remains unrivaled the order it builds and maintains is a peaceful and stable one. Thus, unipolarity is a stable system.

The second proposition says that the balance of power theory also predicts stability in a unipolar system. The balance of power theory posits that states in anarchy will always tend toward equilibrium since unbalanced power is a threat to others. This is evidence, most notably by Kenneth Waltz, not of the instability of unipolarity but its durability. Waltz has argued that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity because with only two poles, uncertainty is minimized. The risk comes from calculations or

¹⁸ William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 23.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

rather miscalculations of power and the uncertainty regarding alliance choices which are simplified in a bipolar system. By this logic then, almost all uncertainty should be removed in a unipolar system. The only options in a unipolar system available to alliance member states regarding alliance choices are to bandwagon with the single pole or at the very least to ensure any action taken does not make you an enemy of the single pole. Because the focus of alliance member states is on the single pole they are less likely to engage in security competitions with other alliance member states and thus, the risk of conflict decreases. Even if an alliance member state decides to engage in this behavior, the unilateral power advantages of the single pole allow it to be interventionist. Once the superpower takes sides, there is little doubt which side will prevail. Furthermore, the alliance member state is usually dependent on the single pole for security (or is at least dependent on the single pole not being a threat to its own security so long as their interests are not conflictual) and this can be exploited. As a result of the security dependence and unilateral power advantages the single pole has the ability to maintain alliances which keep “second-tier states out of trouble.”²¹

Until the distribution of power changes, the structural components of the system reinforce the power of the single pole. Two differing realist theories arrive at the same conclusions for unipolarity. Hegemonic stability theory says an indisputable amount of power with the hegemon will eliminate the rivalry for primacy. Balance of power theory says the fewer poles in a system the more stable it will be because the security

²¹ Ibid., 24-25.

competition is minimized.²² This should not imply that all conflict will be absent from the system, but that the two major sources of conflict among great powers, rivalry for primacy and balance of power politics, are highly unlikely.²³

Realist theorists such as Kenneth Waltz or John Mearshiemer at this point might still take exception with the durability of a unipolar system and thus whether it deserves study separate from previous systems for different behavior. The tendency of states to seek equilibrium, along with a possible decline in power of the single pole, means unipolarity inevitably will shift to bi- or multipolarity. From this assumption these theorists generally discuss three ways in which the system will end: counterbalancing, regional integration, or redistribution of power due to growth.²⁴ While unipolarity will not endure permanently, it is sustainable for a long enough period to make it worth studying state behavior in alliances separate from analysis done so far under bi- and multi-polar systems. This current unipolar world is preferable for the US because security threats are minimized while its foreign-policy autonomy is maximized. According to realists any great power would prefer to be a unipolar power, even if it does not have expansionist ambitions. For any great power unipolarity is preferred to “facing the concentrated hostility and threat of a bipolar world or the uncertainty and risk of miscalculation inherent in a multipolar world.”²⁵ The unipolarity of the current system is durable enough to warrant independent study for two reasons: the way in which the US

²² Ibid., 25.

²³ Ibid., 26.

²⁴ Ibid., 28.

²⁵ Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” *International Security* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 60.

has concentrated its power resources²⁶ and its strategic location. When combined they allow the US the unique opportunity to manage attempts by other great powers to enhance their relative position without increasing the risk for a transition in power and the subsequent challenge for primacy.²⁷

The first factor, the complete concentration of power resources which raises the bar to a significant level for any counterbalancing or rival power, has been discussed above. The second factor, strategic location, is based primarily on geography and is similarly important in reinforcing the power of the single pole. The US is located between Canada, Mexico, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean and this location matters to the durability of the current unipolarity of the system. States measure and react to threats based not only on actual power but proximity to other powers, as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter two. This proximity means local power rivalries are likely to overshadow any global counterbalancing efforts. Any effort by a state to attempt counterbalancing is likely to push regional countervailing action. This regional balancing keeps the amount of power the US must concentrate to sustain the system lower than if the US was not an offshore power.²⁸ Additionally, many of the major powers in the system which could put together a counterbalancing alliance have been closely allied with the US for decades and gain significant benefits from maintaining that

²⁶ This is a term from Glenn Snyder that better captures “what a state can accomplish with its military forces against particular other states.” Defining power within the international arena as a function of the fungibility of its military power better focuses on what a state can do with its power, not just an aggregate number of power units. Furthermore, this definition brings out the importance of the interactions among states and better accounts for the relative power felt among them. See Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 28.

²⁷ William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 27-28.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

relationship. In addition to giving up those benefits if they tried to form a counterbalancing alliance, they would have to do so while the US was watching. While there are several instances in history where a coalition of balancers prevented a hegemon from emerging, there are “none for a group of subordinate powers joining to topple a hegemon once it has already emerged, which is what would have to happen today.”²⁹

Counterbalancing in a unipolar system, therefore, is not realistically possible because at the point a viable counterbalance emerges it would mean the system is no longer unipolar, power resources would no longer be concentrated with the single power. The point at which this shift occurs depends in part on the efficiency of alliances to aggregate the power of individual states in order to rival that of the single pole. Alliances to begin with are difficult and tend to be inefficient at pooling power, but counter-hegemonic alliances are even more difficult. As states consider alliances they are tempted to free ride, pass the buck, or bandwagon to get favors from the hegemon.³⁰ Once the alliances are formed states have to balance fears of abandonment and entrapment which could leave them vulnerable to attack or drag them into a conflict they otherwise would not engage in.³¹ Especially in a unipolar system, this means a state has much more influence alone than the same aggregate of the state’s power resources within

²⁹ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 2002): 22.

³⁰ See Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder’s “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137-168.

³¹ This is the main argument for Glenn Snyder on both the dilemmas facing the state during the formation of alliances and also their bargaining power within the alliance once formed. See Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

an alliance. So to begin with the influence of the single pole's power resources is greater per unit than the same amount of power resource units within a countering alliance.³²

What makes the current unipolar system even more resistant to the small chance of counterbalancing is again geography, the location of the United States and its potential rivals. Any aspiring great power, such as China, Russia, Germany, or Japan, faces the problem of other surrounding great power neighbors who would ally closely with the US at the point they tried to challenge the US primacy. Furthermore, each region of the world has smaller "pivotal states"³³ which are natural US allies against any aspiring regional power.³⁴ These regional balancing behaviors are more likely than a global counterbalance against the US and thus provide more reassurance on the durability of the system since the quickest path to multipolarity, which is the creation of counterbalances, is cut off. The US may inevitably decline in power, but until the costs of counterbalancing are below the benefits of the status quo the unipolarity of the system is unlikely to change and furthermore the structural constraints are likely to reinforce the relative stability and peace of the system.³⁵

Research Methods and Procedures

Definitions

Alliance - When I use the term alliance or alliance framework I am referring to the "formal or informal arrangement[s] for security cooperation between two or more

³² William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 29.

³³ Ibid., 30.

³⁴ Ibid., 30.

³⁵ Ibid., 31-32.

sovereign states.”³⁶ This definition from Stephen Walt covers the idea of the basic relationship; however in a unipolar system this definition should refer more explicitly to the cooperation between the single pole and other sovereign states. True, there are other groups of states who may have loose agreements to support each other which do not include the single pole, but they are not security alliances aimed at augmenting the single pole’s behavior. No other alliance frameworks can exist in the same sense because at the point a counterbalancing alliance forms the system is by definition no longer unipolar. At the point counterbalancing alliances form, state behavior would be better explained by existing theories of alliances such as Stephen Walt’s or Glenn Snyder’s. Furthermore, I am interested in identifying the components of the current international system which lead states within an alliance to choose policies which would not normally be predicted by current theories.

Unipolarity - Unipolarity is the existence of one superpower, with global capabilities, capable of conducting or organizing political-military action anywhere. It does not necessarily denote an equal concentration of influence on a global scale.³⁷

Hegemony - Hegemony is a highly unequal political or political-military influence relationship and can be coercive or consensual. The hegemon is the state with the greater power and influence. Hegemony can exist between different states at the same time for particular issues. On a global scale however, hegemony would consist of a

³⁶ Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 12.

³⁷ David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1999):142-3.

hegemon who possesses both capability and influence beyond all other states in the system.³⁸

Autonomy - Autonomy is a state's ability to pursue its domestic and foreign interests without unwelcome outside interference. Autonomy is different, but not mutually exclusive, from sovereignty. Sovereignty is the supreme authority a state has over its citizens and territory. At present, the highest level of sovereignty which exists is at the state level. As discussed earlier, this creates the international system of anarchy which affects states actions since there is no higher guarantee of security. Autonomy is the ability of a state to exercise their sovereignty through territorial integrity, pursuit of national interests, and freedom of action within the international system. No state possesses complete autonomy because of the anarchical system. Every state's autonomy is limited in some fashion by other states and thus affects state decision-making.

Bilateral Relations – Bilateral relations that exist between two countries can not be defined in exact terms since it refers to the relationship between two countries. This relationship is flexible and ever changing as events arise and new policies are sought. However, it is possible to determine in general whether the relations between two countries are good, mixed, or bad. This determination is made by the general tone each country takes toward the other, government statements about the other country's foreign policies and endeavors, and in diplomatic exchanges. By studying these components one can make an assessment as to the status of the relationship between the two countries, and over time determine if it changes.

³⁸ Ibid., 142.

Why Missile Defense as a Case Study

Pursuing a missile defense system for the United States represents a partial shift in its overall grand strategy as outlined in The Bush Doctrine. This strategy is more offensive in nature than previous administration policies in the post Cold War world. The ballistic missile defense system is different from other defense systems which makes it a good case study to test my theory through process tracing. First, it is an active defensive system which is more threatening than traditional defensive measures, such as shelters. It is an offensive action which is taken to deny the enemy the ability to inflict damage and is debated whether or not the system is stabilizing or destabilizing in a conflict. Second, it is a layered defense system (national, theater, and possibly space based components) which means allied involvement and coordination is essential for the successful operation of the system. Third, the system is arguably not necessary for national survival and thus prospective partnering states have room to negotiate over terms. I will analyze other defense agreements, political decisions, and rhetoric by national leaders regarding cooperation between the United States and European states on missile defense. I will then use the information to test my theory and hypotheses on state behavior as this is an instance where the single pole might be giving more to the other state in order to ensure it can employ the missile defense system it feels is necessary to protect against global threats to its power.

Research Method

The method I will use is fairly straightforward. My principle evidence will be the agreements, treaties, and statements from government leaders concerning a partnership

with the US on missile defense. I will test my theory and hypotheses against the evidence collected to determine if the phenomena are evident in the behavior of the US and its allies. This method is a form of process tracing which “explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes.”³⁹ By using this method I can better identify the causal process leading to the hypothesized outcome, the chain between the independent variables and the dependent variable.⁴⁰ I feel this method will allow for the best analysis since this is a new and untested theory.

Methodological Barriers

There are several areas of concern in this process. Measuring the relationship that exists between the US and its allies is complex and not easily simplified so it can be categorized as a dependent variable. Additionally, the results of my analysis may be over determined because I am focusing only in the issue of missile defense and not the myriad of other issues that occur simultaneously and which can also affect the relationship. In order to overcome this I will be careful to explain my decisions for selecting specific events and evidence as I move through my analysis and conclusions. A second problem might also occur from the focus of the relationship between the US and only European allies cooperating on defense. There are other allies who cooperate with the US on missile defense and testing in those cases might result in a different outcome than my analysis based only on the European theater. However, I do not feel this should prevent

³⁹ Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64.

⁴⁰ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2004), 206.

me from moving ahead with the research if only to further refine the theory so that it might then be tested in other cases.

Finally, I face several obstacles because of the timeframe being researched, from the decision of President George W. Bush to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and pursue a more robust missile defense system to present day. Being that many of the negotiations are ongoing and incomplete, full access to the negotiation transcripts will be difficult to obtain if it has yet to be published or declassified. I have found that if dealing with sensitive issues neither government wishes to divulge the details of the agreement until the process is complete. Also access to source documents from current administrations in the US and European countries will be limited. Due to these limits I will have to rely primarily on secondary resources in investigating the relationships, agreements, and threat analyses during this period. To mitigate this problem I will try to document any agreements and official statements with multiple sources and widely accepted accounts of the event.

