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The Narco-Curse in West Africa

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“Illegal narcotics remain a national threat of significant proportion... they undermine fragile democracies... with enormous negative consequences to our nation. Drug trading and its astronomical profits are fuel that drives the vehicle of nascent terrorism throughout the region. The distortions of and costs to the U.S. economy and that of the entire hemisphere are enormous.”

Admiral James Stravridis
Commander, U.S. SOUTHCOM

I. INTRODUCTION

The “Resource Curse” has traditionally been used to refer to the paradox which exists in countries endowed with an abundance of natural resources but who are unable to capitalize on those resources. Rather, they fall into a vicious circle of conflict, revenue volatility, excessive borrowing, poverty, and vast corruption, all symptoms of the dreaded “Dutch Disease.” So what if another resource, say an illicit one, were to perpetuate these same effects? Would it still be considered a “Resource Curse” if the resource in question is not a natural one? Countries like Guinea-Bissau have not typically been on most people’s radar screens – that is until the very recent assassinations of President João Bernardo Vieira and Army Chief General Batista Tagme Na Waie. Yet Guinea-Bissau represents a critical new manifestation of the Resource Curse and offers invaluable evidence of the theory’s applicability to not only natural resources, but illicit ones too.

Guinea-Bissau has been labeled by some as “Africa’s first Narco-State” and is under attack from cocaine traffickers seeking to transport their narcotics from South America to Europe.¹ Several factors, not the least of which is increased demand in Europe coupled with improved European maritime security, have made West Africa an ideal hub for moving narcotics into Europe. Over the last few years, cocaine trafficked through West Africa has risen drastically

and in a country like Guinea-Bissau, the effects of the massive influx of this resource are painstakingly clear. In a region already plagued by conflict, poverty, disease, corruption, and pitiful law enforcement, the additional strain of narco-trafficking has all but ruined the social fabric of life. Yet this begs the question: did narcotics trafficking cause the demise of the state or did an already deteriorating situation attract narco-traffickers? This paper will attempt to illustrate the former – that the massive influx of cash from narco-traffickers has impacted Guinea-Bissau in most every way predicted by the Resource Curse theory, including the nexus with conflict, as evidenced by the recent assassinations. Furthermore, the implications for local, regional, and global security posed by narco-trafficking represent a significant point of leverage where the US should focus more resources and begin to develop a strategy. First, it is imperative to understand the fundamental theory underpinning the Resource Curse in order to determine if Guinea-Bissau is suffering from the same symptoms.

II. THE RESOURCE CURSE THEORY

Richard Auty first coined the term “Resource Curse” in his 1993 book *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Theory*.² In it he explains why a seemingly desirable asset, such as natural resources, can actually pervert an economy to the extent that it becomes a curse. Terry Lynn Karl subsequently discussed a similar concept, the “Paradox of Plenty,” in his 1997 book *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States* in which he focused on the massive oil booms of the 1970s when dependence on oil exports led to disproportionate fiscal reliance on petrodollars and public spending, at the expense of responsible governance.³ He argued that oil booms created the illusion of prosperity and development while actually destabilizing regimes by reinforcing oil-based interests and further weakening state capacity. The following paragraphs will explain why countries “blessed” with

natural resources often cannot translate this wealth into economic gain and rather suffer from a slew of negative consequences.

Dutch Disease and Dependence on a Single Export

The term “Dutch Disease” is used to describe the economic implications when revenue generated by a boom in a particular sector (such as what occurs after the discovery of a natural resource like oil or natural gas) results in an appreciation of the local currency and consequently, a sharp decline in the competitiveness of other non-booming sectors such as manufacturing. This is exacerbated when the economy relies heavily on that single export, since resource dependence renders a country vulnerable to a sudden drop in the price of the commodity (revenue volatility), depletion of the resource, and poor economic growth due to abandonment of non-booming sectors. Furthermore, lucrative windfall rents from the resource’s extraction deter the development of a diversified economy which could compensate for the dependence on one export.

