INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EL CLÁSICO AND INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT IN CATALONIA, SPAIN

by

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Interrelationship between el Clásico and Independence Movement in Catalonia, Spain

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my wife Aytan, and my sons Javanshir and Farhad who brighten my life every single day.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Euro ....€
FC Barcelona .... Barça
Real Madrid C.F. .... RM
Convergència i Unió ....CiU
Generalitat de Catalunya .... Generalitat
United Kingdom .... UK
Palestinian Liberation Organization .... PLO

ABSTRACT

INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EL CLÁSICO AND INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENT IN CATALONIA, SPAIN

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Catalonia is one of 17 autonomous regions of Spain which has pursued

independence from Spain for several decades. Over the years, Madrid responded by

blocking legality of independence movement through various means of political power,

including arresting and jailing activists, depriving Catalans of cultural rights during

Franco's rule over Spain, and refusing to grant Catalans a wider political autonomy.

Many in Catalonia seem to have responded to this pressure by reaffirming their national

identity through their Barcelona-based football team *FC Barcelona*. Being the namesake

representation of Catalonia's political and cultural capital Barcelona, the club has become

the leading instrument of Catalans' political expression within the context of the

Catalonian-Castilian conflict. Football in Spain as a whole, and specifically within the

context of Madrid-Barcelona relationship, serves as an alternative platform where the

conflict manifests itself in unconventional ways when it is suppressed on the political

arena. There is, therefore, an inverse relationship between political processes involving Spain and its region of Catalonia, and sports. Fusion of political, national and social identity in sports serves as an enabler and a potential booster of mobilization in Catalonian politics. Sacred values, of which Catalan football represented by Barça is one, are the primary drivers in the process.

This thesis examines the relationship between Barça fandom and the Catalan secessionist movement. The key findings are based on the results of the quantitative study of a sample of Catalan football fans conducted in September 2017 which explored the feelings and emotions of the fans in relation to the football rivalry, socio-cultural symbolism in Catalonia and politics of violence.

INTRODUCTION

José Mourinho, one of the most controversial managers of Real Madrid FC, sat disgruntled through the brief press conference following yet another *El Clásico* derby. Normally conversational before the cameras, Mourinho had to manage disappearing into the night after the biggest defeat of his career as a team manager of one of the most successful football clubs (Fitzpatrick, 2013: 69). That night, November 29, 2010, FC Barcelona thrashed Real Madrid in its home field with the score of 5:0 (Lowe, 2010). As the full-time whistle blew, in a display of superiority Barcelona's players raised their 5 fingers to make a '*manita*' salute, a finger for every goal scored. Although Real Madrid was a point ahead in the league standings, that night Barcelona reversed the tide.

El Clásico, or the Classic game as the Barcelona-Real Madrid rivalry came to be known, is not your average football derby. Every component of the match is symbolic. The mere fact that an underdog defeats its main rival — representing Madrid (the capital of Spain), and with-it Catalonia's complicated relationship with the central government — in Camp Nou, Barcelona's home field, is worth the commotion. Both *Barça*, as Barcelona is called by its fans, and Real Madrid own some the world's most expensive players. Millions of people who follow club football are tuned to Spanish league seasons and various European football tournaments every year to follow these rival teams. At its

peak, *El Clásico* has drawn as many as 1 billion viewers worldwide, making it the most watched sporting event in the world (Morris, 2015.)

For Catalans, who regard Barça as the voice of Catalonia follow their team for a lot more reasons than just football. Its now widely recognized slogan "*Mes que un club*" (More than a club), engraved on the seats of Camp Nou stadium in Barcelona, signifies the relationship of Catalans to the club which represents them not only as a club, but in many more realms than just sports. The slogan promotes and symbolizes the connection of Catalans to the international community of supporters, and politics of pro-independence movement in Catalonia (Ashton, 2013: 32).

Sports, in general, is recognized as an effective platform for mitigating peace and unity. Indeed, the competitive nature of sports allows the contending parties to re-locate any existing and potential rivalries among themselves onto sporting platforms. The rules in sports impose restrictions on violence, thereby disallowing conflicts in sports from getting out of control as they normally do on the political arena. The organizations overseeing the competitions have the freedom to ban *and* disqualify individual athletes or teams not only for their violations, but also for misbehavior of their fans.

While sports have demonstrated an ability to contain the competitive rivalries between individual athletes and teams representing various ethnic groups, communities and countries, one can also argue that it may inadvertently or purposefully help mobilize masses or their support bases for political causes. Such is the case with Barça. The base of supporters that Barça has amassed is now demonstratively reflective of the socio-political sentiments in Catalonia. Apart from singing *El Cant del Barça*, the official

anthem of the club before the start of each game (Burns, 2012: 200), Barcelona supporters also shout "Independencia" on the 17th minute 14th second of the match symbolically commemorating *La Diada*, the National Day of Catalonia which marks the fall of Barcelona to the Castilian troops on September 11, 1714, and expressing support for independence of Catalonia from Spain (Tremlett, 2012). In a vivid justification of symbolism of Barça's '*més que un club*' slogan, Barcelona's home stadium Camp Nou has been used for pro-independence events such as the Concert for Freedom which gathered in excess of 90,000 participants in 2013 (Partal, 2013; Colomer, 2013).

The symbolism that Barça has generated among its fans and Catalans, in general, suggests that a sporting club can transform an already existing identity or strengthen a national one. The fact of the matter is that there are other Catalan clubs that have played in the primary Spanish tournaments all along, including Girona FC, CE Sabadell FC, RCD Espanyol, Gimnàstic de Tarragona (Brown, 2009), but none of them have been so successful and so reflective of Catalan national identity as FC Barcelona. Its victories over archrival Real Madrid in defiance of alleged misjudging referring throughout its history and employment of some of the world's best players most certainly contribute to the sense of special attachment to the club. I would also argue that the expanding multinational fan base of Barça is yet another factor which generates feelings of pride and belonging to the club that displays the national colors of Catalonia.

The attachment of its supporters to the club is signified by symbolism and shared valued which seem to arguably have become sacred. Barça's sporting institutions, like the Camp Nou stadium; the club's *La Masia* youth academy which have produced a the

superstar Lionel Messi, successful players like Sergio Busquets and Gerard Pique; FC Barcelona Foundation, are the platforms of communication with the outside world which at the end of the day solidify the allegiance to Barça, and with it, perhaps, the Catalan national identity. Considering the social construct of sports and its ability to mitigate or instigate social conflicts, these may become decisive factors in channeling emotions and taking actions related to national issues in Catalonia.

Taking into consideration the connection of Barcelona fans both to their social and ethnic identities reinforced by football and Spanish politics, respectively; and the fact that Madrid has in recent years blocked legality of Catalonia's pro-independence activities through various means of political power, including arresting and jailing activists and depriving Catalans of cultural rights during Franco's rule over Spain, and refusing to grant Catalans a wider political autonomy, it could be argued that Catalonia's response to this pressure is its political expressiveness through its soccer team FC Barcelona. In other words, the Catalonian-Castilian conflict could be seen as having an alternative platform where it manifests itself when it is suppressed on the political arena. There is, therefore, an inverse relationship between political processes involving Spain and its region of Catalonia, and football. FC Barcelona is the primary instrument of this political expression on the field. Therefore, Catalan fans' sentiments expressed through football against Spanish symbols such as Real Madrid, Spanish national team, alongside with their socio-political views on independence of Catalonia could be representative of tendencies in Catalonia vis-à-vis potential political events in the region that have heretofore not taken place. It is then possible to offer a hypothesis by testing a

randomized sample of Catalan football fans in order to measure the possibility of this football rivalry in sports spilling into the political standoff, and consequentially, its potential transformation into an armed conflict. The research question for this thesis then is how does Catalans' attitudes towards Barça affect their sense of nationalism?

In Chapter One, I review the literature on the relationship between sport and conflict in order to determine the main approaches to the influence of sports on conflict. Here I discuss the works of proponents of sports as peacemaker and peacekeeper, and works of proponents of the approach that sports can act as a platform for conflict escalation. Then, I explore the phenomena called *sacred values*, which are values held dear to the people in question and perceived to be of high moral importance. Among the most common sacred values like human life, health, love, justice, language, I discuss the attachment to Barça as a potential sacred value which can strengthen deeper sense of nationalism among Catalans.

In Chapter Two, I present the hypothesis by discussing the meaning of Barça for its devoted fans and the effects it produces in their relationship with the club, and by association, how it affects their attitudes towards Catalan nationalism.

In Chapter Three, I present the case of Catalonia, and discuss specifics of Catalan nationalism and secessionist theories the Catalan nationalism and independence movement is based upon. In the following section I provide background on fiscal policies in Spain as applied by Madrid to its autonomous regions, and review the fiscal policy on Catalonia. Since fiscal freedom has been an important factor in Madrid-Barcelona relationship, a special attention must be given to this variable. In the following sections, I

move on to describe the Castilian-Catalan conflict through sports and peculiarities of Barça's fandom. In subsequent sections I explore the subject of violence in football, mobilization theory and how Barça fans can organize and mobilize masses. These are important factors which can shed light into the tendency of Barça fans to mobilize and become potentially violent in the future. Finally, in the remaining sections, I examine the types of Barça fans and the extents of their commitment/allegiance to the club, and revisit the notion of Barça being a sacred value.

The sections in Chapter Three address the items of significance that are then used as variables in the quantitative analysis. Among them is the discussion on relationship to Barça; political ideology and parties which have played a role in mobilizing the masses in the past; importance of fiscal policy for Catalans, and Catalan language which takes a chief standing in the list of national priorities for Catalans.

Chapter Four discusses the research design, measures and procedures used to conduct the survey, as well as provides information on some of the important data collected during the quantitative survey. In Chapter Five, I discuss the results and findings and in Chapter Six, I present conclusive remarks on the outcome of the study with an outlook to the future.

Contribution to research

Football increasingly plays an instrumental role in the Madrid-Barcelona relationship. The sentiments around the Catalan independence movement are often reflected in the behavior of fans in the context of *El Clásico*. So integrated is the Madrid-

Barcelona derby in the socio-political rivalry that the 'classic game' has turned into one of 'sacred values' discussed later in the text below.

Fans of Barcelona constitute a considerable portion of the registered voters, and presumably, of the pro-independence movement. Their emotions generated as a result of fans' allegiances to the club of choice may play a significant role in the mobilization of masses for events associated with secession from Spain. The results of the survey conducted in Catalonia for the purposes of this thesis demonstrates a correlation between football and political activity of the respondents.

The assumption then is that there exists an interconnection between political activities of Catalans and their actions in the capacity of Barça fans. It can be argued that these processes are based on the notion of identity fusion, a union of personal selves with social selves, which can form strong group bonds allowing high permeability among group members. Fandom around FC Barcelona brings hundreds of thousands of supporters of the club in Spain—and many millions outside of Spain—together allowing them to act in union. The activities of such groups are often affected by the sentiments generated by victories and losses of the club on the pitch, actions and statements by individual players, team managers and/or club management. For instance, a victory of Barcelona over Real Madrid at a time of heightened political tensions between the Spanish government and Generalitat could yield one effect; a statement by the influential former manager of Barça, Pep Guardiola who supports Catalan bid for independence, could produce another effect. This is why a study of correlations between Barcelona fandom and political activities of Catalans is warranted. This research may contribute to

further studies on mitigation and transformation of the Catalan-Castilian conflict, and

most importantly, expand our understanding socio-cultural institutions can play in

shaping policies intended to prevent armed conflicts and violence, in general.

CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW

Sports is part of everyone's daily life. It has been known to have played an important role in the society. Some do sports to earn for living, others just to be healthy and stay in shape. Yet, each one of us—to a large or small degree—is passionate about sports due, specifically, to its feature of competitiveness. Precisely because sports generate fierce struggle for outcompeting, it has been globally organized to substitute physical conflict between peoples. Although it has been only a few decades that conflict resolution (CR) existed as a discipline, sport as a form of competition and largely as a tool for suppression of a given conflict, has been used for many centuries.

Sports as a platform for conflict mitigation and escalation

In the existing literature, there are opposing approaches characterizing the interrelationship of sports and conflict. Proponents of one extreme claim that sports play an instrumental role in mitigating and transforming conflicts, underlining the very fact that international sports competitions were organized to generate peace, mutual understanding between nations, and reduce polarization and aggression between conflicting parties. Proponents of the other extreme maintain that modern sports can be considered one of the very sources of social conflicts, chiefly due to its very competitive nature, i.e. competition is believed to beget conflict. The interrelationship between sports and conflict is rather interesting. While it may be customary for individual athletes and

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teams to manifest aggression stemming from competition, their actions are properly regulated. Unlike in the political realm, organizations overseeing sports tournaments require adherence to, and to a large extent, succeed in instituting *fair play* between the competing parties in any type of sports, thereby, imposing adequate repercussions for those who violate. This makes sports an extraordinary platform for communication and interaction between political competitors, yet, I would argue, in some cases, not without unpleasant consequences (such as potential diplomatic crises, armed conflict, etc.)

It can also be argued that international sports tournaments are often used as venues to exhibit, reaffirm or consolidate political might of some nations over others, and/or demonstrate resistance of underdogs to top dogs. When it comes to political relations, overcoming other opponents, setting new records, successful performances of national teams at the Olympics, World Cups and championships could also be seen as reaffirmation of socio-political authority of countries. Many countries expend enormous resources to bid for and win the right to hold big international tournaments in an effort to claim that authority, despite the fact that economic incentives may fail to justify the expenditures. On par with competing in international tournaments, some countries at times use the very tournaments to stage political protest by boycotting the games, as many did during the Olympics in Moscow in 1980 and in Los Angeles in 1984.

Sports have a unique feature that can be used to prevent conflicts in a modern society (Spaaij & Burleson, 2015: 59). This is facilitated by its communicative capabilities. Participation in joint trainings and competitions can give people an intimate sense of community, partnership, cooperation, friendship. It can serve as an effective

factor in diminishing the social distance between people and build bridges across multi-confessional communities. Acting as a platform for an open communication, sports can promote tolerance and reconciliation between parties in conflict. Having North and South Korean athletes perform in one unified Korean team during the 2000 Summer Olympics, and table tennis match between China and the United States in 1971 which set the stage for reconciliation and restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries are good examples of how sports has the potential to revitalize broken relationships (Singh & Erbe, 2017: 107).

Sports can be seen as a construct of an orderly and just interaction, and could act as a guiding element in overcoming difficulties in communication over natural and artificially constructed boundaries. One other important element of sports is that individuals engaged in sports activities are also led to learn to follow the decisions made by others, and often times by the adversaries, regardless of whether they agree or disagree with the decision; and to be able to learn to respect the authority making and instituting those decisions regardless of the origin of the judges and referees.

Perhaps, the most impressive contribution of sports to the society is the concept of *fair play*. As the foundation of any competitive sports, fair play underlines adherence to both legal and moral norms applicable to sports. Fair play which originated in sports gradually transformed into a social value and norm, penetrating into and adopted by other sectors of human activity, especially when it comes to conflict between competing parties. In his work on fairness and fair play in sports, the former German rower, philosopher and Professor of Karlsruhe University, Hans Lenk (1964) elaborates on the

philosophy of the concept arguing that fair play can be subdivided into formal and informal. Whereas the *formal* fair play is accepted as a mandatory norm and pertains to the observation of specific rules and submission to the "rule of law" established by the relevant authorities in a given type of sports; the *informal* fair play is understood as the "chosen sporting spirit", relationship and attitudes towards the opponents, authority (judges and referees) and other officials.

This argument is further supported by James W. Keating (1964), who suggests that the spirit of a fair sportsmanship and equality comes even before the conformity with the formal rules (i.e. formal fair play). This perspective proposes a genuine relationship between involved sportsmen in an atmosphere of mutual respect and dignity. One of a few examples, often applauded at in football stadiums is stoppage of the game by players. During a match, when a player from one team is injured and is on the ground, the players from the opposing team will kick the ball out to allow the opponent to be treated, even if they are losing the game and time is of the essence. And after the injured player is treated and is up, his team returns the ball to the opposing team as a sign of respect. These pertain to the unwritten informal rules, adopted by athletes as moral norms. Keating maintains that "modesty in victory" and "admirable composure in defeat" (1964: 32) can be deemed as qualities that define the character of an athlete and his or her self-control.