The organization of this paper will be as follows. In chapter two, I will develop the variables and hypotheses which will be tested against the evidence collected. In chapter three, I will develop a historical account of events related to the hypothesis described in the previous chapter beginning just prior to the decision by President Bush to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and ending in present day. This account will serve as the backbone for the analysis conducted in the next chapter. In chapter four, I will begin comparing the evidence presented in chapter three with the

hypotheses in order to determine their accuracy. In the final chapter, I will sum up my conclusions and discuss any possible implications on international relations theory.

CHAPTER TWO – EXPLAINING ALLIANCE POLITICS IN UNIPOLARITY

Alliance Behavior

According to Glenn Snyder, “alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership. Their primary function is to pool military strength against a common enemy, not to protect alliance members from each other.”¹ Alliances can be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral. A unilateral alliance is a situation where one state commits to the defense of another state without any reciprocation from the protected state. This is similar to a strong state defending its “sphere of influence” by committing to defend all states within a region from a particular threat, as the US did for democracies against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Most alliances, however, are bilateral or multilateral where each state has reciprocal obligations to the other states. A further distinction, especially important to alliance behavior in a unipolar system, is between equal and unequal alliances. An equal alliance is one between states of similar strength so their obligations and expectations of reciprocity tend to be fairly symmetrical. Unequal alliances are between strong and weak states and usually consist of asymmetrical

¹ Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4.

expectations and obligations. The stronger power tends to dominate the alliance and uses it as a means of asserting influence or control.²

In other world systems, bi- or multipolar, all alliance action is generally in response to a rival power which has emerged. However, in a unipolar system a rival power to the single pole has not yet emerged. It is because of this that in a unipolar system, the alliance framework of the single pole serves a different purpose. The alliance framework does tend to be an unequal alliance because of the system realities of unipolarity. However the members of the alliance may not necessarily be fighting a common enemy. Threats to the single pole can be mutually exclusive from threats to alliance member states within the alliance. This creates a dynamic where even though the superpower may be trying to dominate the alliance choices and assert control over a particular policy, it is not able to do so as in previous systems where a direct threat existed.

Furthermore, the purpose of the superpower's alliance framework is uniquely different from other systems. For the single pole the alliance is the only means for it to maintain its status as the system's superpower without directly instigating the security dilemma through arms build ups or threatening behavior. The single pole needs the alliance in order to maintain the status quo in much the same way the alliance member states are dependent on the single pole for security and maintenance of the international system. This alliance framework serves two purposes for the single pole. First, the alliance is unequal so it is a way for the superpower to create dependency of the alliance

² Ibid., 12.

members. Consequently, it can court them for reciprocity in other areas such as political support for its actions globally, as will be discussed below. Second, the single pole uses the alliance framework to prevent spheres of influence from emerging that could eventually turn into counterbalancing alliances that threaten the stability of the system. Where the single pole and alliance member states disagree either on the form or extent of new policies or the threat toward which the new policies are oriented, an area of unique leverage for the alliance member forms. Alliance members then have more bargaining power available to them and the single pole finds it has to “sweeten the deal” in order to gain support from the alliance member.

Alliance Management and State Autonomy

The remaining portion of this paper will focus on the management of alliances because for the most part in a unipolar system the alliance structures are already preset. While new states can join the single pole’s alliance framework, counterbalancing alliances are not seen in a unipolar system as I previously discussed. I will first outline portions of how Glenn Snyder explains alliance behavior within a multi-polar system then build on his theory with how I feel alliance behavior differs within a unipolar system. The management or behavior of an alliance refers to the interaction among states within the alliance to maximize their alliance benefits. This leads to bargaining. The bargaining that happens within an alliance is based on a state’s relative bargaining power which is a function of the allies’ dependence on the alliance, their commitment to the alliance, and their comparative interest in the specific issue over which they are bargaining. Generally, the lower a state’s dependence on the alliance, the looser its

commitment, and the greater it feels its interests are at stake, the greater its relative bargaining power.³

In a unipolar system the alliance structure is fairly solid; fears of abandonment are minimized because there is no great threat to be abandoned to. The goal of alliance members is to gain the greatest amount of benefit from the alliance with the least amount of cost, generally to maximize their autonomy as a state within the new policy while still ensuring mitigation of possible threats toward which the policy is focused. Because of the concentration of power resources and the single pole's goal to keep potential threats to its primacy to a minimum it will bear a significant portion of the security burden among its allies. This ensures that the alliance members are dependent on the single pole for protection but it also provides an incentive for alliance members to resist any regional counterbalancing early before it can threaten the single pole and therefore significantly threaten their own security as well. A unique dynamic is created by the bilateral relationships between the single pole and its alliance members. Alliance members must at some point reconcile differences with the single pole because there are no other viable alternatives. The single pole must entertain the concerns of its alliance member because it needs the political support to pursue its global interests. Neither state can realistically walk away from the negotiations because there are no viable alternatives. Thus, they are forced to work through full negotiations in order to reconcile their differences or at the least gain a willful acceptance. With no other option than to negotiate, diplomatic relations between the two countries can become strained as each fights to obtain the best

³ Ibid., 166.

possible outcome under the circumstances. A worsening of relations between the states will occur where policy adjustments, sought to address a heightened threat, affect the autonomy of an alliance member and the alliance member disagrees with the single pole about the level of that threat. In an effort to maximize autonomy when the alliance member disagrees with the single pole's characterization of the threat it will try to get the single pole to "sweeten the deal" and give more to deal in response to an agreement from the alliance member state to a policy that decreases its autonomy. This is possible only because of the system where the alliance member knows it can't realistically be abandoned and that the single pole needs its reciprocity to ensure its status as the superpower. Because of this relationship the single pole will actually consider and negotiate with the needs of the alliance member in order to maintain its support.

The way the new policy affects the alliance member's autonomy and its perception of the threat determines if there is a change in the relationship between the single pole and its alliance member. A worsening of the relationship will occur when the policy decreases the alliance member's autonomy or there is a disagreement over the perceived threat (see Figure 1). In a multipolar system the first variable of Snyder's theory of alliances is the relative dependence of a state on the alliance and is determined by the net benefits a state receives from the alliance compared to the benefits available from alternative sources. Since an alliance usually involves reciprocation of some sort, the benefits provided by the ally are partially offset by the cost of the commitment to that ally. A state will be less dependent on the alliance as the number of plausible alternatives for gaining these same benefits increases. In this sense Snyder finds that dependence

within an alliance can be defined “as the opportunity cost of terminating it [the alliance].”⁴ However, in a unipolar system there usually are not alternative sources from which to seek security. Once the alliance is formed the ties that exist between the single pole and the alliance member would be far more costly to sever than any potential counterbalance benefits because of the systemic factors which support the stability of unipolarity. Instead what becomes more important is maximizing autonomy under the new policy.

		Perception of Threat	
		Low	High
Autonomy	Decrease	Bad	Mixed
	Increase or No Change	Mixed	Good

Figure 1. Bilateral Relations in Unipolarity

Autonomy can be measured in terms of military dependence, political dependence, and the value a state places on its autonomy. Military dependence consists of three components: a state’s need of military assistance, the degree to which the ally fills that need, and alternative ways of meeting the need. The need occurs where a state’s military resources fall short when compared to the capability of potential adversaries and thus increase the chance for war. As mentioned previously, asymmetrical power resources between states create ambiguity within the system and that increases

⁴ Ibid.

uncertainty; the greater the uncertainty in the system, the greater the risk for conflict because the one state is unsure of its own ability to maintain its sovereignty. The second component of military dependence, an ally's ability to satisfy the security need of the other state, is based on the ally's military resources and potential. The dependency is only based on the amount of needed security. Even if the ally has more capabilities than the state needs this does not create a greater dependency. Finally, the military dependence is based on the availability of alternative ways of meeting security needs such as allying with someone else or increasing the state's own military capabilities.⁵ In a unipolar system, however, this last component of military dependence is significantly minimized due to lack of available alternative alliances and the structural constraints limiting the ability of counterbalancing.

Additionally, in a unipolar system since the single pole is dependent on its alliance member to prevent regional rivalries from evolving, this alliance dependence should be broadened to not just military dependence but "political dependence."⁶ The single pole in a unipolar system will expect its allies' political and diplomatic support within the international system on issues it feels are important. The single pole most likely has the military capabilities to enforce its interests if necessary, but it would be more efficient if it could achieve its interests through the combined diplomatic support of its allies.⁷ For example, the US sought the support of its European allies before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 in order to coerce Saddam Hussein's regime to give up its

⁵ Ibid., 167.

⁶ Ibid., 31-32.

⁷ Ibid.

suspected weapons of mass destruction. The US had the power to invade Iraq unilaterally, but it would have been less costly if the combined support of its allies through increased diplomatic pressure convinced Hussein to do this without an invasion. This is the main area where alliance member states can maximize their benefits from the single pole by leveraging their diplomatic support, which the single pole needs to more benignly pursue its global interests. An alliance member is only able to do this, however, when it disagrees over the potential threat posed by the situation and does not see it conflicting with its strategic interests.

The third component of autonomy is the value a state places on maintaining its autonomy. All states value their autonomy, but for some the simple freedom to make their own decisions seems a higher priority even in spite of an increased threat. The weight states put on their autonomy is different primarily based on historical experiences. In almost all cases, this is very true of the US, which has had the luxury since its emergence as a great power to be able to shape the course of major conflicts as the default leader of its alliances. A small example of this principle is the US refusal to allow its military forces, in any operation, to serve under the authority of a foreign commander. Additionally, countries such as France also seem to place maintaining autonomy as a higher priority. An example is France's decision to remove its troops from the NATO military command structure and only remain a participant in the political councils during the height of the Cold War. In sum, the measure of autonomy of an alliance member is the combined military and political dependence on the single pole as well as the value a state places on its autonomy and whether the new policy increases or decreases it.

Autonomy is not an absolute factor, but relative to other states.⁸ The autonomy a state has in relation to one state may not be the same with another. For example, the autonomy an alliance member has relative to the single pole is less than another alliance member.

In Snyder's theory of alliances the second variable in determining the relative bargaining power of allies is their degree of commitment to the alliance. Similar to dependence, a greater commitment will weaken bargaining power because it decreases both flexibility and leverage within the alliance. The more committed a state is to an alliance the less credible its threats to leave the alliance will be. According to Snyder, this threat to withdraw support is the "most important tactical source of alliance bargaining power."⁹ The role of commitment is different in its effect on bargaining power once an alliance has formed. When forming the alliance each state is trying to maximize their position within the alliance. Once it is formed the degree of commitment is usually expressly identified in a treaty and so the degree of commitment will arise on other issues of interest rather than over the language of the treaty.¹⁰ However, in a unipolar system since the alliance is already a given and the will to leave the alliance is realistically small, this degree of commitment is only over issues outside of the contractual agreements already stipulated in the treaty. The disagreements over policy changes are better explained by the perception of threat which will be outlined below.

Snyder's third variable in determining the relative bargaining power of alliance members is their interest in the specific issue over which they are bargaining. There are

⁸ Ibid., 168.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 169.

two “value dimensions” that frame the bargaining; one where common interests exist and thus the allies are mutually dependent on each other, and the second one where their interests are in conflict, generally surrounding the issue they are bargaining over. To go back to the previous example of Iraq, the US and its European allies were mostly in agreement it was necessary to force Saddam Hussein’s regime to give up its possession and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, but were in disagreement over how to best accomplish this common goal due to conflicting specific interests among certain states. In a unipolar system the interests that involve intra-alliance bargaining between the alliance members and the single pole usually revolve around resisting an adversary, but the disagreement occurs over the level of threat posed by the adversary and how to share the costs and benefits of carrying out that resistance.¹¹

Assessing the Threat

Using the above components, it is possible to determine the relative autonomy of an alliance member and the effect a new policy will have on that autonomy, increasing or decreasing it. This change in autonomy will affect the relationship between the single pole and the alliance member state. But what will also factor in is the disagreement over rising threats. For theorists such as Waltz and Mearsheimer alliance behavior is framed in terms of only power, but according to Stephen Walt there are other factors statesmen use to determine threats and subsequent alliances. The aggregate power of a state is still the most important factor in determining its ability to threaten the security of another state, but also important in the calculus are proximity, offensive capability, and offensive

¹¹Ibid., 171.

intentions.¹² These four variants determine a state's assessment of the exact threat posed to it by an adversary and enters into the bargaining equation with other alliance members. Unique to a unipolar system is that the single pole sees threats on a global scale and must constantly be concerned or react to changes which can threaten its power. In other systems these threats also endanger the whole alliance, but in a unipolar system it is possible for the single pole to feel threatened while its alliance members do not feel the same. The single pole still needs the support of its alliance members, even if they may not feel directly threatened, and so the superpower will have to negotiate to convince it of the threat.

