






ETHNO-NATIONALIST IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION, MOBILIZATION AND
CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA

by

Alexandra Schaerrer
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Science
Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Master of Arts
Conflict Resolution and Mediterranean Security

Committee:

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Date: 12/5/13

Fall Semester 2013
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
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DEDICATION

To my Parents and to Ross

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ABSTRACT

ETHNO-NATIONALIST IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION, MOBILIZATION AND CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA

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George Mason University and University of Malta, 2013

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This thesis examines how three comparable case studies, which each entail the ingredients for ethno-nationalist mobilization and conflict, diverged into different directions. Rwanda became the tragic case of the Great Lakes region, shocking the world with the brutality of its civil war and the genocide that followed, while Kenya has witnessed continued cycles of ethnic-cleansing and ethno-nationalist conflicts. Tanzania alone has managed to remain a relative bastion of stability in an unstable region. The purpose of this thesis has been geared towards theory building, as the key findings that pertain to ethno-nationalist identity construction, nation-state building and ethnic mobilization can logically be generalized to other comparable areas.

Each of the cases in this study, Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania, is the creation of artificial and arbitrary borders, the splitting of ethnic communities and indirect colonial administration. Through this process, each of the three cases inherited at independence a bifurcated state system, tribalized political identities, and ranked and/or differentiated

groups as 'backyards' or 'advanced'. Unlike Rwanda and Kenya, however, Tanzania is the only case where ethnic plurality did not transform into ethnic polarity, eschewing ethnic mobilization and the ethno-national conflict trap.

In this thesis I have introduced macro-historical pathways that merged the strengths of different theoretical frameworks in order to tackle the question of why do we not see evidence of ethno-nationalist conflict in comparable cases? In particular, this study has sought to answer the question, of why do we observe different outcomes in regards to the outbreak of civil war and ethnic conflict in Tanzania, despite a worse economic performance to Rwanda and Kenya, increased ethnic fragmentation, the same Colonial history and bifurcated state system and strive for post-colonial independence?

Through theoretical frameworks and empirical case studies, this thesis demonstrates that the most important prerequisite to ethno-nationalist mobilization is a). a process of ranking and differentiation, b). a move from objective so subjective ethnic consciousness, c). the ethnization of the state structure, and finally d). the institutionalization of set structure as the framework for nation-state formation and political competition. In the Great-Lakes region, this process of tribalization, ranking/differentiation and state bifurcation must be viewed in terms of the colonial legacy of indirect rule and the colonial identity construction. Similarly, for Political Outbidding to resonate amongst constituencies, ethnic grievances and ethnic distinctions must exist *and* be perceived to be true. If this is not the case, elite mobilization along ethnic lines is not possible. Ethno-nationalist conflict is embedded within the struggle for political power and the allocation of state resources and the costs of the state. While not

a foregone conclusion, these processes develop politically salient ethnic identities and the increased potential for ethno-nationalist violence. Finally, the decision by political leaders to institutionalize an ethnic bureaucracy and participate in political outbidding as part of the distributional conflict, can transform these potentially violent criteria into actual violence.

As a final thought, some of the new security threats regarding the region are examined, specifically in the changed political, economic and social atmosphere of Tanzania. While still positive, this thesis concludes that with increased refugee flows, a move to democratization, evidence of outbidding, and changed political leadership, it is by no means unthinkable for Tanzania to engage in increased political outbidding and the emergence of ethnically based political identities.

INTRODUCTION

After years of brutal Tutsi rule, Burundi's first Hutu president was popularly elected. Only four months after the new election inspired international hope that a peaceful transfer of power can be achieved along ethnic and racial lines, Tutsi militants assassinated the President. Within days hundreds of thousands of refugees fled the massacres of Burundi to neighboring Rwanda.¹ On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda was shot down and crashed into the backyard of his own palace. Hutu Power radio station RTLM immediately blamed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its 'Tutsi collaborators' for the assassination. Within hours the city was locked down and systematic massacres were executed based on pre-established lists. Similar incidents became the norm across the border in Zaire, and Uganda—plunging almost the entire Great-Lakes region of Africa into renewed cycles of conflict and violence, with immense human, social and economic costs.

All across the world, internal conflicts dramatically increased after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of colonization. Only a decade after the end of the Cold War, the Armed Conflict Dataset for 2001,² recorded that armed conflicts occurred in 28

¹ Roméo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (New York, NY; [Berkeley, Calif.]: Carroll & Graf ; Distributed by Publishers Group West, 2005), 114.

² Gleditsch et al., 2002

different countries, of which in 11 conflicts over a thousand people were killed--predominantly along ethnic lines. This statistic marked a growing trend away from international conflict, replaced instead by internal wars based on identity, secession and institutional access. Distinctly marked by their protracted nature, civilian component and marked brutality, massacres like Srebrenica, the hundred day genocide in Rwanda, and the civil wars in Sudan and the DRC firmly place ethno-nationalist conflicts as one of the key problems faced today.³

The situation has been especially dire in Africa. According to Williams, “by the start of the twenty-first century, more people were being killed in Africa’s wars than in the rest of the world combined.”⁴ While active civil wars have dropped all across sub-Saharan Africa from a peak of 51 conflicts in 1999 to ‘just’ thirty two in 2006,⁵ the situation remains decidedly less positive when non-state armed conflicts and one-sided violence is added to the equation. As the boundaries between civilians, state-sponsored militias, state forces, and rebel groups are often blurred in the African context, a strict focus on civil war data misses much of the protracted and violent dynamics plaguing the continent—“Africa suffered more non-state armed conflicts after the Cold War than any other region of the world. [Further], between 1997 and 2006, 42 percent of actors engaged in one-sided violence anywhere in the world were in Africa.”⁶ The cost has

³ Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.

⁴ Paul Williams, *War & Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011), 4.

⁵ Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 48, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 4, doi:10.2307/40651577.

⁶ Williams, *War & Conflict in Africa*, 4.

been enormous, both transformative and degenerative, affecting the social, economic and ecological developments for decades to come. Violent conflicts, argue Blattman and Miguel, “inflict more suffering on humanity than any other social phenomenon.”⁷ Adding insult to injury, a great majority of these conflicts are experienced in the world’s poorest countries,⁸ and enacted along an “implicit ethnic or racial base.”⁹ Indeed, conflict data shows a major increase from just 15 percent in 1953 to 60 percent by 2005 of all conflicts that are labeled as ‘ethnic,’¹⁰ making ethnic nationalism “*the* leading source of group cohesion and (by extension) intergroup civil conflict.”¹¹ But not all multiethnic or multiracial societies experience conflict. Indeed a large majority do not.¹² Further, some of the world’s poorest countries, with a very high degree of religious and ethnic diversity, are stable and conflict free even in an otherwise tumultuous region. Tanzania is such a case in point.¹³

The questions that need to be asked are why conflicts with ethno-nationalist factors have become so prevalent in Africa, and secondly, what causes some countries to fall victim to ethnic strife, while other multiethnic societies remain undisturbed?¹⁴ Various answers have been proposed, from degrees of ethnic heterogeneity, to poverty

⁷ Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War,” 47.

⁸ Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (New York: Harper, 2009).

⁹ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, 5.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹ Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War,” 16.

¹² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 75–90, doi:10.2307/3118222.

¹³ Alicia Erickson, “Peace in Tanzania: An Island of Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Jackson School Journal of International Studies* 3, no. 1 (Spring 2012), <http://depts.washington.edu/jsjweb/?p=966>.

¹⁴ Wimmer 1997, 623

and economic opportunities, and from grievance based models to primordial animosity; yet the answer of ‘why’ remains deeply contested and ‘where’ frustratingly elusive. While the literature seeking to resolve such puzzles is rich and diverse, it is unclear how a country such as Tanzania that shared the same colonial past and bifurcated state system, increased ethnic fragmentation, and a steady decline in economic performance, managed to resist ‘the call of the tribe’¹⁵ with the introduction of multiparty elections, when so many of its neighbors did not. Further, it remains unclear ‘how’ and ‘when’ groups form along ethnic lines, and why ethnic identity is mobilized in one country and not the other? This thesis hopes to examine in detail how comparable countries, which each entail the ingredients for conflict, diverge in opposite directions. Rwanda became the tragic case of the Great Lakes region, shocking the world with the brutality of its civil war and genocide, Kenya, which developed increasingly violent cycles of ethno-political conflict culminating in the post-election massacres of 2007/08 and Tanzania, which remains the peaceful exception to a largely conflict ridden region.

While I must agree with Wimmer and Kuper that we may never truly gain a comprehensive insight into “the logic of the infernal machine,”¹⁶ I wish to develop a comparative case model in this thesis that seeks to trace the causal mechanisms that led to the politicization of ethnic identities, and the intensification of such differences to ethno-nationalist conflicts in one country but not the other. The theory I wish to explore further, introduces a new and comprehensive paradigmatic frame on identity, holding that the

¹⁵ Michela Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower* (New York: Harper, 2009).

¹⁶ Andreas Wimmer, “Who Owns the State? Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Post-Colonial Societies,” *Nations and Nationalism* no. 3 (1997): 631–665.

politicization of ethnicity is a central aspect of modern state-building and based on the type of institutionalization of such ethnic identities, a key factor leading to ethnic conflict. In order to understand ethnicity and the politicization of ethnic identities, this thesis will move beyond strict psychological perceptions of grievance or inter-personal economic deprivation, and instead explore a fusion of colonial and post-colonial identity construction, institutionalized horizontal inequalities, as well as elite mobilization theory. By introducing macro-historical pathways that merge the strengths of different theoretical frameworks, this research will tackle the question of why we may observe a manifestation of violent ethnic conflict in some countries and not others. In particular, this study seeks to answer why we observe different outcomes in regards to the outbreak of civil war in Tanzania, despite a poorer economic performance to Rwanda and Kenya, similar ethnic makeup, the same colonial history and bifurcated state system and strive for post-colonial independence.

By examining an ‘outlier case’, like Tanzania, I wish to determine if a comparative study between these cases can expose any latent causal mechanisms that may answer not only why we see civil war in one country and not another, but further, how one country which has all the ingredients for mobilization can reverse its trajectory. As such, the three cases of Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania are examined as three points on a violent trajectory—Rwanda having experienced civil war and genocide, Kenya with cycles of ethnic cleansing¹⁷ and Tanzania, with minimal incidents of one-sided violence.

¹⁷ The type of violent conflict in Kenya is highly contested, with some academics referring to the violence as ‘sporadic ethnic clashes’ while others deem the violence to be evidence of Civil War and ethnic cleansing. See Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Njuguna S. Ndung’u, “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya Not

The purpose of this thesis is geared towards theory building, seeking to resolve an apparent regional puzzle, which may be applied and logically generalized to other cases such as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. Each of these states experienced the creation of artificial and arbitrary borders, the ‘differentiating’¹⁸ and ‘ranking’¹⁹ of groups who share a common history, language, and culture into different countries, and the institutionalization of such artificial and grievance laden ethnic identities during the strive for political power and state ownership in post-colonial Africa.²⁰ Unlike Tanzania, however, all these countries have experienced political violence and ethnic mobilization, and unlike Kenya, once the ethnic mobilization process took root, a reversal of this process has proved near impossible to halt.

Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?,” in *Understanding Civil War Volume 1, Volume 1*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington (D.C.): The World Bank, 2005). Also see Michael Chege, “Kenya: Back From the Brink?,” *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (2008): 125–139. And Michael W Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10460255>.

¹⁸ Donald L Horowitz, “Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict: A Few Steps toward Synthesis,” *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics*. (1998).

¹⁹ Donald L Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict: With a New Preface* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2000).

²⁰ Cassandra Rachel Veney, *Forced Migration in Eastern Africa Democratization, Structural Adjustment, and Refugees* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 61, <http://www.myilibrary.com?id=136145>.

I. LITERATURE REVIEW

The dissolution of the Soviet Union effectively brought to an end a long period in which state-centric international conflict dominated both the international system and conflict theory. No longer primarily about struggles of competing centers of power-- the kind that characterized international conflict for most of the 350 years since the peace of Westphalia—conflicts coalesced around the fragmentation and breakdown of state structures, economies and whole societies. This shift towards internal violence also witnessed the return of the mercenary and militia groups, which preyed on civilian populations creating complex humanitarian, political, economic and social emergencies. With this growing trend towards internal identity-based conflicts over secession and institutional access, theorists like Azar,²¹ Galtung,²² Gurr²³ and Burton²⁴ called for a paradigm shift away from statist approaches to conflict studies, and instead towards a

²¹ Edward E Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Brookfield, Vt., USA: Dartmouth ; Gower Pub. Co., 1990).

²² J Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–191.

²³ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Pub., 2011).

²⁴ John Burton, "THE THEORY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION," *Current Research on Peace and Violence* 9, no. 3 (January 1, 1986): 125–130, doi:10.2307/40725036.

more comprehensive framework, placing the individual as the unit of analysis and incorporating factors of inequality, relative deprivation and the threat to basic human needs into the root examination of societal conflict. Recent shifts towards quantitative studies, however, have challenged such grievance based explanations, focusing instead on the feasibility and opportunity for rebellion. Academics like Collier and Hoeffler,²⁵ as well as Fearon and Laitin²⁶ place Inequality as more of a motive to maximize personal gain rather than social justice.

In this section I will explore some of the main literature seeking to explain the onset of civil war, identity group formation and group mobilization. The first theory explored will examine primordialist and socio-biological explanations for ethno-nationalist conflict as well as some key limitations in the literature when applied to the puzzle of this thesis. Secondly I will examine the two main paradigms of Greed based vs. Grievance based explanations for the onset of political violence and Civil War, as well as their value added and limitations as models for analysis.

Finally, I will examine the current literature on Horizontal Inequality and identity formation in the context of post-colonial nation building. I will argue that much of the current debate in the literature is based on conflicting and contested concepts of ethnicity and civil war, their meaning and how they are defined and measured. Finally, the theory I wish to explore further focuses on a comprehensive paradigm on identity, holding that the politicization of ethnicity is a central aspect of modern state-building and based on the

²⁵ Paul Collier et al., *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* (Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group, 2000).

²⁶ Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."

type of institutionalization of such ethnic identities, a key factor leading to ethnic conflict. In order to understand ethnicity and the politicization of the ethnic identities I need to move beyond strict psychological perceptions of grievance or economic deprivation and instead examine a fusion of colonial and post-colonial identity construction, horizontal inequalities, as well as theories on group mobilization.