Rents and Accountability

A “Rentier State” is one which derives all or a substantial portion of its national revenue from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients. In other words, the Rentier State is typically endowed with great natural resources or another source of strategic advantage. It can collect revenue *not* for the provision of a service or manufactured product, but for the mere sale of a natural resource which already exists – like free money. And because the resource cannot be extracted without government permission, the state can make demands on extracting companies as high as the market will bear. There are no competitors and whatever the government does with the rents, the resource will continue to exist. In contrast with citizens who are heavily taxed and

therefore have expectations from their governments, citizens of a Rentier State are typically lightly taxed or not at all, with their government rather relying on the revenue generated from rents. As a result, these populations typically do not expect the same level of accountability from their governments, thus allowing them to make poor decisions in how they spend public money. Ultimately, the availability of easy rents erodes governance due to the absence of accountability or any incentives to combat corruption.

Corruption

Resource wealth offers countless opportunities for corrupt politicians to manipulate contracts with extractive companies (oil companies being the worst culprits by many accounts)⁴ or to formulate patronage networks to secure their positions of leadership and to reap the rewards of their state's resource wealth. Offshore tax havens enable leaders to hide the wealth derived from corrupt business practices and avoid legal prosecution. When it is easier to maintain authority through corruption rather than good governance and growth-oriented policies, there is simply no incentive for politicians to eradicate this practice. As a result, corruption persists to the detriment of those less fortunate who do not have access to the state's resource wealth.

Excessive Borrowing

Another common effect of the Resource Curse is the false sense of security which comes from borrowing with resource wealth as collateral. Given the easy availability of resources, borrowing may become excessive, especially when the exchange rate appreciates (an effect of Dutch Disease) making interest payments on the debt significantly cheaper. However, should the price of the commodity decline, or if the exchange rate falls, a government has less capital with

which to pay a now more expensive debt. If debt burdens become so great that penalties are charged, the country may find itself in dire straits as its debt spirals out of control.

III. WHY WEST AFRICA?

Having established the theoretical underpinnings of the Resource Curse theory, let us turn to narco-trafficking in West Africa, where it is first critical to understand its attraction for traffickers.

First and foremost, it is important to understand the changing nature of narco-trafficking. Whereas Colombian drug cartels once focused on moving their product (cocaine) into North America, which was a relatively close (necessitating modest transportation costs) and lucrative market, this trend has changed. The drop in demand for narcotics from the US coupled with increasing demand in Europe has forced traffickers to exploit the new market. In addition, the global economy has impacted trafficking patterns, since cocaine now fetches far more revenue in Europe, given the low value of the dollar. Evidence from law enforcement authorities who have confiscated large amounts of Euros from coke traffickers have illustrated this point exactly, reporting that two pounds of uncut cocaine can fetch \$45,000 in Europe versus \$22,000 in US.⁵ Furthermore, with improved maritime security practices both on this side of the Atlantic (thanks largely to initiatives pursued by Mexico's President Calderón) and along European coastal waters, traffickers have been deterred from moving products directly to their markets via sea-going vessels.⁶ Rather, they have redirected their attention to West Africa, whose proximity directly between the source and destination for the product makes it an obvious hub for illegal trafficking activities.




Figure 1: New Cocaine Trafficking Route Through West Africa

(Source: Based on original map from the University of Waterloo, http://www.alumni.uwaterloo.ca/alumni/office/map/world_map.jpg)

There are other features of West Africa which make it an ideal location for illegal activities of any sort. Weak institutions, particularly the ineffective law enforcement sector, allow criminals to operate with impunity, knowing that their illegal actions will likely not have any repercussions. This low-risk environment is also a low-cost one, where the cost of bribing local officials and authorities is relatively cheap due to extreme poverty, unemployment, and perpetual salary arrears, rendering most everyone vulnerable to corruption.

To demonstrate how these characteristics of many West African countries have attracted narco-traffickers, we will turn to Guinea-Bissau which embodies every one of the attributes described above.