As mentioned above, the extent of the threat is measured in four ways, aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intension. Aggregate power is the amount of a state's total resources, to the extent they can be transformed into military power. The greater the aggregate power, the greater threat that state can pose to others.¹³ Proximate power, or proximity, refers to the ability to project power which declines over distance; this means states that are closer inherently pose a greater threat than those far away.¹⁴ With the advent of ballistic missiles states can no project their power farther away from their borders. However, while this changes the threat calculus slightly, missiles are not a substitute for land and naval forces because ballistic missiles are not able to conduct continuous operations against a state's territory and lead to the destruction of the entire state. The reason ballistic missiles lack this ability is because

¹² Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

few states possess nuclear technology and most of those who do comply with international norms against their use. Thus, while ballistic missiles enable a state to project limited power for a short duration over large distances, they are incapable of reversing the trend that power decreases with distance. Offensive power refers to adversaries' offensive capabilities, which are more threatening than defensive ones.¹⁵ The final component in the calculation of the threat posed to a state by an adversary is the state's offensive intentions. The more aggressive an adversary the greater threat it poses, even if its actual capabilities are less in aggregate units than other states. The calculus is not just whether or not an adversary has the capability to inflict harm on another state but whether it intends to inflict that harm. These perceptions of intent are crucial to the relationship of states within the alliance because they determine whether or not and how much room exists to negotiate over terms of the new policy.¹⁶

Testing the Theory

The United States is in a unique geopolitical situation as the single pole of the current unipolar system. Unlike previous instances of the rise of a great power, the current unipolarity appears to be just as stable in the minimization of conflict among great powers, if not more so as argued earlier, as the bipolar system of the cold war. This stems from the fact that the US emerged from the Cold War as the leading state so the status quo for the most part already reflects its preferences. Additionally, geography allows the US to concentrate its power and focus on the global rather than border threats. Also, US geography reduces the incentives for it to be an expansionist power, which

¹⁵ Ibid., 11.

¹⁶ Ibid., 12-13.

would instigate more conflict and perhaps make the benefits of a counterbalance outweigh the costs of breaking the alliance with the US.¹⁷ Furthermore, the system remains stable because the major candidates for great power status to rival the US are either strong and security dependent allies, Japan and Germany, or states who would spark regional countervailing action long before they could obtain global power status, Russia and China.¹⁸ In light of this many states choose to work closely with the United States on its most important issues but talk of creating a balance to US power where interests diverge.¹⁹ This pattern of behavior can best be analyzed and explained by the theory developed above which accounts for alliance bargaining and attempts to explain alliance behavior outside of the context of bi- or multipolarity which has been the main focus of theorists.

Summary of Hypotheses

1. General: Alliances are different in a unipolar system. The single pole uses its alliance framework in order to maintain unipolarity. This means alliances between the single pole and other states serve a fundamentally different purpose than during a bi- or multipolar system because the single pole is using the alliance for prevention in order to maintain its status rather than fighting or hedging against rival powers.
2. The single pole uses its alliance framework in two ways: (1) to maintain dependence on the single pole in order to prevent any alliance member from becoming a potential

¹⁷ William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 33.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 37.

- rival power and (2) to prevent powers outside the formal alliance structure from gaining a sphere of influence which could develop into a counterbalancing alliance.
3. The single pole has to be concerned with threats on a global scale whereas its alliance members do not necessarily face threats of the same scale. This is different from a bi- or multipolar system where major powers are only concerned with other major rival powers. This means the single pole may have to both “sweeten the deal” to compensate for a decrease in autonomy and exaggerate the threat to the alliance member in order to get its buy off on the new policy.
 4. In order to gain support for pursuing global foreign policy goals, the single pole must keep its allies content enough so it can count on their political support for interests it pursues globally, whether the ally is directly involved or not.

Conclusion

These hypotheses mean very different state behavior should be observed by both the single pole and the alliance member states than in a bi- or multipolar world. They indicate that an alliance serves a different purpose than in other world systems. Because of these inferences, the next step is to assemble evidence which will allow analysis of the extent to which this behavior is actually present among the United States and some of its European allies. This will determine the validity of this theory and its merit of possibly being studied further in other cases to further prove and refine its components.

CHAPTER THREE - BACKGROUND OF MISSILE DEFENSE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE SINCE 2001

In 2001, President Bush began to alter the direction of the defensive strategy of the United States, mainly through the pursuit of an integrated and layered missile defense system after announcing the intent to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Subsequently the US expanded its missile defense system by seeking allies either to bear some of the financial and technological burden or lend some of their territory for interceptors and radar stations. Now, the United States needs more allied involvement in order to build its robust and complex international missile defense system designed to counter any nation or group seeking to use ballistic missiles against the United States or its allies. Historically, Europe has been receptive to a debate on missile defense since the first ballistic missile attack was launched by Nazi Germany in World War II.¹ Moreover, in the years following WWII Europeans favored developing a missile defense system, but were limited by technology.

Today, technology no longer limits the development of a missile defense system.² Instead, US allies differ in the degree of their support and some worry about the attention it would bring if they become close partners on the missile defense system. Some states

¹ Jeremy Stocker, Britain's Role In U.S. Missile Defense (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004), 2.

² Although there are still technological concerns regarding the efficiency and ability of the system to perform, especially against decoys and multiple missiles. See E. Fox and S. Orman, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A Review of Development Problems," The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 31, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 3-11.

argue the threat has not yet materialized for this type of system, that building this system only further instigates arms races and leads to greater instability, and cooperation with the US on this system will make them more of a target to terrorist organizations or states hostile to American interests. In this environment the US must convince allies of not only the threat, but that a missile defense system is needed to mitigate it. The US missile defense policy has not necessarily changed since President Bush's speech at the National Defense University in May of 2001, but the way in which the system has been "sold" to America's allies has changed and the reaction of US European allies has been varied.

From National Missile Defense to Ballistic Missile Defense

President George W. Bush was elected to office with the promise to advance missile defense as a main national security objective. His administration immediately increased funding for missile defense programs in their first budget and notified Russia of the intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. For his administration it was a different strategic environment from the Cold War which necessitated the focus and drive to build the system. The US was no longer threatened by the Soviet Union or any other large power and felt the greatest threat was from proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, especially in the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups. The immediate reaction to the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty was "notably muted"³ from its European allies and even from Russia.

In 2002, President Bush went further and announced the intent to deploy a limited ballistic missile defense system against long-rang missiles by the fall of 2004. The goal

³ Steven A. Hildreth, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview," *CRS Report for Congress* 5 January 2007, 5.

was to deploy five ground-based interceptors housed in silos in Alaska. The system has expanded to include interceptor sites in California along with various radar stations and even some interceptors being placed on Navy Aegis ships. While initially domestic debate about funding for the system and the extent of the system were quite vigorous, the US Congress has been more or less highly supportive of providing funding for the President's requests.⁴

In 2006 the US announced formal intentions to pursue a third site for missile defense in Europe. The US from the beginning talked about the prospects of integrating the long-range system currently being built with a short and medium range system that would be a part of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). By fielding an interceptor and radar site in Europe, the US would be better able to protect from missiles coming from the Middle East. Recently, the US secured the long sought after endorsement of its NATO allies at the NATO Summit in Bucharest. NATO leaders issued a statement recognizing the threat posed to Europe and the US by ballistic missiles and called on the organization to look for ways in which it could support the US project with integration of short and medium range systems.⁵

The Setting and the Players

The US and European Missile Defense

Shortly after President Bush's election, his administration spoke of the need for a new deterrence and signaled its intentions to build a missile defense system. President

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans," Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

Bush in his first major speech on the subject since his election spoke of this new deterrence relying on both offensive and defensive forces. The administration saw the sole reliance on nuclear retaliation as imprudent and felt that defenses could only strengthen the US nuclear deterrent.⁶ This symbolized a significant shift in US foreign policy. Remaining a party to the ABM Treaty limited what the US could accomplish on missile defense and so President Bush gave formal notice to Russia on December 13, 2001 that the US was withdrawing from the treaty. At the announcement of the intent to withdraw the President focused on the threat posed to the US from terrorist or rogue state missiles.⁷ In the aftermath of September 11 this threat seemed very clear to most US citizens and many US allies.

In his 2002 State of the Union speech President Bush highlighted the threat posed to the US and its allies from terrorist groups and rogue regimes with ballistic missiles which could be tipped with weapons of mass destruction. He argued that the US must rely on more than nonproliferation efforts in order to defend against this threat. A viable defense system should be in place to protect the US and its allies from being threatened and blackmailed by an attack and in the worst case to defend from an actual launch.⁸ The Bush administration was arguing that states such as North Korea and Iran were major strategic threats, a dramatic shift from previous years.

⁶ George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University," Office of the Press Secretary 1 May 01, accessed 7 December 07; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html>.

⁷ George W. Bush, "President Discusses National Missile Defense," Office of the Press Secretary 13 December 01, accessed 7 December 07; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html>.

⁸ George W. Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," Office of the Press Secretary 29 January 02, accessed 7 December 07; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

Today, the administration continues to argue that both states are unpredictable. North Korea has been negotiating with the international community to give up their nuclear weapons program. The administration, however, argues their arsenal of ballistic missiles remains capable of causing significant damage if they were launched. Likewise, the US focused on the continued threat from Iran as it announced negotiations were underway with Poland and the Czech Republic for a third site of US missile defense to protect Europe. While a National Intelligence Estimate in November 2007 said that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program, the administration alleges that Iran continues to develop the range and lethality of its ballistic missile arsenal.

A majority of the US Congress continues to share the administration's view of the threat. Moreover, they agree that even if the threat is some years off, it is prudent to begin addressing it now with a long-range missile defense system to protect the US, its forward deployed bases and troops, and its allies.⁹ As the US has tried to expand the missile defense system to its European allies the reaction has been varied. While most allies share the concern for Iran's ambitions, they question the ability of a missile defense system to address that threat. It is against this backdrop I briefly examine the individual relationships of the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom (UK) with the United States.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic became a close ally of the United States when it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on March 12, 1999. The Czech forces have

⁹ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe," *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 2.

been drawn down from 200,000 to approximately 35,000 and reoriented as a more mobile, deployable force. The military has also focused on becoming a more professional service with mandatory service ending in December 2004. The Czech government spends less than two percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, which is the European average. Despite a small force, the Czech Republic has been an important contributor to the Global War on Terror. It has deployed over 300 troops in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).¹⁰

In September 2002 the Czech Republic announced that it was interested in negotiating with the US about the possibility of deploying parts of the missile defense system on Czech soil.¹¹ A more concrete plan of installing US missile defense radar facilities in the Czech Republic was announced in the summer of 2006.¹² The US announced its intent to begin official negotiations between the two countries in January 2007 and the Czech government formally agreed to launch the talks in March. Support for the negotiations has been maintained through several changes of government despite a majority of opposition in the Czech public.¹³ On December 5, 2007 the Czech Republic issued a statement vowing to continue with negotiations despite the US intelligence

¹⁰ Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: Czech Republic," January 2008, accessed 6 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3237.htm>.

¹¹ CTK News Agency, "Czech Republic Seeks Joining Missile Defence Shield Project – Minister," BBC Monitoring International Reports 17 September 02.

¹² Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe," *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 8.

report that downgraded the threat posed by Iran.¹⁴ The Czech Republic wanted the system to be integrated into the NATO military structure, thus making the Czech Republic a more important player in NATO for hosting such a key component. The recent endorsement of NATO leaders for the US missile defense system and the announcement of parallel plans to deploy a NATO system to cover short and medium range missile threats have satisfied this need.¹⁵

Denmark

Denmark's security policy is founded on its membership in NATO, which it has been a member of since the founding in 1949. NATO membership is one of four cornerstones which make up Danish security policy, the other three being the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and Nordic cooperation. Denmark spends approximately 1.4 percent of its GDP on defense expenditures.¹⁶ With the reputation of "reluctant" Europeans, the Danes have been naturally close allies of the US and consult closely on European political and security issues. Denmark has been a supporter of the Global War on Terror with troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as important efforts in counterterrorism operations. Denmark was one of the first countries to join the US in the "Coalition of the Willing" in 2003 to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and has provided approximately 500 troops to assist with US efforts in Iraq. Even

¹⁴ "Czech Government Unchanged on Missile Shield after Iran Report," Yahoo! Financial News Online 5 December 07, accessed 12 Mar 08; available from <http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/05122007/323/czech-govt-unchanged-missile-shield-iran-report.html>.