1.1 PRIMORDIAL AND SOCIO-BIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF CONFLICT:

As the world was still coming to grips with the genocide in Bosnia, news of new atrocities flashed across the television screen. According to Neuffer, much of the media automatically attributed the violence in Rwanda “to the unleashing of ancient hatreds.”²⁷ The primordialist literature, most notably by Kaplan²⁸ and Young,²⁹ claims that it is indeed ancient hatreds that are the key to driving ethnic violence. According to Blattman and Miguel, primordial theorists “stress the deep cultural, biological or psychological nature of ethnic cleavages, whereby conflict is rooted in intense emotional reactions and feelings of mutual threat.”³⁰ According to this literature, ethnic cleavages are deeply entrenched in the subconscious of individuals, inherited at birth and embedded in their identity.³¹

Under these assumptions, ethnic status is to a great degree static and unavoidable, as it is imparted at birth and remains charged for life. As uneven distribution leads to rivalries and anxiety between competing groups, deep ethnic traumas take shape and are

²⁷ Elizabeth Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor's House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda* (New York: Picador, 2001), 4.

²⁸ Robert D Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

²⁹ Crawford Young, “Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity,” *Daedalus* 111, no. 2 (April 1, 1982): 71–98, doi:10.2307/20024786.

³⁰ Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War,” 16.

³¹ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, 8.

renewed with every generation. Taking such a socio-psychological approach, Volkan explores why groups feel “*compelled* to take revenge for the wrongs inflicted on their ancestors or others belonging to their bloodline.”³² According to Volkan, at the root of many conflicts “are bloodlines that establish a kind of border in times of crisis that cannot be crossed,”³³ whereby a politicized ethnic identity can be transmitted at birth and transcends generations while remaining politically charged.

While proponents of a more horizontal interpretation on transmittance conclude that uneven distribution leads to rivalries and renewed conflict cycles with every generation in the struggle for dominance and prestige,³⁴ Volkan focuses instead on identity based anxiety and specific collective traumas for mobilization. According to this paradigm, only groups engaged in continuing conflict with other groups become acutely aware of their large-group identity, “to the point where it may far outweigh any concern for individual needs, even survival.”³⁵ Working off of Freud’s contributions on group differentiation, collective behavior and individual identity,³⁶ Volkan explores the implications of damages to the communal tissue due to shared communal traumas and unresolved mourning. According to this paradigm, trans-generational ethnic violence should be analyzed as a *time collapse*, “in which the interpretations, fantasies, and feelings about a past shared trauma co-mingle with those pertaining to a current

³² Vamik D Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), 17.

³³ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁴ Horowitz 1985

³⁵ Volkan, *Bloodlines*, 25.

³⁶ See, Freud, Sigmund. 1922. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*

situation.”³⁷ Due to an interruption in the mourning process, the traumatized group’s feeling of humiliation, loss of dignity, and anxiety remain unresolved and lead to the adoption of a *chosen trauma*, describing the collective memory of a tragic trauma that befell a group. This shared mental representation of the event includes both realistic and fantasized information by the ancestors, who are “*doomed* to pass down the memory of the tragedy and their feelings about it to their descendents.”³⁸ Ethnic grievances are hence inherited and it is this internalized and transmitted anxiety that explains how memories of loss and revenge can survive generations and reemerge decades or centuries after the original event.

The theory clearly implies a certain inescapability of such an ancestry, as “the transmission of traumatized self-images occur almost as if psychological DNA were planted in the personality of the younger generation through its relationships with the previous one.”³⁹ Feelings of humiliation and anger pertaining to the trauma of his/her forefathers are hence passed along to the next generation, creating a context for the reactivation of old traumas, and the blurred perception of new enemies “as extensions of an old enemy from a historical event.”⁴⁰ Since each generation is raised under a tent of victimhood, it falls to the children to reverse the loss of dignity and avenge the group. Under such conditions, and when anxiety about identity occurs for various related or unrelated reasons, “members of a large group may consider killing a threatening

³⁷ Volkan, *Bloodlines*, 35.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁴⁰ Vamik D Volkan, *Killing in the Name of Identity: A Study of Bloody Conflicts* (Charlottesville, Va.: Pitchstone Pub., 2006), 46.

neighbor rather than endure the anxiety caused by losing their psychological borders and having holes in the canvas of their ethnic tent.”⁴¹ Consequently, what may appear as irrational collective insanity or the sudden and incomprehensible emergence of ethnic hatreds among groups who have coexisted for decades, is in actuality a reactivation of a real trauma—transferring past anxieties unto a new perceived threat.

1.1.2 Model Limitations:

In his most recent work, *Killing in the name of Identity: A Study of Bloody Conflicts*, Volkan states that he has become “pessimistic about finding or establishing a peaceful world, not only because human beings are endowed with aggression, but also because large-group psychology, in its own right, includes the necessity to find enemies and allies.”⁴² While I certainly agree with large parts of Volkan’s socio-psychological approach, an over-reliance on basic human psychology runs the risk of overemphasizing the inescapability of ethnic identities and ignoring their potential for social con/destruction. In terms of examining Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya, this theory certainly adds value on group psychology, but remains incomplete, as it cannot answer how certain regions that have the same traumatized ethnic groups can remain peaceful, while other regions such as Rwanda and Burundi fall victim to growing ethno-nationalist violence. In fact, despite the widespread assumption that Hutus and Tutsis have a genetic “homicidal animosity for one another, the exiled Rwandans got along peacefully in

⁴¹ Ibid., 115.

⁴² Ibid., 17.

Uganda, in Kenya, in Tanzania, and –until Hutu Power politics spilled over in the early 1990’s--in Zaire. Only in Burundi did Refugees find the politics of Hutu and Tutsi inescapable.”⁴³ Further, the large-group identity and grievance based model fails to adequately explain the transformation from reactivated identities engaged in protracted cycles of conflict along ethnic lines and their subsequent deactivation. History abounds with examples of identity groups that changed over time, assimilate, disaggregate, flare up, calm down and overtime, discontinue to place social significance on identities that previously inspired their ancestors to kill or die for that same identity.⁴⁴

1.2 Relative Deprivation Theory and Human Needs:

According to John Burton, the high prevalence of “ethnic and alienation conflicts” that dominate the current international environment are based on the threat to and/or deprivation of basic human needs essential to survival.⁴⁵ According to Burton, conflict is intrinsic to human relationships and reflects the constant renegotiation of associations within a system. Burton differentiates conflicts from disputes, as disputes involve issues

⁴³ Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998), 210.

⁴⁴ An interesting example is the case of Switzerland, and the often violent and protracted conflicts that emerged between cantons, such as Catholic Fribourg and Protestant Zurich.

⁴⁵ Dennis J. D Sandole, Van der Merwe, and John Burton, eds., “Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy,” in *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (Manchester, UK; New York; New York: Manchester University Press ; St. Martin’s Press [distributor], 1993), 55.

that are negotiable, whereas conflicts are not, since they concern “issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised.”⁴⁶

Burton, building off of Johan Galtung’s work on structural violence,⁴⁷ views perceived evidence by groups of gaps between the actual and potential development of individual opportunity as indications of the failure of certain basic human needs to be addressed by the societal system, leading to the dysfunction of that system. Since essential human needs are non-negotiable, a “person or group, when deprived of some essential human need, cannot be socialized.”⁴⁸ This view challenges the assumption, based on the classical view that society represents the greatest interests of the majority of the citizens, that individual needs should be subordinated to societal needs. Instead, Burton asserts that the notion that the interests of most citizens are best catered to by the preservation of the social institutions and structures of society, even if in the short run this curbs some individual freedoms and development in exchange for the social system’s benefits, is deeply problematic. If, as is often the case for at least some minority groups in society, social values/institutions are less focused on recognizing individual basic needs than on protecting the role of elites or majority groups, than these suppressed needs—revolving around identity, recognition and autonomy-- may in actuality endanger the very development and stability of society in the long run, as no amount of coercion can

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.”

⁴⁸ Sandole and John Burton, “Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy,” 55.

permanently suppress fundamental basic human needs.⁴⁹ Violence, according to Burton, is hence symptomatic of “social deprivation.”⁵⁰

Following similar lines of argument, Tedd Gurr postulates that the potential for collective violence depends on the intensity and scope of a perceived relative deprivation by individuals and groups. Relative Deprivation is defined as the “perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities.”⁵¹ When individuals are relatively deprived, frustrations materialize due to a discrepancy between what individuals realistically feel ought to be their condition in life, and what is. It is this discrepancy between value expectation and value capability that Gurr utilizes in order to gauge the intensity of deprivation (frustrations) and the potential for collective action (aggression).⁵² The application of Basic Human Needs and Relative Deprivation Theory provides a significant tool in explaining patterns of collective violence, setting deprivation as the mobilizing factor and collective action as a response to induced frustration.

According to Gurr, the greater the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude of collective violence. Key to this argument is the understanding that feelings of deprivation are subjective, and can be based on perceptions of and comparisons with “value gains” by other groups, a perceived or actual deterioration in

⁴⁹ Ibid., 58.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 59.

⁵¹ Ted Robert Gurr, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and Center of International Studies, *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton, N.J.: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University [by] Princeton University Press, 1970), 13.

⁵² Ibid., 24.

current conditions (and hence the expectation of continued or improved future conditions), or perceptions of artificial boundaries that place limits on the structural opportunities of groups or individuals.⁵³ All these perceptions of relative deprivation cause frustrations, and if repressed or ignored, have the potential to mobilize political contestation. The most frustration inducing deprivation, according to Gurr, involves perceptions of decremental deprivation, or the reversal of individual/group fortunes. In such cases, the value expectations remain constant, while value capabilities are perceived to go down--“Men are likely to be more intensely angered when they lose what they have than when they lose hope of attaining what they do not yet have.”⁵⁴ This argument is important when analyzing conflicts involving state or elite sponsored violence, as a perceived threat to the continuation of power positions creates a strong incentive to utilize force in order to maintain set position.⁵⁵

In regards to the research topic of this thesis, the concept that thwarted aggression due to a fear of retribution (by the Colonial regime or autocratic nation-state for example) only increases underlying frustrations and the amplification of anger and aggression, adds great value in understanding the magnitude and protracted nature of many internal conflicts. Further, Burton and Gurr’s argument that aggression is only transformed into overt violence if it cannot be circumvented or addressed by other means, highlights the role that weak or dysfunctional institutions—such as a biased police or judiciary—play in exacerbating frustrations and potential violence. This is particularly pertinent to Africa,

⁵³ Ibid., 13–14.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 50.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 55.

and the growing disparity between rich and poor within the state, as well as group comparisons to other, more successful nations. Vargis Broche-Due, describes the growing frustration of Africa's "middle-class-in-the-(un)making," who view the reversal of development in Africa "not simply as a lack, but as a loss."⁵⁶

1.2.1 Model Limitations:

While Human Needs and Relative Deprivation theory do a very thorough job in explaining how the magnitude of mobilizations spring from the extent and intensity of frustrations, less clear is how groups feeling deprivation mobilized and acted upon their frustration at a particular time and further, when structures become more or less conducive to such violent action. It also remains unclear as to exactly which needs constitute essential human needs, which is especially significant when considering conflict in Africa's Great Lake Regions, as the protection of one group's basic human needs (the rights of Pastoralist groups to graze their cattle for instance) is inherently conflictual with another group's human need for subsistence (home-stead farmers for example). Further, since feelings of deprivation are subjective, any number of groups are aggrieved at any given time, yet do not engage in violent conflict. It is this claim of the universal applicability of subjective grievances to any group and at any time, that has led recent quantitative scholars to reject Relative Deprivation Theory as providing explanatory utility when examining causes of civil war.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Vargis Broch-Due, "Violence and Belonging: Analytical Reflections" (New York: Routledge, 2005), 4.

⁵⁷ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 61, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 1–27, doi:10.2307/25167719.

Finally, and as the discussion on Horizontal inequality will delve into further on, it is not necessarily those relatively deprived who initiate conflict.⁵⁸ Fear of status reversal is not limited to minority groups, as pre-genocidal Rwanda will demonstrate-- dominant-majority groups also fear (actual or imagined) a loss of power, privilege and position. Further, the ability for comparatively sized ethnic groups to engage in coalitions of convenience based on ethnic arithmetic,⁵⁹ leads to “dramatic shifts in power constellations,” meaning that “the political status of an ethnic group may change from discriminated minority to ruling elite from one period to the next.”⁶⁰

In the next section of this literature review I will explore a model that is particularly critical to grievance based explanations of civil war onset, advocating instead a ‘greed’ based perspective, in which ethnicity is utilized as a strategy to mobilize support and resources. This and similar instrumentalist approaches to identity and ethnic conflict reintroduce traditional concepts of *realpolitik* into the equation, by claiming that ethnic mobilization has more to do with a rational evaluation of socio-economic competition towards maximizing power positions, than feelings of grievance, trauma or ethnic identity.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*.

⁵⁹ Sebastian Elischer, “Ethnic coalitions of convenience and commitment: political parties and party systems in Kenya” (GIGA Working Papers, 2008), <http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1628/>.

⁶⁰ LARS-ERIK CEDERMAN, ANDREAS WIMMER, and BRIAN MIN, “WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL? New Data and Analysis,” *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 91, doi:10.2307/40646192.

⁶¹ See also Benn Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner, “Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa,” *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 494–510, doi:10.2307/25652219.

1.3 Greed, Opportunity and Instrumental Ethnicity:

Increasingly, literature examining the outbreak of ethno-nationalist civil war has coalesced around the suggestion that the initiation of rebellion and civil war is actually a function of economic opportunity. According to Cederman, Wimmer and Min, such quantitative studies have become “the most widely cited articles in the recent civil war literature,”⁶² and conclude that neither ethnic diversity, nor grievances concerning political, economic, social and cultural marginalization holds any explanatory value when examining the onset of civil war and rebellion. Instead, ethnicity is developed and utilized instrumentally as a mobilizing tool for recruitment or action, in order to achieve economic objectives.

Recent quantitative studies examining the outbreak of ethno-nationalist civil wars have placed an increased emphasis on financial motives as critical to understanding the mobilization and onset of conflict. Such studies have created a theoretical distinction between financial opportunities (greed motivation) and ethnic/inequality motives (grievance motivation). The most ardent advocates of this dichotomy, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, have attempted to isolate which set of motives, greed or grievance have causal power in terms of civil war initiation.⁶³ More recently in 2004, Collier and Hoeffler developed an econometric model to predict the outbreak of civil war, whereby rival explanations, greed or grievance based, were examined to determine what factors influence the initiation of rebellion. For Collier and Hoeffler, opportunity can be defined

⁶² CEDERMAN, WIMMER, and MIN, “WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL?,” 114.