IV. THE PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT IN GUINEA-BISSAU

Guinea-Bissau has what can be termed a “permissive environment” which allows criminals to operate uninhibited by any legal, financial, or other constraints. This is different from an “ungoverned space” which is often used to describe countries in Africa where government is ineffective or governance is essentially absent. Rather, a permissive environment may have the semblance of a government (or governance) but it is essentially conducive to illegal activity by failing to impose restrictions or deterrents to such activity. Guinea-Bissau, for example, has a legitimate government and at least nominally adheres to certain democratic norms. In fact, parliamentary elections were held on November 16 which the US State Department touted as “an encouragement for democracies throughout Africa and around the world.” The press release continued to note that “US and international observers witnessed an election that was transparent, well-organized, and well-executed despite minor technical issues.”⁷ However, the recent assassinations reflecting the fragility of the state and the absence of other democratic institutions such as a judicial system essentially negate any assertion that Guinea-Bissau truly is a genuine democracy.

So what comprises this permissive environment? First and foremost, Guinea-Bissau’s geography is a trafficker’s dream, with 350 km of unpatrolled coastline and the Bijagós Archipelago which has 88 un-policed islands.⁸



Figure 2 Location of Guinea-Bissau

(Source: Based on original map from the CIA World Factbook entry for Guinea-Bissau <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pu.html>)

Many of these islands host defunct airstrips leftover from the country's war for independence from its former colonial power Portugal. These allow South American drug cartels to fly their product to one of these islands, undetected, before continuing the drugs' movement into Europe via couriers or other means. Any risk of detection by maritime officials or airport authorities is, for all intents and purposes, eliminated.

Another crucial component of Guinea-Bissau's permissive environment is the economic incentives which drive participation in illegal trafficking. In a country plagued by poverty,

unemployment, and salary arrears, the risk one assumes for trafficking narcotics pales in comparison with the opportunity for personal enrichment. Even at the institutional level the revenue to be derived from illicit trafficking can compensate for the utter destitution of some government entities. For example, the value of one seizure can easily exceed the entire budget of the Guinea-Bissauan Judicial Police (the agency assigned to narcotics interdiction).⁹ And for an overly militarized society whose soldiers' salaries the government cannot pay, it is no wonder the military is deeply complicit in the trade.¹⁰

Perhaps the most important aspect of Guinea-Bissau's permissive environment is the weak institutions, many of which have never gained legitimacy in the eyes of the population or been held accountable for their actions. The police, for example, are numerous yet under-resourced. The gendarmerie and police combined gives a ratio of 284 officers per 100,000 citizens – one of the highest in West Africa and only slightly below the European average.¹¹ This many civil servants create a huge burden on the public budget, leaving next to nothing for investigations and operational activities associated with drug interdiction. The Judicial Police, for example, have 60 agents, one vehicle and often no fuel. As a result, when culprits are apprehended they are driven in a taxi to the police station. They just recently received six sets of handcuffs from the UK, which were badly needed.¹² In the military, one rusty ship patrols the 350 kilometer coastline and 88 islands. The sad picture these anecdotes paint is the unfortunate reality in Guinea-Bissau, where the near absence of a judicial system allows traffickers to operate unimpeded.

To add fuel to the fire, many state officials (the military in particular) are highly complicit in narco-trafficking. Military personnel are known to collude with Colombian drug traffickers and both have been arrested by the Judicial Police. Yes because the police are so

impotent, the culprits are often held for just a few hours before senior military personnel suddenly attain extraordinary judicial powers to demand their release.¹³ This accommodation of the traffickers is further demonstrated by the excessive intimidation used on anyone who threatens their operations. The head of Judicial Police, for example, was internationally praised for his work against drug trafficking, but then received death threats and was summarily dismissed in June 2007. His proposed successor declined the job, indicating the danger in store for anyone who attempts to thwart the trafficking trade, including journalists who report on the issue. Furthermore, the Portuguese press reported that President Vieira's return to power in 2005 was allegedly due to an alliance he forged with military commanders. Not only did this render him beholden to the military but also generally averse to making any accusations related to narco-trafficking. And even if the will existed to arrest drug traffickers and those guilty of aiding and abetting them, the absence of a functioning judicial system (which would include prisons, courts, and a penal code) result in little capacity to prosecute and incarcerate criminals.