Renson (2008) writes that fair play is one of the biggest contributions made by sports into modern ethics. Fairness and fair play on the sporting fields and venues, seen and felt by fans and viewers throughout the world could surely reform our perception of ethical norms. In the eyes of a sports fan, regularly exposed to fair play, the concept of

fairness could obtain a new meaning. This has a potential to truly restructure the relations between people based on morality and definitely has a positive impact on mitigation, resolution and transformation of conflicts. The argument that sports is the "war minus the shooting" famously coined by George Orwell is still relevant today (2008: 78).

According to Ramsbotham, et al. (2011), Olympic Games which are comprised of dozens of athletic competitions was introduced in ancient Greece as a way of bringing peace to the Peloponnese and suppressing conflicts between city-states on the peninsula. Competition in sports is, perhaps, the best venue for expression of strength, wisdom and power over the rival within the established constraints. While the ancient world recognized no regulations for conducting conflict and had yet to reach the age of Westphalia, Congress of Vienna, League of Nations, or the most recent United Nations, where international order is established on commonly-agreed principles and rules of engagement such as the Helsinki Final Act and Geneva Convention, in the distant past sports was the only contest for superiority which was exercised with respect to the commonly-accepted rules. That is the reason why Olympic torches began firing again at the turn of the 19th century to provide athletic spaces for competition between nations. Since re-introduction of Olympic Games in 1896 (Martin & Gynn, 2000), newer forms of sports have been added to the Games, and the tournaments were gradually split into various contests such as the Winter and Summer Olympics, Paralympics, Youth Games, Pan-continental Games, etc.

Apart from suppression of existing or emerging conflicts, sports could be seen as a bridge-building activity between peoples of various ethnic and religious backgrounds.

There are also commercialized aspects of sports which generate business opportunities on global scale through advertising during global and continental tournaments like the World Cup, Asian Games and the like. So much trust does the international community have in conflict resolution through sports that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) revived the idea of *Olympic Truce* (which was at the core of the Olympic Games during Peloponnesian wars) by launching the Olympic Truce Foundation in July 2000 to promote peace via sports (Ramsbotham, 2011: 353).

At the core of this belief in positivity of sports is, perhaps, the assumption that there is linear relationship between sports and social rituals that humans conduct, abide by, and produce in their communities. In her interpretation of sports as rituals, Professor Birrell of University of Iowa (1981) suggests that sports can be seen as a transformed modern-day ritual that can be traced to early human ritualistic practices, including ones associated with fertility festivals and religious rituals. She maintains that although with time sports may have lost its religious meaning, the form of those activities is maintained. The so-called Mesoamerican ball game, played by the Mayans could serve as a vivid example to corroborate Birrell's theory. According to Hersh (2007), these highly ritualistic ball games were associated with dedication events, potentially including human sacrifices, as depicted on panels in Chichen Itza, Mexico. Placing sports in line with other societal rituals and activities, Hargreaves (2014), in turn, suggests that as a cultural form, sports is able to convey meanings powerful enough to be used for ideological purposes. The notion that sports are may be intertwined or even fused with other forms of cultural interaction between humans allows us to presume that it is yet another form of cultural

and – by an association – political expression.

Sports could be then interpreted as a unique platform for building interpersonal and inter-group relationships and affections. For instance, whereas in any interethnic or inter-religious conflict, members of the groups are likely to glorify their own and degrade members of the other group, in sports the attitude could be quite the opposite. In many sports, members of one group often appreciate the superiority and "good sports" demonstrated by member(s) of the rival team and are likely to cheer and applaud to them despite the existing tensions. This is true in football, volleyball, basketball or any individual sports like wrestling and boxing. In their study of sports in conflict resolution, Tuohey and Cognato (2011) state that inter-community peace projects like PeacePlayers International (PPI), founded in 2001 by Brendan and Sean Tuohey can build stronger bridges between the divided communities and generate platforms for a new status quo by engaging in sports. The founding maxim of the organization which later introduced its activities in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Cyprus and New Orleans was "Children who play together can learn to live together." This logic is at the core of the global tournaments like the World Cup held every four years. The last World Cup, for instance, which was held in Brazil in the summer of 2014 became the platform of global call to end racism. Many notable players and teams urged the viewers worldwide to condemn and stop racism. Moreover, FIFA as the official organizer of the World Cup ran a social network campaign asking soccer fans to take selfie pictures saying "#SayNoToRacism" in an effort to start a global movement to tackle the problem of racism and discrimination (Fare Network, 2014). Building on this logic, some world-known players also use their

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reputation to contribute to reconciliation efforts in war-torn areas of the world. For instance, the professional football player Didier Drogba who himself is a Christian married to a Muslim woman, promoted peace within the framework of United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) by calling Christian and Muslim communities in his country to peace (Cardenas, 2014:113) following the end of the civil war between these communities which reportedly contributed to the five-year ceasefire agreement (Ramsbotham et al, 2011; Hayes, 2007). Ramsbotham et al (2011), cite as another good example the partnership agreement signed between Barcelona FC and the Open University of Catalunya according to which the club was making itself available to promote peace and other educational programs of the university. Since the club represented the cultural struggle of Catalans against the oppression by official Madrid during the reign of Francisco Franco, Barcelona FC was in a position to serve as platform for peace programs associated with the Catalan community in Spain. In 2006, the former president of the club Joan Laporta committed to promoting peace via having the logo of UNICEF of Barcelona FC's uniforms and signed up the club for an annual contribution of 1.5 million euros to UNICEF to support its efforts to promote peace.

According to the proponents of the second approach to the role of sports vis-à-vis conflicts, despite the overwhelming belief in the positivity of sports, it can presumably also generate negative dynamics in a given intergroup relationship. This is not to say that sports as an athletic activity is likely to create increasing conflict between large groups as there is no evidence that any athletic contest by itself has heretofore led to an armed conflict between two or more groups; yet, it does have the potential to exacerbate

simmering conflicts to a point of armed escalation. German sociologist Günter Luschen argues that sports may be seen as one of the sources of social conflicts because of the very nature of competitive construct in sporting activity. In his academic article "Cooperation, association and contest" (1970), Luschen argues that a sports contest is virtually a zero-sum game in which the contenders compete for a win incentivized by low *or* high payoffs. Any game starts out with participating competitors having the equal standing and by the end of the game they become unequal with one coming out as a winner and outranking the other(s). Luschen states that as a highly regulated structure, a sport contest functions in accordance with a "mutually agreed order". That derives from a notion that in sports there is a certain combination of internal elements, which, in the form of concrete connections, establishes a hierarchical order of things (Luschen, 1980). This hierarchy is determined by the results of sporting performances and reflects the social stratification of the society. The hierarchical order is defined by the inequalities of talent, physical inheritance and the ability (access) to practice sports, which is determined by belonging to one's social class. Sports, unlike legal or armed conflicts, are not permanent in a sense that any form of victory or defeat in sports is not final. That is, any title, reward or ranking obtained through contest can be re-contested in future matches or tournaments. This, in turn, in my opinion, is conducive to breaking the cycles in conflict spirals that can usually be seen in other forms of social conflict.

The actual elements of natural conflict inherent in sporting activity are, in Luschen's opinion, mitigated by intragroup and intergroup relationships. He identifies two forms of interdependent relationships in sport contest: cooperation and association

(1970: 21). Cooperation emerges out of the need to achieve common objectives and obtain common rewards, and is primarily exercised on an intragroup level, i.e. between members of one team. Based on previously done research, Luschen concludes that "groups in conflict and competition with others are hypothesized to develop higher solidarity among members and a more differentiated structure" (22). This hypothesis was also affirmed by the results of the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif, 2013), also known as the realistic group conflict theory, conducted in 1960s which showed how an intragroup cooperation and subsequently, intergroup hostility arise in the face of fierce competition for scarce resources. Luschen (1970) argues that any potential internal conflict between members of the same team is then naturally superseded by cooperation in the quest for maximizing common rewards and contribution to the team's effectiveness. These dynamics are also present in international football. For instance, after a recent purchase of FC Barcelona's Neymar by the French football club PSG which became the largest deal in world football to date (Dudley, 2017), an internal rivalry ensued between Neymar and PSG's own long-time superstar Edinson Cavani. The conflict reached its culmination when the forwards publicly argued over who would take the penalty kick during the game with Lyon (Wilson, 2017). The conflict continued into the dressing room, but a few days later the players reconciled calming down their supporters (Garcia, 2017).

The second form of an interdependent relationship, called by Luschen an 'association', which stems from the 'antagonistic cooperation' (1970) between two competing individuals or teams, is motivated by intrinsic rewards. The common interest

of obtaining those rewards become so high as to warrant suppression of antagonistic feelings toward each other. Elias and Dunning (1966) explain this process as fluid configuration formed by both teams in a game in which individuals from both sides remain interdependent, and "move and regroup themselves in response to each other." In my opinion, this process acts as the opposite of a conflict spiral, unraveling the tendency for mutual antagonism, although how far that association goes is vague and is open to interpretation. That being said, in Luschen's view, sports have a structural contradiction that could be defined as being dialectical, i.e. a sports competition seems to involve opposite elements: both associative (integrative) and conflictual elements, depending on the type of sports, circumstances and so forth (Luschen & Sage, 1981; Luschen, 1980). In his words, sports contest constitutes a highly regulated "system of exchange" (Luschen, 1970) that seems to respond to the circumstances rather than a specific standard established by regulations. It is also important to note that cooperation and association between opposing individual athletes and teams could also extend to their fans and supporters "off the field".

Following Luschen's line of thought about dialectical nature of sports, we can conclude that sports is sometimes used as a platform for instigating or escalating conflicts. International competitions such as World Cups and Olympic Games could be seen as venues for pushing countries' and non-state actors' political agenda. The 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin, 1988 Olympic Games in South Korea, as well as the boycotts of the Olympic Games in Moscow and Los Angeles in 1980 and 1984, respectively are good examples of how parties will not stop short of using sports for political purposes. In

this context, sport boycotts act as yet another form of sanctions. Just like economic

sanctions, intended to harm the (common) adversary, countries individually and

collectively can seek to harm reputations and decrease economic gains of the targeted

countries by declaring boycotts. To some extent, these actions in international sports

constitute a "war without weapons" (Goodhart & Chataway, 1968) where countries in

fierce political competition refrain from using military but use other actions to cause each

other some damage. In his book "Sport in a changing world" (2016), Nixon writes that as

a surrogate for military conflict, sport acts as a symbolic substitute for a bloodier and

costlier military conflict. A win on a sporting field could serve as an indicator of a

national superiority over the adversary. In this regard, the responses by an adversary are

usually reciprocal in kind. The author uses the subsequent boycott by the Soviets and

their allies of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games in response to the American-led

international boycott of 1980 Moscow Olympic Games due to Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan as an example of how countries remain within the constraints of the

surrogate conflict. Goodhart and Chataway (1968) who coined the term "war without

weapons" in their namesake book reflect on the nature of conflicts arising from sports.

Sport, in the opinion of the authors, may lead to increasing of confrontation, tension and

conflicts in the relations between countries.

Use of sports by non-state actors for political purposes creates additional

challenges for nations. Ungoverned, unaccountable and untied to any legal treaty, non-

state actors can be deemed unpredictable in their actions and pose "lethally destructive

threat" (Abella, 2009: 268). Perhaps, hostage taking and slaughtering of 11 Israeli

athletes by members of the PLO's offshoot called Black September during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games is a vivid testament to this claim. Munich killings reshaped the landscape of how terrorism was to be fought in spaces theretofore unthought-of by authorities (Brauer & Van Tuyll, 2009; Abella, 2009; Weinberg, 2008). After the Munich events, terrorism transcended nation-state boundaries. The Paris attacks of 2015 by Islamic militants, among which was blowing up a bomb close to the *Stade de France*, where President Hollande was watching the Germany-France friendly match (Banerjee & Shergold, 2015), sends the world a message that non-state actors determined to make a "lethal" statement will use big public spaces, sporting facilities among them, to inflict mass casualties. Considering the fact that the next World Cup will be held in Russia, a country with a seemingly loose security structure, the threat of terrorism is big as never before.

One of the often-cited armed conflicts allegedly caused by football is the so-called Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 (Goodhart and Chataway, 1968; Ramsbotham, 2011). In reality, the conflict had deeper roots, related to the new land reform of the General Arellano government enacted in 1962 which took the land away from Salvadorian migrants who had lived in Honduras for many years, and deported most of them back to Honduras thereby creating a humanitarian crisis in their homeland. The 1970 World Cup qualifier match between the two national teams simply ignited the long-awaited conflict and escalated it into a full-fledged war which lasted only for a few days with conflict ending in peace agreement a decade later (Anderson, 1981: 64-75). In this particular case, sports served as a platform to escalate the existing contradictions and

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polarization of the two Central American communities into an armed conflict.

Therefore, as one can see sports has been used extensively to promote peace and development of relations between people, and can at times serve as a springboard to escalate conflicts. However, little research has been conducted on the bi-directional relationship between sports and politics where a conflict suppressed in politics transforms itself into sports, and has a potential to spring back into political realm in a reshaped form. One such example is the bloody confrontation during water polo match between Hungarian and Soviet teams during the Olympics in Melbourne in December 1956 (Goodhart and Chataway, 1968). Following the military invasion of the Soviet Army in Hungary in November 1956 in order to suppress a nationwide revolt against the Communist government which ended in nearly 3,000 deaths, Hungarians had no other choice other than to remain subjects of the regime. Yet, their willingness to retaliate and defeat the enemy was expressed during the Olympic match on December 6, 1956. So fierce was the competition that after a humiliating defeat of the Soviet team with the score 4:0, a member of the Russian team punched Hungary's forward Ervin Zador who was escorted to the locker room in blood (Burnton, 2011). While this event was just an episode between two nations, it does demonstrate the potential of conflict escalation if the circumstances and environment allow it.

The contradictory nature of the influence of sport on international relations in the course of its history is analyzed in detail in the study of Finnish sports sociologist Kalevi Heinilä. In his academic article "Notes on the Inter-Group Conflicts in International Sport" (1966), Heinilä writes that the history of international sports and the Olympic

Games undoubtedly includes numerous evidences of the important role played by sport in strengthening friendly relations between various countries, but such facts are also known when international sports events came to be one of the causes of conflicts leading to disruption of all relations between countries. To justify his argument, Heinilä refers to the history of track and field competitions between Sweden and Finland and notes that even simple disagreements in the sporting event led to deterioration of peaceful and quiet relations and emergence of the atmosphere of "cold war", bringing the parties to an open conflict in 1930s, and termination of athletic competitions between the two countries for several years. However, I would argue that there is no evidence suggesting that increased tensions between Sweden and Finland were not also potentially caused by territorial Åland Islands dispute between the two countries. Since the autonomous status of Swedish-majority Åland Islands within Finland was established in 1921 (Hara & Jukes, 2009: 107) following the territorial dispute between Sweden and Finland, the tensions could have still been present during the track and field competitions in the 1930s. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the Åland Islands dispute unlike many other territorial disputes in Europe ended in relative peaceful agreement and has been sustained as such specifically due to Finnish-Swedish track and field competitions which contributed to the peaceful atmosphere between the two nations (albeit there is no such evidence that this was the contribution reason).

Furthermore, symbolism in sporting activities could be seen as yet another potential for exacerbation of existing conflict. Some of the symbolism in sports could act as catalysts for generating certain sentiments in relation to the opposite team or what it

represents. Athletes and their fans often consciously guide themselves to national stereotypes and prejudices, shaped by historical, political, cultural and social factors. For instance, Georgian and Ukrainian athletes and fans alike are more likely to feel anxious about being defeated by Russian athletes than by German or American ones. In other words, the sentiments based on realities outside of sports could presumably be amplifying the attraction to national symbolism. This kind of symbolism is represented by a national anthem, or a song identifying a home team, the demonstration of flags, emblems, colors and other national symbols. Undoubtedly, just as in any conflict, striving for national success and excellence pertaining to one's own ethnic or social group contributes to the strengthening of group identification and expansion of the social split between opposing teams and their corresponding fan bases, thereby increasing the likelihood for an intergroup conflict. In his study on nationalism and sports, Bertoli (2017) notes that international sporting competitions and the symbolism around them often strengthen national identities and increase feelings of national unity and hostility toward other countries. The recent Serbian-Albanian drone conflict and English-Russian riots during the Euro 2016 are good examples of the effect of nationalism on escalation of conflict in sports competitions. Bertoli underlines that the surges of nationalism from sporting events in an environment of a simmering conflict can make the conflict more likely. Symbolism seen at Camp Nou stadium in Barcelona in the years of Madrid's restrictions of political autonomy since 2006 and especially in the wake of Catalan independence referendum is no exception.