⁶³ See Also Collier & Hoeffler, 2002a,b; Collier, 2000

by quantitative indicators such as opportunity to finance rebellion, extortion of natural resources, funding from diasporas and unsympathetic governments. Additional factors in the greed model include mountainous terrain and access to finance. Based on this model, the greed or economic opportunity model deems economic and political opportunity for rebel mobilization as the key driving force to rebel mobilization and the initiation of violence.

In opposition to this hypothesis, stands the grievance model. Four objective measures for grievance were considered by Collier and Hoeffler: “ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality.”⁶⁴ By using a logit regression based on a comprehensive data set of civil wars for the period 1960-1999, Collier and Hoeffler conclude that the factors based on opportunity perform much better as compared to the objective proxies for grievance. Most notable, inequality is among the indicators for grievance that is largely dismissed in the study, finding no significant causal link to the outbreak of civil war. Availability of finance, male secondary education enrollment, *per capita* income, and growth rate all showed statistical significance, whereas in addition to inequality, political rights, religious fractionalization and ethnic polarization do not. The findings of this influential work hence support an economic interpretation of rebellion, and especially opportunity as an explanation of ethno-nationalist conflict risk.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 570, doi:10.2307/3488799.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 589.

Reaching similar results, James Fearon and David Laitin construct another quantitative analysis to test ethnic and economic variables on insurgency and civil war. In this study relative deprivation is again examined to determine if frustrations act as major instigators for political protest and violence. Insurgency is defined as a form of warfare, which “can be harnessed to diverse political agendas, motivations, and grievances.”⁶⁶ Using similar data, Fearon and Laitin find very little evidence that civil war is predicted by ethnic fragmentation, cultural divisions, or any of the other objective indicators for grievances. Instead, they find that the civil wars from the 1940’s to the 1990’s have structural roots, such as state weakness manifested in large populations, political instability, poverty and rough terrain.⁶⁷ These conditions favor insurgency and create the motive for active rebel recruitment. Once again, inequality is among the grievance indicators that are rejected, along with the thesis that religious and ethnic fractionalization, division and grievances are a catalyst for insurgency and civil war. An interesting addition to the Grievance vs. Greed findings, is that Fearon and Laitin find that intense grievances are a direct product of civil war--so directly produced by the civil war, and often a central strategy and objective of the rebel groups.⁶⁸ In this case grievances follow civil war, not precede it.

Ethnicity as instrumental has not merely been confined to quantitative literature. In his highly influential work on ethnic identity construction in post-colonial societies,

⁶⁶ Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75.

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 570, doi:10.2307/3488799.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 88

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 89

Posner argues that since every multi-ethnic society contains multiple identity groups comprised of multiple dimensions of identity and potentially salient cleavages,⁶⁹ people “select the identity that puts them in a minimum winning coalition.”⁷⁰ Consequently, far from being primordial, inescapable or inherited, Posner argues that “the cleavage that emerges as salient is the aggregation of all actors’ individual decisions about the identity that will serve them best.”⁷¹ In order to reach any useful explanation on when particular ethnic cleavages form and why, Posner requires the examination of two discrete processes--the constriction of identity⁷² and the choice of identity.⁷³ Both individuals and elites are hence constrained by the option set available in choosing an identity, as well as the rules governing the formal institutions that set the parameters of potential gains/losses in political competition.

Institutions are highlighted as key to understanding the potential for ethnic conflict. Since individuals possess multiple ethnic identities, each of which could serve as the basis for ethnic mobilization, the coalitions that form are those that are institutionally possible and maximize the potential for gains. According to Posner, “people want resources from the state. They believe that having someone from their ethnic group in a

⁶⁹ Daniel N Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁷² By Identity Constriction Posner refers to the process by “which the repertoire of political identities in society that might be mobilized is constructed.”*Ibid.* See also Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, “Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa.”

⁷³ By Identity Choice, Posner refers to “the process through which political actors decide to emphasize one identity from this set of potentially mobilizable social categories rather than another.” Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 2.

position of political power will facilitate their access to those resources. And...the best way to get someone from their ethnic group into a position of political power is to build or join a political coalition with fellow group members.”⁷⁴ While Posner readily admits to taking “a purely instrumental view of ethnicity,”⁷⁵ he stresses that while strategic calculations influence which ethnic identity to highlight, this does not imply that the list of available identity choices are artificial. The formation of identity is hence not being discussed, but rather the rational decision to pick a particular identity that is already in existence, over another identity also already in existence. In order for a chosen identity to have utility, it must be understood and readily identifiable “as a unit of social division and political self-identification,”⁷⁶ by the individual, the group and the rest of society.

In terms of this thesis, Posner’s work adds great explanatory power and directly criticizes the misleading presentation of ethnic categorizations in post-colonial Africa and the argument that high levels of diversity automatically means that each listed group is salient, and hence mobilization is less likely. His case study on the tribalization of Zambia during colonialism highlights how the post-colonial inheritance of approximately seventy different tribal groups does not translate into seventy equally salient ethno-political movements. Instead, groups have formed around linguistic cleavages, resulting in four broad coalitions. This ability of groups to amalgamate into broader ethnic coalitions (as distinct to coalitions of convenience) is especially important when

⁷⁴ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 18.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 6.

examining Kenya (and Tanzania), as over fifty⁷⁷ tribal units morphed into super-ethnic groupings such as GEMA (Kikuyu, Embu, Meru), and KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) maximizing their power potential and influence.⁷⁸ By this analysis, ethnic groups have real markers of identification which allow amalgamation, and when transformed by the colonial experience, made the post-colonial ethnic grouping partially based on primordial factors and partially artificial via tribalization. To understand which groups identify in what manner and for which reasons, requires a detailed case study of the historical context and political goals and institutions currently impacting rational choice decisions.

1.3.1 Model Limitations:

While the quantitative studies have been very influential, they have not been without serious critics. Many of these critics, such as Kalyvas⁷⁹ and Sambanis,⁸⁰ argue that the parsimonious model distinguishing greed from grievance indicators may not be as simple as suggested by the studies briefly explored above. Kalyvas makes the excellent

⁷⁷ The exact number of tribes in Kenya and Tanzania is disputed and as a colonial legacy, quite arbitrary. I am using the most commonly cited numbers here, as will be explained in the case studies.

⁷⁸ Posner implicitly addresses this mistaken concept of tribes as salient ethnicities: “The voluminous literature that attempts to explain political, social, and economic outcomes in terms of a political system’s degree of ethnic fractionalization also implicitly embraces a conceptualization of ethnic groups as nothing more than units of a particular size.” Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 14.

⁷⁹ Stathis N. Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?,” *World Politics* 54, no. 1 (October 1, 2001): 99–118, doi:10.2307/25054175.

⁸⁰ Nicholas Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War,” in *Understanding Civil War Volume 1, Volume 1*, ed. Nicholas Sambanis and Paul Collier (Washington (D.C.): The World Bank, 2005).

point concerning the direction of causation relating opportunity to civil war. Despite such quantitative models, it is not clear whether people “wage war in order to loot or do they loot to be able to wage war.”⁸¹ This is especially pertinent since it distinctly addresses the fundamental question of what motivates ‘greed’—Group-identity protection or economic incentives/opportunities? The issue of endogeneity has also been raised by Miguel and Blattman, as poverty may cause civil wars, but civil wars clearly create poverty.⁸² Further, his point regarding who exactly is doing the looting and fighting leads to another important question, namely how do greed factors motivate such a large civilian population to take part in the conflict?

More recently, Lars-Erik Cederman et al, have criticized the macro-level indicia employed in these quantitative studies as highly problematic. Ethnic dominance, for example, is measured by the index of Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) by Collier and Hoeffler, which measures the likelihood of a random drawing of two people speaking a different language. As Sambanis points out, and as the case study of Rwanda will demonstrate, a purely linguistic basis is not a good measure of ethnicity or ethnic dominance. Further, cases such as Mali, Sudan, Kenya and the DRC highlight the “deficiencies” in the measure as “even when the ELF index suggests a high degree of fractionalization, the country may be deeply polarized.”⁸³ Further, even expanded measures as the ones used by Fearon and Laitin are problematic, as “they implicitly assume that the ethnic groups listed in the work of anthropologists and linguists are

⁸¹ Kalyvas, “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars,” 104.

⁸² Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War.”

⁸³ Nicholas Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War,” 313.

relevant.”⁸⁴ Similarly, the use of Gini coefficients and GDP per capita to measure levels of inequality are limited to interpersonal inequality, and miss the distributional asymmetries that affect specific groups.⁸⁵ Both Rwanda and Kenya were registering high GDP per capita growth before the outbreak of violence, yet suffered from distinct in/out-group resource allocations which impeded the trickle-down effects of economic growth and the societal benefits (such as job creation for example) as access to such benefits was limited or entirely blocked due to in/out group ethnic considerations.⁸⁶ The failure of the Greed Model to register considerations of grievance and inequality as significant explanatory variables in conflict behavior may accordingly “be due to inappropriate conceptualization and imperfect measurements, rather than reflecting a fundamental absence of any causal effect.”⁸⁷

There is also a significant amount of literature that challenges the degree to which ethnicity may be instrumental.⁸⁸ There is growing evidence that ethnic groups are willing to “incur nontrivial costs”⁸⁹ in order to favor the in-group and punish out-groups. The

⁸⁴ CEDERMAN, WIMMER, and MIN, “WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL?,” 89.

⁸⁵ Christopher Cramer, *Violence in Developing Countries: War, Memory, Progress* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

⁸⁶ Gudrun Østby, “Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 2 (March 1, 2008): 143–162, doi:10.2307/27640647.

⁸⁷ LARS-ERIK CEDERMAN, NILS B. WEIDMANN, and KRISTIAN SKREDE GLEDITSCH, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison,” *The American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (August 1, 2011): 478, doi:10.2307/41480853.

⁸⁸ While in-group loyalty may be employed strategically and purposefully, certain studies have demonstrated that groups are willing to make their own condition worse off in order to punish and exclude other groups. In this regard the instrumentalist approach in terms of rational gains is not as clear. See for example Edward L Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, and National Bureau of Economic Research, *The Curley Effect* (Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002).

⁸⁹ Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War,” 18.

case studies on Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania all lend evidentiary support to Horowitz's research, which highlights the high degree of "willingness to incur costs to maximize ingroup differentials."⁹⁰ The power of group loyalty to supersede considerations of personal sacrifice all "casts doubt on materialist theories of conflict."⁹¹ Stewart also draws reference to the abundant evidence suggesting the deeply emotive link between individuals and ethnic identity, as the "power of belief," and group loyalty "is so strong that they are prepared to sacrifice their own interests--in the extreme case their own lives--for the wider objectives of the group."⁹² The degree to which individuals can choose which identity to adopt as the most salient is also debatable. Ethnic identity is not merely a self-referent, but also dependent on out-group perceptions. As such, the degree to which identity choices are flexible is significantly diminished, especially in a violent context. The 2007/2008 post-election violence in Kenya clearly demonstrated this, as individuals were attacked based on ethnic markers such as last-name and place of origin. Whether or not a person viewed their Embu or Luo identity as the most salient marker was irrelevant-- their fate was linked to the perceptions of other groups as to who they are and what that means.

It is clear from this review that while theoretical models may gain great utility via abstraction, they are also significantly limited by viewing ethno-nationalist situation in simple, generic terms. As Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch correctly point out, "rejecting 'messy' factors, such as grievances and inequalities, may lead to more elegant

⁹⁰ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 146.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁹² Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, 12.

models that can be more easily tested, but the fact remains that some of the most intractable and damaging conflict processes in the contemporary world...are to a large extent about political and economic injustice.”⁹³ Rational choice motivations may certainly explain why elites adopt racist rhetoric from above, yet that is only half of the equation resulting in political violence, since that rhetoric and violent agenda imposed from above, resonates with and is acted upon from below.⁹⁴

In this next section I will revisit the debate of grievance and relative deprivation, but within the expanded framework of Horizontal Inequalities.⁹⁵ While much research has highlighted the role of elite ethnic manipulation to secure private goals, the literature has not explained why groups have defined themselves along ethnic lines in the first place, and how those identifications secure mobilization and group cohesiveness.⁹⁶ Further, I am interested in exploring current literature which examines group marginalization without being dependent on the minority status of the marginalized group. It is apparent that both the state and society play a key role in ethno-nationalist conflicts, and as such their motivations should be de-coupled, as they may not and indeed need not be the same. Further, at this state in the literature it still remains unclear as to why ethnic outbidding falls on fertile grounds in some cases, such as Kenya and Rwanda for example, and not Tanzania. To answer these questions, I will examine the growing

⁹³ CEDERMAN, WEIDMANN, and GLEDITSCH, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War,” 492.

⁹⁴ Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 7.

⁹⁵ Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” *Oxford Development Studies* 28, no. 3 (2000): 245–262.

⁹⁶ Nicholas Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War,” 325.

literature on Horizontal inequalities, and the distinct context of nation-state formation and the African colonial legacy.

1.4 Social Constructivism and Horizontal Inequalities:

According to Tarrow and Tilly,⁹⁷ ethnic coalitions suffer from a ‘collective action problem’. How ethnic groups form and sustain their group cohesion is by no means clear. According to Stewart, “large-scale *group* mobilization-particularly for violent actions- is unlikely to occur in the absence of serious grievances at both the leadership and mass level,”⁹⁸ and hence requires a re-examination of deprivation theories. Building off of Burton’s work on non-negotiable needs as well as Azar’s work on Protracted Social Conflicts,⁹⁹ Stewart introduces a context dependent constructivist approach to ethnic identity, shifting the explanatory focal point “from individuals to group-level accounts of inequality and conflict.”¹⁰⁰ Horizontal Inequalities are hence defined as the obstructed or total lack of access by particular *groups* to the central power structure and decision-making institutions of the state and can take the form of political, cultural, economic and/or social marginalization.

Especially interesting for this thesis is the concept of Horizontal Inequalities as ‘spatially distributed,’ whereby particular regions may be privileged or deprived

⁹⁷ Charles Tilly and Sidney G Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).

⁹⁸ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, 12.

⁹⁹ Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*.

¹⁰⁰ CEDERMAN, WEIDMANN, and GLEDITSCH, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War,” 478.

depending on which groups live where and who is in power. As the examination of indirect colonial political administration will demonstrate, this link between ethnic groups, particular regions, and the subsequent allocation of resources based on this link has had significant implications as to conflicts over land and district-based resource allocation. In such a context, ethnic groups seek to control government institutions in order to reverse the process of marginalization, or to control the state apparatus to ensure a reversal will not occur.