V. EVIDENCE OF A NARCO-CURSE IN GUINEA-BISSAU

The argument that narcotics can act in a similar way as natural resources and have an analogous impact on the local economy can be illustrated in several ways. Recalling the Resource Curse theory, some of the most common effects are economic, political, social, and security-related.

Economic Impacts

A recent massive and unexplainable influx of currency into Guinea-Bissau follows squarely with symptoms of the Dutch Disease. In this case, however, the cash infusion into the

country is presumably the result of activities associated with drug trafficking, vice revenue derived from the sale of a natural resource.¹⁴




Figure 3 FDI into Guinea-Bissau and Foreign Exchange Reserves

This cash infusion into Guinea-Bissau is largely due the sudden increase in 2005 of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Given the absence of alternative revenue-generating sectors or commodities in the country, one can assume that this FDI is derived from drug traffickers who have constructed buildings and roads under the guise of legitimate businesses to accommodate their activities. It could also be the result of laundered money entering the country. Either way, groundnuts are the only significant commodity to speak of in Guinea-Bissau, and it is doubtful that global demand has increased so much as to warrant such a dramatic increase in FDI.

Other data anomalies would seem to point to the presence of a high-value commodity in the country, such as mysterious increases in cash remittances from Europe. The UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has endorsed this notion, noting that

“If part of the European wholesale market for cocaine has indeed moved from Colombia to West Africa, the movement of large amounts of hard currency to the

region, representing the proceeds of retail cocaine sales reinvested in future supplies, would be expected.”¹⁵

Other signs indicating the presence of a Resource Curse would include the “crowding out” of alternative (and licit) sectors of the economy. While there is no hard evidence to indicate this has occurred in Guinea-Bissau, one could assert that the easy income earned by locals from the facilitation of trafficking activities would logically reduce any inclination to participate in other far less lucrative sectors. Or one could argue, for example, that exploitation of Bijagos beaches by narco-traffickers deters the development of any potential tourism industry.

Guinea-Bissau does not appear to be guilty of excessive borrowing using resource wealth as collateral, which is at least one clear deviation from symptoms described by the Resource Curse theory. Moreover, given the secretive nature of illicit market transactions, it is difficult to *prove* that the aforementioned troubling economic trends are directly attributable to narcotics trafficking. However, given that these trends have developed concomitantly with the rise of known narcotics trafficking, it is not an unreasonable assertion to make.

Governance Impacts

The impacts of narco-trafficking on national governance in Guinea-Bissau are clear – the high rates of corruption and the complicity of government officials severely undermines respect for the rule of law. Many questionable judicial and executive decisions appear to be corrupt and chip away at the already tenuous confidence of the population in the national government. For example, the former Head of the Judicial Police was widely praised for his assertive stance against drug trafficking. By 2007, however, he had received numerous death threats and was eventually dismissed. Not surprisingly, his proposed successor turned down the job.¹⁶

Unfortunately, the fact that trafficking fuels corruption while increasingly endemic corruption attracts more traffickers makes this a vicious circle with little hope for good governance.

Social Impacts

The most obvious social impact of the narcotics trade in Guinea-Bissau is the degradation of civil liberties, evidenced by death threats to citizens and journalists who have attempted to expose the illegal business. Although it is too soon to identify additional social impacts of narco-trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, one can certainly spot some disturbing trends in neighboring countries which may well be indicative of what is to come in Guinea-Bissau. Specifically, local cocaine-use has been reported in Burkina Faso, Guinea-Conakry, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.¹⁷ Moreover, the Washington Post reported in May 2008 that “drug smugglers bribing local people with small amounts of cocaine are creating addicts in a nation that never had them.”¹⁸ That said, there is some hope for Africans to avoid any severe social and health risks. The UNODC has reported that:

“if the flow through the region is highly organised, it is unlikely that much cocaine will be “spilled” into local markets, as there are strong economic incentives to bring as much of the drug as possible to its highest value destination – West Europe. West African organised crime networks, being very profit-oriented, generally shun drug use, so there may be some protections against cocaine use spreading in the region. If, on the other hand, there is truly a local wholesale market in which a range of players are acting as middlemen and couriers, the risk of a local drug use problem developing is much greater.”¹⁹

While the poverty present in so many parts of Africa has traditionally precluded excessive drug use, some regions which have experienced various commodity booms resulting in easy availability of cash (such as the Niger Delta) may become the first wave of Africans who succumb to drug addiction.