This is an area where the leaderships of countries are not sitting on the sidelines.

Houlihan (2000) argues that not only is sport used for nation-building but international sport is used as a platform to project a positive image of that nation abroad. Thus, modern nations are using sports not only to facilitate or consolidate national unity but also to demonstrate their distinctiveness and superiority on an international stage. This is where national symbols such as anthems, flags, uniforms, emblems, slogans and the very language spoken in the sporting venues could play an important role by amplifying the national sentiments and increasing collective allegiance to one's own nation. These symbolic components can be regarded as the so-called *sacred values,* which I will discuss in the following section. It could be argued that the groups that had been oppressed in the political realm would feel more protective of their sacred values and more strongly about the displays of their symbols in a relatively unrestricted social space such as sporting competition, and would therefore be arguably more vocal in their expression of feelings.

Established rules of the game notwithstanding, sports are *politically expressive*, especially when one party cannot respond to the other on the political arena. In world politics, even with international treaties for order and conduct of war, conflicting parties have a tendency to violate those norms of law, disregarding any constraints set upon them by the international community. Even the binding resolutions passed by UN's most influential body, the Security Council, are often dismissed as dysfunctional pieces of paper. At the same time, sports serve as an optional platform where parties do have an opportunity to retaliate, albeit within the parameters of rules and regulations established by sports organizations. One would argue that sports committees and bodies such as FIFA, for example, are much more effective in maintaining law and order in sports

competitions between rival national teams than the United Nations between nation-states, which is pretty ineffective in making conflicting parties abide by the rules of engagement.

I should like to argue that out of all rivalries the most expressive conflict on the field which had ran parallel with the political struggle between the peoples and governments (central and local) is the Castilian-Catalan conflict. Spanish-Catalan rivalry through football could be sustainable as long as football is played; and politically expressive so long as there is a growing independence movement accompanied by the increasing divide between the Castilian and Catalan communities. While there could be many elements influencing this political expression, elements driven by sacred values take a special place, especially when it comes to football.

Sacred values

As in any other conflict, especially protracted ones, *sacred values*, play an instrumental role in swaying the conflict dynamics various ways. Sacred values have been in focus of conflict resolution theorists for quite some time as they attempt to determine the nature and extent of hardline positions of the parties in conflicts. In protracted conflicts, sacred values have a tendency to become increasingly *protected*, and turn into one of the very reasons a conflict remains protracted. I would argue though that in newly emerging conflicts, sacred values play a similarly vital role, as they decide how the conflict will develop. If we consider the Hourglass model of conflict resolution, the effect of sacred values may be most observable in the *polarization* stage where positions of the parties become hardened. Taking into consideration the complexities of the Catalan case, a fresh look at the sacred values is warranted.

A sacred value, sometimes also defined as 'protected value' is "any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values" (Tetlock et al., 2000: 853). The value becomes sacred when it is perceived to be of high moral importance, and therefore, cannot be negotiated and used as a subject for trade-offs. Among the most common sacred values are the human life, health, love, justice and other intangible values that most humans hold dear. Within the parameters of conflict, other sacred values emerge superseding the most fundamental values normally held by humans. Among them are motherland, nation, ethnic affiliation and identity, and most often, other tangible *and* intangible values that individuals or parties in conflicts may have been deprived of. These could be land, access to water, specific lifestyle and so forth. For instance, Native American communities protesting against construction of Dakota Access Pipeline mobilized around issues they closely identified with their culture: vitality and meaning of clean water in their culture, the importance of land and burial sites of ancestors, and the like (Ravitz, 2016).

Sacred values are normally contrasted to *secular values* which "have a price" and can be materialized. In conflict resolution field, secular values are used as trade-offs offered to the parties in exchange for other secular *or* sacred values in order to resolve the conflict. For example, for Tyrolians (Austrians) in South Tyrol (also called Alto Adige as per Italians), the land of Tyrol which was split into two parts with the southern part ceded to Italy in the beginning of the 20th century, can be considered a sacred value. Yet, decades later, economic gains benefitting Tyrolians in South Tyrol may have transformed

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the land into a "negotiable" sacred value in exchange for secular values. Today, South Tyrol is part of a very wealthy 'Tyrol–South Tyrol–Trentino Euroregion' comprised of Austrian region Tyrol and Italy's Alto Adige and Trentino regions.

Tetlock (2003) identified sacred-to-secular tradeoff as 'taboo' because from the moral point of view, trading off sacred values such as national territory, for example, to monetary benefits such as loans, grants or economic investments, can be deemed as treason. These trade-offs were central to the research conducted on resistance to social influence, temporal discounting and exit strategies from Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Sheikh *et al.*, 2013) in which "devoted actors" were tested with secular offers. Devoted actors are those who deem issues, central to their conflict, sacred. At the other side of the spectrum are 'rational actors' who act in accordance with the 'Rational actor model' and make decisions based on cost-benefit calculations to achieve a desired outcome (Duncan & Jancar-Webster, 2009: 145; Ginges & Atran, 2013: 276). In their now famous study, Sheikh, Ginges and Atran found that not only subjects were resistant to social influence when it came to sacred-secular tradeoffs but these tradeoffs also had an effect of a *backfire*, strengthening the resolve and reinforcing the existing sacred values among Palestinian 'devoted actors'. This reaffirms the belief that commitment to sacred values largely depends on the dynamics and intractability of a given conflict.

According to Tetlock (2003), however, the argument that sacred values can't be traded off with secular ones is becoming more and more moot in a world of scare resources, and people begin to agree to accept some material benefits offered as part a deal in exchange to conceding on sacred issues (*taboo tradeoffs*). This is possible with

reframing those sacred values in such a way that they become less sacred and more acceptable to a subject group. It is largely based on the notion of *tragic tradeoffs*, a tradeoff of sacred values, when a subject is faced with a dilemma of choosing between two sacred values, such as deciding to save a life of one out of two patients who both need a transplant (Brosch *et al,* 2016: 227).

In the case of Catalan independence movement, sacred values are believed to play an increasingly important role. According to Nafees Hamid and Clara Petus, researchers from Artis International, who have conducted a study on Catalan independence movement, Madrid's recent policing actions vis-à-vis the referendum held on October 1, 2017, may have dramatically shifted the attitudes of ordinary Catalans on the independence vote. Based on their research, among the chief sacred values for Catalans are "the right to vote for independence and the protection of Catalan identity." (Hamid & Pretus, 2017) The researchers suggest that by denying Catalans the right to vote and suppressing it through violent means, Spanish authorities have touched the very sacred values of the group, and have therefore, risked pushing them towards more resilience in their efforts to gain independence. In previous non-binding referenda, the study indicates, the numbers supporting independence have dropped in the wake of loose control over Catalonia's actions. In the aftermath of the latest referendum, though, the numbers are likely to increase specifically due to Madrid's denial of rights to Catalans to vote. Some of the general sacred values that Catalans identify with, and some specific sacred values Catalan football fans identify with are part of the empirical data collected during the study of Catalan (Barça) fans, and will be discussed in the following chapters.

Conclusion

The existing literature in the field of sociology suggests sports can play both positive and negative roles in mitigating or escalating conflicts. There appears to be no standard and no precise boundary between sports and conflict which would allow us to determine how exactly sports can prevent conflicts in *all* conflicting situations, and how exactly sports can escalate a given conflict. The literature that was reviewed in the earlier sections was used to expand our understanding of various approaches to the relationship between sports and conflict.

The literature on sacred values was reviewed specifically to address this general question and to shed light into a narrow space in the relationship between sports and conflict. Undoubtedly, by its very competitive and emotional nature, sports generate sentiments in people. The mixing of national symbolic elements in these sentiments has the potential to increase the level of happiness, boldness, anxiety and allegiance. This is where, I believe, sacred values play a prominent role. While the relationship between sports and conflict is sufficiently researched, the subject of sacred values in sports is understudied. It is to be noted that only English language literature on sacred values was explored and no links to sports have been found. It is possible that this connection may be available in other languages but I would highly doubt it since the very subject of sacred values is a recently researched phenomenon and its relationship to sports could be non-existent. This makes the subject of this research all the more important when it comes to the role of sacred values in the relationship between sports and conflict.

If some of the national symbols such as a flag, emblems, slogans, language, anthems and sports songs can be defined as sacred values, then they can be regarded as significant channels of political expression of fans and supporters. As was mentioned earlier, this paper examines the case of FC Barcelona fans and explores the relationship of fans to Barça as a sacred value. The empirical data collected during a study will disclose how this specific sacred value is able to increase political expression of Barça fans in the political realm.

CHAPTER TWO: HYPOTHESIS

As many Catalans, individual Barça fans in Catalonia who have themselves formed a distinct social identity are becoming increasingly pro-independence. This is where identity fusion is most palpable, with individual Catalans with various background fusing into the phenomenon of Barça. So integrated are the personal *and* social selves in this phenomena that the boundaries between social identities become highly permeable. I would argue that the moral relationship to the club transforms members of this big Barça family into 'devoted actors' with distinct sacred values. In other words, in addition to other sacred values Catalan fans of Barça have had since birth or adopted during upbringing, the fandom for Barça has become a sacred value of its own. The relationship with Barça would have been ordinary in many other sports-related cases where teams and supporters share rivalry based on athletic competition only. In Barcelona's case, this relationship is especially pronounced since it pertains to the overall political Spain-Catalonia relationship and naturally has bi-directional effects.

Considering the fact that Catalan fans are sensitive to the issues of national importance such as self-determination, and sacred values such as language, cultural rights, Catalan history, etc., then it would be logical to assume that fandom for Barça is as a legitimate sacred value as any other values that Catalans hold dear. This, in turn, allows to assume that with elevated sentiments around Barça's victories and defeats on the

football field and its players' activities off the field (when its Catalan players speak out in favor political independence (Davis, 2017)) can affect the fans' activities in the political realm. For instance, if Barça defeats its archrival Real Madrid in an important game, does that embolden Catalan fans' sense of nationalism? Does it empower them and increase their willingness to want to self-determine or secede from Spain? Does it lead the fans towards already existent mobilization structures that were discussed above? And finally, does it amplify sentiments and push them towards violence in an effort to achieve their objective?

Based on these arguments, it is my hypothesis that the respondents who report a deeper connection to Barcelona's football team should also feel a deeper sense of Catalan nationalism. To test the hypothesis, I will propose three regression models measuring the relationship of five independent variables on three important dependent variables. This will be done using the quantitative data collected in September 2017 from respondents in Catalonia in an online survey. Self-determination, secession and willingness to use violence against the "oppressor" are the three dependent variables which represent the Catalan nationalism. Relationship of supporters to Barça, political ideology of the respondents, views on fiscal policy, gender and importance of language for respondents are the independent variables. The variable representing the relationship of supporters to their favored club is based on the question that identifies the extent of allegiance of a respondent to the club. The ones that showed close devoted association with the club will be classified as one category and their attachment to Barça will be tested against the dependent variables associated with nationalism. It is my belief that controlling for other

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independent variables, the results will confirm that deeper connection to Barça also

means a deeper connection to Catalan nationalism.

CHAPTER THREE: CASE DESCRIPTION

Catalan Nationalism

The surge of radical nationalism in many states is one of the most acute problems of our time. That may primarily have to do with the political dynamics in Eurasia in the 1990s which shifted the political boundaries and completely reshaped the bipolar world we had theretofore known. The tumultuous disintegration of multiethnic and multinational states like the USSR and Yugoslavia gave a new impetus to radical nationalism in Europe. This does not necessarily mean Catalan nationalism is a direct byproduct of the collapse of USSR and Yugoslavia; rather it is a consequence of the tendency that originated with dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. Many pundits argue that appearance of new states like Kosovo on the map is yet another driver for Catalan separatism. When people speak of radical nationalism in Western Europe, the first cases that come to mind are those associated with Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, most likely due to militant activities of IRA and ETA, respectively, that tried to undermine the British and Spanish statehoods and used armed terrorism to obtain political independence from the parent state.

Historical perspective of the Catalan nationalism

Before grasping the meaning of Catalan nationalism and how it reshapes the political dynamics in Spain and beyond its borders, we need to review the historical

origins of the phenomena. Despite its relatively small size, Catalonia has a long and very rich history. The emergence of the Catalan national identity dates back to 801 A.D. when the city of Barcelona was conquered by the Franks (Collins, 1998: 214). In 988, Borrell II, the Count of Barcelona, Girona, and Ausona, obtained independence from the Carolingian kings and Barcelona became a de-facto independent political unit (Van Vrijaldehhoven, 2007: 119). This is point in time is marked as the virtual termination of the vassal status of the county and birth of Catalonia.

The Catalan parliament, also known as the *Generalitat*, (reportedly one of the kind in Europe at the time) was created in 1359 (Doubleday et al, 2008: xvi). Catalan independentists of today refer to this institution as a solid foundation of democratic self-governance in Catalonia. The first attempt to secede from Spain was undertaken by Catalonia during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). In 1640, the Catalans revolted against the king of Spain and signed an agreement with the French about Catalonia passing under suzerainty of France. Thereafter, the Spanish forces restored control over Barcelona and most of Catalonia in 1652 (Sargent & Velde, 2003: 255).

The most crucial period in Catalonia's history falls to the years of War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) which still serves as a source of "chosen trauma" in Catalan historiography. By extending their support to the Archduke Charles of Austria in the war, Catalans made the wrong bet, eventually leading the way to the surrender of Barcelona to the army of Philip V, Bourbon king of Spain on September 11, 1714, a national day marked annually in Catalonia as the *Diada* (Minder, 2017: 21). Following the fall of Barcelona, Catalans were deprived of all autonomous privileges and local political elite

was gradually repressed. The Catalan language, a sacred value in a Catalan psyche, was severely restricted and replaced by the Castilian Spanish.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Catalanism, a movement of Catalan national vindication picked up, with the strategic goal being the achievement of Catalonia's independence from Spain. After the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic, Catalonia regained its autonomy in 1932, and the corresponding Statute was adopted and autonomous authorities were created. The short-lived autonomy was destined to collapse with the defeat of the Republican government in the Spanish civil war in Spain of 1936-1939, when General Fransico Franco established a dictatorial rule over the country and Catalonia was to pay the highest price. Ruling Spain with an iron fist, the Generalissimo abolished autonomy for both Basque Country and Catalonia and instituted an "excessive centralization", repressing cultural rights of the Catalans (Sangmpam, 2008: 163).

After the death of Franco, Spain began a rapid process of democratization and decentralization. The new Constitution of Spain, adopted in 1978, guaranteed the right to self-government "of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all" (Constitution of Spain, 1978: Section 2). In 1979, Catalonia's new Statute of Autonomy was approved.

The power in Catalonia was first concentrated in the hands of moderate nationalists from the party *Convergència i Unió* (CiU)*,* which would eventually dissolve in 2015. The never-ending debate among Catalan nationalists since the adoption of the Statute of Autonomy in 1979 was whether the autonomy within Spain was the final

destination or was it only an intermediate phase in post-Franco years. This debate led to the formulation of policies on definition of Catalonia as a nation and the need to make Catalan the second official language in the region.

On September 30, 2005, the new Statute of Autonomy, intending to grant more authority to the Generalitat and improve fiscal positions of Catalonia, was overwhelmingly approved by the Catalan Parliament with 120 out of 135 members of the parliament voting in favor (Cuadras-Morató, 2016: 12). The official Madrid was not happy. Considering the fact that Catalans wanted to be recognized as a distinct nation in the new Statute, lawmakers in Spain decided to remove the definition of the term "nation" in relation to Catalonia from the articles of the Statute, agreeing to leave it only in the preamble of this document (Cloots, 2015: 2). At the same time, the central authorities made an explanation that the text of the preamble has only a *declarative*, but not a legal significance.

After these changes, the new Autonomous Statute of Catalonia was approved by both chambers of the *Cortes General* on March 30 and May 10, 2006, respectively, and approved at a general referendum on June 18, 2006. In the next few years, it was decided the Statute crossed the boundaries and did not correspond to the Constitution of Spain. Of the 223 articles of the Statute, 14 were struck down and 27 were reworded, making it hard for Catalans to put Catalan language above Spanish (Calamur, 2017). Within the context of Catalanism, the words "nation" and "language" have a special meaning equivalent to other sacred values held dear to Catalans.