Cultural diversity in itself is not inherently conflictual. Instead, cultural differentiation tied to major political and/or economic implications is necessary for the formation of ethno-nationalist identification and violent mobilization.¹⁰¹ Social identities must hence have some meaning and implicit implication in terms of the supplying or withholding of basic human needs and opportunity for success. According to Murshed and Gates,¹⁰² popular mobilization and sustained in-group cohesion can only be achieved by a well defined grievance established along clear ethnic lines. These collective grievances are based on deprivation theory, and must be “seen and believed to be the case” in order to become salient.¹⁰³ As such, ethno-nationalist conflicts are not individualistic bursts of violence, but rather a collective action perpetrated by clear

¹⁰¹ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, 11.

¹⁰² Scott Gates, *Spatial Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal* (Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, 2004), <http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2004/rp2004043.pdf>.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 3.

groups.¹⁰⁴ For a group to be culturally defined, therefore, it must have clearly recognizable and salient identity markers. While social identities are never fixed and are constantly in flux, there does need to be a sustained differentiation between culturally defined and locally identified groups in the presence of ethno-nationalist violence. Key to this concept, according to Stewart, is the limited flexibility of social, economic, political and cultural mobilization between groups based on these ethnic markers: “It is where there is limited freedom to switch group that groups’ boundaries are particularly important in terms of creating potential group grievances, and hence in terms of political mobilization.”¹⁰⁵ Consequently, it is when cultural indicators (such as language and/or religion, and/or origin and/or subsistence...) become intrinsically tied to political, economic, social and cultural opportunities/marginalization that ethnic consolidation and the potential for violent conflict becomes more likely.¹⁰⁶

Horizontal Inequalities can manifest themselves in several ways: politically--via access to participation and decision-making positions and institutions; economically--through access to and ownership of assets, employment and income; socially--by way of government services, resources and ‘human outcome indicators,’ and finally, culturally--as pertains to social recognition of group practices.¹⁰⁷ Mirroring Gurr’s Relative

¹⁰⁴ Group affiliations may occur along a variety of different lines, and are by no means uniform-- ethnic (Kenya), clan based (Somalia), Racial (Rwanda) or a combination thereof as with ethno-religious conflict in Tanzania.

¹⁰⁵ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, 11.

¹⁰⁶ According to Stewart, ‘violent conflict’ refers to “serious political violence, that is violence that primarily has political objectives,” and includes instances of communal violence, state repression and separatists conflicts. 18

¹⁰⁷ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, 13.

Deprivation model, grievances are subjective in this framework, meaning that even majority groups (numerically speaking), as for example the Sukuma of Tanzania or the Kikuyu under Moi, can feel marginalized and relatively deprived. Violent action is hence perpetuated “on the basis of their *perceptions* of others and of their relative position rather than *actual* inequality.”¹⁰⁸ This is particularly important in the context of this research, as there is ample evidence documenting the historic (and current) marginalization of specific groups and regions in Tanzania, and so indicating that a lack of group-based conflict is not due to a lack of horizontal inequality.¹⁰⁹ To understand the systems, nature and conditions that shape anxieties and incentives for violence, this thesis hence needs to develop a framework that incorporates the historic context of state and group formations in the Great-Lakes region of Africa.

In the next section of this thesis, I will utilize the Horizontal Inequalities Model as developed by Wimmer, Cederman and Minn, holding that the politicization of ethnicity is a central “aspect of modern state-building” and based on the type of institutionalization of such ethnic identities, a key factor leading to ethnic conflict. In this context, an understanding of the politicization and mobilization of ethnic identities requires the incorporation of state formation, colonial legacy and the ranking and/or

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 18.

¹⁰⁹ See for example James Leonard Giblin and Blandina Kaduma Giblin, *A History of the Excluded: Making Family a Refuge from State in Twentieth-Century Tanzania* (Oxford; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Athens, Ohio: James Currey ; Mkuki na Nyota ; Ohio University Press, 2005). Also Gregory Maddox and James Leonard Giblin, *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority & Dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford; Dar Es Salaam; Athens: James Currey ; Kapsel Educational Publications ; Ohio University Press, 2005). And more recently, “The Untold Story of Tanzania’s Resource Curse | Think Africa Press,” accessed August 23, 2013, <http://www.thinkafricapress.com/tanzania/untold-story-tanzanias-resource-curse-mtwara>. As well as “Poor Tanzanians Left out of Resource Rush - Features - Al Jazeera English,” accessed August 23, 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/06/201361712850176972.html>.

differentiating of communal groups into advanced vs. backwards. Finally, these perceptions of relative deprivation or advance need to be explained in the institutional context of the bifurcated state, as the link between tribe, home-land and native administration took on a legal dimension inherited at independence.

II. THEORY, HYPOTHESIS AND METHOD

On a theoretical level, I have examined three necessary conceptual shifts in order to effectively analyze the questions posed in this thesis. First, we need to look at group inequality not merely individually based inequality.¹¹⁰ Secondly, we must examine inequality beyond simple economic inequality,¹¹¹ and finally, we need a theoretical foundation of identity and its social construction in order to answer the question of why ethnic groups form and how violent mobilization occurs at all.¹¹²

According to Wimmer's influential work on the rise of ethno-nationalism and the nation-state, the decade before a state reaches independence sees incidents of political unrest based on ethnic differences, followed by a more radical and violent shift directly before independence, peaking directly after the establishment of an independent state.¹¹³ This research suggests a strong causal link between state-building and ethnic conflict, as ethnic conflicts arise during the process of state formation and the competition by different groups for independence and power over the state. In my work I will rely

¹¹⁰ Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*; Østby, "Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict"; Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War."

¹¹¹ Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research"; Wimmer, "Who Owns the State?"; CEDERMAN, WIMMER, and MIN, "WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL?".

¹¹² Mahmood Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity*. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012); Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

¹¹³ Wimmer, "Who Owns the State?".

heavily on this paradigmatic frame, while shifting the point of ethnic group competition formation to the colonial construction of a ‘Bifurcated State System’ and the institutionalization of structural asymmetries inherited at independence.

In their highly influential quantitative study on *Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War*, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch take the asymmetric condition of various ethnic groups as their starting point. Working off of Horowitz’ work on the formation of ranked groups as part of the colonial process, they link the formation of group grievances to “the realization that ethnic groups find themselves in radically different situations for various historic reasons.”¹¹⁴ In this paper I will argue that the most important prerequisite to the creation of a salient ethnic group is a historic structural asymmetry, caused by the systematic and institutionalized subjugation of certain cultural groups as compared to the other. Clear ethnic distinctions must exist for resonance, and must be deep rooted and perceived to be true, otherwise elite mobilization is not possible. In the Great-lakes Region of Africa, this historic subjugation is located in the colonial legacy of indirect rule, the tribalization of ‘objective’ ethnicities and the creation of a bifurcated state system. Based on this, I can develop my first hypothesis:

H1: If groups are mobilized along ethnic lines, then clear and socially significant boundaries generating group comparison must exist.

¹¹⁴ CEDERMAN, WEIDMANN, and GLEDITSCH, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War,” 480.

Several influential scholars have written about the colonial legacy on state-group-resource relationships. Most notable among them are Horowitz and Mamdani, who explored the psychological and institutional significance of in-direct rule in creating actual and perceived differences in economic, social and political development. Recent studies have shown that stratified social systems are particularly prone to violence,¹¹⁵ particularly along the “juxtaposition of ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ groups.”¹¹⁶ According to Horowitz, colonial rule made ethnic identity the focal point of group mobility, and hence the most salient identity among a repertoire of pre-colonial identities. By differentiating groups along various lines, and assigning specific roles, privileges and obligations to each new category, “new standards of group evaluation emerged that carried over long after the colonial departure...strengthening ‘ethnic’ as against other allegiances.”¹¹⁷

Based on this type of differentiation, social distinctions and shared identities/differentiations began to take on binary forms. While, according to Mamdani, a great deal has been written on the racial aspect of indirect rule,¹¹⁸ less has been explored about the institutional legacy of tribalization—“the social production of cultural difference”-- and how differentiation was institutionalized making the tribe the unit of analysis and the native authority (native homeland, native tribal community and tribal

¹¹⁵ CEDERMAN, WEIDMANN, and GLEDITSCH, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War.”

¹¹⁶ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 147.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹¹⁸ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*. (New York: Grove Press, 1965).

chief) the means by which individuals accessed resources and services.¹¹⁹ Since certain groups were more suited to prospering under the colonial institutional framework (due to their form of subsistence, sedentary society, nature of social hierarchy and willingness to adapt,) indirect rule “sanctioned the notion that an ethnic group was a valid basis for an administrative unit...and provided an institutional expression for cultural unity.”¹²⁰

While a few scholars have tackled the lasting implications of the colonial legacy in Africa, the most comprehensive study on the institutional legacy of indirect rule has been conducted by Mahmood Mamdani.¹²¹ In his latest work, *Divide and Rule*, Mamdani describes the dual nature of colonial administration, differentiating based on race *and* further differentiating based on nativity--“the result was a mode of rule undergirded by a set of institutions—a racialized and tribalized historiography, a bifurcation between civil and customary law, and an accompanying census that classified and enumerated the native population into so many ‘natural’ groups.”¹²² Tribalism is described by Mamdani as “reified ethnicity,” excluding the natives from the racialized domain of civil rights, and pinning them to a culturally fixed and legally demarcated homeland, politicized and run by the native authority and ‘traditional’ tribal chief. By the early 20th century, “the ‘customary’ administrative authority classified the population in each unit (‘tribal homeland’) into natives and migrants,” both being ethnitized, “with customary law

¹¹⁹ Broch-Due, “Violence and Belonging,” 9.

¹²⁰ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 150.

¹²¹ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*; Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity*.

¹²² Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity*, 7.

privileging the ethnic native while discriminating against the ethnic migrant.”¹²³ This transformation of loose ethnic communities into tribal units fixed to a strictly demarcated native homeland sows the seeds for the land conflict plaguing Africa so persistently, most notably by “Sons-of-the-soil”--conflicts that are “fought by the local majority against in-migrants.”¹²⁴

The importance of the native authority and homeland cannot be stressed enough in understanding land and resource competition along ethnic lines in present-day Africa. According to Mamdani, land in a colony was defined exclusively as a composite of different homelands, each the home of a designated tribe. Only those officially designated as natives could claim land rights in the tribal homeland. Participation in public affairs was no longer the right of all those who lived on the land; instead, it became the exclusive preserve of natives said to belong to the homeland.¹²⁵ At the heart of the tribal administration was hence a distinction between native and non-native tribes. Every colony was divided into a set of tribal homelands, each homeland identified with a certain tribe classified as ‘native’ and legally and administratively empowered with certain ‘customary’ rights based on ‘native’ status. While the colonial authority envisaged an African context where each tribe existed in a native homeland under the rule of a traditional chief, this perception of Africa was at odds with the reality of most ethnic communities, as many communities were not fixed to a particular location, and were not administered by a tribal king or chief. Further, social status was not tied to tribal identity

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War,” 30.

¹²⁵ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity.*, 3.

but depending on the type of community, was based on cultural factors such as age or marital status. According to Illiffe, such communal social systems and the predilection of a large number of communities to roam regionally,¹²⁶ rather than remain fixed to a ‘homeland’ was at odds with the European view of a ‘tribal Africa,’ which clearly presupposed that “every African belonged to a tribe, just as every European belonged to a nation.”¹²⁷ The first need for a successful colonial administration was hence to tribalize Africa.

In the context of indirect rule, ‘*tribe*’ refers to a linguistic and/or cultural group tied to a particular territory. Based on the size, perceived commonalities and relative cohesion of different pre-colonial ethnic communities, colonial administrators either split or amalgamated differing groups, or sub-clans, under one tribal administration, effectively minimizing the potential threat from larger cohesive communities via an “internal mechanisms for the discipline and control of members across a geographical territory.”¹²⁸ A ‘tribe’ as came into existence under colonialism was hence something new—a combination of the authentic and artificial. According to Lynch, tribes, stand as moral and political units, with customs, traditions, sanctions, and recognized leaders or decision-making institutions that enjoy powers to authoritatively define local duties and responsibilities, and proscribe punishment and measure justice over community

¹²⁶ Unsurprisingly, “the most disenfranchised in this arrangement were pastoralist groups whose very mode of life was based on seasonal movement.” Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009), 167.

¹²⁷ John Illiffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 323.

¹²⁸ Gabrielle Lynch, *I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 14.

members—an analytically specific category that has never accurately reflected the more complex range of local realities.¹²⁹

To be a member of a tribe in a tribal homeland indicated nativity. In contrast, ‘non-natives’ were identified as such irrespective of how many generations they may have lived in an area now considered another tribe’s homeland. Since “no amount of time could erase the difference in origin,”¹³⁰ who was native and who had the right to live in a particular territory became the first form of organized land-based violence in colonial Africa. Entire groups of people, who were delineated as resident but non-native tribes were excluded from access to justice, power, land ownership and participation in governance.¹³¹ They were subject to fines and taxes under what Mamdani refers to as an “institutionalized regime of inequality,” with the long-lasting effect whereby ‘cultural identity’ was reified into “an administratively driven political identity.”¹³² The juxtaposition between ethnicity, land, jurisdiction, legal entitlement and backward vs. advanced groups¹³³ was hence reproduced in every tribal homeland, “each imagined as a

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity.*, 51.

¹³¹ According to Mamdani, “The ‘native identity’ involved three distinct privileges. The first was right of access to land. The second involved right of participation in the administration of the native authority (Chiefs in the native authority could only be appointed from among those identified as natives—The higher the position in the native authority, the stricter the observance of the colonially sanctioned custom that only natives have the right of representation and governance in the homeland). The third privilege was in the area of dispute settlement, for every native authority settled disputes on the basis of customary laws that privileged natives.”Ibid., 52.

¹³² Ibid., 53.