Security Impact

Although Guinea-Bissau has suffered from several coups and a civil war since its independence from Portugal, there has not been any significant civil strife or major conflict in the country since the start of known narco-trafficking around 2006. One should note, however, that following the recent parliamentary elections in November there was an attempted military coup by restive opposition members who rejected the elections as fraudulent and unreflective of the will of the people. Though unsuccessful, the incidence of such a coup does reflect some discontent among the population which could well sow the seeds for future conflict.

The recent assassinations of President Vieira and General Na Waie are not thought to be associated with narcotics traffickers, rather the tragic result of a prolonged power struggle perpetrated by a group of disaffected junior soldiers. That said, given the complicity of both men in such a dangerous and destructive activity, one must question if their deaths were a coincidence or perhaps symptomatic of the broader problem in which narco-trafficking plays a central role.

For these reasons it may be too soon to determine if narco-trafficking is directly destabilizing Guinea-Bissau, though one can rightly point to the well-known resource-conflict nexus that accompanies the Resource Curse. For example, control of the market, how profits are allocated, how disputes are settled, and where the drugs are directed could all have profound impacts on local security.²⁰

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

As tragic as the circumstances are, political realists might question the purpose and utility of intervening when no obvious US interests are at stake. However, there is one very important national policy document which counters this notion and which compels the US to assist Guinea-Bissau in overcoming the narco-trafficking which has destroyed much of the country – the US National Security Strategy (NSS). In addition to endorsing the creation of democratic institutions, promoting economic growth through the development of the formal economy in developing countries, and the diffusion of regional conflicts, the NSS states that:

“Illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern era’s greater ease of transport and exchange. Such traffic corrodes social order; bolsters crime and corruption; undermines effective governance; facilitates the illicit transfer of WMD and advanced conventional weapons technology; and compromises traditional security and law enforcement...These challenges are not traditional national security concerns, such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can threaten national security”²¹

Furthermore, the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy states that in West Africa, weak governance and enforcement structures have permitted an explosion of drug trafficking, particularly in Guinea-Bissau, which could fuel wide regional instability.²² It notes that opiates (heroin) from central Asia are being trafficked to North America via Africa. Moreover, it states that due to tighter controls in Canada and Mexico, traffickers are even exploring Africa as a hub for smuggling precursor chemicals needed for methamphetamine production into the US.

In addition to the repercussions for governance and the barriers to economic development posed by the “Narco Curse,” there are more traditional implications for the national security of the US. It is well known that there exists a large Lebanese merchant community which plays a major role in the local economies of many West African nations, most notably in the diamond trade. Although the majority of Lebanese diamond buyers are licensed, some are believed to be involved in the illicit trafficking of the gems and have purportedly doubled as recruiters with ties to Al Qaeda.²³ At the same time, it is known that Hezbollah is at least partially financed by the diamond trade in West Africa and likely serves as a conduit between the Revolutionary United Front²⁴ and Al Qaeda.²⁵ Even though evidence linking West Africa’s Lebanese Diaspora to terrorist networks such as Hezbollah or Al Qaeda is generally thought to exist in the diamond trade, one could reasonably assume that narco-trafficking is an equally profitable opportunity from which to finance operations at home. This would be a relationship of concern to many international actors, but particularly the US as the lead force in the Global War on Terror.

V. CONCLUSION

The evidence presented here clearly indicates that the permissive environment in Guinea-Bissau has indeed attracted narco-traffickers and that once in place, their activities have contributed to the further demise of the state (and are likely to continue to do so). The evidence also indicates, though perhaps less clearly, that cocaine could serve as a proxy natural resource which creates dependence at the expense of licit industries. Ultimately, the cash derived from this illicit market fuels the kind of poverty, corruption, and poor governance more commonly associated with sudden oil wealth. Reexamining the situation several years from now will allow researchers to more definitely deduce a causal relationship, although the emerging trend is quite convincing.