The far-reaching effects of Catalan nationalism

Disregarding the unconstitutionality of the new Statute, and in fact, using the Spanish Court's ruling as the very reason to secede from Spain, Catalan government sanctioned the institutional beginning of the self-determination process by having Declaration of Sovereignty pass by the Catalan parliament in January 2013 (Cuadras-Morató, 2016: 89). The failure of Artus Mas, the President of Catalonia and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy to come to terms on the fiscal arrangements vis-à-vis Catalonia led to Catalonia's holding of an unofficial referendum on November 9, 2014 in which 80.75% percent of voters expressed the desire to secede from Spain. The only two questions asked in this non-binding vote were: 1) Do you want Catalonia to become a state? 2) In case of an affirmative response, do you want this state to become independent? The Spanish government slammed the referendum and declared it unconstitutional. Moreover, only 41.6% of the registered voters showed up at the polls with more than half either boycotting or abstaining from the vote (Duerr, 2015: 108).

The last referendum held on October 1, 2017 which the Catalan government declared binding and was struck down as unconstitutional by the Spanish Court, is the next phase in Catalonia's quest for independence. The potential secession, which at the time of this writing seems unlikely, may have far reaching consequences. Although at this stage any civil war is unimaginable, the move towards unilateral declaration of independence, followed by potentially armed resistance, could have ignited a whole range of events in Spain and in European Union, as a whole. Inspired by the example of Catalonia, other separatist movements and organizations in Europe could become more

active in an instant or gradual domino effect would ensue. This includes Scotland in the United Kingdom which had already voted against leaving UK in the recent past, but vowed to repeat the vote in the wake of Brexit; Corsica and Brittany in France, South Tyrol (or Alto Adige in Italian) and Veneto in Italy, Faroe Islands in Denmark, Flanders in Belgium, Bavaria in Germany, Äland Islands in Finland, and most importantly for Spain, its own autonomous regions, including Galicia, Basque Country, Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, and others.

So far, in support of the Catalan referendum and condemnation of the Spanish authorities, other regions of the country with separatist tendencies have already made statements. The Basque Country Parliament supported Catalans with a special statement. A local parliament in Navarre called on Madrid to abandon its repressive approach vis-à-vis Catalonia. This leaves Madrid, and the EU, for that matter in a precautionary mode for the next few months as the Spanish government is trying to keep the crisis under control. Despite the overwhelming majority of votes in favor of secession, it must be noted that as many Catalans support the idea of staying in Spain, albeit not many of them showed up on the day of referendum. To gain a full understanding of Catalonia's aspirations for secession, it is necessary to review the nature of the claims based on these theories.

Secessionist theories and the case of Catalonia

According to the classification of Dr. Allen Buchanan, Professor of the Philosophy of International Law at King's College, Catalan aspirations for independence would most definitely fall into the category of the 'remedial right' to secede from Spain.

Buchanan (1997) divides secession into two types of normative theories: *The Remedial Right Only* and *the Primary Right* theories. In a nutshell, the Remedial Right Only theory states that a "group has a general right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort", while the Primary Right theory asserts that a group can have a general right to secede through a plebiscite based on ascription and association (Buchanan, 1997: 34-35).

Remedial Right Only Theory is essentially based on John Locke's theory of right of the people to revolution. In his seminal work 'Two Treatises of Government', Locke conceptualized the 'right of revolution' stating that people should have the right to "resume their original liberty" (Locke: 227) by revolting and/or overthrowing the existing regime(s) in the face of injustices committed upon the people by the ruling governments. In other words, the remedial right of the people at large to revolt to end the abuse of their fundamental rights is invoked under Locke's theory. According to Buchanan, the main difference between the right to secede and the right to revolt is that the former is invoked when that right is claimed by a portion of the population compactly living or concentrated in a part of the territory of that state. In most of the cases around the world, people concentrated in a part of the territory are made up of one single ethnicity or a group of relative ethnic groups. Weaker groups have a tendency to turn into underdogs which in most of the cases turn into subjects of what Buchanan calls a "selective tyranny" (Buchanan, 1997: 36). Kurds in Northern Iraq, Kosovars in Serbia (until Kosovo became independent), Rohingya in Myanmar are all good examples of the tyranny instituted by central regimes. It is then practical that the minority groups subject to injustices by the

governments are not striving to revolt and *overthrow* that central government, but are merely demanding to be separated as a group-concentrated unit from under its jurisdiction. At the core of the Remedial Right Only Theory lies the assertion that a given group has a right to secede only if a) the physical survival of its members is under threat from the state they live in, or it suffers from violation of basic human rights; b) its sovereignty had been taken by the state they live in at the moment (Buchanan, 1997: 37).

The Primary Right Theory, in turn, is subdivided into two categories: the *Ascriptive Group Theory* and *Associative Group Theory*. The former is based on the so-called 'Nationalist Principle', according to which every nation is entitled to have its own sovereign state, and the latter is based on the ability to muster the needed numbers to form a majority in order to attain the secession by plebiscite. Under the argument of the Primary Right Theory, the minority group in question does not set a precondition for the state to be unjust and/or violate its rights, but simply bases its claim for secession on its own voluntary political choice to separate. Scotland and Wales may be regarded such cases.

Under the aforementioned theories of secession, Catalans' quest for disunion from Spain is based chiefly on both Ascriptive and Associative group theories of Primary Right Theory. Catalans maintain that their sovereignty—and subsequently their cultural and political rights—have been stripped from them since the fall of Barcelona in 1714 when the Castilians imposed their rule upon Catalonia at the peak of War of Succession (Castro, 2013: 14). Throughout the last three centuries, Catalans' fundamental rights to their culture, language and political presence have been severed by the central

government in Spain. Only after the demise of the Franco regime, democratization of the country, and enactment of the 1978 Constitution of Spain, were the Catalans able to freely reinvigorate their socio-national identity. With return of the fundamental freedoms and expansion of cultural and political autonomy, Catalans have reinforced their expression of right to secession through 'Nationalist Principle' contending that as a nation they are entitled to form their own independent state. Hundreds of polls and the non-binding self-determination referendum in 2014 demonstrated that Catalonia is also able to muster the majority for secession. According to Catalan officials, 2,236,806 out of roughly 5.4 eligible voters at the time participated in the referendum, with 80.72% answering 'Yes' to the only two questions: "Do you want Catalonia to become a state?" and "In case of affirmative answer, do you want this state to become independent?" (BBC, 2014).

However, it can also be argued that Catalans are claiming their right for secession based on the remedial rights. Although human rights abuses and suppression of cultural rights by the Franco regime are already a history, and Catalans today have a high degree of self-rule which also provides for full freedom of cultural rights, Catalan nationalists and government officials still have grievances over mismanagement of the region by Madrid, expressed through a careful choice of words. When speaking about the fiscal policies of Madrid vis-a-vis Catalonia, Artur Has i Gavarró, the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia (2010-2016), stated that Catalonia is forced to *suffer* the consequences of the policies of Madrid in the wake of the financial crisis in Europe and reduce the public spending in the autonomous region to "meet the deficit objectives that

are disproportionately, unjustly, and disloyally imposed by Spain" (Castro, 2013: 11). As the numbers from the sample will show, Catalans care deeply about fiscal independence of their province.

Although restrictions of fiscal freedoms are far more harmless than physical purges, deprivation of cultural and political rights, they are nonetheless painful. Hence, the choice of words by Artus Mas clearly depicts the actual view of the Catalan society vis-à-vis Madrid's policies and fiscal mismanagement. In the words of Dr. Elisenda Paluzie, Professor of Economic Theory at the University of Barcelona, for a large part of Catalonia's population, "the feeling is more similar to that of an exhausted cash-cow, tired of paying Swedish-level taxes in exchange for sub-par public services, and of being made a scapegoat for the debt crisis in Spain, to boot" (Castro, 2013: 24). In order to mobilize the public *and* justify the willingness to secede, the debate over the fiscal policies of Madrid in relation to Catalonia is also manipulated effectively by the Catalan government through semantic misrepresentation. "Spain robs us" is the main argument when it comes to justification of Catalan government's agenda and its adamant opposition to the redistribution policies of Spain. Germà Bel (2015) elaborates on the usage of the concept 'expolio fiscal' ("fiscal plundering") by Catalans on the fiscal policy: in Catalan *espoliar* means "to deprive someone of what belongs to them". Since the decentralization of Spain in late 1970's and increasing of political and cultural autonomy of Catalonia, remedial right for secession is hardly warranted. In the absence of physical injustice against Catalans in post-Franco years, the only grievance that can generate public discontent and mobilize it to "seek remedy" is the fiscal "injustice".

Fiscal policies in Spain: the place of Catalonia

Freeing itself from the dictatorial past in the years following Franco's death, Spain transformed itself into a decentralized democratic state. With the new constitution adopted in October by the Congress of Deputies and the Senate and ratified by the public referendum in December 1978, Madrid extended extraordinary political rights to its minorities, unthinkable under Franco's rule. In accordance with the Section 143 of the document, "bordering provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, insular territories and provinces with a historic regional status" could "accede to self-government and form Self-governing Communities (Comunidades Autónomas) in conformity with the provisions contained in this Part and in the respective Statutes", thereby establishing 17 autonomous communities within a highly decentralized monarchy (Spanish Constitution of 1978: 64). However, provision of certain political, cultural and financial freedoms was established on an unequal basis which in itself became a source of contention that emerged in the following decades. For example, although each autonomous community has its own parliament and some degree of legislative power, the fiscal decentralization models are palpably asymmetric. In general, there are two systems: the *common* and the so-called *foral* regime. The latter regime is applied to the provinces of Basque Country and Navarre which are governed by economic agreements with the autonomous governments called *Concierto* and *Convenio*, respectively, and give the provinces the power to collect and manage their entire tax systems. These agreements ensure complete fiscal sovereignty within the boundaries of the two provinces. The other 15 autonomous communities, Catalonia among them, fall

under the *common* fiscal regime which allows high expenditure decentralization but provides low fiscal sovereignty over revenues generated in those provinces. This structure unequivocally upsets Catalonia because for each Euro paid in taxes to the central government, only 52 cents are returned to Catalonia, while 48 cents are spent elsewhere in Spain (Castro, 2013: 24-26). In the wake of the Spanish economic crisis that started in 2008, Catalonia, as the country's richest region (Kubicek, 2017: 189), has a reason to be unhappy as its contributions to the Spanish budget are spent on other non-Catalan provinces. Madrid, in its turn, demonstrably refuses to accede and allow changes to its economic arrangements with its autonomous provinces, evidently for two reasons. First and foremost, any changes in economic relationships with autonomies and subsequent awarding of *foral* regimes to any of the remaining 15 autonomous communities would open Pandora's box and set the precedent for economic demands from all, eventually leading to emergence of many separatist movements in highly multiethnic state as Spain. Second, Catalonia is Spain's richest region and taxes collected by the *common* regime allow Madrid to overcome the crisis by redistributing revenues and maintaining expenditures in the other provinces too poor to raise funds necessary public expenditures themselves (Rosenfeld, 2015). This contentious battle over fiscal policy has resulted in decisive calls for complete secession from Spain. In their quest for establishing the new European state, Catalan politicians appeal to their constituents and followers by presenting the independence movement not as a separatist project but as a "national transition". In the words of former President of Catalonia Artus Mas who in defiance of the Spanish government organized a symbolic referendum in Catalonia on

secession in November 2014, Catalans "have realized that in the same way that Spain went through its transition thirty years ago, it is now time for Catalonia to go through its own national transition." (Castro, 2013: 11)

Castilian-Catalan conflict through sports

The world-known standoff called *El Clásico*, a globally-followed battle between Madrid's Real FC and FC Barcelona, is one of the most viewed contests in the world. From its early existence Barcelona became "more than a club", a motto adopted by the club and its fans, and represented a struggle for Catalan cultural and political rights under Franco regime. David Redshaw (2010) writes that in *El Clásico,* during and shortly after the Spanish Civil War in 1930-40's, the team representing the capital city Madrid was recognized as "royal" while the Barcelona FC was considered by the Spanish as an insurgent figurehead fighting for independence of Catalonia, and by the Catalans - as "synonymous with Democracy, Republicanism, Communism and the struggle for autonomy." With the ban of the use of Catalan language and flag, the only venue for expression of political self-identity was at the Barcelona stadium *Camp de Les Corts,* the club's old stadium (Redshaw, 2010: 47).

In the years before the November 9, 2014 referendum in Catalonia and ever since, the game has been painted with political brushes, as Barça fans adopted a habit of singing their anthem and calling for independence. In addition, some prominent figures, including former president of Barça, Joan Laporta and its coach Josep Guardiola have openly called for independence of Catalonia (Crameri, 2014; McGowan, 2012). In his seminal namesake work on *El Clásico* (2013)*,* Richard Fitzpatrick illustrates the degree of

Barcelona FC's importance for Catalans and their leaders who became more vocal in their public calls for independence by using the club as the primary venue for pro-independence campaign. Joan Laporta, for instance, set up his own pro-independence political party *Catalan Solidarity for Independence* winning four seats in Spain's 135-member parliament a month after he departed from Barcelona FC. Even during his tenure as the president of the club, he promoted Barça as the national symbol and substitute of the Catalonia national team, a privilege that Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland enjoy as members of the United Kingdom, and Catalonia as an autonomy within Spain does *not* (Fitzpatrick, 2013: 106). These calls have also amplified the symbolic meanings of sites like the famous *Camp Nou* — the home base and stadium of FC Barcelona — which serves as the main battleground where Catalans feel most proud of their heritage and self-identify themselves against the Castilian rulers (Perrons, 2004: 291). Apart from feeding nationalism to their compatriots, Catalan sports leaders also tap into the potential of direct appeal to millions of viewers and diehard fans of FC Barcelona beyond boundaries of Spain. At its peak, *El Clásico* has drawn as many as 1 billion viewers worldwide, making it the most watched sports event in the world (Morris, 2015).

Barcelona FC and establishment of fandom

The football club Barcelona, commonly referred to as *Barça* (pronounced as 'Barsa') was founded in November 1899 by a group of soccer enthusiasts led by Joan Gamper, a Swiss footballer and later himself a player and president of the club (Venteo et al, 2014: 136). Since its very inception, the club has symbolized Catalan culture and nationalism leading to the now famous club motto *"Més que un club"* translated as "More

than a club". Unlike other football clubs, *Barça* is completely owned by its supporters

through membership fees and financial contributions. It is one of the most valuable sports

teams in the entire world and is worth $3.55 billion, second to its arch rival Real Madrid

which is valued at $3.65 billion (DeSantis, 2016). Real Madrid FC was founded as the

Madrid Football Club in 1902 and was added a prefix *Real*—which means 'royal' in

Spanish—in 1920 to honor the Spanish monarch King Alfonso XIII (Lowe, 2014: 43).

Since the founding of the clubs, their rivalry, romantically called *El Clásico*, has

represented a bitter politicized struggle between the Spanish monarchy and Catalonia.

With the establishment of Francisco Franco's dictatorship in 1936, elimination of

political opposition and suppression of "independentist" tendencies among minorities

during the 1936-1939 Spanish civil war and especially in its aftermath, *El Clásico* gained

a new status of a socio-political spectacle. Despite bitter episodes of the struggle, from

the assassination of Josep Sunyol i Garriga, Barça's president, by Franco's fascist troops

on August 1936 (Kuhn, 2011: 128) to alleged preferential treatment of Real Madrid by

government-manipulated referees on the field during Franco years, Barcelona's fans

mobilized around the club and maintained their support to elevate their voices and

national stature under fierce oppression by Madrid (Lowe, 2014: 24). *El Caudillo*, as

Franco was called in Spain—much like the Nazi *Führer* and Italian *Il Duce*—was said to

like the Real Madrid-Barcelona games. Whenever he was in attendance, the game would

gain most prominence in the international press. By attending games, he projected his

own image of a tolerant leader and promoted a positive international profile of Spain, in

particular (Elsey et al, 2017: 80). The close relationship between the dictator and

Santiago Bernabéu de Yeste, who served as the president of Real Madrid for 35 years since 1950s helped galvanize support of the government to the Madridistas and further alienate Catalans. That the mutual hatred between Barça and Real Madrid fans was a crucial factor is undisputed. According to Burns (2009) Barça fans saw Real Madrid as a manifestation of General Franco and his repressive regime while Real Madrid fans found Barça as traitors and secessionists. Even after the demise of the Franco regime, the imprints of the emotionalized rivalry during the dictator's tenure would last forever, driving the football part of the Catalan-Castilian conflict forward into the new Spain where Catalans' political freedoms grew over the last four decades.