¹³³ Advanced was viewed as disproportionately educated and/or wealthy, and hence disproportionately represented in the job market, civil service, or business sector. A group may consider itself, or be considered as backward as it is disproportionately poor and/ or uneducated and rural or substance based, excluding it from the cash economy.

nation in miniature, each solidified in reality through a string of bureaucratic decrees, acts and interventions.”¹³⁴

The result was that at the eve of independence Africa inherited a bifurcated state, both racialized and tribalized, and in need of deconstructing both in order to reverse the institutional disenfranchisement currently at work. What would successful decolonization have entailed in the African context? According to Mamdani, this process would have required both the deracialization of the civil power *and* the detribalization of the customary power, in order to reach a sufficient starting point favorable to a general democratization capable of transcending the institutionalized despotism of the bifurcated state system. Key to this understanding is that it was the institutional aspect of the native authority and tribal homeland, and not the much publicized racial segregation, which has created the inherent “impediments to democratization” so obviously plaguing post-colonial African states.¹³⁵

2.1 Post-Colonial Africa and the Nation-State:

Wimmer identifies three conditions under which ethnic differences become political and conflict prone, appearing as communities sharing a common political fate. First, if there is an ethnization of the bureaucracy. Secondly, if an educated elite is excluded from the state apparatus, and finally, if there is an unequal distribution of goods

¹³⁴ Broch-Due, “Violence and Belonging,” 8.

¹³⁵ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 25.

of the state, which is perceived as ethnic discrimination and thus leads to new appeals for solidarity of broader segments of a population.¹³⁶ The rise of the nation-state, according to Wimmer, has led to the rise of nationalism¹³⁷ and ethno-nationalist conflicts, as ethnic communities struggle for control of the state or over seceding from the current state to either form a new and ethnically homogeneous state, or to join co-ethnics in another state deemed to be the legitimate home. In the post-colonial context, which inherited an ethnic-bureaucracy and ranked/differentiated groups, the failure to detribalize the bureaucracy would result in the perception of an institutionalized structural asymmetry, transforming “objective political and economic asymmetries into grievances through a process of group comparison.”¹³⁸ In this regard, ethnic elites competing for access to state resources previously denied them, plays into the expectation of their constituents for redistributive justice, while reinforcing a perception of marginalization by backward groups who view advanced groups as benefitting disproportionately at their expense. Further, as resources are not merely distributed, but also collected, perceptions of “unequal distribution of the *costs* of the state frequently plays a more important role than distribution of profits.”¹³⁹ If perceptions of the costs fall on one group, but are seen to benefit an ethnic ‘other’, this leads to an increased feeling of relative deprivation and the perceived need to dominate the state apparatus, leading to a clear distributional conflict which is articulated and


¹³⁶ Wimmer, “Who Owns the State?,” 646.

¹³⁷ Nationalism can be defined as “a political principle that demands that the unit of governance and the nation should be congruent.” CEDERMAN, WIMMER, and MIN, “WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL?,” 92.

¹³⁸ CEDERMAN, WEIDMANN, and GLEDITSCH, “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War,” 481.

¹³⁹ Wimmer, “Who Owns the State?,” 644.

fought along ethnic lines.¹⁴⁰ The post-colonial state is hence recast as a distributive institution, which “is captured to different degrees by representatives of particular ethnic communities,” and which results in “competing ethno-nationalist claims to the state.”¹⁴¹



CYCLES OF ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND POLARIZATION

Increased competition for control over the state leads to heightened levels of group distrust and increased group polarization. Elites, fighting for the resources of the state, will attempt to mobilize the masses based on these perceptions of distrust, grievance and distributive justice. The utilization of ethnically based discourse, or

¹⁴⁰ Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 522–524.

¹⁴¹ CEDERMAN, WIMMER, and MIN, “WHY DO ETHNIC GROUPS REBEL?,” 87.

‘political outbidding,’ hence leads elites to adopt an increasingly extreme nationalist platform, further heightening ethnic tensions and polarization. For outbidding to successfully resonate amongst local constituents, however, perceptions of group-based grievance must be shared and perceived to be true.¹⁴² Based on this hypothesis two looks as follows:

H2: If an elite group draws on ethnic grievances to mobilize the masses along ethnic lines, then it does so due to perceptions of an uneven distribution of power and the collective goods of the state.

According to Kaufman, the preconditions for mass hostility depend on “a set of ethnically defined grievances, negative ethnic stereotypes, and disputes over emotional symbols.”¹⁴³ Ethnic elites will use these grievances in the struggle over the collective goods and resources of the modern state, which according to Wimmer, includes aspects of “territorial sovereignty, protection from arbitrary violence, social and legal security, political representation, financial redistribution, economic infrastructure, and the symbols of independence and state power.”¹⁴⁴ This process of outbidding eventually leads to the point whereby the policy goals of one ethnic group reflect the worst fears of the other, leading to the creation of a security dilemma, whereby efforts by one group to make itself

¹⁴² Stuart J. Kaufman, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War,” *International Security* 21, no. 2 (October 1, 1996): 109, doi:10.2307/2539072.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ Wimmer, “Who Owns the State?,” 642.

more secure inevitably leads the other side's acuity of less security.¹⁴⁵ One group's win hence results in the other group's loss, leading to the perception of a zero-sum scenario and renewed ethnic mobilization as self-defense. This process leads to the construction of hypothesis three:

H3: If historic perceptions of grievances exist, and if those grievances are articulated in terms of ethnically based redistributive justice then a security dilemma is created.

By the creation of a security dilemma, both the group/s in power and the group/s marginalized begin to view state control in terms of survival.¹⁴⁶ The formation of political opposition groups is hence met with intense hostility and a rise in extrajudicial killings, harassment, arbitrary arrests and the banning of political rallies. These increased tensions further heighten the security dilemma, and demonstrate how ethnic groups can rationally adopt policies and attitudes that lead to increased tensions and potentially worse conditions for the group in the long-run. In this case the need for violence becomes a mechanism for self-defense. An ethnic security dilemma requires joint fears of group extinction, and such fears do not arise unless hostile masses define their security in excessive ways based on a shared history and violated identity.

¹⁴⁵ Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War," 111.

¹⁴⁶ The link between state control and survival is often more than a perception, as studies concerning ethnic dominance and child mortality have demonstrated. See for example Martin Brockerhoff et al., *Ethnicity and Child Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa* (New York: Population Council, 1998).

According to Horowitz, it is the history of group differentiation that makes the threat of violence appear real and not merely hypothetical. If elites emphasize past victimization, then their call for a preemptive strike in the name of self-defense becomes a legitimate cause. Further, since violence itself is transformative, each incident of ethnically incited violence, such as arbitrary arrests and beatings or extrajudicial killings, further impacts social relationships between ethnic communities, heightening perceptions that the protection of essential group needs can only be guaranteed at the exclusion of the other. The Struggle for the state hence becomes the struggle against the 'other,' which leads us to our fourth and final hypothesis:

H4: If past grievances exist and uneven distributions along ethnic lines are institutionalized, then the political contestation for state control becomes the ethno-nationalist mobilization against the ethnic other.

The combination of these four hypotheses outline the analytical framework by which I will seek to resolve the question as to why certain states experience ethno-nationalist based political mobilization and conflict, while other comparative cases do not. In the next section I will outline my methodological approach towards answering my research question, as well as discuss case selections and levels of comparability.

2.2 Methodology

In this thesis I will conduct a comparative case study between Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda. By employing a method of historic process tracing, I hope to identify the complex causal mechanisms that explain the potential for a greater or lesser likelihood of ethno-nationalist violence.¹⁴⁷ Historical Process tracing is one specialized approach that examines the detailed historic trajectories and patterns of a single case in order to identify which variables impact on the dependent variable, and which do not. Further, historic process-tracing, has the capacity to evaluate various theoretical frameworks and the “claims that a single variable is necessary or sufficient for an outcome.”¹⁴⁸ By examining three comparative cases, each with a different degree of ethno-nationalist conflict manifestation, I hope to uncover what variables exacerbated or mitigated the onset of ethno-nationalist group identification, solidarity, and mobilization towards violent conflict. This theory is hence geared towards theory building in an effort to contribute to the literature currently assessing ethno-nationalism and civil war. The unit of observation for this case study is the country (Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania), and more specifically several periods of observed calm and conflict. The pathways linking the independent variables to the dependent variable will also help explain why states sharing a common, historical background and ethnic composition can evolve in radically different ways.

¹⁴⁷ Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 5.

¹⁴⁸ Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is Civil War?: : Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution : A Quarterly for Research Related to War and Peace Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004): 227.

2.2.1 Research Question:

Why do we observe different outcomes in regards to the outbreak of civil war in Tanzania and Kenya, despite similar or poorer economic performances to Rwanda, increased ethnic diversity, Indirect colonialism and the bifurcation of the state system, and strive for post-colonial independence?

2.2.2 Dependent Variable:

The outbreak of ethno-nationalist conflict, including Civil War, Non State-Armed Conflicts and One-Sided Conflict.

The definition of what constitutes a civil war is often contested and ambiguous. Kenya, for example, is coded as having experienced a civil war in 1991-93 by Doyle and Sambanis¹⁴⁹ while being excluded from a large number of other data sets. A strict definition of civil war, based on a minimum threshold of 1000 battle-related fatalities per annum and involving organized armed forces¹⁵⁰ is particularly ill suited to the examination of ethnic conflict in Africa. Indeed all three cases examined in this thesis will demonstrate the high degree to which the role of the state and the status of combatants is highly ambiguous, contested and blurred. Further, while a case may not meet the strict definition of civil war described above, it may still be experiencing

¹⁴⁹ Doyle, *Making War and Building Peace United Nations Peace Operations*.

¹⁵⁰ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982).

significant instances of ethnic violence. Since this thesis is primarily concerned with organized instances of ethno-nationalist conflict resulting in death, I have expand my Dependent Variable (DV) to include Civil War, State-based organized violence (where at least one of the warring parties must be a government) and non-state based organized violence where an acknowledged government is not one of the violent parties.¹⁵¹ This expansion of my DV is important for this research, since current data clearly suggests a decrease in Civil War instances since the 1990's, while Non-State Armed and One-Sided Conflicts¹⁵² have increase in Africa. Since both Tanzania and Kenya have had instances of non state and/or one-sided conflict, but not disputably of Civil War, any valuable research should incorporate factors for all three.

2.2.3 Unit of Analysis:

Rwanda, as a surrogate for the surrounding States that experienced Civil War, Kenya as a surrogate for states that experienced both non-state and one-sided violence, and Tanzania as a surrogate for states that experienced one-sided violence while largely avoiding the outbreak of organized political violence.

¹⁵¹ Williams, *War & Conflict in Africa*, 21.

¹⁵² Non-state and one-sided conflict are based on the definitions by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which codes non-state armed conflict as *"The use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year,"* and one-sided conflict as the *"use of armed force by state or formally organized non-state groups against civilians, resulting in at least 25 casualties."*UCDP, "Definitions - Uppsala University, Sweden," UCDP: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, accessed September 1, 2013, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Non-state_conflict.

2.2.4 Independent Variable:

Indirect colonization, the creation of ranked/differentiated ethnic groups, a bifurcated state system and the ethnization of the state bureaucracy in post-colonial Africa.

2.2.5 Method:

Comparative Case Study, and more specifically, historical process tracing.

2.3 Case Selection and Comparability:

Several scholarly works have set the precedence for the comparability between Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania. The most significant studies that considered comparability appropriate between the cases are Horowitz's comparative examination of Kenyan and Tanzanian in terms of group comparisons as a source of conflict (advanced vs. backward groups), Mamdani's comparison of Tanzanian and Rwandan in terms of indirect colonial rule and the bifurcation of the state, Miguel and Barkan's exploration of Kenya and Tanzania's geographic and historic commonalities, Posner' comparative comparability of Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania's former colonial rule, and further Kenya and Rwanda's Single-Member plurality (SMP) electoral rules, as well as competitive one-party and multi-party elections. Finally, Collier, includes all three cases in his study of the bottom billion, and codes each of them as "structurally insecure and structurally

unaccountable.”¹⁵³ Based on these studies, every aspect of the three cases, from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial development has hence been the topic of previous comparative case studies.

In contrast, two main arguments are made against the comparability of Tanzania with its more violent neighbors. The first, as exemplified by Alicia Erickson,¹⁵⁴ sites Tanzania’s high ethnic fractionalization and the second, as argued by Anke Weber,¹⁵⁵ based on the degree and level of colonization. I will only briefly touch upon Weber’s arguments here, as the extent and effects of colonialism are examined in detail in my empirical section. According to Weber, Tanzania’s lack of ethnic based violence can be traced to its distinct colonial heritage, which was much milder and less involved than that of neighboring Kenya and Rwanda and as a result, Tanzania did not inherit the institutional or ethnic legacy that made Kenya and Rwanda prone to ethnic conflict. This line of argument is widely rejected by leading scholars on the subject, including Mamdani, Horowitz and Posner.¹⁵⁶ In complete contrast with Weber’s arguments, Mamdani actually sites Tanzania as one of the most thorough cases of indirect colonial administration and state bifurcation as post-Berlin conference colonization had been

¹⁵³ Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes*, 240.

¹⁵⁴ Alicia Erickson, “Peace in Tanzania: An Island of Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.”

¹⁵⁵ Anke Weber, “The Causes of Politicization of Ethnicity: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania,” *Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS)* no. 47, CIS Working Papers (November 2009), <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail//?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=109603>.

¹⁵⁶ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity*.; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, “Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa”; Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*.

thoroughly perfected by that point.¹⁵⁷ Similarly, Horowitz sites Tanzania as one of his cases whereby the creation of advanced vs. backward categories was especially prevalent.¹⁵⁸ Based on these studies, I do not consider Weber's arguments sufficiently well grounded to exclude Tanzania from this research.

The other line of argument, based on Tanzanian ethnic fractionalization, is more widely accepted (though again not by the leading scholars listed above). Erickson, for example, "concludes that Tanzania is not actually as similar to other East African states as many assume, particularly when taking into account the extent of ethnic diversity that exists in Tanzania."¹⁵⁹ By ethnic diversity, Erickson sites 130 as the number of distinct ethnic groups in Tanzania. According to Posner, this number reflects colonial tribal constructions, and is not only arbitrary but fails to reflect politically salient ethnic cleavages.¹⁶⁰ Further, the fact that by such similar indices the DRC has over 250 and Nigeria approximately 200 ethnic groups did not preclude them from experiencing significant and prolonged ethnic conflict. Further, scholars like Newbury have demonstrated that the binary view of Rwanda as comprising either Hutu or Tutsi, is grossly misleading as to the number of socially significant ethnic groups in Rwanda, as he documents the clans of Rwanda and their significance from pre-colonial times.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

¹⁵⁸ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 149.

¹⁵⁹ Alicia Erickson, "Peace in Tanzania: An Island of Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa," 19.

¹⁶⁰ Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 1.

¹⁶¹ David S. Newbury, "The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical Hypothesis," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 50, no. 4 (January 1, 1980): 389–403, doi:10.2307/1158430.