¹⁵ Jonathan Marcus, "Win some, lose some for US at Nato," BBC News [online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7328879.stm>.

¹⁶ Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: Denmark," October 2007, accessed 6 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3167.htm>.

with declining troop levels as Danish troops turn over their areas of responsibility to the Iraqi army, the country has promised continued support to the US in its efforts.

Further tying the two countries together is the US Air Force (USAF) base and early warning radar at Thule, Greenland. This system was and is a crucial component of US and NATO defenses. Greenland is a Danish self-governing territory for which Denmark retains the right of foreign policy and security decisions. In August 2004, Denmark and the Greenland Home Rule governments gave permission for the US to modernize the USAF base to better support the missile defense program. Additionally, agreements were signed that involve environmental and technical cooperation as well as building mechanisms to increase trade and economic ties.¹⁷ Denmark has also signed a missile defense framework agreement with the US which gives its defense industry “improved opportunities to establish partnerships with the American military and the American defence industry.”¹⁸ As the US has sought support from its other European allies on missile defense, Denmark has been a strong advocate with Denmark’s Prime Minister urging other nations to join the US in its efforts.¹⁹

France

France is an influential ally of the US as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, NATO, the G-8, and the EU among other multilateral institutions. Due to its size, location, economy, membership positions in key institutions, strong military, and active diplomacy, France is a leader in Western Europe and believes strongly in increases

¹⁷ Matthew Lee, “US, Denmark, Greenland sign agreement to modernize US base,” Agence France Presse 6 August 04.

¹⁸ “Denmark and USA Sign Missile-Defence Deal,” BBC Monitoring International Reports 26 October 05.

¹⁹ “Danish PM supports US anti-missile shield,” Agence France Presse 7 March 07.

of European efforts for European security.²⁰ France is America's oldest ally with French military intervention a considerable factor to the colonies being able to establish their independence from Britain. French security policy is based on national independence, nuclear deterrence, and military strength. France is a founding member of NATO and is only second to the US among other NATO members in the number of troops deployed abroad. While France has been a significant contributing member to the alliance, in 1966 the French withdrew from the organization's military bodies, but remained full participants in the political councils. In December 1995, France increased its participation in NATO's military wing and in April of this year President Sarkozy publicly expressed the desire to reintegrate fully into the NATO military structure.²¹ France is also an important contributor to NATO forces in Afghanistan. President Sarkozy pledged to send an additional 1,000 troops to bolster efforts against the Taliban. This is a noteworthy announcement considering the opposition of the French public, some of whom see the war as another Vietnam.²²

Outside of NATO, France is active in peacekeeping and coalition efforts in Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans and many times takes the lead in operations. France has restructured its military in order to make it a more professional force²³ that is smaller and rapidly deployable for missions abroad. With an active-duty force of

²⁰ Currently President Sarkozy is a champion of the need for European defense development, but as a supplement to, not substitution for NATO efforts.

²¹ "France sets date on Nato decision," BBC News [online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7327940.stm>.

²² Colin Brown, "Sarkozy Comes to Bush's Rescue with 1,000-Strong Force for Afghanistan," The Independent 4 April 08.

²³ Conscription ended on December 31, 2002.

approximately 350,000, almost 39,900 are deployed outside of French territories.²⁴ France plays an active role in global arms control and non-proliferation efforts and has been an ardent supporter of the US effort to halt Iran's uranium enrichment activities. Additionally, France has been an important supporter of the US counterterrorism efforts to monitor and disrupt terrorist group activities. France opposed the US use of force in Iraq in 2003 and was not a part of the coalition efforts to liberate the country from Saddam Hussein. Despite the notable disagreement over initial US efforts in Iraq, France has taken considerable steps through debt relief, reconstruction aid, and NATO training missions to support the Iraqis since the toppling of the Hussein government.²⁵

France has been active in efforts to curb the spread of missile technology and acknowledges the threat faced by Europe and the US by ballistic missiles. However, initially France disagreed with building a missile defense system in order to mitigate that threat. France felt the system would upset the existing nuclear balance and were committed to the principle of nuclear deterrence, which they saw as incompatible with a simultaneous missile defense system.²⁶ France has always supported political efforts in the area of nonproliferation and disarmament as a better means to curb the threat faced by rogue nations or terrorist groups with ballistic missiles and other weapons. In April 2008, NATO leaders offered their endorsement of the US plan to build a third missile defense site in Europe; however, France has not signed any agreements which make it a direct participant or contributor to the US system. Recognizing the threat that ballistic missile

²⁴ Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: France," January 2008, accessed 6 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ "France, Germany propose EU plan to curb missile threat," Agence France Press 12 June 01.

proliferation poses to Europe, NATO leaders also called for ways in which the planned US system could be linked to a parallel NATO system. The system would cover medium and short range threats as well as areas of Europe that would not be covered by the US long range system, which includes Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.²⁷

Germany

German foreign policy focuses on close ties with the US, membership in NATO, and the “deepening” of the EU. As a large contributor to the EU budget, Germany holds considerable influence in Europe. Strong US-German relations have been a priority since the end of World War II when the preservation and consolidation of the relationship with Germany was vital to winning the Cold War. During the 45 years of German division the American military presence served as an important symbol of commitment to the security of both Germany and Europe. Since unification the US policy has remained that the security and prosperity of Europe depends in large part to a prosperous and secure Germany. The US continues to have a military presence with a large number of personnel hosted at several US military bases in the country. Germany has cooperated closely with the NATO efforts in Afghanistan, contributing almost 3,000 troops to ongoing operations.²⁸

Germany is a strong international advocate for nonproliferation and arms control efforts as a means to combat the ballistic missile threat. The initial announcement of US missile defense efforts was viewed with suspicion as many Germans held the belief that it

²⁷ “NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans,” Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

²⁸ Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Background Note: Germany,” January 2008, accessed 6 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3997.htm>.

would upset the existing nuclear balance and encourage proliferation.²⁹ While German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder issued many joint statements with French President Jacques Chirac aimed at curbing US efforts at building a long range missile defense system in Europe and instead developing a common EU initiative, Germany signed many agreements with the US for short and medium range systems. Germany, as well as Italy, signed agreements to purchase multiple Medium Extended Air Defense Systems (MEADS) which are designed to target incoming aircraft and missiles within a close range. Funding for the system faced some criticism domestically, but overall was “hailed as a symbol of trans-Atlantic cooperation”³⁰ and is an improvement to the current Patriot anti-aircraft systems of the German military. German Chancellor Angela Merkel parted from her predecessor and said Germany would not oppose the US plans for missile defense in Europe because of the threat of future attack by Iran.³¹ Germany was also part of the recent NATO endorsement of the US missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.³²

Italy

Italy is an important US ally as both a member and strong supporter of NATO. Italy is an important international security actor with a strong military that plays a vital role in many UN peacekeeping missions. Over 8,000 Italian troops are deployed abroad in support of military, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations. Approximately 2,500

²⁹ “France, Germany propose EU plan to curb missile threat,” Agence France Press 12 June 01.

³⁰ “Berlin to Spend Billion on Missile Defense,” Deutsche Welle [article online] 21 October 04, accessed on 9 March 08; available from <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/0,2142,266,00.html>.

³¹ “Merkel Open to Missile Shield Due to Iran Threat,” Reuters [article online] 18 July 07, accessed on 7 March 08; available from <http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=63227>.

³² “NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans,” Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

Italian troops support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Italy is also a major contributor to forces and US efforts in Iraq with approximately 3,000 troops deployed prior to December 2006. Even though these troops have returned to Italy, the country remains a strong supporter of reconstruction efforts and developmental assistance to the Iraqi people. Italy hosts several important US military bases that are home to about 13,000 personnel. Italy also hosts the NATO Defense College in Rome.³³ Italy signed a framework agreement with the US on missile defense in July 2006 which “facilitates bilateral information exchanges on missile defense matters, establishes a top-level management structure to oversee cooperative work, and prepares the way for fair opportunities to be given to [Italian] industry to participate in the US program.”³⁴ The United States currently only has framework agreements on missile defense with Australia, Denmark, Japan, the UK, and Italy.³⁵

Poland

The US and Poland have had warm bilateral relations since 1989. Poland became a full member of NATO in 1999 and was a part of the first enlargement after the Cold War ended. Poland’s top national security goal is further integration with NATO along with other western European defense, economic, and political institutions in order to modernize its military forces. Poland has been a staunch supporter of US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Polish forces command a multinational division of stabilization

³³ Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Background Note: Italy,” February 2008, accessed 6 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4033.htm>.

³⁴ “Italy, US Expected to Sign Missile Defense Deal,” Global Security News Wire [online] 20 July 06, accessed 8 March 08; available from http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2006_7_20.html#08914BC7.

³⁵ James Ray, interview by Marietta Sanders 14 March 08, Western Europe/NATO Desk Officer, Missile Defense Agency, International Affairs.

forces which have stabilized south central Iraq and worked to train Iraqi forces to eventually take over their area of responsibility.³⁶ Poland signed a Science and Technology agreement with the US in February 2006 that builds on earlier agreements to facilitate “broad bilateral cooperation in science and technology”³⁷ by removing barriers to scientific collaboration.

Informal talks over the possibility of establishing missile defense facilities began with Poland in 2002. More concrete plans of placing interceptor launchers in Poland were revealed in the summer of 2006. In January 2007 the US announced that formal negotiations were ready to begin.³⁸ The previous Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his government were highly supportive of the US efforts and while some specific conditions were made a part of the negotiations, he wanted the negotiations to succeed as quickly as possible.³⁹ However, many Poles opposed the plan in whole or in part, believing the Polish were not getting enough benefits for the risks associated with hosting the interceptors. Many believe the country will become a greater target of rogue states or terrorist groups because of the presence of the US system on their soil. Additionally, many Poles are concerned with the Russian response; blatant threats have been made that Russia will target missiles at Poland if they allow the interceptors to be built.⁴⁰ In

³⁶ Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Background Note: Poland,” November 2007, accessed 6 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm>.

³⁷ “United States and Poland Sign Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement,” US Department of State Media Note [online] 10 February 06, accessed 10 Mar 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60956.htm>.

³⁸ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 6.

³⁹ PAP News Agency, “Polish Premier Favours Swift Talks with USA on Anti-Missile Shield,” BBC Monitoring International Reports 21 February 07.

⁴⁰ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 6.

elections held in October of 2007 the Polish public elected a new government which supported the negotiations but was more concerned about the implications to Polish sovereignty and indicated they would seek some sort of public support possibly with a referendum.⁴¹ The new government led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk has bargained more openly for concessions expected from the US in return for hosting the interceptors.⁴² In February 2008, Prime Minister Tusk indicated that support of the Polish government for the interceptors would be based on a guarantee to modernize the Polish army, a key national security objective. He indicated this was necessary to mitigate the increased threat to the country for hosting the US system.⁴³ In March 2008 during a visit to the US, Prime Minister Tusk indicated the two countries had reached an initial agreement to allow the interceptors on Polish soil.⁴⁴

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is one of the US' closest allies. The UK is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and is also a member of the EU. The UK is a founding member of NATO and is one of its major military contributors, ranking third among fellow members in total defense expenditures. The UK has been a major supporter of the Global War on Terror and its military forces are crucial to OEF and OIF. The UK troops in Afghanistan numbered 7,700 at the end of 2007 alone and the

⁴¹ Ibid., 7.

⁴² "Polish defense chief wants to rethink stance on missile defense," International Herald Tribune [article online] 19 November 07, accessed 7 Mar 08; available from <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/19/europe/EU-GEN-Poland-US-Missile-Defense.php>.

⁴³ "Tusk says he supports US missile defense base if tied to modernizing Polish army," International Herald Tribune [article online] 24 February 08, accessed on 9 Mar 08; available from <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/24/europe/EU-POL-Poland-Missile-Defense.php>.