Despite the fact that *Caudillo* favored Real Madrid over Barcelona, his regime created a climate of relatively free competition for Barça and other clubs from autonomous communities, allowing the Catalans and minorities to exercise *controlled* expression of discontent. This, in turn, also helped to divert attention from the weak economy in the country and his repressive tactics against opposition. However, it was mistaken on part of the Franco regime to assume that football rivalry would successfully and completely distract Catalans from politics. If anything, Barça's boldness on the field reinforced the Catalan identity and energized political expressiveness among Catalan fans. In March 1951, thousands of Catalans protested over the increases of the tram tickets in Barcelona in a series of rallies, workers protests, student demonstrations and mass boycotts of the city's transportation. Among the organizers was a Communist leader and Barça fan Gregorio Lopez Raimundo who was arrested and tortured by the regime. After the league match with Racing of Santander in Las Corts stadium, Barça fans in

attendance joined the public boycott and walked home ignoring the empty city trams

made available for the match goers. (Burns, 2009: 150).

On November 17, 1974, 6,000 Barça fans marched onto Montserrat, a monastery

in the suburbs of Barcelona symbolizing Catalanism, to mark the 75th anniversary of the

club and make a political statement of sorts. The club was used more and more to voice

issues from political agenda of Catalonia and galvanize support among many groups of

Catalans. At this event was present one of notable politicians in modern Catalan history,

Jordi Pujol who himself had been a victim of Franco's repressions (Burns, 2009: 194).

These events are indicative of how fused and interconnected have social and

political identities of Barça fans been throughout its history. Increasing alienation of

Catalans led to a more resiliently organized mobilization within the realm of football.

Emotions and fandom initially contained to football rivalry due to oppressive form of

regime eventually unraveled after the death of the Caudillo and the fall of his dictatorial

regime. This impelled Catalans to diffuse the established mobilization mechanisms to

participate in Spain's transition process to democracy in the late 1970s. With tensions

growing between the rivaling fan bases, so did the potential for physical violence.

Violence in football

Football hooliganism could certainly be viewed as both a 'distinctive new form of

collective violence' and juvenile subcultural identity (Spaaij, 2006: 22). Whereas in

earlier periods the fighting took place in schools, dance halls, movie theaters, etc., from

1960s on when the world and especially club football became more competitive, football

stadiums and surrounding areas became new grounds for inter-group fighting and

hooliganism. An emergence of football hooliganism has much to do with the fact that the individuals and/or groups taking part in violent fights simply shifted to a new geographical space for expression of violence than with the football rivalry per se. In other words, the competing juvenile groups were already violent enough; presence of sports competition representing the groups' geographical areas or their ascriptive social identities, just amplified their rivalry and widened the extent of violent activity.

The violent fan subculture in the country originated in the midst of major political shifts in Spain. Spain's post-Franco transition to democracy and political decentralization triggered an inevitable shift in the social culture composition of the working-class youth. Football, and sports at large became the inviting ground for cultural and political expression in the socially transforming society (Spaaij, 2006: 85). The victories and losses of football clubs in the derbies expanded the enmity between warring fan groups.

The World Cup in Spain held in 1982 is credited with initiating the organization of militant fandom in the country, as the Spanish violent fan groups picked up the resolve, strategies and tactics of more experienced Italian, English and Scottish fans who flocked to Spain to support their teams (Burns, 2012: 223-226; Spaaij, 2006: 85). This is when Real Madrid's '*Ultras Sur*' and Barça's '*Boixos Nois*' emerged, thence stimulating the growth of other hooligan fan clubs among many first and second division team supporters. Needless to say, political ideologies of the youth played a significant role in the organization and activities of the groups: Basque, Galician and Catalan groups—including Boixos Nois—identified with the leftist pro-independence ideology while Madrid-based Ultras Sur identified with the right-wing nationalist ideology.

Long before the existence of Real Madrid's Ultras Sur, Barcelona fans faced a

serious opposition from the Espanyol's violent fan groups who are considered one of the

most racist and violent groups in Spanish football. The animosity towards Espanyol's

fans stems from the fact that the club is Barcelona-based but represents the Spanishness

inside Catalonia (Duke & Crolley, 2016: 28). It is often perceived as the "fifth column"

in Barcelona. Founded in 1900 as Sociedad Española de Football, it changed its name to

Club Español de Fútbol in 1903, with King Alfonso XIII awarding it the title 'Royal' in

1912. These were the times of heightened nationalist activities in Spain. Throughout the

years of the 1936-1939 civil war in Spain and during Franco's years of rule over Spain,

the club was seen in association with fascism. The mere fact that the name of the club at

the time was spelled in Spanish was deemed provocative against Catalans (Ball, 2011:

99). Espanyol's fan group 'Peña Deportive Ibérica' was often used in the community to

promote Spanish nationalism and defy separatist tendencies among Catalans. The

members of the group are credited with sustaining injuries to Barcelona fans during the

matches between the two clubs. Another infamous fan group of Espanyol called

'Brigadas Blanquiazules' which existed from 1985 until 2010, were closely associated

with political ideology as much as with football. However, they were not excessively

anti-Catalan but were primarily anti-separatist (Spaaij, 2006: 190). The existence, and

more importantly, highly organized expansion of committed fans bases (especially if they

are violent fan groups) in sports creates theretofore unavailable mobilization structures

which in time of need be used for violence outside of the sports realm. As the next

section will show, Barça's fans present an important potential for mobilization.

Mobilization à la Catalana

The forms and mechanisms of mobilization are as important in independence

movements as are the ideologies and causes that drive them. There are numerous studies

which have looked into mobilization of separatist movements yet the one I found most

appealing to Catalan mobilization was the socio-institutional theory by Paul Staniland,

laid out in his seminal work 'Networks of Rebellion. Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and

Collapse' (2014). According to Staniland, cohesive insurgent groups are able to construct

more effective forces for armed activity and the extent of organizational cohesiveness

affects the dynamics and duration of the armed conflict and the final solution of it.

Staniland's social-institutional theory presents a classification of four kinds of

insurgent organizations: *integrated, vanguard, parochial* and *fragmented*. An *integrated*

organization is one that has a cohesive leadership and tight horizontal links between top

commanders and strong vertical connection to the operatives/people in locales where it

operates. A *vanguard* organization is one which has a robust leadership but weak local

compliance. A *parochial* organization, in turn, is one that has weak leadership at the top

but robust local processes of control. And finally, a *fragmented* organization is one that

has neither robust leadership nor local compliance.

From the first glance, there might be a quick disconnect between a peaceful

movement we observe in Catalonia at the moment and Staniland's study of insurgent

movements. Firstly, the main focus of Staniland's study were chiefly insurgent groups

which have already left their trace in history; hence, their activities were relatively easy

to dissect and analyze. Second, one of the main preconditions he famously set before

delving into his analysis was that the social bases within a given conflict had to be ready for war and/or any armed activity. These two factors are outliers in the independence movement in Catalonia; however, there is no guarantee that once a non-violent Catalan movement we see today won't turn violent and partly transform into an armed insurgency, much like Catalans' neighbors to the west, the Basque separatists from ETA did for half a decade, eventually ending their violent campaign against Spain in 2011 (Conversi, 2000; Clark, 1979). That being said, the core of Staniland's argument is that the very make-up and organization of social bases, their relationship with the elites, and more importantly, the networks facilitating these ties are instrumental in what can become an effective insurgency *when* and *if* the time comes.

When it comes to Catalan independence movement, the elected autonomous government has been the main actor in working the politics of obtaining freedoms through negotiations, chiefly without involving the social bases up until Spanish government made an abrupt gesture to completely dismiss Catalonia's quest for political freedoms. In 2006, two years before the European economic crisis hit Spain necessitating the need to renegotiate its fiscal policy with Spain, Catalonia has reached an agreement with the Spanish government and ratified a new Statute of Autonomy through a Catalan regional referendum. The statute sought to expand the autonomous powers of the *Generalitat de Catalunya* which is the primary institution of self-government of Catalonia, consisting of the regional parliament, the presidency of the Generalitat and the Executive Council or Government of Catalonia. Moreover, the preamble of this legal document underlined the importance of the term 'nation' in reference to Catalonia, an

introduction that did not sit well with the Spanish Constitutional Court (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2006).

As previously mentioned, the legality and especially the wording was challenged in the Spanish High Court of Justice which ruled that numerous articles within the Statute were unconstitutional or were vague to be easily misinterpreted. The 2010 ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court invalidated fourteen of the statute's clauses and stated the term 'nation' in the preamble had no legal standing (Anderson, 2013: 201), agitating the Catalans and strengthening their resolve for holding a binding referendum for independence. The 2006 decision by the Spain's judicial branch led to mass protests further solidifying the cohesiveness of social bases and pro-independence groups in Catalonia (Tierney, 2015: 174). Two pro-independence groups have been instrumental in mobilizing the masses since 2006 until now: *Òmnium Cultural* and *Assemble Nacional Catalana* (National Assembly of Catalonia).

Òmnium Cultural was founded in 1961 as the main platform for helping promote the knowledge of Catalan language and culture. Within the last six decades, the organization has organized hundreds of events in various settings. It has more than thirty thousand members and twenty-eight branches throughout Catalonia. Since 2006, Òmnium Cultural has openly become a pro-independence organization, organizing the July 10, 2010 mass protests in support of the new autonomy statute and June 29, 2013 '*Concert for Freedom*' at Camp Nou designed as a call for independence referendum in 2014. (Crameri, 2014: 30-31).

Assemble Nacional Catalana was founded in March 2012 and was modeled as a

successor to *Assamblea de Catalunya* which operated in 1970s in the waning years of Franco regime. Existing cultural associations and ties provided main social bases for membership in the organization. By mid-2014 the organization had more than 30 thousand full members and 15 thousand sympathizers (Gillespie, 2015: 105). With strengthened horizontal ties amongst them, *Assemble Nacional Catalana* and *Òmnium Cultural* also organized the September 11, 2012 pro-independence demonstration which gathered up to 1.5 million people, the largest pro-independence protest in Catalonia to date (Crameri, 2014: 27). In 2015, *Assemble Nacional Catalana* and *Òmnium Cultural* along with two other pro-independence groups—the Platform for National Catalan Sports Teams and *Drets.cat*—organized a flag distribution campaign at the FC Barcelona - Bate (Belarusian club) Champions League soccer match at *Camp Nou* (Barcelona's home field) by handing out 30,000 *estelades* (pro-independence flags) to protest against UEFA that has twice fined the club for letting fans wave the Catalonian flags at matches (Winchester, 2016).

This demonstrates the ability of these two organizations to tap into various social bases and mobilize them for a campaign and/or an ideological cause, at times in unison with political organizations. Their vertical ties to the main pro-independence political parties like Convergència i Unió, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Candidatura d'Unitat Popular are essential for efficient and effective mass mobilization (Gillespie, 2015: 15). However, this does not mean that the relationship to the Generalitat and the political parties is a hierarchical top-down. On contrary, it is bidirectional, in a sense that the pro-

independence civil society groups such as *Assemble Nacional Catalana* and *Òmnium Cultural* are increasingly the ones exerting pressure on the political elites to act on the political arena and setting their long-term agendas (Puente, 2015). If we were to fit the Catalan independence movement into Staniland's socio-institutional theory, the Catalans would most likely fall into the category of integrated organization (Staniland, 2014: 6). Assuming Barça fans in Catalonia are also Catalans who are pro-independence and in accordance with Staniland's integrated organization category can be tied to other top tiers of the organization vertically, it is worth taking a look at the classification of Barça fans.

Types of Barça fans and factors that affect the outreach to fan groups

If we could improvise and borrow della Porta's term *precariat* (2015)—for the lack of a better term—to characterize the overwhelming majority of Catalans in all precarious conditions and backgrounds, including the people deprived of economic, cultural and political statuses, who are seeking secession from Spain, it would be obvious that the main sphere of activity of pro-independence civil society groups *does* involve the Barça fans.

Fans of Barça can be related to their favorite team in many ways. Many fans choose to formally commit to the team by enlisting as *socios*, club members eligible to vote in the election of a president of the club. Socios voted for the first time at the end of 1970s following the post-Franco transition of Spain to democracy. Others choose to form their own separate (amateur) fan clubs called *penyes* (also spelled as *peñas*) and are closely associated with socios, i.e. socios can also be penyes. The first *Peña* was formed in 1944 quickly diffusing to various parts of the country and the world. In the early

1980s, some penyes transformed one supporters' club into a group called *Boixos Nois* (translated as 'Boxwood boys'). Members of this club associated themselves with left-wing separatism and eventually right-wing nationalism (Duthel, 2011: 190-191). *Boixos Nois* have been associated with extreme violence and neo-Nazism. The actions of *Boixos Nois* are often reciprocated by the so-called *Ultras Sur*, the violent supporters of Real Madrid. Throughout their activity, both groups have faced each other in violent fights at *Clásico* games and given the fact that Barcelona and Madrid both have professional basketball, handball and indoor hockey teams, the activities of these right-wing violent groups have been reproduced in other sports as well (Spaaij et al, 2005: 85). Finally, there are *culers* who are regarded as ordinary fans of Barça who do not possess any formal membership in the club (Subirana, 2013: 95).

Each of these types may have a distinct characterization due to the extent of its activities and contributions to the fandom of Barcelona. Some groups, like the *Boixos Nois*, had been normally placed in certain sections of the stadiums in order to be separated from non-violent fan groups. Taking into consideration that each group may have self-adopted symbolisms and ideologies, each may require special approach as far as overall mobilization is concerned. Currently, this phenomenon is understudied and there is virtually no English-language literature specifying as to how these groups mobilize or how they may be mobilized for a campaign or a cause by larger groups like the pro-independence civil society organizations *Òmnium Cultural* and *Assemble Nacional Catalana* who are the leading "agencies" organizing mass demonstrations.

One assumption is that with impossibility of appealing to a specific group, or

rather the identity of members within that group, mobilizers can also appeal to other social identities of the same groups/people. For instance, if the mobilizers don't have any approaches to the extremist ideologies of *Boixos Nois,* they may try to appeal to their identity of 'youth' or 'profession', etc. This is based on the concept of *intersectionality*, a term coined by American civil rights advocate Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw to describe overlapping or intersecting social identities (Groeneveld, 2016: 74) and related systems of oppression, domination, or discrimination, albeit at its origins it was part of gender studies. At its core, intersectionality is the idea that multiple identities intersect to create a whole that distinctly varies from the component identities. Among the identities that can intersect are social class, gender, race, religion, age, ethnicity, illnesses and potentially self-ascribed identities. The presence of several identities and self-realization of the targeted group members about their various identities allows the mobilizing groups to tap into their potential and attract them to a cause. Needless to say, each individual or a highly cohesive group is likely to react differently from others. For example, the reaction of a *Boixos Nois* member who also has an identity of a Catalan nationalist and potentially a neo-Nazi is likely to be physically violent, intolerant even to other Barcelona fans and dismissive of the damage and harm to Barcelona. This means this kind of a member is likely to respond positively to calls for violent anarchic activity rather than a peaceful pro-independence protest.

Taking into account Catalonia's multiethnic and multinational makeup, it becomes potentially harder for mobilizers to appeal to specific segments of the society. According to the data from the official EULP poll in 2008, only 58 percent of the

respondents of the sample were born in Catalonia while 24 percent were born in other

mostly Castilian-speaking regions of Spain and 17 percent were born abroad (Castro,

2013: 33). Although there is no empirical data to support the argument, the fact that only

a little over 50 percent of Catalonia's population was born in the region itself, leads us

assume that the reason why Catalans have a tendency to mobilize for non-violent

movements rather than violent ones lies within their highly immigrant make-up of the

population. In other words, new or first-generation immigrants may identity themselves

as Catalans but may not necessarily identity with the Catalan cause, much like many

naturalized or first-generation immigrants in the US identity themselves as Americans but

won't associate with patriotism that promotes American military engagements abroad.

The multiethnic makeup of the population brings us to another important factor in

mobilization of social bases in Catalonia - the language.

According to the same sample data from the aforementioned 2008 EULP poll,

94.6 percent of the Catalonia residents older than 14 years of age declared they could

understand Catalan, while 78.3 percent could speak it, 81.7 percent could read it, and

61.8 percent could write it (Castro, 2013: 33). Following the Spanish War of Succession

when Catalonia, Valencia and the Balearic Islands were defeated and incorporated by

Castile, the Spanish crown abolished Catalan courts and universities, replacing them with

Castilian ones, thus effectively banning the practice of Catalan language. This stemmed

primarily from a fear of cultural distinctiveness of the suppressed group and its alleged

weak commitment to the state (Ross, 2007: 131). These practices were renewed and

aggressively enforced under Franco regime from 1936 through 1975, banning Catalan

from school and official spheres, and spreading knowledge of Castilian among all Catalans. Catalan names and toponyms were frequently replaced by Castilian and even speaking verbal Catalan became dangerous (Fishman, 1997: 297). Franco also facilitated migrations of Castilian-speaking immigrants to Catalonia thus reducing the number of Catalan speakers and increasing the Castilian. These bans, however, had backfired, because immediately after the end of the dictatorship and following transition of Spain to democracy, the language issue was prioritized. So important has the language issue become for Catalans that at the present more than 10,000 different books are published every year in Catalan which is a bigger number than books published in Hebrew or Finnish (Castro, 2013: 35-36) The importance of Catalan language as a sacred value for Catalans was central in my current study of Barça fans.