Finally, the ability for ‘tribes’ to amalgamate into super-ethnicities and coalitions of convenience is clearly demonstrated by numerous case studies on Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria to name a few.¹⁶² According to Posner, the amalgamation and differentiation of groups is not foreign to Tanzania either, as the tension between the Zanzibari *Warabu* (Arab/Muslims) and Mainland African/Christians demonstrates. Further, Posner states that divisions in Tanzania “among broad regional/linguistic blocs (e.g. among Sukuma-speakers, Nyamwezi-speakers, and Chagga-speakers) have become much more salient since the transition to multiparty elections in 1995.”¹⁶³ Based on these considerations, as well as what Miguel calls “a shared pre-colonial historical universe,” with extensive migrations of “Niger-Kordofanian (Bantu) populations and substantial Nilo-Saharan minorities,”¹⁶⁴ the experience of indirect rule and the formation of a bifurcated state system, as well as arbitrary borders inherited at independence demonstrate abundant evidence that Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania have sufficient common markers to validate a comparative case study.

¹⁶² Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*; Elischer, “Ethnic coalitions of convenience and commitment”; Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*; Williams, *War & Conflict in Africa*.

¹⁶³ Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 260.

¹⁶⁴ Edward Miguel, “Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania,” *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (April 1, 2004): 333, doi:10.2307/25054263.

2.4 Data Collection and Challenges:

Data availability for a comparative case study comes in various forms. Second-hand accounts of conflicts, descriptive statistics concerning country makeup and performance, historical accounts, economic evaluations, ethnographies and sociological works dealing with the ethnic identity development of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial states are all valuable and utilized in this thesis. Not surprisingly, information on Tanzania was far more difficult to obtain than works on Kenya and on Rwanda. As Tanzania has largely avoided all forms of violence, it has not been a major source of interest to many political scientists. Even anthropological works have focused mainly on ethnic composition while “*ethnic processes* have attracted the attention of relatively few anthropologists.”¹⁶⁵ Posner as well has lamented the degree to which information on Tanzania is not easily available, concluding that “unfortunately, the secondary source coverage of Tanzania’s one-party elections is too thin to allow for comparisons of the salience of local tribal divisions.”¹⁶⁶

As a great deal of works in conflict studies and political science are concerned with identifying why violence broke out after the fact, this goes a long way in explaining why literature on Rwanda and to a much lesser degree Kenya, is abundant compared to Tanzania. Further, since analysts disagree as to how many ‘armed conflicts’ occurred when and where, gathering accurate information can be challenging when the analytical

¹⁶⁵ Helena Jerman, *Between Five Lines: The Development of Ethnicity in Tanzania with Special Reference to the Western Bagamoyo District* (Saarijarvi; Uppsala, Sweden: Finnish Anthropological Society ; Nordic Africa Institute, 1997), 34.

¹⁶⁶ Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, 260.

framework and DV is not congruent, but the terminology employed in each study is. The purpose of this paper is hence geared towards the examination of the causal and trigger mechanisms that lead to the outbreak of civil war in Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania, from a multitude of sources, linking particular incidents to ethnic mobilization.

III. CASE STUDIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This section of the thesis will take a closer look at the ethnic processes and mobilizations in Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania. Ethnicity in this context is best conceptualized as “stages in a process,”¹⁶⁷ and follows Jerman’s approach of constructed ethnicity by distinguishing between the cultural, social and political aspect of ethnic identity.¹⁶⁸ Cultural and social ethnicity are deemed to be ‘objective,’ referring to pre-colonial social identities as cultural categories which did not translate into a politically salient self-referent, and as such failed to convert into a political identity. Political ethnicity, on the other hand, is categorized as ‘subjective ethnicity’, which Mamdani describes as the ‘tribalization’ of the objective ethnicity as a product of colonial administrative institutions, acquiring social salience as a political identity.¹⁶⁹ This thesis argues that by constructing a native colonial administration based on “a substructure of ethnic government,” formerly “murky ethnic affiliations”¹⁷⁰ were transformed into

¹⁶⁷ Carl Sebastian Laurentius Gahnstroem, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Tanzania: The 2010 General Elections and Mwanza Region” (Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, 2012), 54.

¹⁶⁸ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 37.

¹⁶⁹ When speaking about pre-colonial Africa, I will refer to ethnic communities and clan or kinship groups. ‘Tribe’ is the name that various kinship and clan-based groups were given by the colonial administration, denoting an administrative unit, as part of the ‘tribalizing’ process that underpinned Indirect rule—deconstructing larger communities and amalgamating smaller ones into fixed territories. Current ethnic groups are hence not synonymous with the tribal groups inherited up upon independence, even though the tribal name has remained unchanged. See Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

¹⁷⁰ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 151.

clearly defined, institutionally enacted and legally enforced political ethnicities. It is subjective ethnicity that is the basis for group coherence and mobilization in post-colonial Africa, which is synonymous with ethno-nationalist identity and ethnic politics in the competition between ethnic groups for control of state resources and institutions.

The argument of this thesis is that the foundation for modern ethno-nationalist mobilization is rooted in the historic development of the nation state—tribalized under the native authority, institutionalized under the bifurcated state system, and inherited at the eve of independence. Further, this thesis will examine the particular way each state approached its colonial legacy of a racialized and tribalized society and to what degree it deconstructed or adopted the distinct structure of the state and resource allocation. In each case study, the original ‘objective’ ethnicities will be examined, followed by the transformation of ethnic communities into ‘subjective ethnicities’ based on regionally bound and administrative systems of obligations and expectations between people, the tribe and the ‘native authority.’ Finally this thesis will examine the colonial legacy at independence, the competition for control of the State bureaucracy, evidence of nationalist exclusion and an ethnization of the State bureaucracy and the mobilization of grievance laden ethno-nationalist political polarization. By following these micro-historic pathways and linking each to a specific period of ethnic transformation in Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania, I will highlight the mechanisms at play in each historical context, making ethno-nationalist identity more or less prone towards violent mobilization.

3.1 The Case of Rwanda:

Within hours of President Habyarimana's plane being shot down in 1994, the simmering civil war that had been ongoing since 1990 flared up with a vengeance. Between the beginning of April and the beginning of July, a brutal genocide left over a million Rwandans dead,¹⁷¹ and spilled across neighboring borders carrying along the seeds of discord and violence:

In human terms, the toll was horrendous: about 1.1 million dead, two million refugees abroad, over one million internally displaced, tens of thousands of deeply traumatized genocide survivors, and over half a million 'old caseload' (i.e. Tutsi) refugees returned in a chaotic fashion. The material damage too was substantial: infrastructure destroyed, banks and businesses plundered, the civil service, judicial system, health care and education services in ruins, crops and livestock lost.¹⁷²

While the media reverted to "comfortable stereotypes" of ancient "tribal" hatreds,¹⁷³ the underlying causes of the civil war and ethnic conflict are far from ancient. Contrary to mainstream opinion, the binary differentiation between Hutu and Tutsi is actually a rather recent construct.¹⁷⁴ In this section, I will examine the ethnic (Hutu and Tutsi as political ethnicities), socio-economic (growing inequality and economic shocks),

¹⁷¹ Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship," in *The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa: The Pitfalls of Enforced Democracy and Globalization*, ed. Stefaan Marysse and Reyntjens, Filip (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 15.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

nationalist (1990 RPF invasion) and regional (north/south divide) roots of the civil war and genocide.¹⁷⁵ In order to understand the construction of a political ‘other,’¹⁷⁶ this thesis will go back to the pre-colonial Rwandan territory, and a time when the social structure lacked the bipolar characteristics that later came to define it. In tracing the formation of the ethnic political identities in Rwanda, I will analyze the causes and the consequences of Rwandan state formation, focusing particularly on the history of inclusion, exclusion, differentiation and post-colonial institution building that set the stage for the civil war and 1994 genocide.

3.1.1 Objective Identity in Pre-Colonial Rwanda:

According to oral history and legend, the Hutus are a Bantu people who settled Rwanda first. They originated from the south and west. Tutsis, on the other hand are a Nilotic people who migrated from the north and east.¹⁷⁷ Over time the groups blended, settling in clan-based societies across what is today Africa’s Great Lakes Region.¹⁷⁸ Hutus and Tutsis developed a common language, socio-political chiefdom structure, shared a common religion, intermarried, and intermingled without territorial

¹⁷⁵ Vigdis Broch-Due and Johan Pottier, eds., “Escape from Genocide: The Political Identity in Rwanda’s Massacres,” in *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 201.

¹⁷⁶ In her book, *The Balkan Express*, Slavenka Drakulic tackles the question of the unimaginable: “Once the concept of “otherness” takes root, the unimaginable becomes possible.”

¹⁷⁷ Newbury, “The Clans of Rwanda.”

¹⁷⁸ For more information on the Bantu and Nilot migrations and how they spread across Central, Eastern and Southern Africa see John O Oucho, *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002); Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.

demarcations. While there were cultural differences, these cultural peculiarities were ‘objective.’ Hutu and Tutsi as they are known today did not exist in the pre-colonial context, and instead consisted of broad-based social groupings that included various sub-clans, such as the Kiga, today part of the northern Rwandan Hutus, or the Hima and Ruguru, among many groups subsumed under the Tutsi.¹⁷⁹

Scholars like Gourevitch and Mamdani have argued that the pre-colonial ethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi were not fixed, but transformative, allowing for social mobility between the two groupings. The pre-colonial chiefs were called *Mwamis*, and some were Hutus, and some Tutsis. Both Hutus and Tutsis fought together in the *Mwamis*’ armies, and through systems of intermarriage and clientage, Hutus could become hereditary Tutsis, and Tutsis could become hereditary Hutus.”¹⁸⁰ The identities were not fixed, and the earliest source of inequality is largely agreed upon by scholars. Tutsis were primarily herdsman, owning cattle, while Hutus were to a large extent cultivators. Although these were not rigid terms, “the *word* Tutsi became synonymous with political and economic elite.”¹⁸¹

While scholars by-en-large agree that pre-colonial Rwanda had a set of socio-economic distinctions, comprised of agriculturalists and pastoralists, these distinctions did not follow ethnic lines. Recently ethnographers and historians agree that Hutus and Tutsis cannot be considered distinct ethnic groups.¹⁸² In economic terms, it was long

¹⁷⁹ Newbury, “The Clans of Rwanda.”

¹⁸⁰ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 47.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

believed that the origin of the Hutu/Tutsi divide was based on class distinction, the Tutsi as the more wealthy cattle owners, and the Hutu as the agriculturalists tilling the land. Recent research has challenged this assumption, however, as evidence indicates that predecessors of the Hutu had cattle long before the Tutsi appeared on the scene. Political thinkers including Prunier¹⁸³, Gourevitch and Mamdani agree that “with the Tutsi identity sufficiently porous to absorb successful Hutu through ennoblement and Hutu clearly a trans-ethnic identity of subjects, the Hutu/Tutsi distinction could not be considered an ethnic distinction. Neither could it be considered a socioeconomic distinction, one between exploiters and exploited or rich and poor.”¹⁸⁴

It would, however, be a mistake to think that Hutu and Tutsi were indistinguishable prior to the arrival of the colonists. In pre-colonial Rwanda, the Hutu label did have a serf-like status. Many clan groups associated with Tutsi shared the same economic circumstances as Hutu groups, intermarriage was common, and many of the poorer Tutsi were agriculturalists, as were the majority of Hutus. The distinction was based on power. Those associated with power were Tutsi, entitled to certain privileges including exemption from forced labor, *uburetwa*. To be Hutu was to be associated with a subject status. Originally land was inherited, but as court practices began to change in the first half of the nineteenth century, the King began allocating land based on favor. This changed the dimension dramatically, as chiefdoms were no longer inherited, but

¹⁸³ See also Brubaker and Laitin, Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (January 1, 1998): 423–452, doi:10.2307/223488; Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

¹⁸⁴ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 74.

now appointed. Inhabitants of the land had to provide *ubureetwa* for the local chief, and these labor obligations would play a key role in the genocide, as *ubureetwa* was little more than legal exploitation by the powerful elite.

Under Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-1895), polarization between Hutu and Tutsi identities reached its highest pre-colonial point. His policies were often contradictory where Hutus and Tutsis were concerned, as at the same time that he “expanded Hutu participation in the army from nonmilitary to fighting roles - and appointed Hutu to administrative positions while taking on the power of uppity Tutsi aristocratic lineage - these reforms debased the social position of the Hutu outside the army and administration and further polarized the social opposition between Hutu and Tutsi.”¹⁸⁵ Even as polarization increased, however, the social identity was not fixed. Any native of diverse ethnicity who was allocated to the serf status was deemed to be Hutu. In her study on identity formation in Rwanda, Catherine Newbury concluded that “Hutu identity came to be associated with and entirely defined by inferior status.”¹⁸⁶ While the two cultural communities had different ethnic origins, the identities were ‘objective’ and transethnic on both sides, and as social and cultural identities, allowed for social mobility. This changed with the advent of colonization, as the two identities were tribalized and fixed into ‘subjective’ categories, making social mobility impossible.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 69.

¹⁸⁶ See Newbury, “The Clans of Rwanda.”Ibid.; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 70.

3.1.2 Colonialism, Indirect Rule and Subjective Ethnicity:

Colonization left its mark on Rwanda, both physically and psychologically. It would perhaps be redundant to state that the European colonizers were racist. The logic of colonial administration was based on a rather simplistic understanding of African social organization, placing each ethnic community into a tribal category, bound to a specific piece of land. According to Mamdani, the colonial presupposition was twofold: First, “that every colonized group has an original and pure tradition,” and secondly, “that every colonized group must be made to return to that original condition, and that the return must be enforced by law.”¹⁸⁷ Communities who had never organized themselves in such a manner often resisted these enforced structures, frequently with brutal consequences. One prominent German General who occupied Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania outlined his campaign against intransigent natives quite clearly:

The exercise of violence with crass terrorism and even with gruesomeness was and is my policy. I destroy the African tribes with streams of blood and streams of money. Only following this cleansing can something new emerge, which will remain.¹⁸⁸

Race was the marker that divided the civilized from those needing civilizing. The bipolar division between superior and inferior races acted as the justification for the reorganization and/or elimination of entire indigenous peoples in Africa. While certain

¹⁸⁷ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity*, 50.