⁴⁴ "Bush, Polish PM agree on missile defense," USA Today [article online] 10 March 08, accessed on 14 March 08; available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-03-10-poland-missiles_N.htm.

government has given over £500 million to reconstruction efforts, making it the second largest donor after the US. In Iraq, the UK was a main coalition partner to the US and continues to have over 5,000 troops deployed in Iraq performing stability and reconstruction operations.⁴⁵ Additionally, the US and UK signed an unprecedented Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty on June 26, 2007. The treaty works to improve interoperability of equipment and systems between the two military forces. It allows the export of certain US defense articles and services to both the UK Government and select British companies who meet specific requirements without the need for a US export license or other prior approvals. Additionally, it ensures the continuation of the British policy which already allows for the export of UK defense articles and services to the US without the need for export licenses or prior approvals.⁴⁶

The UK has been one of the US' oldest partners on missile defense, involved in consultations and research on technology since President Johnson announced the Sentinel program in the 1960s. British policymakers have always been concerned by the effects of missile defenses, that they might decrease the credibility of the UK's own small, independence nuclear deterrent.⁴⁷ Rather than openly disagreeing with an important ally, the UK has sought to influence US decisions from behind the scenes. After President Ronald Reagan had begun the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the British worked with the US to ensure existing arms control agreements were respected and that program

⁴⁵ Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, "Background Note: United Kingdom," January 2008, accessed 6 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm>.

⁴⁶ Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "The US-UK Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty," 10 August 07, accessed 7 March 08; available from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/90740.htm>.

⁴⁷ Jeremy Stocker, Britain's Role In U.S. Missile Defense (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004), 3.

developments were aimed at supporting rather than undercutting the principles of deterrence.⁴⁸ After Britain was invited to participate in actual SDI research it became the first to sign an SDI Memorandum of Understanding with the US on December 6, 1985.⁴⁹ The British government felt that even though they disagreed on some of the principles of the program, by being involved in research it might lead to useful technological discoveries while gaining lucrative contracts for UK defense companies as well as gain insight into exactly how the technology might affect the British nuclear deterrent.⁵⁰

After the end of the Cold War when President William Clinton began development of the National Missile Defense (NMD), British officials held the same opinion they had when President Johnson announced the Sentinel program. They still believed it would negatively affect strategic stability and arms control efforts. Additionally, it was viewed as a rather complex and expensive solution to the modest political problem of North Korea, which was touted as the primary aim of the system. However, the British reluctantly continued their partnership with the US, believing the technology would ultimately prove to be impossible and also the defense and intelligence links were worth the risk. After Clinton's announcement that he was deferring the deployment of the system to his successor, many of the concerns faded.⁵¹

After President Bush announced his administration's missile defense plans it was revealed the British government was in secret negotiations to upgrade the early warning radar station at Fylingdales as well as other unspecified "technical cooperative

⁴⁸ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 5.

⁵¹ Ibid., 8.

programmes”⁵² for missile defense purposes. The government insisted that none of the agreements committed Britain to buying actual components or allowing deployment of the system. Rather, the agreement would allow better understanding of the capabilities of the US system to better “inform any future decisions on missile defense for the UK or Europe as a whole.”⁵³ Many in Britain saw this as evidence that the government was committed to supporting the US project, even though a majority of the public opposed it.

On June 12, 2003 the UK signed a Framework Agreement on Missile Defense with the US; it was largely an extension of previous agreements which were already in place from previous eras of cooperation.⁵⁴ A month after the Framework Agreement was signed, the UK launched its Missile Defence Center (MDC) aimed at providing an interface between the UK and the US Missile Defense Agency and a forum for exchanging ideas and capabilities.⁵⁵ Under the agreement signed by the UK and five major UK defense industry contributors, funds from the government are matched in equal amounts by the industry. This makes Britain a significant contributor to US missile defense efforts and is a crucial component in the development of US systems.⁵⁶

By May 2005 the UK was being considered by the US as a possible site for the missile defense system interceptors which were to be located in Europe.⁵⁷ Official talks

⁵² “Britain in Secret Start Wars Deal,” The Guardian 13 June 03.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ James Ray, interview by Marietta Sanders 14 March 08, Western Europe/NATO Desk Officer, Missile Defense Agency, International Affairs.

⁵⁵ “UK Government: Lord Bach Attends Launch of UK Missile Defence Centre,” M2 Presswire 21 July 03

⁵⁶ Terry Roach, interview by Marietta Sanders, 14 March 08, Senior Advisor, Missile Defense Agency, International Affairs.

⁵⁷ Andrew Gilligan, “UK May Host ‘Son of Star Wars’ Missiles,” Evening Standard [article online] 7 May 04, accessed on 10 Mar 08; available from <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-10642167-details/UK+may+host+%27son+of+Star+Wars%27missiles/article.do;jsessionid=M2vSHprCSsR3pgfQKz9pjpX776bSb9d2TGe5ShYTjyJFT2jjJh1W!-2080287929!-1407319344!7101!7102>.

were confirmed by Prime Minister Tony Blair in early 2007. Even though Poland and the Czech Republic had expressed interest in providing locations for elements of the system, the government's intention was to be kept in consideration as the US developed its plans.⁵⁸ The Prime Minister faced backlash from some in his government and the public who feared hosting US components would make Britain more of a target. Parliament indicated displeasure at not being consulted on the negotiations.⁵⁹ Ultimately Prime Minister Blair promised that Parliament would be consulted, but did not indicate he would seek a vote on the matter. He stressed that the negotiations were in a very preliminary stage and once more concrete proposals had been made they would be submitted to lawmakers for discussion. Ultimately, the US decided that Britain would not play a key role in the hosting of new components for the third site as it made formal requests to Poland and the Czech Republic, but pointed out the importance of the early warning radar system at Fylingdales which was upgraded to integrate into the US missile defense system.⁶⁰ The UK was among the members of NATO who recently offered its endorsement for the US missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.⁶¹

Summary

The United States has come a long way on missile defense since President Bush announced his administration's commitment to deploying a viable system. The US system has been expanded as allies have negotiated and agreed to cooperate in different

⁵⁸ "UK Talks on 'Star Wars,'" Evening Mail 23 February 07.

⁵⁹ Jason Beattie and Pippa Crerar, "We'll Take Star Wars Base, Blair Tells Bush," Evening Standard 23 February 07.

⁶⁰ David Stringer, "Blair says talks on possible British role in US anti-missile program ongoing," Associated Press Worldstream 28 February 07.

⁶¹ "NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans," Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

aspects on the US program. From Framework Agreements aimed at increasing cooperation on technology to treaties agreeing to host physical components of the program, the US has worked with a variety of allies to expand the system to protect Europe. In the negotiation process, the US has seen differing reactions to offers of cooperation with its allies. The US has had to convince certain countries of the threat posed while others readily agreed. Still, in other circumstances the disagreements in negotiations stemmed mostly from issues of autonomy. The next chapter will examine these differences in an attempt to look for patterns and discern where the proposed hypotheses from chapter two might be confirmed.

CHAPTER FOUR – THE DYNAMICS OF A UNIPOLAR ALLIANCE

Unipolarity is the preferred international system for the United States. While the United States may have to worry about threats on a global scale, there is no other major power able to significantly threaten the existence and strategic balance of the United States. American policymakers will naturally pursue policies “aimed at dissuading other states from rising to great power status and, singly or in combination, balancing against the United States.”¹ This means policies should work to reinforce the belief among American allies that they are secure and do not need to expand their own military capabilities significantly, which would challenge the status quo balance. Additionally, the United States would want to ensure new policies are not construed as threatening to minimize the risk of retaliation or backlash or being seen as hegemonic. Furthermore, the United States must retain the political support of its allies in order to pursue the protection of its national interests abroad. The more political support the United States has from its allies, the easier it is to pursue its international agenda.

Alliance members, for their part, see a somewhat different world from the US. As the sole power in the system the US sees threats on a global scale and it must always be concerned with instability in any region as having the potential to grow into a serious strategic threat. For US allies this is not necessarily the case. As smaller, less

¹ Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” *International Security* 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 60.

threatening powers they do not face the same threats or same level of threat as the US. As allies of the US however, they will be asked at times to participate or contribute to policies the US is pursuing in order to protect its interests, which the US will portray as in the global interest. While the US has the power to defend itself in almost any case, acting alone is costly both politically and in resources. With the help and support of its allies, whatever the US is trying to accomplish becomes much easier. Allies know the US needs their political support. They also know they have more room to argue with the US since there are no great fears of being abandoned from the alliance. With no threatening great power the US cannot use abandonment as a bargaining chip to get support for its policies; instead it must “sweeten the deal” to make it worthwhile for the ally to take on the increased risk and cost associated with the new policy. This new area of bargaining within the alliance creates a new dynamic unique to unipolarity.

As the United States has pursued a ballistic missile defense system and sought to expand the coverage to its European allies, elements of this new alliance dynamic can be seen in negotiations among the states. This chapter considers the relationships between the US and its allies, as outlined in the previous chapter, and whether the observed behavior is evidence of the different hypotheses proposed in chapter two. There are two ways in which the different hypotheses are tested. The first is to identify variance in the dependent variable (bilateral relations) with changes in the independent variables (autonomy, level of threat). The second is to rely on direct evidence from government officials as well as the judgments of experts for insight into state behavior and decisions on the case (missile defense).

		Perception of Threat	
		Low	High
Autonomy	Decrease	Germany	Czech Republic, Poland, France
	Increase or No Change	None	Italy, Denmark, UK

Figure 2. Bilateral Relations During Negotiations on Missile Defense

Measuring the Effects of Negotiations on Bilateral Relationships

Italy, Denmark, and the UK

Italy, Denmark and the UK maintained good relations with the US throughout negotiations on missile defense (see Figure 2). Italy signed a Framework Agreement on missile defense in early 2007 with little opposition or public statements by officials on either side. The agreement did not limit the autonomy of Italy in any way and there were no indications that a disagreement occurred among the two governments over the threat which warranted the need to pursue research and technology. The military dependence on the US for security did not change as a result of the agreement. Since the agreement did not call for an open endorsement of the system it did not require any more political support from Italy than what already existed for other defense agreements. Italy was already a supporter of the US, with significant US military installations hosted on their soil and contributions to the US in other controversial policies such as Iraq. The signing of this agreement with the US did not significantly change how closely the two countries were already linked. Looking back to chapter two, when the autonomy of the ally does

not change and the threat perception is high then relations will remain good as they did between Italy and the US.

Denmark has signed a Framework Agreement with the US as well as negotiated an amendment to the Defense of Greenland treaty to upgrade components at Thule Air Force Base (AFB) in Greenland. Under the amendment the Home Rule Government of Greenland and Denmark agreed to let the US upgrade and modernize systems at Thule AFB to better integrate the system into the US ballistic missile defense system. Agreements were also signed that involve environmental and technical cooperation between the parties in order to increase trade and economic ties.² When Denmark signed the agreements the government stressed that while they were not opposed to missile defense the agreements did not tie them any closer to the US on the issue. Almost a year later when the US and Denmark signed a Framework Agreement on missile defense the Defense Minister spoke of the benefits to Danish companies that would be afforded through the agreement and that the agreement was in large part thanks to their agreement to allow the US to upgrade facilities at Thule. The government was careful to stress again that the agreement did not commit Denmark politically to approve the continued spread of missile defense; only that it allowed for rights and opportunities without obligations.³

As the US announced intentions to build a third site in Poland and the Czech Republic, Denmark was a strong advocate with the Prime Minister urging other nations to

² Matthew Lee, "US, Denmark, Greenland sign agreement to modernize US base," Agence France Presse 6 August 04.

³ Christian Brondum, "Denmark, US to Sign Missile Defense Technology Agreement," Copenhagen Berlingske Tidende 9 October 05.

join the US in its efforts.⁴ Government officials appeared to echo those of the US, indicating their support of missile defense as a means to protect Europe from threats by rogue states. For Denmark the alliance with the US serves as an important identity in a more integrated Europe where larger states such as France and Germany can dominate the agenda. With the US as a strong ally the country feels it has more of an ability to assert itself among the big states in Europe.⁵ For Denmark the view of the threat was never vastly different from that of the US. Denmark never felt pressured to offer an open endorsement of the system. In upgrading the facilities at Thule AFB, the US was not asking Denmark to commit more territory or resources to the project. Additionally, the US offered business opportunities for the Danish defense industry through the Framework Agreement on missile defense. Thus, there was not a change in Denmark's autonomy and combined with the common high threat perception of ballistic missile attack, relations remained good throughout negotiations.

As one of the US' closest allies and oldest partners on missile defense, the UK has continued to work closely with the US even as it sought to expand the system to Europe. For the UK the biggest concern has always been the effect the system would have on their own small nuclear deterrent. Thus, by working with the US it could better understand how the technology might do so and perhaps influence US policy to the UK's advantage.⁶ Very early in the Bush administration the UK began secret negotiations to upgrade the early warning radar station at Fylingdales as well as other unspecified

⁴ "Danish PM supports US anti-missile shield," *Agence France Presse* 7 March 07.