Language serves as cultural trait and is part of the symbolism in Castilian-Catalan conflict. Demonstration of lingual vitality is important within the Catalonian culture and political realm. In 2014, the former Barcelona manager Pep Guardiola dismissed the UEFA ban on speaking Catalan—since it is not recognized as official UEFA language— and proceeded to speak Catalan at a press conference (Morrissey, 2014). Adding to forms of performances, Catalan soccer fans continue to express Catalanism through songs at Camp Nou. Their contentious repertoires (Tilly, 2015: 14) include collective singing *El Cant del Barça* (Burns, 2012: 200) minutes before every Barcelona match and shouting "Independencia" on the 17th minute 14th second to commemorate *La Diada*, the National Day of Catalonia which marks the fall of Barcelona to the Spanish troops on September 11, 1714, and to express support for independence of Catalonia from Spain

(Tremlett, 2012).

Finally, there is the issue of internet and social networks which are being increasingly used by pro-independence groups and fan clubs. When it comes to appealing to their own population—whether immigrant or not—Jordi Pujol, the former head of the Catalan regional government for more than twenty years was quoted as saying that a "Catalan is person who lives and works in Catalonia and wants to be Catalan" (Ross, 2007: 143). This statement lies at the core of Catalan mobilizers' engagement with internal *and* external groups. Whilst there are no certifications—to put it in contentious politics lingo (Tilly, 2015: 105)—of Catalonian pro-independence actors from external political actors such as foreign governments, the EU and UN, Catalans take their issue to the wider audience represented by international fandom for Barça. In order to reach out to millions of fans across the world, Barcelona fans groups use social media including Facebook and Twitter to tailor messages to the international audience. Through their favored club Barcelona, pro-independence groups popularize Catalan symbols, including the Senyera (the Catalan flag), slogans like "Visca Barça!" (translated as *Come on Barca!*) and other social and cultural symbols to promote Catalanism and gain support.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN

The study was designed to test correlations between Barça fandom and Catalan nationalism and their potential for mobilization for an armed resistance within the context of intergroup conflict. Although only a few variables were used for the purposes of hypothesis for this thesis, the study was designed to collect as much as data with as many variables as possible, since this data may be useful in future research projects on the subject.

Measures and Procedure

The study was based an online survey, approved by the Institutional Review Board at George Mason University (IRBNet No. 1112386). The online survey consisted of a bilingual (Catalan and Spanish) questionnaire with 47 questions (The questionnaire is attached to this documents as an Appendix). The questionnaire included: 1) general data questions (ethnicity, place of residence, age, marital information, salary, education, etc.); 2) questions on football; 3) questions on symbolism; 4) questions on political engagement.

The online questionnaire built on www.surveymonkey.com was embedded into an article on a Spanish-language news site www.eurasiahoy.com and promoted through a Facebook ad service. The targeted audience in the Facebook ad was limited to 'Cataluña,

Spain'. When using Facebook ad, an applicant adds keywords (called *Interests* by Facebook) that would link the promoted advertisement to the targeted audience. This means that if, for instance, a keyword used in a particular ad campaign is 'Lionel Messi', the sponsored ad will appear on the Facebook screen of a person who lives in Catalonia and had previously searched for or viewed any information on Lionel Messi on Facebook. The keywords/interests entered for this ad were: *LigaBBVA, Independence, Lionel Messi, Real Madrid C.F., Cristiano Ronaldo, Catalan language, FC Barcelona, Liga Española de futbol, Ivan Rakitić, Catalonia national football team, Catalonia, Fc Barcelona Fans, Carles Puyol, El Clásico, Andrés Iniesta, Neymar, Self-determination, Gerard Piqué, Ernesto Valverde, Pep Guardiola, Cataluña or Luis Suárez*. This allowed the ad to appear on the screens of Catalonia-based Facebook users who had previously searched for or viewed information (articles, videos, etc.) on the above-mentioned people or events. Although the ad reached thousands of people, only 341 users responded.

After being prompted to read the Consent Form approved by IRB, respondents were presented with the bilingual questionnaire. Each question was presented in both Catalan and Spanish. Almost all of the questions were multiple choice with the exception on an open-end question on age of a respondent. Many of the questions were Likert scale and measured the applicable degrees and extents of sentiments of respondents.

In the first part of the questionnaire on general background data, respondents were asked to identify their place of residence; their own identification of ethnicity; gender; age; marital status; education; employment; salary; types of news sources used by a respondent; preference of social network; relationship to Catalonia (whether they are

born in Catalonia or are immigrants); self-identification on political ideology. In this

cluster, I intended to gather as much background information as possible, that could also

be important and used in further research on the subject. Employment status of a

respondent can presumably explain some of the answers to other questions, as

unemployed or underemployed people with lower salaries are likely to express more

discontent towards the state than employed ones. The same logic can be applied to less

educated individuals who are likely to be less open to or have less data on a given issue

than educated individuals. Furthermore, respondents who were not born in Catalonia may

feel Catalan but not necessarily associate with the Catalan cause, and therefore, may be

unlikely to express any aggressive attitude towards Spain or want Catalonia to secede.

The next cluster of questions focused on the subject of football and the

relationship of a respondent to football in general and specifically to Barça. Respondents

were asked about frequency of watching football; identifying the favored club; the extent

of importance of their favored team's image and success to them; whether or not they

followed World Cups; if they rooted for Spanish national team; which team they rooted

for when *El Clásico* took place (Barcelona or Real Madrid); relationship to Barcelona

(type of fans); whether Catalonia should play in World Cup independently; the extent of

happiness or unhappiness when Barça and Real Madrid won and lost an important game.

The questions from this cluster were designed to gather background information about

the level of involvement of respondents in Barça fandom and to find out whether being a

Barça fan was for them a sacred value. The questions on the clash of Barça and Real

Madrid would also reveal the level of 'sporting hatred' towards the rival which is an important indicator which can affect dependent variables on politics.

The third cluster of questions were on cultural and national symbolism pertinent to Catalonia; some applicable to football. Respondents were asked about the importance of *La Diada*; cultural programs on Catalonia on TV; whether the Catalan flag (Senyera) and an emblem 1714 should be patched to the Barça jerseys; importance of cultural autonomy; importance of history for Catalan identity; UNESCO Heritage Sites in Catalonia; self-identification as a Spaniard; actions of Barça fans calling for independence and singing the anthem of Barcelona at Camp Nou; and importance of Catalan language. Questions on symbolism were designed to obtain information on sentiments involving sacred values (such as language and Catalan identity), and what could presumably be considered sacred values (being devoted Barça fans with fused identities of a fan and nationalist, calling for independence).

Finally, the fourth last cluster of questions pertained to political views of respondents. They were asked to answer questions (mostly Likert scale) on self-determination; whether Catalonia should be a member of UN and EU; fiscal policy; whether Spain has been fair to Catalans or not; the extent of affection to Spain and Catalonia and willingness to support secession. The last few questions were designed in ways so as to get insight about discriminatory views of respondents and to see the level of potential aggressiveness that can be yielded if it came to political suppression or repression by Spain. The questions inquired whether ethnic Catalans should get the status of "first citizens" if Spain suppresses their right; are likely to defend their rights by all

means including armed resistance; and if Spain used law enforcement to suppress political rights of Catalans, the extent of willingness to form defense forces to counter act and protect their rights. This last question is especially important in the wake of harsh actions of the Spanish police against Catalan voters and protesters on the day of referendum on October 1, 2017.

Some questions were designed as reverse questions to make sure respondents answered the questions in a 'non-automatic' way. The online survey was started on September 1, 2017 and ended on September 14, 2017. The time frame for this cross-sectional study was chosen carefully with an intent to keep it as farther from any major political or football event as possible. It is worth mentioning that two important football events took place in August 2017, a few weeks before the survey was done.

First, on August 8, Real Madrid beat Manchester United in UEFA Super Cup. The UEFA Super Cup is a match played by reigning champions of the two main European club competitions: the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League. As winners of the Champions League, Real Madrid clashed with Manchester United beating them with a score 2:1 to the dismay of Barça fans (Wallace & Bull, 2017).

Second, Real Madrid clashed with Barça in Supercopa de España (Spanish Super Cup), a two-leg game played annually between the winners of the two Spanish tournaments, *La Liga* and *Copa del Rey*. On August 13, as the title holders of La Liga's 2016-2017 season, Real Madrid beat Barcelona in Camp Nou, Barça's home field with the score 1:3; and on August 16, *Los Blancos*, as Real Madrid is often called, beat Barça

again at Santiago Bernabeu, Real Madrid's home field, with the score 2:0, bringing the aggregate score to 5:1 (Bull, 2017).

It is impossible to predict if these specific football matches had any effect on the responses during the survey. In addition to football matches, a small part of the survey fell on *La Diada*, the National Day of Catalonia, marked on September 11. None of the questions specifically addressed La Diada held on September 11, 2017. The only question on La Diada asked about the importance of the day, in general.

Participants

The predominant majority of the respondents in the sample (*n=341*) were males (87.1%) with females constituting 11.7% and others 1.2%. The youngest respondent was 18 years of age, the oldest 83 with the median age being 41. Close to half of the respondents (49.7%) were married or in domestic partnership, with singles making up 40.5%, separated 2.4%, divorced 6.8%, widowed 0.6%.

Education was not factored in a regression model; the data was obtained for future research only. Yet, the following table with descriptive information about the educational background of respondents could reflect the extent of additional information potentially shedding light as to how informed one is about the subject. The commonly accepted assumption is that the higher the degree of education, the more open the respondent is to inclusivity, tolerance, consumption of various sorts of information, etc.

Table 1 Education (highest degree)

	Percent	Cum
No schooling completed	0.89	0.89
Primary schooling only	2.67	3.56
Some secondary school	4.45	8.01
Secondary school completed	22.85	30.86
Some college but not completed	23.15	54.01
College degree completed	34.42	88.43
Graduate degree completed	11.57	100.00

Geographically, Catalonia *was* the primary target of investigation; yet Madrid and the rest of Spain were also listed as options for choosing the residence. While none of the respondents registered as being from Madrid, 43.4% chose 'Barcelona' as the place of their residence, 54.6% chose 'Other city in Catalonia', and 2.1% chose 'Other city in the rest of Spain'.

Ethnicity of the respondents was an important factor in assessing the values for other variables, especially when it came to issues of commitment to their favored team(s) and/or responses on symbolism and political issues. Ethnic identification is an essential element in considering the subjects of intersectionality and identity fusion.

Table 2 Ethnic classification of R's

	Percent	Cum.
Catalan only	59.53	59.53
More Catalan than Spanish	15.84	75.37
As Catalan as Spanish	13.49	88.86
More Spanish than Catalan	4.69	93.55
Spanish only	3.52	97.07
Neither Catalan nor Spanish	2.93	100.00

The number of the unemployed nearly corresponded with the overall Spanish/Catalan statistics on unemployment (see the table below). Roughly 18.1% of the respondents in the sample registered as unemployed, with 60.5% being employed full-time, 8.6% - part-time, 11.6% - retired and 1.2% disabled. Out of the employed respondents, 44.2% had a monthly salary of up to €1,000, 44.6% between €1,001-€2,000, 7.8% between €2,001-€3,000, 1.7% between €3,001-€4,000, 0.8% between €5,001-€6,000 and 0.8% above €6,001.

The time period (2006-2016) shown in the unemployment rate in Catalonian and Spain below was also chosen for the purpose of displaying the growth of unemployment rate on par with the growth of the activity of the independence movement. While the correlation between unemployment and growth of independence movement was not investigated in this thesis, there is a reason to believe that unemployment could be one of the primary factors affecting public discontent on fiscal policies imposed by Madrid on Catalonia, subsequently fueling the quest for secession.

Table 3 Unemployment rate 2006-2016 (regions in Catalonia; average Catalonia and Spain)

	Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona	Catalonia	Spain
2016	15.5	16.1	11.7	19.1	15.7	19.6
2015	18.2	19.7	15.0	21.9	18.6	22.1
2014	20.0	22.5	15.0	23.4	20.3	24.4
2013	23.1	23.0	16.5	26.9	23.1	26.1
2012	22.5	24.2	17.8	23.4	22.5	24.8
2011	19.1	21.7	13.8	20.0	19.2	21.4
2010	17.7	17.8	14.6	18.5	17.7	19.9
2009	16.2	18.0	11.6	17.1	16.2	17.9
2008	8.6	11.0	6.6	10.1	8.9	11.3
2007	6.5	8.0	3.0	6.5	6.5	8.2
2006	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	6.5	8.5

Units: Per cent (annual averages). Source: Idescat, based on data from the INE's Survey of active population.

As the table below demonstrates, slightly more than a half of the respondents used Internet as their primary source of news, while nearly a quarter of respondents got their news mostly from television. These are important indicators when it comes to mobilization tactics. Visuals available through internet sites (which include social networks) and TV amplify the effects of exposure to a given phenomenon. That is, an effect of a football game, or a combination of football and politics (such as fan groups' repertoires at Camp Nou) grows when the exposure of an individual to the visuals grow. In the realm of Internet, the space for discussion, strategies and action also persistently

grow, especially when the physical space can be suppressed (della Porta, 2015: 204-220). Additionally, TV and Internet serve as an alternative platform for sustaining the *politically motivated* relationship with the club when that relationship is disrupted in physical forms. For instance, when the Spanish government sent the police force to Catalonia to enforce the ban on the referendum held on October 1, 2017, the authorities also shut down Camp Nou, denying access to 98,000 fans waiting outside to attend the Barça-Las Palmas game. This inspired the club to express support to Catalonia in their own way by posing for a team photo before the game wearing warm-up t-shirts in the colors of Catalan flag (Terrell, 2017).

Table 4 Primary source of news

	Percent	Cum.
TV	22.87	22.87
Internet	53.96	76.83
Radio	8.23	85.06
Newspapers	7.93	92.99
Social media	5.79	98.78
Other	1.22	100.00

It is worth mentioning that 78.83% of the respondents stated they used Facebook as their mostly used social network; followed by Twitter with 10.06%, Instagram with 9.15, LinkedIn with 0.61%, and others – 2.44%.

When it comes to the political ideology, 41.46% identified themselves as Left, 21.04% as Center Left, 15.85% as Center Right, 5.79% as Extreme Left, 2.44% as Right, and 1.22% as Extreme Right. 12.20% declined to answer the question.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

For the purposes of this thesis, three models were run to test the hypothesis on the connection of respondents who had identified themselves as Barça fans to deeper sense of Catalan nationalism. It must be noted that towards the end of the questionnaire, where political symbolism and violence-related issues are discussed in the questions, a significant number of respondents decided to exit the survey. By the last question, the number of missing values was 88, with 253 respondents completing the entire questionnaire.

As mentioned earlier, three regression models were to be run to measure the relationship of five independent variables on three important dependent variables. Self-determination, secession, and willingness to form a defense force to resist Spanish law enforcement are the three dependent variables which represent the Catalan nationalism. These elements representing dependent variables in the study remain at the core of Catalan nationalism. The quest for self-determination has always been there since the emergence of Catalan nationalism as a concept. It has gained Catalans self-rule under Spanish monarchy providing it wide political and substantial economic autonomy. As was noted earlier, Catalan independentists viewed autonomy as a transition stage to full independence. Therefore, secession from Spain serves as the next desired stage for Catalan nationalists. Lastly, an ability to form a defense force to protect and defend own

population could be seen one of the red lines that separates peaceful movement in Catalonia from a potentially armed conflict. Thus, in a way, self-determination, secession and willingness to form a defense force to defend against Spanish law enforcement could be consecutive stages within the context of the independence movement. Therefore, it is important to be able to see the extent of correlation of these variables with the independent variables that normally define the political climate in a given country with separatist movements, and in case of Catalonia, additionally the extent of a football factor as an independent variable.