An unfortunate reality is that the environments in many West African states render them attractive to narco-traffickers and similarly vulnerable to trafficking's destructive effects. They are also conducive to transnational crime, including terrorist operations. To the extent the U.S. is committed to fostering democratic transitions in developing countries, strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, and working to prevent attacks against the US homeland and allies, this issue is one which warrants greater attention and more resources. Ways in which the US can support and assist in local and international efforts include improving law enforcement operations capabilities, developing legal frameworks, establishing border controls, promoting transparency and accountability, and reform of the security, defense, and judicial sectors.

Prior to the assassination of President Vieira and General Na Waie, Guinea-Bissau appeared to be squarely under the control of certain corrupt government and military officials; despite an attempted coup by some disaffected military personnel, it did not appear to be on the brink of collapse. The UNODC has labeled this a "Shell State," i.e. sovereign in name but hollowed out from the inside by criminals collaborating with corrupt government officials. Some may argue this is a more appropriate characterization than a "Narco-State" despite Vieira's alliance with Latin American traffickers and complicit military commanders as mentioned earlier.. Defined as "an area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent," it is hard to deny that Guinea-Bissau is Africa's first "Narco-State". Demonstrating that it is suffering from a "Narco Curse" similar in nature to the Resource Curse may be more difficult, but it certainly appears to be heading in that direction.

Notes

¹ Ed Vulliamy, "How a Tiny West African Country Became the World's First Narco State," *The Guardian Observer*, March 9, 2008; and Kevin Sullivan, "Route of Evil: How a Tiny West African Nation Became a Key Smuggling Hub for Colombian Cocaine, and the Price It Is Paying," *Washington Post*, May 25, 2008.

² Richard Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 284.

³ Terry Lynn Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1997), 380.

⁴ Nicholas Shaxson, *Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 288.

⁵ Joseph Kirshke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa," *World Politics Review* <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2629> (9 September 2008).

⁶ Colleen Cook, *Mexico's Drug Cartels*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 20.

⁷ Guinea-Bissau Elections (Washington D.C.: U.S. State Department Press Statement, 19 November 2008).

⁸ *CIA World Factbook Entry for Guinea-Bissau*, (accessed February 2009); <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pu.html#Geo>.

⁹ Kirshke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa."

¹⁰ It should be noted that the size of Guinea-Bissau's armed forces have been drastically reduced and that this should continue under a UN SSR mandate

¹¹ US Department of State *Human Rights Report: Guinea-Bissau*, (Washington DC: February 25, 2009). <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119006.htm>

¹² Kirshke, "The Coke Coast: Cocaine and Failed States in Africa."

¹³ Leonard Vincent, *Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine and Coups Haunt Gagged Nation* (Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2007), 6. Available at: http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_guineebissau_en.pdf

¹⁴ *Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa*, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2008), 41.

¹⁵ "Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development," (Vienna: U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, December 2007), 24.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁸ Kevin Sullivan, "Route of Evil; How a Tiny West African Nation Became a Key Smuggling Hub for Colombian Cocaine, and the Price It Is Paying," *Washington Post*, 25 May 2008.

¹⁹ Sullivan, "Route of Evil: How a Tiny West African Nation Became a Key Smuggling Hub for Colombian Cocaine, and the Price It Is Paying."

²⁰ *Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa*, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008), 54.

²¹ *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C., 2006). Available at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>

²² *United States National Drug Control Strategy*, (Washington D.C., 2009), 46. Available at: <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs09/2009ndcs.pdf>

²³ Lansana Gberie, *War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection, The Diamonds and Human Security Project* (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, International Peace Information Service, 2002), 28.

²⁴ The RUF was a rebel army that fought a failed ten-year insurrection in Sierra Leone and which financed its operations from the diamond trade.

²⁵ Douglas Farah, "An 'Axis' Connected to Gaddafi; Leaders Trained in Libya Have Used War to Safeguard Wealth," *Washington Post*, November 2, 2001.

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