⁵ "Danes seek balance in new ties with US," *The Record* 7 November 05, p. C11.

⁶ Jeremy Stocker, *Britain's Role In U.S. Missile Defense* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004), 3.

“technical cooperative programmes”⁷ for missile defense purposes. When negotiations were revealed the government was quick to insist that none of the agreements committed Britain politically to the US missile defense system. Instead, they focused on the benefits to the UK defense industry and military by gaining a better understanding of the technology.

On June 12, 2003 the UK signed a Framework Agreement on Missile Defense with the US which was largely an extension of previous agreements already in place from previous eras of cooperation.⁸ While a majority of British citizens opposed the US system, not enough opposition existed among lawmakers to repeal the agreements. When further negotiations were revealed, however, that the UK was making an effort to be considered by the US as a possible site for the missile defense system interceptors in Europe many in the country were opposed to hosting further US components for the program. Additionally, the impression was given by the Prime Minister’s office that the UK was actively seeking to be considered, whereas the Czech Republic and Poland were being “courted” by the US.⁹ Ultimately, the US did not select the UK as a site for additional missile defense components. The UK was among the members of NATO who recently offered its endorsement for the US missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.¹⁰

⁷ “Britain in Secret Start Wars Deal,” The Guardian 13 June 03.

⁸ James Ray, interview by Marietta Sanders 14 March 08, Western Europe/NATO Desk Officer, Missile Defense Agency, International Affairs.

⁹ “Downing Street Confirms Talks with US on ‘Son of Star Wars,’” Guardian Unlimited 23 February 07.

¹⁰ “NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans,” Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

Even though a majority of the public opposed many of the missile defense negotiations once they were made public, it did not significantly alter the decision of the UK government. Throughout the missile defense negotiations the UK and US have maintained good relations; this is in part because the two countries have agreed on the threat. The UK has been a major supporter of the US War on Terror, a key member of the “Coalition of the Willing,” as well as critical components of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The two countries are already closely linked and share a very special defense relationship which no other country shares with the US. All subsequent missile defense negotiations have fallen in line with this pattern and do not further limit British autonomy and thus relations remain good.

France, Czech Republic, and Poland

France, the Czech Republic, and Poland experienced mixed relations with the US as they negotiated on missile defense (see Figure 2). While France has yet publicly offered or accepted any offers from the US to partner on long range missile defense, this does not mean that France did not have a significant influence on the US plans for a third site in Europe. Even though the US did not have to negotiate any treaties or agreements with France over missile defense, it did need France’s support to make the project a success. The US also needed France’s political support to aid in reducing fear among the international community that the system would spark an increase in proliferation.

France had disagreed with the US over its missile defense plans since they were announced. Former President Jacques Chirac felt the system would be destabilizing to

the existing nuclear balance and create “new divisions in Europe”¹¹ as those who supported the US would be pitted against those who did not. Mostly, France had concerns over how the system would affect their own nuclear deterrent. France proposed diplomacy, nonproliferation, and disarmament as a better means to curb the threat faced by rogue nations or terrorist groups with ballistic missiles and other weapons. France is a country with a strong military that is active in operations all over the world and has always valued her autonomy even over some alliances. While the French agreed with the US on the threat posed by Iran, a missile defense system was an unacceptable solution for France. President Chirac instead spoke of the need to preserve the strategic balances which already existed in part because of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He also focused on the need to step up efforts to combat proliferation which he saw as a better way to prevent a country from attaining the ability to threaten others with ballistic missiles. Furthermore, he emphasized France’s commitment to nuclear deterrence which was the “ultimate guarantor of security in the face of any threat to its vital interests.”¹² Finally, with disagreements over the invasion of Iraq tying France any closer to the US foreign policy issues was not a viable option.

After Nicolas Sarkozy was elected in 2007 relations between France and the US began to improve. While France continued to stress that it took the missile threat seriously, it still felt its nuclear arsenal was the ultimate dissuasion for rogue states and terrorist groups. However, France began to play an active role in the development of the

¹¹ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 11.

¹² Jeffrey Ulbrich, “France and Germany skeptical about US anti-missile plans With Bush – Europe,” [Associated Press Worldstream](#) 13 June 01.

NATO theater missile defense system that was being developed in response to the increasing threat.¹³ In April 2008 France was among NATO leaders in offering open endorsement of the US plan to install interceptors and a radar facility in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively; however France has not signed any agreements which make it a direct participant or contributor to the US system.¹⁴ Furthermore, President Sarkozy announced that France will make a decision by late 2008 that it will return to the NATO military command, which it exited in 1966. While there are no personal memoirs or access to personal presidential memos, it seems France believes it can better pursue its national interests as a more integrated member of the alliance. In sum, initially the US missile defense proposal promised a stark limit to French autonomy if France offered open support and thus caused relations to worsen between the two countries. As the French perception of how to best mitigate the threat moved more closely to match that of the US and proposals to make the missile defense system more NATO friendly were endorsed by the alliance, especially with the announcement of the desire to reintegrate into the NATO military structure and thus allowing France to be involved with the NATO system and not a US only system, the negative effect on French autonomy has been minimized and relations have improved.

Since September 2002 when the Czech Republic announced that it was interested in negotiating with the US about the possibility of deploying parts of the missile defense

¹³ "France says missile shield not a priority," Agence France Presse 19 March 07.

¹⁴ "NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans," Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

system on Czech soil¹⁵ until the summer of 2006 when more concrete negotiations over the installation of US missile defense radar facilities were revealed,¹⁶ support for the project from the Czech government has remained fairly constant despite a majority of the public who initially opposed the project. This general support for the project has been maintained through several changes of government.¹⁷ Even with support to move forward on the project, relations between the Czech Republic and the US have been mixed as negotiations over specifics unfolded. The Czech Republic wanted the system to be integrated into the NATO military structure, thus making the Czech Republic a more important player in NATO for hosting such a key component. This need has been met with the recent endorsement of NATO leaders for the US missile defense system and announcement of parallel plans to deploy a NATO system to cover short and medium range missile threats.¹⁸ This was important to the negotiations because after the Russian response to the US plans, and the revelation that the US would allow Russian oversight of the systems,¹⁹ the Czechs could be more reassured that Russian military presence might not be needed to the same extent because their radar systems could be integrated with the NATO ones meaning they could see the same picture.²⁰

¹⁵ CTK News Agency, "Czech Republic Seeks Joining Missile Defence Shield Project – Minister," BBC Monitoring International Reports 17 September 02.

¹⁶ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe," *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 6.

¹⁷ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe," *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 8.

¹⁸ Jonathan Marcus, "Win some, lose some for US at Nato," BBC News [online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7328879.stm>.

¹⁹ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe," *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 8.

²⁰ Jiri Roskot, "Use of US Shield Will Supposedly Bring Savings; Ambassador Fuele: Cost of NATO Defense Will Be Much Lower Than Anticipated by Study," BBC Monitoring International Reports 10 April 08.

On the one hand, Czechs saw the addition of the missile defense sites as a prestigious symbol of the country's role in defending Europe which might give them more influence in other European affairs. Additionally, Czechs see the agreement as an ultimate security guarantee. If US components are in their country, the US is more likely to take an increased concern in their overall security and come to their defense, especially against a Russian influence. The Russian reaction and subsequent threats to Poland and the Czech Republic confirmed that there was still much to fear from their previous occupier.

On the other hand, Czechs felt that their NATO alliance already guaranteed them ultimate security from the US and a missile defense system might only increase the risk to their country from enemies of the US who now wished to target an ally with systems valuable to the US. Additionally, Czechs felt it did not need to do more to show their commitment to the bilateral security relationship as they had already shown their loyalty to the alliance by committing troops and resources to the US Global War on Terror. Furthermore, the missile defense system is unpopular with a majority of the public and political parties have to worry that they will lose power if they consent to the project without gaining enough benefits to the Czech Republic. Another issue of concern has been over sovereignty. The Czech's have maintained from the beginning that the base "would be under the Czech Republic's jurisdiction."²¹ The issue of command and control is also sensitive; who gets to decide when to push the launch button, what is the notification system protocol? Unlike the amassing of enemy troops on a border or the

²¹ CTK News Agency, "Any US Missile Base on Czech Territory Subject to Czech Laws – Czech Ministry," BBC Monitoring International Reports 18 August 06.

launch of enemy aircraft, the time between the detection of a launch and the need to fire the interceptor is very small and would not allow for government to government consultation before taking action.

While the Czech government has agreed with the US on perceptions of threat, agreements to host a US radar facility would bind the two governments and militaries as never before and decrease the autonomy of the Czech Republic. This caused a worsening of relations among the two countries and disagreements in specifics emerged as negotiations concerning the radar evolved. What is surprising in the Czech case is the lack of aid sought from the US. While the Czech's made sure to highlight that the construction worth approximately \$90 million²² would be paid by the US and have asked for agreements on science and technology cooperation,²³ they have not sought additional security guarantees or military upgrades as has Poland. Instead, the government has maintained that the facility alone will bring with it additional security guarantees.²⁴ The Czech government has announced that negotiations have been successful and an agreement with the US should be signed in early May 2008.²⁵

The Polish Government has also been supportive of negotiations since the announcement was made that the US was interested in placing ten interceptor sites in Poland. The previous Prime Minister, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, was highly supportive of the

²² Benjie Telleron, "Washington Says Czech Radar Base Be Key Part of NATO System," All Headline News [online] 29 January 08, accessed on 8 March 08; available from <http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7009871390>.

²³ "Prague criticises Warsaw over anti-missile shield," Thenews.pl [article online] 3 March 08, accessed on 7 March 08; available from <http://www.polskieradio.pl/thenews/foreign-affairs/?id=77124>.

²⁴ CTK News Agency, "Czech Opposition Figure "Surprised" Cabinet Not Seeking Aid Over US Radars," BBC Monitoring International Reports 15 January 08.

²⁵ "NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans," Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

US efforts and made few specific requests in exchange for hosting the interceptors as he wanted the negotiations to end as quickly as possible.²⁶ Many in Poland have opposed the plan in whole or in part, believing the Polish were not getting enough benefits for the increased risk of hosting the interceptors. Hosting the interceptors could be a way to strengthen the security relationship with the US. By hosting such an important asset to the US it would be a prestigious symbol of the important role of Poland in defending Europe, making it a more influential country in NATO and perhaps the EU.²⁷ Finally, this could be the ultimate security guarantee against Russia who continues to try and exert influence over the country.²⁸ Prime Minister Kaczynski mentioned hosting the interceptors could help protect Poland from a possible threat from Russia at a news conference. While he later issued a statement saying he was referring to the fall of communism which ended Soviet domination over Poland, it showed that the shadow of Russia was still felt.²⁹

The Polish government had to deal with possible consequences of hosting the interceptors as well. While the system was likely to bring increased security from the US and thus possibly deter aggression on Poland, it also could threaten Poland by “involuntarily being dragged into conflicts, which are against Polish national interest, but

²⁶ PAP News Agency, “Polish Premier Favours Swift Talks with USA on Anti-Missile Shield,” BBC Monitoring International Reports 21 February 07.

²⁷ “Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Missile Defence Base to Yield ‘Tighter’ US Ties,” BBC Monitoring International Reports 22 August 06.

²⁸ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 9.

²⁹ “Polish PM: Hosting US Shield May Counter Russia,” Javno.com [article online] 18 October 07, accessed on 12 March 08; available from <http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=90746>.

which are natural for a great global power like the US.”³⁰ This statement by the former Polish deputy defense minister, General Stanislaw Koziej is a clear illustration of the entrapment concerns within any alliance. There also was a risk with such a strategic asset to the US on their territory, that Poland might be increasingly targeted by anti-American terrorist organizations. By hosting the system it would give their military greater access to security information and could provide opportunities for research and development cooperation but this concerned the Russians. After the US announced formal negotiations were underway for the interceptors, the Russians responded very negatively to the fear of many in Poland. Russia made blatant threats to target Polish cities and the interceptor sites themselves.³¹ After the initial negative Russian response, the Polish government was quick to tie support for the interceptors with additional security guarantees.³²

However, domestic criticism increased against Prime Minister Kaczynski and his brother President Kaczynski for trying to bargain for additional guarantees after they had already indicated that Poland wanted to host the interceptors. In elections held in October of 2007 the Polish public elected a new government which still supported the negotiations but was more concerned about the implications to Polish sovereignty. The Prime Minister designate even indicated he would seek some sort of public support for

³⁰ “US Anti-Missile Shield has to be in Poland’s Best Strategic and Economic Interest,” Polish News Bulletin 13 September 06.