Relationship of supporters to Barça, political ideology of the respondents, views on fiscal policy, gender and importance of language for respondents are the independent variables in this study. The independent variable representing the relationship of supporters to their favored club is based on the question that identifies the extent of allegiance of a respondent to the club. The question posed to the respondents was: *Which of the following best describes your relationship to Barcelona FC?* with multiple choice answers being 1) I am a socio; 2) I am a member of Penya; 3) I am a culer; 4) I am a member of Boixos Nois; 5) I don't have a formal or informal association with Barcelona FC. I am just an average fan; 6) I don't have any association with Barcelona whatsoever. Neither am I a fan of the club. It's an important indicator of how a devoted respondent is to be associated with Barça. It is my opinion that those devoted to the club via formal or informal membership, or permanent viewership are passionate followers who consider themselves a part of Barça phenomenon. Those who don't have strong associational links are infrequent supporters who are unlikely to be affected by what happens on Barça

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matches and the club's rivalries with other teams. 77% of the respondents identified themselves as either socios, penyes or culers. This variable was then converted into a dichotomous variable dividing those with higher commitment to Barça as 1 and others with loose attachment to Barça as 0.

The independent variable determining political ideology was based on the question which allowed seven possible answers: 1) extreme left; 2) left; 3) center left; 4) center right; 5) right; 6) extreme right; 7) decline to answer. Those who declined to answer were reclassified as missing values (removed from results) during the analysis stage as they constituted no value for the test. The independent variables on importance of fiscal policies and Catalans language for respondents were measured by Likert-scale questions. The question on Catalan language asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement that "Catalan must be taught as the primary language in all schools throughout Catalonia" (1 Strongly disagree to 6 Strongly agree). The question on the importance of the fiscal policies of Spain vis-à-vis Catalonia asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the reverse question "Fiscal independence of Catalonia is NOT important for the population of Catalonia" (1 Strongly disagree to 6 Strongly agree). The reverse (*negative*) wording was used to get a stronger and more valid measures. During the analysis, the variable representing the answers was recoded accordingly to reflect the attitudes of respondents to a *positive* question. P value of 0.05 was used for this test.

The dependent variable in the first model was self-determination, based on the question: *Catalonia must be allowed to self-determine* (Likert-scale question measuring

from 1 Strongly disagree to 6 Strongly agree). The dependent variable in the second model was secession, based on the question: *Should the Spanish government forbid Catalonia to self-determine, Catalonia must unilaterally secede from the Spanish state* (Likert-scale question measuring from 1 Strongly disagree to 6 Strongly agree). The dependent variable in the third model was willingness to form a defense force for protection of the population and to resist the Spanish law enforcement, based on the question: *In case of an attempt by the Spanish law enforcement to subdue Catalans, Catalonians should have a right to form a defense force to protect its population and their fundamental freedoms.* (Likert-scale question measuring from 1 Strongly disagree to 6 Strongly agree). As mentioned above, many respondents have dropped out of the survey by the time they reach this last question. However, it must be noted that responses or willingness to respond to this question could have been different should this survey had been taken on or after October 1, 2017 when the referendum took place and when the Spanish law enforcement used excessive force against the Catalan voters and the protesters.

The results from running three regression models, depicted in Table 5, showed that controlling for other variables, having a deeper connection or allegiance to Barça also meant supporting self-determination (B=0.397; P=0.063), secession (B=0.550; P=0.031) and support for forming a defense force (B=0.814; P=0.002) to protect own population and to enact resistance against the Spanish law enforcement. The results also indicate that being a male respondent did not make a difference in expressing support for self-determination (B=0.432; P=0.887), secession (B= - 0.290; P=0.424) and armed

resistance (B= - 0.281; P=0.939). It is potentially indicative of universal attitude on Catalan nationalism regardless of gender, i.e. as can be seen at nationalist and separatist rallies in Catalonia, the participants are heavily mixed and both men and women take active part in the events. The numbers for the variable on political ideology showed that the more politically left a respondent identified himself or herself, the more likely was his or her support to self-determination (B= - 0.316; P=0.001), secession (B= - 0.352; P=0.001) and armed resistance (B= - 0.402; P=0.000). As mentioned earlier, Likert scale answers for the question on political ideology was set up to measure 1 being Extreme left to 6 being Extreme Right; hence the negative coefficients (*B*). Interestingly, unlike the United States, in many Europe the leftists are likely to be more nationalistic and more aggressive, as the data indicates, than the right. Spain's other once violent and now dormant separatist movement of ETA was based on left ideology.

Table 5 Results of a three-model regression on self-determination, secession and armed resistance

	Self-determination (Coefficient and P value)	Secession (Coefficient and P value)	Armed resistance (Coefficient and P value)
Relationship to Barça	*B*=0.397; *P*=0.063	*B*=0.550; *P*=0.031	*B*=0.814; *P*=0.002
Political ideology	*B*= - 0.316; *P*=0.001	*B*= - 0.352; *P*=0.001	*B*= - 0.402; *P*=0.000
Importance of fiscal freedom	*B*=0.427; *P*=0.000	*B*=0.540; *P*=0.000	*B*=0.312; *P*=0.000
Male	*B*=0.432; *P*=0.887	*B*= - 0.290; *P*=0.424	*B*= - 0.281; *P*=0.939
Importance of language	*B*=0.373; *P*=0.000	*B*=0.453; *P*=0.000	*B*=0.426; *P*=0.000
Number of observations and variance	*n=231; R^2=0.38; P<0.05*	*n=231; R^2=0.39; P<0.05*	*n=226; R^2=0.32; P<0.05*

The results on importance of Catalonia's fiscal freedom and Catalan language, controlling for other variables, depict a high support for Catalan nationalism, as well. The models run for self-determination, secession and armed resistance explain 38%, 39% and 32% of the variance. The conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that allegiance to Barça means as much deeper connection to Catalan nationalism as do issues of political importance such as ideology, fiscal freedom and importance of language.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

Social conflicts are the reality of daily life. Sport is an integral part of the life of society. Therefore, the conflicts arising in this sphere are characterized by both the general features characteristic of any social conflict, as well as specific features pertinent to a given conflict.

As revealed in the literature review, the concept of conflict in contemporary literature is treated ambiguously. In defining this concept, authors appear to derive at their conclusions by presenting the concept of conflict as a social contradiction. The general understanding of a social conflict seems to stem from a notion of a process in which two or more individuals or groups actively seek the opportunity to prevent each other from achieving a particular goal, to prevent the satisfaction of the interests of the opponent, or to change his opinions and/or social positions.

The intra-system aspect of the development of social conflict and the determination of its boundaries is associated with a characterization of the system in which it occurs, i.e. the conflicting parties, potential organizers, accomplices, supporters and opponents of the conflicting parties (representatives of the parties, experts, etc.), referees and judges who make up the system. The analysis of participants in a social conflict can be done from the point of view of various sciences. From the standpoint of psychology, social conflict could be regarded as interpersonal, because starting from the

confrontation of two individuals to the confrontation of formal or informal small groups, the conflicting parties are always. From the standpoint of sociology, social conflict can be characterized as a conflict of social communities - social strata, social classes, state and other organizations, mass movements, etc. From the point of view of political science, a social conflict can be treated as political or geopolitical, that is, as a conflict at the intrastate or interstate level.

The subject of a conflict is the main contradiction because of which, for the sake of solution, the subjects come into conflict. That could be the struggle for power, existence of different values, the problem of formal and informal leadership, the issue of socio-psychological compatibility, and so forth. The object of social conflict is usually a scarce resource, a specific material or spiritual value, to the possession or use of which the conflicting parties seek. It is any element of the material world and social reality that can serve as a subject of personal, group, public, state interests.

When it comes to the Castilian-Catalan conflict, sports have become as integral part of the intra-system which the conflict is occurring. Sports could be seen as a component that have fused with other components of the political rivalry between the center and the autonomy, permeating into smallest parts of the social life. Football which generates certain peculiar passions as a type of sports has penetrated deeply into the conflicting ideology on both sides. The act of winning over the rival appears to have become a 'scarce resource' and a spiritual value in its own right, transforming the attachment to one's own club into a non-negotiable sacred value.

The study on the interrelationship between El Clásico and the independence movement in Catalonia helped to clarify how emotions around football in Catalonia, and specifically Barça as the carrier of Catalan national identity are associated with sacred values and affect the extent of potentially aggressive involvement in the Catalan independence movement. The chief findings were the following:

First, within the context of *El Clásico*, the sense of attachment to the club does seem to constitute a sacred value on par with other important spiritual and non-negotiable values such as Catalan language, culture, history and other symbols of national significance. Second, self-determination or expression of will, is a significant value for Catalans in its own right because many other issues surrounding the Catalan independence movement have formed and transformed it into an important part of Catalan identity and sacred value system. Hamid and Pretus (2017) who wrote a piece on Catalan sacred values this fall, argue exactly that. The data interpretation on the impact of feelings on fiscal issues, importance of language also demonstrated tendency to want to secede. And lastly, while controlled for other independent variables, being a Barça fan, closely associated and connected to the club, did have a significant impact on the willingness to pick up arms and form a defense force to fight the Spanish law enforcement.

At the time of this writing, the Catalan referendum did take place (Thornell, 2017), and the Catalan autonomous government did declare "formal" independence from Spain which was struck down by Spanish courts (Minder & Kingsley, 2017). However, the Spanish government responded with force and increased police presence in the region

(Osborn, 2017). Several Catalan leaders were arrested (Jones, 2017) with the President of

Generalitat Carles Puidgemont fleeing and seeking refuge in Belgium (Birnbaum, 2017).

The Spanish government dissolved the Catalan parliament and called for new elections

which will take place on December 21, 2017 (Jones et al, 2017; Tadeo, 2017). Although

these events did spark an outrage among Catalan independentists and several rallies were

held through Catalonia, so did pro-union demonstrations with many thousands of anti-

independence Catalans rallying to support the Spanish government and remain in the

union (Simmons et al, 2017). At this point, no violence on part of the Catalans was

witnessed, and no defense forces were established. However, as per results of the study,

there is a statistically significant potential of this taking place in the future. When it

comes to Barcelona-Real Madrid rivalry, at the time of this writing Barcelona leads the

Spanish La Liga tournament with Real Madrid lagging behind and underperforming

despite winning the last two seasons of the Spanish league. The teams will meet on

December 23, 2017, for the first time after the October referendum (Barcelona, 2017). It

remains to be seen how politically expressive the climate will get after the parliamentary

elections on December 21 and El Clásico on December 23.

The online questionnaire was presented to the respondents in Catalan and Spanish only. The following version includes the English variant, as well.

Page 1

1. I currently live in:

- Barcelona
- Madrid
- Other city in Catalonia
- Other city in the rest of Spain

1. Jo actualment visc a:

- Barcelona
- Madrid
- Una altra ciutat a Catalunya
- Una altra ciutat a la resta d'Espanya

1. Yo actualmente vivo en:

- Barcelona
- Madrid
- Otra ciudad en Cataluña
- Otra ciudad en el resto de España

2. How do you identify yourself?

- Catalan only
- More Catalan than Spanish

- As Catalan as Spanish
- More Spanish than Catalan
- Spanish only
- Neither Catalan nor Spanish

2. Amb quin sentiment s'identifica vostè?

- Em sento només català
- Em sento més català que espanyol
- Em sento tan català com espanyol
- Em sento més espanyol que català
- Em sento només espanyol
- No em sento ni català ni espanyol

2. Con qué sentimiento se identifica usted?

- Me siento solo catalán
- Me siento más catalán que español
- Me siento tan catalán como español
- Me siento más español que catalán
- Me siento solo español
- No me siento ni catalán ni español

3. I am:

- Male
- Female
- Other

3. Sóc:

- Home
- Dona
- Un altre

3. Soy:

- Hombre
- Mujer
- Otro

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4. My age is: _____

4. La meva edat és: _____

4. Mi edad es: _____

5. Marital status:

- Single, never married
- Married or domestic partnership
- Separated
- Divorced
- Widowed

5. Estat civil:

- Solter, mai casat
- Matrimoni o unió de fet
- Separat
- Divorciat
- Vidu/vidua

5. Estado civil:

- Soltero nunca casado
- Matrimonio o pareja doméstica
- Separado/a
- Divorciado/a
- Viudo/a

6. Education: What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree received:

- No schooling completed
- Primary schooling only
- Some secondary school
- Secondary school completed
- Some college but not completed
- College degree completed
- Graduate degree completed

6. Educació: quina és la titulació més alta o nivell acadèmic que ha completat? Si actualment està inscrit, indiqui el màxim nivell rebut fins ara:

- No s'ha completat cap escola

- Educació primària només
- Alguns estudis secundaris
- Completat l'ensenyament secundari
- Alguns estudis universitaris però no acabats
- Completat el títol universitari
- Graduat completat

6. Educación: ¿Cuál es el grado más alto o nivel de escuela que ha completado? Si está actualmente matriculado, el grado más alto recibido:

- No se completó la escolaridad
- Sólo la enseñanza primaria
- Algunas escuelas secundarias
- Escuela secundaria completada
- Algunos estudios universitarios pero no completados
- Título universitario completado
- Graduado completado

7. What is your employment status:

- Full-time
- Part-time
- Unemployed
- Retired
- Disabled

7. Quin és el vostre estatus laboral:

- A jornada completa
- Mitja jornada
- Desocupat
- Jubilat
- Discapacitat

7. ¿Cuál es su situación laboral:

- A jornada completa
- Media jornada
- Desempleado

- Jubilado
- Discapacitado

8. What is your current monthly salary?

- €0-€1,000
- €1,001-€2,000
- €2,001-€3,000
- €3,001-€4,000
- €4,001-€5,000
- €5,001-€6,000
- Above €6,000
- Decline to answer

8. Quin és el vostre sou mensual actual?

- € 0- € 1,000
- 1.001 € - 2.000 €
- 2.001 € - 3.000 €
- 3.001 € - 4.000 €
- 4.001 € - 5.000 €
- 5.001 € - 6.000 €
- Més de 6.000 €
- Es nega a respondre

8. ¿Cuál es su salario mensual actual?

- € 0- € 1,000
- € 1.001- € 2.000
- € 2.001- € 3.000
- € 3,001- € 4,000
- € 4,001- € 5,000
- € 5,001- € 6,000
- Más de 6.000 €
- Se niega a contestar

Page 3

9. What is your primary source of news?

- TV
- Internet
- Radio
- Newspapers
- Social media
- Word of mouth
- Other

9. Quina és la font principal de notícies?

- TV
- Internet
- Ràdio
- Diaris
- Mitjà de comunicació social
- Boca-orella
- Un altre

9. ¿Cuál es su principal fuente de noticias?

- Televisión
- Internet
- Radio
- Periódicos
- Medios de comunicación social
- Boca a boca
- Otros

10. Which social networking site do you use **most** (one response only)?

- Facebook
- Twitter
- LinkedIn
- Pinterest
- Instagram
- Other

- None

10. Quin lloc de xarxes socials utilitza **més** (només una resposta)?

- Facebook
- Twitter
- LinkedIn
- Pinterest
- Instagram
- Un altre
- Cap

10. ¿Qué sitio de redes sociales usas **más** (sólo una respuesta)?

- Facebook
- Twitter
- LinkedIn
- Pinterest
- Instagram
- Otros
- Ninguna

11. What is your political ideology?

- Extreme left
- Left
- Center left
- Center right
- Right
- Extreme right
- Decline to answer/Unsure

11. Quina és la seva ideologia política?

- Extrema esquerra
- Esquerra
- Centre esquerra
- Centre dreta
- Dreta
- Extrema dreta
- Declinar respondre / indecís

11. ¿Cuál es su ideología política?