¹⁸⁸ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 12.

aspects of colonial administrative practices outlined in previous chapters were common across all African nations who experienced indirect colonial rule, Rwanda represented the most extreme case of ethnic rebranding. According to Mamdani, only in Rwanda was one ‘native’ group considered so superior to another native group as to transcend the racial divide between natives (origin) and settler races (foreigners) creating a new racial category for the Tutsi. The key distinction, “was not between colonizer and colonized, but between native and non-native. Non-Natives were tagged as races, whereas natives were said to belong to tribes,” defined as those “indigenous in origin.”¹⁸⁹ Some races were indisputably foreign, such as Europeans and Asians, whereas others were not, such as the Tutsi in Rwanda or the Swahil in Tanzania. The result of such official racial designation was the creation of ‘ranked’ groups, whereby certain groups were not only privileged in some areas (creating advanced vs. backwards groupings), but ranked higher than the ‘other’ natives on the ladder of civilization—privileging them in every aspect of social, economic, cultural and political life.

According to Neuffer, when the Europeans began to arrive in Rwanda in the nineteenth century, they saw a distinction between the aristocratic looking Tutsi, with their fine features and superior status, to the serf-like Hutu, tilling the soil.¹⁹⁰ Gourevitch describes the initial visual dichotomy as that “of a stately race of warrior kings, surrounded by herds of long-horned cattle and a subordinate race of short, dark peasants,

¹⁸⁹ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity.*, 47.

¹⁹⁰ Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor’s House*, 87.

hoeing tubers and picking bananas.”¹⁹¹ Further, Europeans were stunned to see civilization on the African continent, and racial prejudices of the time logically forced them to assume that evidence of advanced society must have originated from elsewhere.¹⁹²

In 1863, John Hanning Speke introduced his Hamitic hypothesis. During his travels across Africa in search of the source of the Nile,¹⁹³ Speke concluded that the more attractive inhabitants were part of a “superior race” and “who were as unlike as they could be from the common order of natives...[with] fine oval faces, large eyes, and high noses, denoting the best blood of Abyssinia.”¹⁹⁴ According to this legend, the Tutsi were part of the lost Tribes of Israel, and believed to be the reason why there were signs of civilized society in Africa. These mobile civilizers were called the Hamites, the decedents of Ham, the cursed son of Noah. Their black appearance was part of their punishment, as the Hamites “were actually Caucasians under a black skin. Rather than Negroes, Hamites were seen as other than Negroes, those who civilized the Negroes and were in turn corrupted by the Negroes.”¹⁹⁵ Hence an intermediary race was created - one below the

¹⁹¹ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 50.

¹⁹² Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2009).

¹⁹³ For details see John Hanning Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*. (New York: Harper, 1864). Also for a truly excellent book on early European exploration see Tim Jeal, *Explorers of the Nile: The Triumph and Tragedy of a Great Victorian Adventure* (New Haven [Conn.]; London: Yale University Press, 2011).

¹⁹⁴ Speke quoted in Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 53.

¹⁹⁵ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 82.

Caucasians, but above the Negroes. The Tutsi were no longer Rwandans, but Afro-Hamites, originally from Ethiopia.

Ironically, few Rwandans are familiar with Speke and yet,¹⁹⁶ his biblically inspired racial fantasy has had the most significant impact on the construction of Rwandan identity. Whether they accept or reject it, few Rwandans would deny that the Hamitic myth is one of the essential ideas by which they have been impacted in society. One only has to examine a Hutu Power speech in 1992 by Leon Mugesera, a senior member of Habyarimana's party, addressing a gathering of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development Party (MRND), saying: "The fatal mistake we made in 1959 was to let [the Tutsi] get out...They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get there by throwing them into the Nyabarongo River. I must insist on this point. We have to act. Wipe them all out"¹⁹⁷ In April 1994, the river was packed with thousands of Tutsi corpses, washing up en masse on the shores of Lake Victoria.

3.1.3 German Indirect Rule and Subjective Ethnicity:

After the death of Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri political turmoil followed, as rival Tutsi families vied for power. In 1897, Germany set up indirect rule over Rwanda, and with it the ethnic identities transformed as the political structure altered dramatically. The

¹⁹⁶ Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

¹⁹⁷ Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 339.

result was a sort of “dual colonialism,” under which system the “Tutsi elites exploited the protection and license extended by the Germans to pursue their internal feuds and to further their hegemony over the Hutus.”¹⁹⁸ Important to note is that differentiation among the Tutsi was common, though they uniformly subverted the Hutu, clan-based rivalry was rife among the new Tutsi factions. In 1919, the League of Nations assigned Rwanda and Burundi to Belgium as a trusteeship territory. Adopting the Hamitic hypothesis, Belgian colonial administrators institutionalized Hutu and Tutsi as two different races, legally embracing the superiority of one over the other. The Belgian authority decreed that only Tutsi could serve in official posts, and all Hutu were officially stripped from any position, as well as banned from higher education. Belgian scientists embraced the Hamitic pretext, weighing Rwandans, measuring their noses, foreheads and height. Tutsi identity was extended to individuals who fit a specific physical appearance, as measured by a nasal index, skin tone and height for example.¹⁹⁹

Another restructuring of society soon followed, as the colonial administration ruled Rwanda in a joint effort with the Roman Catholic Church. Hutu leaders were replaced by Tutsis, and almost unlimited power was extended to the Tutsi elites. Exploitation and discrimination became the norm for the Hutus, and in 1933 ethnic identity cards were issued that “made it virtually impossible for Hutus to become Tutsis, and permitted the Belgians to perfect the administration of an apartheid system rooted in

¹⁹⁸ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 54.

¹⁹⁹ Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor's House*, 88.

the myth of Tutsi superiority.”²⁰⁰ According to Mamdani, the transgression of the colonial legacy went beyond the extermination and subjugation of the natives physically. Instead, the greater crime was to politicize indigeneity in the first place.”²⁰¹ The creation of a ‘ranked’ political structure, complete with institutionalized political identities based on an artificial concept of racial differentiation, is the key to understanding the foundations of ethnic grievances and ethnically based lens through which all political competition will come to be seen.

3.1.4 Fixed Ethnic Races: European, Foreign and Native:

Based on the Hamitic hypothesis, the Tutsi were established as a different *race*, as foreign, alien and superior to the native Hutu. As discussed in the previous section, “only in Rwanda was the notion that the Tutsi were a *race* apart from the majority turned into a rationale for a set of institutions that reproduced the Tutsi as a *racialized* minority. The Tutsi were racialized, not just through an ideology but through a set of institutional reforms that the ideology inspired, in which it was embedded, and which in turn reproduced it.”²⁰² Identity cards, education restriction, forced labor, land allocation and access to jobs were all based on ethnic identity distinctions. Tutsi were Hamites, superior, civilizing and foreign. They were a part of the settlers, yet below the colonizers. By 1930, the education system was under the direct control of the church, which actively

²⁰⁰ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 57.

²⁰¹ Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors*, 14.

²⁰² Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 87.

institutionalized and legitimized the Hamitic hypothesis into the educational framework of all Rwandans.

Life was harsh under Belgian colonization. Hutus experienced a double subjugation, forced to provide communal labor and crops for the foreign Europeans and the alien Tutsis. Local chiefs added additional taxes and demands on the ‘natives’ and failure to comply or meet demands resulted in confiscation of property, fines and/or corporal punishment. The constant demand for more forced labor meant that the fields were neglected. As famine repeatedly struck Rwanda beginning in 1920, a mass migration of Hutu crossed into neighboring Uganda and Zaire. In response to the famine that struck Rwanda, the administration failed not only to establish “a program of public relief through public works, [but] instead instituted a “program where it became compulsory to work for the public power without reward.”²⁰³ At this point, ‘native’ Rwandans were totally excluded from the institutional and administrative capacity of the state. The identity of Hutu and Tutsi was now fixed and permanent, with social mobility no longer possible. Indirect colonization had effectively transformed socio-cultural ‘objective’ identities into ethno-political ‘subjective’ identities complete with deep rooted grievances.

While the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi may be analyzed in a political-economic framework, the salience of ethnic identity is best understood in terms of state power and access to privilege. A narrow focus on economic factors as an analytical paradigm is limited, as economic factors explain the outbreak of violence based on

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 95.

clashes of market-based identities.²⁰⁴ While class and division of labor played a significant role in the creation of ethnic grievances, the focus should rest on the political aspect of identity, fixing access to resources and economic opportunity. As such, it is the political that stands as the starting point of the struggle between the political ‘self’ and the political ‘other,’ as “political identities are the consequence of how power is organized... not only [defining] the parameters of the political community, telling us who is included and who is left out, it also differentiates the bounded political community internally.”²⁰⁵ By the start of the twentieth century, Rwanda had effectively been categorized, ranked and differentiated, complete with an ethnically institutionalized exclusionary framework and a bifurcated state system.

3.1.5 Independence and the Cultivation of a Security Dilemma:

The end of WWII ushered in a new turning point for Rwanda. Flemish priests, reminded of their own struggles for emancipation in Belgium, identified with the marginalized Hutu majority and their aspirations to political access. At the same time, Belgium’s colonies were now under United Nation trusteeship, with increasing pressure being placed on the colonial powers to prepare them for independence and self-rule. It is in this context, that educated Hutus began to call for democratic rule. Important to note is that this quest for a democratic transition was a quest for majoritarian rule, and that “the

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

political struggle in Rwanda was never really a quest for equality; the issues was only who would dominate the ethnically bipolar state.”²⁰⁶

When nine Hutu intellectuals published the *Hutu Manifesto* in 1957, they called for democratic domination not by rejecting the Hamitic hypothesis, but rather by embracing it. The construction of the Tutsi as ‘foreign’ and invading colonizers was embraced as a legitimization for Hutu calls for self-rule. Rwanda belonged to the ethnic indigenous race, and hence the Hutu majority had the right to rule the nation-state, under the principle of “like ruling like.”²⁰⁷ The Bahutu Manifesto “claimed that ‘the conflict between Hutu and Hamite--i.e., ‘foreign-Tutsi’ was at the heart of the Rwandan problem, demanding a “double liberation” of Rwanda—“from the Hamites and Bazungu (white) colonization.”²⁰⁸

At the eve of independence, the colonial administration attempted to ‘deracialize’ the state by creating a certain measure of equality between settler and native--replacing settler rule with native rule.²⁰⁹ Instead of creating a system of equality, however, this process adopted the administrative and institutional colonial legacy, and simply reversed the rule of power; it did not do away with the political identities. The *Hutu manifesto* firmly rejected getting rid of ethnic identity cards, for example, for fear that their elimination would “preventing the statistical law from establishing the reality of facts,’ as

²⁰⁶ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 58.

²⁰⁷ Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

²⁰⁸ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 104.

²⁰⁹ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*.

if being Hutu or Tutsi automatically signified a person's politics."²¹⁰ At the same time, and in line with current nationalist sentiments, Belgium, who was coming under increased criticism for the part it played in the Hutu discrimination, took an active part on the side of Hutu independence and liberation.

Political parties began to emerge along ethnic lines, and a distinct discourse of the Hutu as a 'suppressed mass' was adopted. In 1960 the Belgians established a provisional Rwandan government headed by Gregoire Kayibanda, whose Hutu party had swept the country's local election that year. In 1962 Kayibanda became Rwanda's first post-independence ruler. According to Neuffer, Kayibanda is best described as "an autocratic king disguised as a democrat." Effectively reversing the arrow of discrimination, the Hutu administration marginalized the Tutsi minority "as ferociously as Hutu had been discriminated against before."²¹¹ According to the post-independence report by the United Nations on Rwanda, one "oppressive system has [simply] been replaced by another one."²¹²

While certainly not unexpected, it is nonetheless a historical tragedy that the PARMEHUTU dominated the elections over APROSOMO. The former embraced a nationalist platform based on the colonial heritage--while deracializing the state from the European colonials, implement the same racialized and tribalized institutions—simply returning Rwanda to the 'native' Hutu. APROSOMA, on the other hand, stood for a united Rwanda against privilege, by uniting the poor peasant masses, Hutu and Tutsi,

²¹⁰ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 58.

²¹¹ Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor's House*, 90.

²¹² *Ibid.*

APROSOMO advocated a popular nationalism that could have detribalized Rwanda by eliminating the race based Civil Society and tribal Native Authority.

A “socialist transformation” stood in many ways as the natural enemy of tribalization, as it threatens the localized practice of native administration, land rights and obligations.²¹³ Since both the Tutsi and Hutu communities included significant class stratification, most notably along the North/South divide,²¹⁴ neither group of elites wished to deconstruct the current colonial state structure, but rather to dominate it. In response, both Hutu and Tutsi elites embraced increasing platforms of ethnic nationalism furthering the emerging security dilemma. Fearing a Tutsi mobilization aimed at curtailing their loss of power, the Belgian authority declared a state of emergency, and concluded that the presence of Tutsi as chiefs and sub-chiefs “disturbed the public order.”²¹⁵ Based on this rationale, the Belgians systematically replaced Tutsi chiefs with Hutu chiefs, “thus spearheading a ‘revolution’ against what had hitherto been the colonial power’s own local authority...and [further] augmented a Hutu administration with an embryonic Hutu-dominated military force.”²¹⁶ The institutional reorganization that followed is known as the ‘coup of Gitarama.’

In 1960, the PARAMEHUTU, the Hutu power party, won the communal elections. Under Kayibanda, Hutu power ideology conquered the political mood and the legal institutions, both civil and native, that governed the inhabitants of Rwanda. This

²¹³ Jeremy M Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3.

²¹⁴ Broch-Due and Johan Pottier, “Escape from Genocide: The Political Identity in Rwanda’s Massacres.”

²¹⁵ Guy Logiest, quoted in Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 124.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

meant that Rwanda belonged to the native majority and that power was exclusively administered by Hutu--“Tutsi may live in Rwanda, but only as a resident alien minority, at sufferance of the Hutu nation.”²¹⁷ As Hutu power increased its exclusive power consolidation on Rwandan politics, Tutsi were wholly excluded from the political sphere. Tutsi chiefs were either deposed, killed or fled into exile, where they began planning an armed incursion based on a restoration of the old order. With the first cross-border raids in 1963, Hutu anxiety about a potential reversal of their newly gained political rights unleashed a set of reprisals against the remaining Tutsi community.²¹⁸ The arming of youth wings into state-sponsored militias introduced a routineized violence into Rwandan daily life, setting the stage for a further socio-political and ethnic transformation, culminating in a heightened security dilemma. Between 1959 and 1963, prolonged episodes of violent attacks and massacres—known as *muyaga* (‘the wind’)—left 20’000 Tutsi dead and another 300’000 in exile.²¹⁹

Before 1959 there is no report of systematic political violence in Rwanda. With the change of power from minority to majority rule, however, Tutsi elites and political activists in exile began rebel attacks in the hope of reclaiming power. As Hutu power militias and state forces repulsed each attack, they “vented their frustration on the Tutsi within Rwanda, claiming they had aided those outside. Oppression of the Tutsi was

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 126.