³¹ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 6.

³² Thom Shanker, “Poland Ties US Missile Plan To Security Pledges,” The New York Times 25 April 07.

the system possibly with a referendum.³³ The new government led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk bargained more openly for concessions expected from the US in return for hosting the interceptors.³⁴ He tied the support of the Polish government for the interceptors to a guarantee to modernize the Polish army, a key national security objective of his government. He indicated this was necessary to mitigate the increased threat to the country for hosting the US components from terrorist organizations and even Russian pressure.³⁵ This caused slightly rocky relations as the US ultimately agreed to the modernization proposals, government representatives denied it was because of increased threats to Poland. White House press secretary Dana Perino said specifically, “it is certainly not a quid pro quo,” the US would help any ally modernize a part of their defense system.³⁶

Throughout negotiations, Poland never significantly disagreed with the US over the threat posed and the need for a missile defense system to mitigate it. For Poland relations became more difficult as issues of autonomy arose. The Polish government knew that agreeing to host the interceptors would certainly change the security relationship between the two countries. The two governments would be more closely linked than ever before and the ability of the Polish government to act autonomously would be limited. This is a likely reason why Poland has sought additional security

³³ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 7.

³⁴ “Polish defense chief wants to rethink stance on missile defense,” International Herald Tribune [article online] 19 November 07, accessed 7 Mar 08; available from <http://www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2007/11/19/europe/EU-GEN-Poland-US-Missile-Defense.php>.

³⁵ “Tusk says he supports US missile defense base if tied to modernizing Polish army,” International Herald Tribune [article online] 24 February 08, accessed on 9 Mar 08; available from <http://www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2008/02/24/europe/EU-POL-Poland-Missile-Defense.php>.

³⁶ Peter Baker, “Bush Vows He Will Upgrade Poland’s Air Defenses,” The Washington Post 11 March 08, p. A12.

guarantees and unique research and technology cooperation agreements in exchange. The US had to listen to the requests and agree to them, although certainly they were put in terms which made it seem like the US was agreeing to these measures more as an act of benevolence than out of need. In March 2008 during a visit to the US, PM Tusk indicated the two countries had reached an initial agreement to allow the interceptors on Polish soil.³⁷

Germany

Germany saw a deterioration of relations with the US over missile defense. Since there was both an initial disagreement over the threat and fears of limits on autonomy this led to bad relations for a period of time. Relations became more mixed as Germany began to agree with the US on the threat, but it was not until a larger NATO study validated the US characterization of the threat as well as supported a NATO missile defense that the US saw relations improve with Germany. Germany had been involved with the US on missile defense, loosely through agreements on air defense, but not by any direct agreements to participate or host long range components such as interceptors or radar facilities. As a strong advocate for nonproliferation and arms control efforts, when the US announced its plans for missile defense Germany disagreed. Many Germans believed the existing nuclear balance would be upset and proliferation would be encouraged among rogue nations and terrorist groups. Some in the government also faulted the Bush Administration for failing to adequately discuss the proposal with affected countries, especially Russia. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder issued

³⁷ “Bush, Polish PM agree on missile defense,” *USA Today* [article online] 10 March 08, accessed on 14 March 08; available from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-03-10-poland-missiles_N.htm.

many joint statements with French President Jacques Chirac aimed at curbing US efforts at building a long range missile defense system in Europe and instead developing a common EU initiative.³⁸ While there may have been some agreement over the threat posed to nations from ballistic missiles, there were no indications the German government felt the threat was immediate enough to warrant pursuit of a system they felt to be destabilizing. They did not see countries like Iran as possessing the capabilities to carry out a ballistic missile attack and so the better method was to prevent them from gaining those capabilities. To more closely tie the German government to the policies of the US on missile defense, especially as disagreements arose over the US decision to invade Iraq, would have decreased the ability of Germany to pursue its own nonproliferation and arms control efforts abroad. In this case a worsening of relations between the US and Germany occurred as the two grappled with a policy aimed at a threat the Germans felt was relatively low and that would limit their ability to act independently on their own foreign policy agenda.

As the years went on Germany maintained its original position on the US missile defense system but began to sign agreements which upgraded their air defense system, the Patriot system, with the Medium Extended Air Defense Systems (MEADS) which are designed to target incoming aircraft and missiles within a close range. These new systems were capable of being a short range missile defense system in addition to

³⁸ Jeffrey Ulbrich, "France and Germany skeptical about US anti-missile plans With Bush – Europe," Associated Press Worldstream 13 June 01.

providing anti-aircraft abilities.³⁹ With the election of German Chancellor Angela Merkel Germany gradually began to shift its policy and improve relations with the US. The first major departure from her predecessor was in openly agreeing with the US on the threat Iran posed and not opposing the US plans to build a third site in Europe.⁴⁰ As the German government's perception of threat from Iran changed, German relations with the US improved. Additionally, the support of NATO to integrate the US long range system into a shorter range NATO alliance defense also improved relations between the two countries. Germany is already an integral member of NATO so to have missile defense as part of a NATO system doesn't further limit the country's autonomy. Germany was part of the recent NATO open endorsement of the US missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Germany had become convinced that the US was serious in its efforts to coordinate the plans with Russia which eased previous concerns that the system could be destabilizing.⁴¹ Initially the US missile defense proposal premised on a differing perception of threat and was likely to limit the autonomy of Germany. As a result it caused relations to worsen between the two countries. Since the German perception of the threat has changed to match the US' and fears that German autonomy would be limited have abated based on news of NATO partnership with the US missile defense system, relations between the US and Germany have improved

³⁹ "Germany Approves Involvement in MEADS Missile," Defense Industry Daily [article online] 2 May 05, accessed on 12 Mar 08; available from <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/germany-approves-involvement-in-meads-missile-0443/>.

⁴⁰ "Merkel Open to Missile Shield Due to Iran Threat," Reuters [article online] 18 July 07, accessed on 7 March 08; available from <http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=63227>.

⁴¹ "NATO Leaders Agree to Endorse US Missile Shield Plans," Fox News [Online] 3 April 08, accessed on 3 April 08; available from <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,345514,00.html>.

The Importance of Autonomy

In each case of worsening relations, the more important issue was a decrease in autonomy, whether the relations became just slightly rocky or highly tense. This is true for France, Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic. In each case it was an issue of how siding with or accepting US systems would affect the overall defense relationship and thus make them more beholden to the US. For France, a country for whom autonomy is highly important due mostly to their own historical experiences and the possession of a strong military with a nuclear deterrent, to accept the missile defense system would significantly limit their autonomy. Having previously been a strong supporter of nonproliferation and arms controls and believing missile defense was destabilizing, to agree with the US or go so far as to host components of the system would be seen as bending to the US will. Poland and the Czech Republic also were faced with decisions affecting their autonomy. In choosing to host physical components of the system, the defense relationship between the two countries would be significantly closer than ever before. This closer defense relationship is beneficial, especially to smaller countries that do not have the ability to provide increased security if needed. It can also be risky for these countries if the US becomes involved in events which do not necessarily affect their national interests because they could find themselves dragged into the matter because of the close relationship. Finally with Germany as well, the main issue was about autonomy. Initially there was some disagreement over the threat which also played a role in souring relations, but ultimately it was about siding with the US on an issue with which it very publicly disagreed. Even as the German government began to

agree on the threat posed by Iran's ballistic missile arsenal and alleged nuclear weapons program, it was not until NATO conducted its own study and concluded the threat from Iran matched what the US had been saying that Germany began to accept being a part of the NATO system.

In the case of Denmark and Italy, even though they have signed missile defense agreements with the US relations never soured because the agreements worked largely within a preexisting framework. For Italy the agreement was on technology research cooperation which did not commit the country to endorsing the US system or hosting physical components. Italy already maintained a close defense relationship with the US, hosting several US military installations and supporting the Global War on Terror with troops and funds. This agreement in no way increased the closeness of that relationship. Denmark's agreement to allow the US to upgrade facilities at Thule AFB followed a similar pattern. The base already exists and is a fully functional and operational military facility, upgrading the systems already there changes little. Denmark did have to agree to the upgrades and acknowledge they would be used for the missile defense system the US was expanding to Europe, but for the Danes a close relationship with the US was part of their identity alongside much larger European countries. Their view of autonomy was different and not limited by a closer relationship to the US; instead it was an asset amongst larger European neighbors. This agreement was in line with the already close relationship enjoyed between the two countries.

Increased Influence of Political Dependence

As the single pole in the system, the US is dependent on its alliance framework for preventing rising powers from gaining enough influence to be able to challenge its dominance and national interests. Additionally, in order to more benevolently pursue its global interests it needs the political support of its allies. While it has the power to pursue its interests unilaterally if necessary, this is draining and costly and likely to push alliance partners away if used too often. The need for political support can be seen in the case of the US extending the missile defense system to Europe. While the US could have worked out bilateral agreements with the countries that would be involved in hosting physical components of the system and pushed ahead on its own, the support of NATO members has drastically increased the US credibility on the system. When the 2007 US National Intelligence Report came out and undercut what the Bush Administration had been saying about the Iran threat, the support and statements of its allies helped cement the continued importance of missile defense. Furthermore, the support was crucial in being able to disarm the Russian reaction and get them to the negotiating table with the US.⁴² The chief of the Czech general staff publicly noted that “by simple arithmetic, Russian generals can see that US missile defenses cannot imperil Moscow’s arsenal.”⁴³

⁴² See “Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: there is every reason to strive for preserving the CFE Treaty,” Interfax Interview [online] 24 July 07, accessed on 14 March 08; available from <http://www.interfax.com/17/296014/Interview.aspx> and “NATO Sec. Gen. criticizes Russia’s stance on US missile defense plans in Eastern Europe,” PanARMENIAN.Net [article online] 6 September 07, accessed on 8 March 08, available from <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=23267>.

⁴³ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” *CRS Report for Congress* 9 January 2008, 12.

The Validity of Alliance Politics in Unipolarity Theory

The evidence discussed above demonstrates how alliance politics in a unipolar system operate by observing negotiations between the US and its European allies on missile defense. The US is clearly using the alliance as a means to maintain its dominance. Signing agreements on missile defense is another way the US can maintain the security dependence of its allies and thus prevent them from becoming rivals to its power. By increasing the dependence and gaining support from its European allies, the US is also able to prevent any outside powers, such as Russia, from gaining a sphere of influence which could develop into a counterbalancing alliance. The US has shown that the interceptors and radar going into Poland and the Czech Republic are directed toward the threat from Iran's ballistic missile arsenal and not Russia. However, gaining the political support and dependence of Poland and the Czech Republic certainly helps mitigate the ability of Russia to influence their decisions. Another interesting conclusion is why the US perhaps chose Poland and the Czech Republic as sites for the physical components of the missile defense system. Again, the US has demonstrated that these countries were ideally situated to intercept incoming missiles from the Middle East, but increasing the power of Eastern European countries that are friendly to American interests provides a unique opportunity to balance against Western European powers in institutions such as the EU and the UN.

The evidence also showed how in each case the US had to convince its allies of how the threat to the US also threatened the alliance members. Additionally, in order to gain support and agreements the US had to "sweeten the deal" by offering incentives

individually to countries or concede to make the system NATO friendly and work within the pre-established alliance agreements. Furthermore, throughout negotiations to the present time the support of Europe on missile defense has been vital to the US. When the US received indirect NATO support for the system through a NATO study which agreed on the threat posed to Europe from ballistic missiles originating from the Middle East, it went a long way to encouraging Germany and France to support the system. The initial NATO study outlining the threat helped push countries like Germany and Russia to encourage the Russians to work with the US on missile defense. As the US received explicit support of the facilities it is planning for Poland and the Czech Republic it received the backing it needed to gain the needed cooperation of the Russians.

Summary

This chapter has examined how the United States relies on its alliance framework to pursue policies that maintain its place as the single pole. For the United States, unipolarity is a preferred world. In order to preserve the status quo the United States works through its alliance framework to create a security dependence of its allies while also aiming to prevent regional powers from gaining a sphere of influence that would allow them to form a counterbalancing alliance and threaten the United States' dominance. The United States must worry about threats on a global scale since instability in any region can become a threat to the strategic balance. The United States' strategy then, should be oriented around policies which work to support alliance members and simultaneously mitigate future threats. Missile defense is an example of one of these policies. Expanding the missile defense system to Europe allows the US to maintain and

deepen the security relationship while at the same time mitigating the threat the US feels from rogue nations and terrorist groups that possess ballistic missiles. Obtaining support for the system was not a foregone conclusion, however, and the United States had to work with each of its allies on a bilateral basis to “sweeten the deal” in order to gain agreements and approval. The next chapter will look at the paper in totality, and determine the overall validity of the hypotheses posed in chapter two and analyzed in this chapter. Then it will look to other possible research applications and the implications for future United States foreign policy.

CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION

I began this paper by arguing that the politics of alliances work differently in unipolarity. I hypothesized that the relationships that exist between the single pole and other states cannot be explained by current theories based on observations in either bi- or multipolarity. I examined existing theories of alliances along with observations about unipolarity and came up with an augmented theory of alliance politics which would hopefully better explain the behavior of states. In order to validate this theory for further research I examined it within a case study. Using the negotiations and agreements between the United States and its European allies on missile defense I tested my hypotheses for soundness. In order to conclude the paper, several tasks remain. The first is to summarize my theory and subsequent analysis in chapter four and compare the explanatory power of the general hypothesis. The second is to look at possibilities of refining the theory by extending the analysis beyond the European theater and the case of missile defense. The third is to explain how my conclusions should play a role in future US foreign policy.

Theory Summary

In writing this paper I hypothesized four differences of alliance behavior in unipolarity. Generally, the alliance framework serves a different purpose in unipolarity, specifically it is the way a single pole can maintain power by using the alliance as a

prevention tool. The single pole uses its alliance framework to maintain unipolarity in two ways. First, it works to prevent current allies from becoming potential rivals by creating security dependence. Second, it ensures allies are strong enough to prevent powers outside the alliance from gaining a sphere of influence which could develop into a counterbalancing alliance. The single pole must be concerned with threats on a global scale while its allies will not necessarily face these same threats or face them on the same scale as the single pole. In order to gain alliance support for policies to mitigate the threat, the single pole will have to convince its allies of the threat. Additionally, the single pole may have to “sweeten the deal” to incentivize the ally to accept a policy which might limit their autonomy. Finally, in order to gain support for pursuing global foreign policy goals, the single pole must keep its allies content enough that it can count on their political support for interests it pursues globally, whether the ally is directly involved or not.

There are structural differences in a unipolar system which affect state behavior and create these differences. In a unipolar system the choices for alliances are extremely limited and thus, a state has only a few options. It can maintain its current alliances, with the single pole whose alliance framework is the only one in a unipolar system. It can join with the single pole in a new alliance if it previously belonged to a defeated alliance. Finally, it can choose to remain outside the alliance structure of the single pole. Important to note is that the current system is unipolar, but not hegemonic. While the US is the dominant power with considerable influence it does not have the ability to force the next greatest powers to do something they truly do not want to do without the risk of

creating a counterbalancing alliance in response to the threatening behavior. This is important because it means while the US is the single pole, it can not always get its way when disputes arise. This gives other states in the system room to bargain with the single pole and receive concessions which would not be possible in a true hegemonic system.

Until the distribution of power changes, the structural components of the system reinforce the power of the single pole and provide stability to the system. This does not imply that all conflict will be absent from the system, but that the two major sources of conflict among great powers, rivalry for primacy and balance of power politics, are unlikely. And while unipolarity will not endure permanently, it is sufficiently sustainable to make it worth studying alliances and other state behavior separate from analysis thus far under bi- and multipolar systems. A unipolar world is preferable for the US since security threats are minimized while its foreign policy autonomy is maximized; any power would prefer to be a single pole. The US, seeking to maintain the status quo and its position, will ensure weaker states have security from stronger neighbors in an effort to prevent wars it would be dragged into that could weaken its position. This security guarantee prevents traditional balancing on a regional scale which could eventually threaten the single pole. Furthermore, this creates a system where most states feel they have the room to diplomatically negotiate without directly confronting or threatening the single pole.

Further reinforcing the power of the US is the lack of a direct threat, which is usually what alliances are oriented against. The alliance tends to be an unequal one because of the dominant power of the US, but the forces of the alliance are not oriented

against a particular immediate threat. Also, the US must concern itself with threats on a global scale as the superpower while its alliance members may not face the same threat. This creates a dynamic where even though the superpower may be trying to dominate the alliance choices and assert control over a particular policy, it is not able to do so as in previous systems where a direct threat to the entire alliance clearly existed. Instead, the US must be careful in how it uses its alliance.

For the US its alliance is the only means to maintain its status as the system's superpower without directly instigating the security dilemma through arms build ups or threatening behavior. The US needs the alliance in order to maintain the status quo in much the same way its alliance member states are dependent on it for security and stability in the international system. The US relies on its alliance framework to create security dependency of alliance member states so it can court them for reciprocity in other areas such as political support for its actions globally. At the same time, the US uses its alliance framework to prevent spheres of influence from emerging that could eventually turn into counterbalancing alliances and threaten the stability of the system. Where the US and its alliance members disagree either on new policies or the threat toward which the new policies are oriented, an area of unique leverage for the alliance member forms. The ally has the ability to bargain in negotiations without having to worry about abandonment as a serious consequence and the US will have to listen and agree to the requests of its ally or "sweeten the deal" in order to gain its ally's support which it needs.

This bargaining space is possible because of the unique structural components of unipolarity. Since in this unipolar system the alliance framework of the US is fairly solid, fears of abandonment are minimized. Without a great threat to be abandoned to, the goal of allies is to gain the greatest amount of benefit from the alliance with the least amount of cost. In general allies will attempt to maximize their autonomy within the new policy under negotiation while still ensuring mitigation of the threat toward which the policy is focused. The US' goal is to keep potential threats to its primacy at a minimum and so it will bear a significant portion of the security burden among its allies. This ensures that its allies are dependent on the US for protection but it also provides an incentive for them to resist any regional counterbalancing. Allies want to resist counterbalancing so long as the security relationship continues to protect them. Any counterbalancing that can threaten the US will also threaten their security as well.

In this dynamic relationship where both sides, no matter how unequal, need each other in some way to maintain the status quo, allies must at some point reconcile differences with the US because there are no other viable alternatives. The US must entertain the concerns of its allies because it needs their political support to pursue its global interests. Thus, they are forced to work through full negotiations in order to reconcile their differences or at the least gain a willful acceptance. With no other option than to negotiate, diplomatic relations between the two countries can become strained as each fights to obtain the best possible outcome under the circumstances. A worsening of relations between the states will occur where policy adjustments, sought to address a heightened threat, affect the autonomy of the ally. Relations can also deteriorate when

the ally disagrees with the US about the level of threat, since it may feel the proposed policy is unwarranted, inefficient, or too costly compared to the actual threat posed. Relations are the most strained when the ally is faced with a policy that will decrease its autonomy and it disagrees on the level of the threat. In an effort to offset limits to autonomy or to minimize the impact on autonomy the ally will try to get the US to “sweeten the deal” and provide additional incentives in exchange for an agreement.

As negotiations are underway the two variables which will affect the relations among the US and its ally are autonomy and level of threat. Autonomy is comprised of a state’s military dependence, political dependence, and the value a state places on its autonomy. As the US and its ally are negotiating, the effect on autonomy is almost always a pressing concern. The perceived level of threat posed to a state is determined by the aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and intentions of the threat. Differences in perceived threat among countries can arise from differing intelligence estimates of power or capabilities as well as differing proximities and perceived differences in intentions. As previously mentioned, in this unipolar system the US must react to threats on a global scale and be constantly concerned to changes regionally which could threaten its power. These threats may not directly threaten US allies, but the US will undoubtedly need their support in order to combat the threat. In cases where allies disagree, the US will have to convince them the threat exists to their states as well in order to gain broader support for a new policy. The differing dynamics of this theory are evident in the negotiations over the extension of the US missile defense system to its European allies. The ballistic missile defense system of the US is different from other

defense systems and agreements already in place between the US and its European allies which made it a good case study to test my theory. I was able to look at negotiations on this particular issue and observe whether or not the behavior I hypothesized was evident.

The evidence presented demonstrates the validity of my alliance politics theory, which should be viewed as a refinement of traditional alliance politics theory. As discussed in chapter four, the US does appear to be using its alliance in Europe to maintain its status as single pole in the current unipolar system. By gaining agreements on missile defense the US increases the security dependence of its allies while also protecting against a potential threat. As the US receives support from its allies on missile defense and increases their security the US also is able to prevent any outside powers, such as Russia, from gaining a sphere of influence that could develop into a counterbalancing alliance. Furthermore, the decision to place the third site in Eastern Europe could also be a way in which the US is ensuring balance within its alliance framework so that one or a set of larger, more powerful countries do not dominate. It also ensures more voices that are friendly to the US interests are seated at the table in institutions such as the EU and the UN.

The evidence also showed how the US had to work to convince its allies of how the threat it felt was also a threat to their interests. Additionally, the US often had to “sweeten the deal” with incentives or concessions in order to gain support and agreements. Finally, the importance of the political support of Europe on missile defense has been vital to the US. When the US first received indirect NATO support for the system it went a long way to encourage Germany and France to change their positions

and support the system. It also helped push countries to pressure Russia to stop its threatening behavior and work with the US on missile defense. Once the US received explicit support for the construction and operation of the long range system in Europe it received the backing it needed to gain the necessary cooperation from the Russians.

Autonomy versus Perception of Threat

In each case during negotiations autonomy was the most important factor in souring relations. Whether it was France who did not want to become a part of the system because of how it would limit their autonomy or Poland who asked for additional security guarantees, each state found the resulting limit to their autonomy to be the most difficult to accept. This result is not surprising; autonomy inherently deals with issues of sovereignty and states usually are reluctant to give any of it up willingly. And while autonomy was the most important factor in affecting relations the perception of threat still mattered; without it there is little chance the US can get the support of its allies.

Implications for Further Research

I have proven the initial validity of my theory of alliance politics in unipolarity, but there is more that could be done to improve the explanatory power of the theory. A case study of missile defense in Asia could help expand the explanatory power of the theory by testing to see if similar patterns of behavior have emerged in negotiations on missile defense between the US and its allies in the Asian theater. A case study could also be done on similar issues among alliance members, besides missile defense, to see if the theory holds true. Further, a Cold War comparison case study could help refine the

theory to ensure it is truly distinctive from alliance politics theory which is based on bi- or multipolarity observations.

The Future of Alliance Politics

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought to maintain its position as the only superpower in the system. In doing this it meant policies had to work to prevent a rival power from emerging that could challenge the US position. As the US endeavors to remain the single pole in the system there are several points to keep in mind for foreign policy and grand strategy.

First, the US must remember the importance of appearing or acting benevolent. The worst thing the US could do is appear threatening to its own allies and create a counterbalancing alliance, thus moving back into bi- or multipolarity. In the long run, the US must remember that it can not afford to lose the support of its alliance members as they are its best bet against any rival power, should one emerge.

Second, the US may have to give concessions or provide incentives in order to gain approval for policies. The US must remember the importance of gaining the approval of its allies on new policies for political support in the future. The US will continually face threats on a global scale and must know it can count on its allies for support in neutralizing those threats and preventing them from disrupting the overall stability of the system.

Finally, the US must remember that if it wants to pursue a new policy aimed at an emerging threat it has to convince its allies how it also threatens them. Without a similar view of the threat relations between the countries can deteriorate and the US may find

itself alone or with limited support for the policy it wants to pursue. While the US does have the power to pursue its interests unilaterally if needed, this is a very costly course of action both in the short and long term. By taking these points into account the US stands the best chance of maintaining its position as the dominant power with the least amount of cost while also not risking a counterbalance or instability.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Marietta Sanders graduated from Meeker High School, Meeker, Colorado, in 1999. She received her Bachelor of Science in Political Science from the United States Military Academy in 2003 and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force as a Personnel Officer. She has served as Chief, Relocations and Employment, 377th Military Personnel Flight, Kirtland Air Force Base; Executive Officer, 377th Mission Support Group, Kirtland Air Force Base; and Section Commander, 377th Security Forces Squadron, Kirtland Air Force Base. Marietta Sanders was twice recognized as the Personnel Manager of the Year at Kirtland Air Force Base and has also been awarded the Air Force Achievement Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster and the Air Force Commendation Medal. Marietta Sanders was competitively selected for the Air Force Institute of Technology – Civilian Institution Program en route to teach in the Political Science Department at the United States Air Force Academy.