- Extrema izquierda
- Izquierda
- Centro izquierda
- Centro derecha
- Derecha
- Extrema derecha
- Declina responder / Indeciso

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12. I watch football:

- On daily basis
- Once per week
- Once a month
- From time to time
- Never

12. Veig futbol:

- A diari
- Un cop per setmana
- Un cop al mes
- De tant en tant
- Mai

12. Veo el fútbol:

- A diario
- Una vez por semana
- Una vez al mes
- De vez en cuando
- Nunca

13. I am a fan of:

- Barcelona FC
- Real Madrid
- Other club
- No specific club

13. Sóc seguidor del:

- FC Barcelona
- Reial Madrid
- Un altre club
- Cap club específic

13. Soy un seguidor de:

- FC Barcelona
- Real Madrid
- Otro club
- Ningun Club en especial

14. On a scale from 1 to 7 (with 7 being very important) how important to you is your team's success?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

14. En una escala d'1 a 7 (sent 7 molt important) quina importància té per a vostè l'èxit del seu equip?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

14. En una escala de 1 a 7 (siendo 7 muy importante) ¿qué importancia tiene para usted el éxito de su equipo?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. On a scale from 1 to 7 (with 7 being very important) how important to you is your team's image?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. En una escala d'1 a 7 (sent 7 molt important) quina importància té per a vostè la imatge del seu equip?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. En una escala de 1 a 7 (siendo 7 muy importante) ¿qué importancia tiene para usted la imagen de su equipo?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. I follow World Cup:

- Always
- Never
- Sometimes

16. Segueixo la Copa del Món:

- Sempre
- Mai
- De vegades

16. Sigo Copa del Mundo:

- Siempre
- Nunca
- A veces

17. I root for Spain's national team in World Cup:

- Always
- Never
- Sometimes

17. Dono suport a l'equip nacional d'Espanya a la Copa del Món:

- Sempre
- Mai
- De vegades

17. Soy seguidor del equipo nacional de España en la Copa del Mundo:

- Siempre
- Nunca
- A veces

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18. To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Catalonia should be represented in the World Cup as an independent team.

Agree - - - - Disagree

18. Fins a quin punt està d'acord amb la següent declaració? Catalunya ha de ser representada a la Copa del Món com a equip independent.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

18. ¿En qué medida está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración? Cataluña debería estar representada en la Copa del Mundo como equipo independiente.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

19. When *El Clásico* takes place I root for:

- Barcelona
- Real Madrid
- Sometimes for Barcelona, sometimes for Real Madrid
- Neither team

19. Quan es fa *el Clàssic*, suporto:

- Barcelona
- Real Madrid
- De vegades al Barcelona, de vegades al Reial Madrid
- Cap equip

19. Cuando *El Clásico* tiene lugar, apoyo:

- Barcelona
- Real Madrid
- A veces para Barcelona, a veces para el Real Madrid
- Ninguno de los equipos

20. Which of the following best describes your relationship to Catalonia?

- I was born in Catalonia
- I was born elsewhere in Spain

- I am an immigrant from another country living in Catalonia
- I am an immigrant from another country living elsewhere in Spain
- I am non-immigrant temporarily residing in Catalonia
- I am non-immigrant temporarily residing elsewhere in Spain
- None
- Decline to answer

20. Quina de les següents frases descriu millor la seva relació amb Catalunya?

- Vaig néixer a Catalunya
- Vaig néixer en un altre lloc d'Espanya
- Sóc immigrant d'un altre país que viu a Catalunya
- Sóc immigrant d'un altre país que viu a la resta d'Espanya
- Sóc no resident immigrant temporalment a Catalunya
- Sóc no immigrant que resideix temporalment a altres llocs d'Espanya
- Cap
- Es nega a respondre

20. ¿Cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor su relación con Cataluña?

- Nací en Cataluña
- Nací en otro lugar de España
- Soy un inmigrante de otro país que vive en Cataluña
- Soy un inmigrante de otro país que vive en otro lugar en España
- No soy inmigrante residente temporalmente en Cataluña
- No soy inmigrante residiendo temporalmente en otro lugar en España
- Ninguna
- Negarse a contestar

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21. Please rate your mood when the following event happens:

Very Unhappy		Neither Happy nor Unhappy		Very Happy	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Barcelona wins an important game

21. Si us plau, avaluï el seu estat d'ànim quan succeeix el següent:

21. Por favor evalue el estado de su ánimo cuando ocurre lo siguiente:

Molt Trist Muy Infeliz		Ni feliç ni infeliç Ni feliz ni infeliz		Molt feliç Muy Feliz	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Barcelona guanya un partit important Barcelona gana un partido importante

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22. Please rate your mood when the following event happens:

Very Unhappy		Neither Happy nor Unhappy		Very Happy	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Barcelona loses an important game

22. Si us plau, avaluï el seu estat d'ànim quan succeeix el següent:

22. Por favor evalue el estado de su ánimo cuando ocurre lo siguiente:

Molt Trist Muy Infeliz		Ni feliç ni infeliç Ni feliz ni infeliz		Molt feliç Muy Feliz	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Barcelona pèrd un partit important Barcelona pierde un partido importante

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23. Please rate your mood when the following event happens:

Very Unhappy		Neither Happy nor Unhappy		Very Happy	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Madrid wins an important game

23. Si us plau, avaluï el seu estat d'ànim quan succeeix el següent:

23. Por favor evalue el estado de su ánimo cuando ocurre lo siguiente:

Molt Trist Muy Infeliz		Ni feliç ni infeliç Ni feliz ni infeliz		Molt feliç Muy Feliz	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Madrid guanya un partit important Madrid gana un partido importante

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24. Please rate your mood when the following event happens:

Very Unhappy		Neither Happy nor Unhappy		Very Happy	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Madrid loses an important game

24. Si us plau, avaluï el seu estat d'ànim quan succeeix el següent:

24. Por favor evalue el estado de su ánimo cuando ocurre lo siguiente:

Molt Trist Muy Infeliz		Ni feliç ni infeliç Ni feliz ni infeliz		Molt feliç Muy Feliz	
1	2	3	4	5	
					Madrid perd un partit important Madrid pierde un partido importante

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Please mark the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Si us plau marqui el punt d'acord o desacord amb les següents frases.

Por favor marque el punto de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

25. Barcelona FC should add Catalonian flag (*Senyera*) to its uniform

Agree - - - - Disagree

25. El FC Barcelona ha d'afegir la bandera catalana (Senyera) al seu uniforme

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

25. El FC Barcelona debería añadir la bandera de Cataluña (Senyera) a su uniforme

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

26. *La Diada* is NOT an important part of Catalan identity

Agree - - - - Disagree

26. La Diada NO és una part important de la identitat catalana

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

26. La Diada NO es una parte importante de la identidad catalana

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

27. Barcelona FC must add an emblem "1714" to its uniform to commemorate *La Diada*?

Agree - - - - Disagree

27. El Barcelona FC ha d'afegir un emblema "1714" al seu uniforme per commemorar La Diada?

D'acord - - - - En desacord

27. ¿El FC Barcelona debe añadir un emblema "1714" a su uniforme para conmemorar La Diada?

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

28. Catalonia must NOT be allowed to self-determine:

Agree - - - - Disagree

28. A Catalunya NO s'ha de permetre la autodeterminació :

D'acord - - - - En desacord

28. A Cataluña NO se le debe permitir la auto-determinación:

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

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Please mark the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Si us plau marqui el punt d'acord o desacord amb les següents frases.

Por favor marque el punto de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

29. Catalonia should be part of European Union as an independent state

Agree - - - - Disagree

29. Catalunya hauria de formar part de la Unió Europea com un Estat independent

D'acord - - - - En desacord

29. Cataluña debería formar parte de la Unión Europea como un Estado independiente

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

30. Catalonia should NOT be a member of United Nations

Agree - - - - Disagree

30. Catalunya NO ha de ser un membre de les Nacions Unides

D'acord - - - - En desacord

30. Cataluña NO debe ser un miembro de las Naciones Unidas

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

31. Catalans should enjoy the highest cultural autonomy within Spain

Agree - - - - Disagree

31. Els catalans haurien de gaudir de la més alta autonomia cultural a Espanya

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

31. Los catalanes deben gozar de la mayor autonomía cultural dentro de España

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

32. Which of the following **best** describes your relationship to Barcelona FC:

- I am a socio
- I am a member of Penya
- I am a culer
- I am a member of Boixos Nois
- I don't have a formal or informal association with Barcelona FC. I am just an average fan
- I don't have any association with Barcelona whatsoever. Neither am I a fan of the club.

32. Quina de les següents característiques descriu millor la relació amb el FC Barcelona:

- Sóc soci
- Sóc membre de Penya
- Sóc culer
- Sóc membre de Boixos Nois
- No tinc una associació formal o informal amb el FC Barcelona. Sóc un seguidor mitjà
- No tinc cap associació amb Barcelona. Tampoc sóc seguidor del club.

32. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones describe mejor su relación con el FC Barcelona:

- Soy un socio
- Soy miembro de penya
- Soy un culer
- Soy miembro de Boixos Nois
- No tengo una asociación formal o informal con el Barcelona FC. - Solo soy un seguidor medio
- No tengo ninguna relación con Barcelona. Tampoco soy un fan del club.

33. To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Singing *El Cant del Barca* at Barcelona matches is an important ritual expressing support for the team.

Agree - - - - Disagree

33. Fins a quin punt esteu d'acord amb la següent declaració? Cantar *el Cant del Barça* en els partits de Barcelona és un ritual important que expressa el suport a l'equip.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

33. ¿En qué medida está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración? Cantando *El Cant del Barca* en los partidos de Barcelona es un ritual importante que expresa apoyo al equipo.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

34. To what extent do you agree with the following statement?

'Clamor independentista' at Barcelona matches is an important ritual for Barça fans.

Agree - - - - Disagree

34. En quina mesura esteu d'acord amb la següent declaració?

"Clamor independentista" en els partits de Barcelona és un ritual important per als aficionats del Barça.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

34. ¿En qué medida está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración?

'Clamor independentista' en los partidos de Barcelona es un ritual importante para los aficionados del Barça.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

35. When I am at the Barcelona's game at *Camp Nou*, I join other Barça fans in the *'Clamor independentista'* on 17th minute 14th second of the match.

- Always
- Never
- Sometimes
- Decline to answer

35. Quan estic en el partit de Barcelona al *Camp Nou*, m'uneixo a d'altres seguidors del Barça en el '*Clamor independentista'* en el minut 17:14 del partit.

- Sempre
- Mai
- De vegades
- Es nega a respondre

35. Cuando estoy en el partido de Barcelona en el Camp Nou, me uno a otros seguidores

del Barça en el 'Clamor independentista' en el minuto 17:14 del partido.

- Siempre
- Nunca
- A veces
- Negarse a contestar

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36. To what extent do you agree with the following statement? History of Catalonia is an important part of Catalonian identity.

Agree - - - - Disagree

36. Fins a quin punt esteu d'acord amb la següent declaració? La història de Catalunya és una part important de la identitat catalana.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

36. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración? La historia de Cataluña es una parte importante de la identidad catalana.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

37. A World Heritage Site is a landmark or area which has been officially recognized by the United Nations, specifically by UNESCO. Sites are selected on the basis of having cultural, historical, scientific significance, and are legally protected by international treaties. UNESCO regards these sites as being important to the collective interests of humanity.

To what extent do you agree with the following statement? UNESCO's World Heritage sites in Catalonia represent uniqueness of Catalan cultural identity, **independent** from Spain.

Agree - - - - Disagree

37. Un lloc declarat Patrimoni de la Humanitat és una fita o àrea reconeguda oficialment per les Nacions Unides, concretament per la UNESCO. Els llocs es seleccionen sobre la base de tenir rellevància cultural, històrica, científica i estan protegits legalment pels tractats internacionals. La UNESCO considera que aquests llocs són importants per als interessos col·lectius de la humanitat.

Fins a quin punt esteu d'acord amb la següent declaració? Els llocs del Patrimoni Mundial de la UNESCO a Catalunya representen unicitat de la identitat cultural catalana, **independent** d'Espanya.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

37. Un Sitio del Patrimonio Mundial es un hito o área que ha sido oficialmente

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reconocida por las Naciones Unidas, específicamente por la UNESCO. Los sitios se seleccionan teniendo en cuenta su importancia cultural, histórica y científica y están legalmente protegidos por tratados internacionales. La UNESCO considera que estos sitios son importantes para los intereses colectivos de la humanidad.

¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración? Los sitios del Patrimonio Mundial de la UNESCO en Cataluña representan la singularidad de la identidad cultural catalana, **independiente** de España.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

38. To what extent do you agree with the following statement?

My identity as a Spaniard is very important to me.

Agree - - - - Disagree

38. En quina mesura esteu d'acord amb la següent declaració?

La meva identitat com a persona espanyola és molt important per a mi.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

38. ¿En qué medida está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración?

Mi identidad como persona española es muy importante para mí.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

39. To what extent do you agree with the following statement? A Catalonian can love Catalonia and Spain as a whole at the same time.

Agree - - - - Disagree

39. Fins a quin punt esteu d'acord amb la següent declaració? Un català pot estimar Catalunya i Espanya en conjunt al mateix temps.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

39. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración? Un catalán puede amar Cataluña y España en su conjunto al mismo tiempo.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

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Please mark the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements

Marqueu la mesura en què estigueu o no d'acord amb les declaracions següents

Por favor, marque en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones

40. As an official language, Catalan must be taught as the primary language in all schools throughout Catalonia.

Agree - - - - Disagree

40. Com a llengua oficial, el català s'ha d'ensenyar com a llengua primària a totes les escoles de Catalunya.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

40. Como lengua oficial, el catalán debe ser enseñado como lengua primaria en todas las escuelas de toda Cataluña.

De acuerdo --- en desacuerdo

41. Catalan TV channels should NOT broadcast daily programs related to Catalan culture and history

Agree - - - - Disagree

41. Canals de televisió catalns NO han d'emetre programes diaris relacionats amb la cultura i la història catalana

D'acord - - - - En desacord

41. Canales de televisión catalana NO deben emitir programas diarios relacionados con la cultura y la historia catalana

De acuerdo - - - - - En desacuerdo

42. If Spain dismisses Catalonian aspirations for freedom, citizens of Catalonia must obtain the status of "first citizens" of Catalonia to be *privileged users* of social services.

Agree - - - - Disagree

42. Si Espanya descarta aspiracions catalanes per la llibertat, els ciutadans de Catalunya han d'obtenir la condició de "primers ciutadans" de Catalunya per a ser usuaris privilegiats dels serveis socials.

D'acord - - - - En desacord

42. Si España descarta aspiraciones catalanas por la libertad, los ciudadanos de Cataluña deben obtener la condición de "primeros ciudadanos" de Cataluña para ser usuarios privilegiados de los servicios sociales.

De acuerdo - - - - - En desacuerdo

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Please mark the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Marqueu la mesura en què estigueu o no d'acord amb les declaracions següents.

Por favor, marque en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones.

43. Should the Spanish government forbid Catalonia to self-determine, Catalonia must unilaterally secede from the Spanish state

Agree - - - - Disagree

43. Si el govern espanyol prohibeix l'autodeterminació de Catalunya, Catalunya s'ha de separar unilateralment de l'Estat espanyol

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

43. Si el gobierno español prohíbe a Cataluña autodeterminarse, Cataluña debe separarse unilateralmente del Estado español

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

44. Fiscal independence of Catalonia is NOT important for the population of Catalonia

Agree - - - - Disagree

44. La independència fiscal de Catalunya NO és important per a la població de Catalunya

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

44. La independencia fiscal de Cataluña NO es importante para la población de Cataluña

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

45. If Spain denies Catalans their political rights, Catalonians should retain their right to obtain political freedoms by using all means, including armed resistance.

Agree - - - - Disagree

45. Si Espanya nega els drets polítics als catalans, els catalans haurien de conservar el seu dret a obtenir llibertats polítiques utilitzant tots els mitjans, inclosa la resistència armada.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

45. Si España niega a los catalanes sus derechos políticos, los catalanes deben conservar su derecho a obtener libertades políticas utilizando todos los medios, incluida la resistencia armada.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

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Please mark the extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Marqueu la mesura en què estigueu o no d'acord amb les declaracions següents.

Por favor, marque en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones.

46. The central government of Spain has NOT been fair to Catalonians.

Agree - - - - Disagree

46. El govern central d'Espanya NO ha estat just per als catalans.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

46. El gobierno central de España NO ha sido justo con los catalanes.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

47. In case of an attempt by the Spanish law enforcement to subdue Catalans, Catalonians should have a right to form a defense force to protect its population and their fundamental freedoms.

Agree - - - - Disagree

47. En cas d'un intent de la llei espanyola de subjugar els catalans, els catalans haurien de tenir dret a formar una força de defensa per protegir la seva població i les seves llibertats fonamentals.

D'acord - - - - No estic d'acord

47. En caso de un intento por parte de la policía española de someter a los catalanes, los catalanes deberían tener derecho a formar una fuerza de defensa para proteger a su población y sus libertades fundamentales.

De acuerdo - - - - En desacuerdo

Thank you for participating in the survey! We highly value your views and opinions.

Gràcies per participar en l'enquesta! Valorem els seus punts de vista i opinions!

Gracias por participar en la encuesta! Valoramos sus puntos de vista y opiniones!

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