²¹⁸ The Tutsis invasions and the following repressions by Hutus promulgated a cycle of violence, as each side mistrusted the other and felt that pre-emptive attacks were justified and necessary. With each new clash, the security dilemma was reinforced—“what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.” Posen, 104

²¹⁹ Jennifer G. Cooke, “Rwanda: Assessing Risks to Stability” (CSIS- Center For Strategic and International Studies, June 2011), 6.

carried out in the name of self-defense.”²²⁰ Small privately and state-sponsored bands of Hutu youth began a systematic and organized campaign of violence against their Tutsi neighbors, including rape, pillaging, and periodic massacres.

In charge of supervising the growing tension was a Belgian Colonel named Guy Logiest. Defending his decision of non-intervention on behalf of the targeted Tutsi community, Logiest explained that “it was without a doubt the will to give the people back their dignity. And it was probably just as much the desire to put down the arrogance and exposed duplicity of a basically oppressive and unjust aristocracy.”²²¹ The double colonialism that had made life so difficult for Hutus in the past was now wholly reversed, with Tutsis suffering from the same double oppression and discrimination. With increased Hutu power, there was also a rise in organized pillaging, murders, arbitrary arrests and the seizure of Tutsi property. Since the civic sphere was now exclusively dominated by Hutus, access to jobs, education and legal restitution was entirely restricted to the ‘in-group’. A steady stream of Tutsi refugees began pouring out of Rwanda, exporting the ethnic tension of Rwanda and directly impacting the stability of the region.²²²

²²⁰ Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor’s House*, 90.

²²¹ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 60.

²²² In Burundi, for example, the immigrants added to the government’s repression of Hutus. “Hutus were excluded from elite positions and inflicted violence on their leaders. Over time, this repression led to fewer educational opportunities and less economic power for Hutus- but it eventually backfired, resulting in a large- scale Hutu rebellion that entailed Hutu coup attempts, Tutsi countercoups, Hutu massacres of Tutsi in 1965 and 1972, and the involvement of the army and ethnic militants. The lack of democratic governance and the collapse of political and judicial institutions meant that there was no source of legitimate authority that could break the cycle of violence.” Sambanis, 271

3.1.6 The First Republic and the Ethnization of the Bureaucracy:

When Kayibanda became the president of the first republic he stepped up his exclusionary rhetoric. The Kayibanda administration viewed Tutsi and Hutu as two separate nations, “between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different planets.”²²³ Two cross-border raids in 1962 led to the death of six Hutus. In retaliation, Hutu militias killed between 1,000 and 2,000 Tutsi civilians, including men, women and children—homes were burned and pillaged and the property of victims was distributed among the Hutu participants. According to Mamdani, the situation was “worse than anything that had happened during the revolution, [as] repression joined political violence to redistribution of property, rewarding perpetrators with benefits.”²²⁴ Opportunity for economic gain now intermingled with past grievances and calls for redistributive justice. With each act of political outbidding and violence, the political “other” was dehumanized, resulting in further ethnic polarization. Bloodshed became conceivable, and popular support towards the notion of a total eradication moved a step closer to being a viable solution towards a purified state. Moderates who advocated compromise were seen as ‘out-group’ collaborators and traitors to their community, seeking to cheat the traditionally repressed of their long awaited justice. The notion that the survival of one group became dependent on the extinction of the other began to take on real form.

²²³ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 127.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 129.

Gerard Prunier saw the First Republic as a continuation of the same colonial political system, simply in reverse. According to Prunier, “what would later be touted as ‘social revolution’ resembled more an ethnic transfer of power. It was a fight between competing elites, the newly-developed Hutu counter-elite produced by the church, and the older neo-traditionalist Tutsi elite which the colonial authorities had promoted since 1920s.”²²⁵ The key causal mechanisms that set the stage for the upcoming civil war and genocide was rooted in the colonial period, and fixed in the post-colonial regime. As Rwanda faced increased economic downturns, and the Kayibanda’s regime faced increased criticism, the focus on a common enemy increased. Desperate to consolidate power, Kayibanda blamed the Tutsi exiles and civilians for the problems that faced the new republic. His ethno-nationalist rhetoric resonated among the public,²²⁶ particularly among the educated but unemployed Hutus. Unfolding events in Rwanda had a significant impact on the region.

In terms of understanding these developments in the context of this thesis, the revolution is of significance precisely because of its limitations. Real social, political and economic gains were achieved in regards to the empowerment of previously subjugated Hutus, including the abolition of forced labor and corporal punishment. Additionally a land distribution program to the poor and landless Hutu was established. What the revolution failed to do, however, is breakdown the colonial institutional legacy by

²²⁵ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 50.

²²⁶ “The Hutu memories of preindependence Rwanda had been passed down through the generations, and Hutu children could recite at length the sins the Tutsi had committed against their forefathers.” Power, 337

rejecting the colonial political identities that tied ethnicity to state sponsored in/exclusion and the allocation of resources and state benefits. If the goal of the revolution was to liberate Rwanda from colonialism, then the revolution can be seen as a failure. While it liberated Rwanda physically from the presence of the European colonizers and shifted power to the subjugated Hutus, it failed to deconstruct the political binary system and instead institutionalized the ethnic bureaucracy in post-colonial Rwanda.

3.1.7 The Second Republic and Multiparty Elections:

1973 proved to be another difficult year for Tutsis, particularly students. All across Rwanda, Tutsi students were targeted, expelled, beaten, harassed and uprooted from their homes. The trigger that unleashed this set of reprisals was in response to unfolding events in Burundi, where the political landscape appeared very much like Rwanda's "through a bloody looking glass."²²⁷ In Burundi, a Tutsi military regime held power and Hutus lived in a constant state of oppression and fear. Inspired by the success of Hutu power in Rwanda, Burundian Hutus attempted a rebellion in 1972. The uprising was crushed, and in the name of restoring "peace and order, the army conducted a nationwide campaign of extermination against educated Hutus, in which a lot of unschooled Hutus were murdered as well. The genocidal frenzy in Burundi exceeded anything that had preceded it in Rwanda."²²⁸ It is estimated that over a hundred thousand

²²⁷ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 67.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

Hutus were murdered in Burundi, and that at least double that number fled as refugees to Rwanda, further exacerbating tensions.

In July, the head of the army Major General Habyarimana, established the Second Republic in a bloodless coup. Representing the Northern-based Hutu communities, Habyarimana ousted Southern-based Kayibanda after growing resentment over perceived home-base favoritism.²²⁹ Declaring that “Rwandans should live in peace and work together for development,”²³⁰ ethnic hatred had achieved its goals in the form of the coup and a new ruling power consolidation. That same year, Habyarimana changed the constitution and officially established Rwanda as a one-party state. Under the new regime, certain rules that subjugated Tutsi were still prevalent, however, Habyarimana did not advocate the pogroms that were common in the previous administration. Although members of the military were not allowed to marry (or be) Tutsi, Habyarimana eventually elected two Tutsi to his parliament and one to a ministerial post. According to Neuffer, both Hutus and Tutsis tend to remember the first years of Habyarimana’s rule with some nostalgia. Rwanda was opened to the West amidst promises to restore national unity. By utilizing the power of the military, the Rwanda Armed Forces (FAR) and the Presidential Guard, the Habyarimana regime set about consolidating control. Rwanda was to have only one party, and that party was controlled by Habyarimana and his Northern base.²³¹

²²⁹ Jennifer G. Cooke, “Rwanda: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 6.

²³⁰ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 69.

²³¹ Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor’s House*, 93.

In 1986 the economy began to crumble, as drought resulted in major food shortages, while the price of coffee dropped by almost fifty percent. Additionally, the long ignored Diaspora began to make its presence felt as refugees demanded the right to return to their homelands. External influence also began to play an increased role in Rwanda during the Second Republic. Once hailed as the ‘Switzerland of Africa,’ the World Bank was citing Rwanda as “one of the three *worst* performing sub-Saharan countries when it came to food production.”²³² The country suffered from chronic land shortages, overpopulation, a lack of technological innovation, and severe land degradation. As economic hardship spread, forced labor and discontent with the government soared. A growing income disparity between Hutu and Tutsi, and further between Hutu from the north and south, led to growing resentment and increased evidence of state sponsored repression against Tutsi and Hutu critical of the ruling regime.

By 1988 Rwanda depended on foreign aid to feed itself, and the conditions of foreign loans had the adverse effect of dramatically pushing up prices. The country’s gross domestic product per capita fell by over 40 percent in four years, and “by the early 1990’s, 50 percent of Rwandans were hungry and unable to feed themselves. As the population increased, land became more and more scarce, a situation that particularly affected the rural areas.”²³³ After the implementation of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program, the Rwandan currency declined rapidly, leading to a spike in the deficit from 12

²³² Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 146.

²³³ Neuffer, *The Key to My Neighbor’s House*, 95.

to 19 percent of GDP by 1993. Life was difficult for all Rwandans, Hutu and Tutsi alike. While land alienation and economic shocks had a significant impact on mounting tensions in Rwanda, these factors alone are not sufficient to explain the outbreak of the genocide in 1994. According to Mamdani, “there was nothing exceptional about the economic crisis that beset Rwanda. It was shared by many an African economy undergoing IMF-supervised structural adjustment. It is not the economic, but the political crisis that would set Rwanda apart from its neighbors in the decade to come.”²³⁴ Instead evidence suggest that economic and political marginalization along Hutu vs. Tutsi and Northern Hutu vs. Southern Hutu increased feelings of relative horizontal deprivation, fueling frustrations and elite commitment to power consolidation.

As the Second Republic increasingly fell into economic decline and emerged as a totalitarian regime, Habyarimana alienated Hutus further by drawing his entourage almost exclusively from his home base. As the country got poorer, the President and his followers became noticeably richer, and a regional split between Hutus in the south and Habyarimana’s northwest district solidified. According to Pottier and Hilsum, tensions in Rwandan politics were exceptionally high, not merely concerning issues of racial-ethnicity (Hutu vs. Tutsi), but also about the political control and the consolidation of power among Hutu ethnic groups (North vs. South). Highlighting the misconception of homogeneous ethnic bipolarity in Rwanda, power among the Hutu was regionally allocated along pre-colonial kinship clans-- “being a Hutu was not enough, you had to be

²³⁴ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 149.

a Hutu from the president's northwestern region."²³⁵ The economic crisis clearly emphasized this divide and the failure of independence to provide a better life for the majority of Hutus created bitter resentment as value expectations were not met. The justice that the Revolution promised to deliver was based on the righting of historical wrongs. By further adopting a moderated stance towards the Tutsis, many Hutu felt that they had been robbed of their social justice by the administration. The Second Republic was soon being attacked as pro-Tutsi. Further, elite land-grabbing schemes and corruption exacerbated frustrations among ordinary Hutu. In what appeared to be a regression towards colonial conditions, the administration increased taxes and forced labor to compensate for the lack of funds, so that by 1989 a combination of insufficient rains and poor resource management created increased famine and starvation.

Hutu elite, who felt cheated from the fruits of independence, began to form an opposition platform critical of the current administration. It was not long before Habyarimana's critics "suffered so-called automobile accidents,"²³⁶ increasing widespread international concern and domestic discontent. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Western nations began to demand that Habyarimana embrace true democratic principles and embrace a multiparty political system. Faced with donor withdrawal, Habyarimana's agreement to multiparty elections was a capitulation of foreign coercion and provoked widespread alarm among the more militant Hutus, who feared a change in

²³⁵ Broch-Due and Johan Pottier, "Escape from Genocide: The Political Identity in Rwanda's Massacres," 198.

²³⁶ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 81.

the political balance with Tutsi inclusion.²³⁷ Cementing these fears, on October 1, 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)--largely comprised of second-generation Tutsi exiles from Uganda—launched their first invasion of Rwanda, starting the Rwandan Civil War.

3.1.8 Outbreak of Civil War and the creation of a Genocide:

The RPF invasion of 1990 was widely conceived as a Tutsi attempted to regain political power amongst Rwandan Hutu. In the face of growing in-group tensions, the RPF invasion “offered the Habyarimana oligarchy its best weapon yet against pluralism: the unifying specter of a common enemy. Following the logic of the state ideology - that identity equals politics and politics equals identity - all Tutsis were considered to be RPF accomplices, and Hutus who failed to subscribe to this view were counted as Tutsi-loving traitors.”²³⁸ Any political middle ground had effectively been eliminated.

Almost immediately, lists naming educated, successful Tutsi were circulated. In addition, critics of Habyarimana were equally targeted. Just ten days after the RPF invasion, local officials in Kibilira “instructed Hutus that their communal work duty for the month consist of fighting their Tutsi neighbors.”²³⁹ According to Mamdani, the violence was “not a violence against one who is seen as a neighbor but against one who is seen as a foreigner, not a violence that targets a transgression across a boundary into home but one that seeks to eliminate a foreign presence from home soil, literally and

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 82.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 84.

physically.”²⁴⁰ Every Tutsi was perceived as a RPF sympathizer. The Minister of Justice, Stanislas Mbonampeka, highlighted this perception when he claimed that “there was no difference between the ethnic and the political...Ninety-nine percent of the Tutsis were pro-RPF.”²⁴¹ Hassan Ngeze, editor of the Hutu power paper *kangura*, stated that the RPF invasion was part of a “Tutsi supremacist conspiracy to subjugate Hutus in feudal bondage,”²⁴² and went on to published the Hutu Ten Commandments, mirroring colonial ethnic and racial differentiations.

By 1992, Rwanda began to arm itself. Despite the economic downturn, the government spent nearly 70 percent of its budget on the military, and under the tutelage of the French, the Rwandan Army increased by almost five times its original size. Rwanda’s political parties began recruiting youths and armed them with machetes, small arms, and hand grenades. Among the most violent were Habyarimana’s right-wing Mouvement Revolutionaire pour le De`veloppement party (MRND), known as the *Interahamwe*, and the Coalition pour la De`fense de la Re`publique (CDR). The economic collapse of the late 1980’s had left “tens of thousands of young men without any prospect of a job, wasting in idleness and its attendant resentments, ripe for recruitment.”²⁴³ When ‘Hutu Power’ radio announced a supposed Tutsis plot to murder all Hutus, the *interhamwe* led the attack in a preemptive strike of self-defense, killing three hundred Tutsi in three days.

²⁴⁰ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 14.

²⁴¹ Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*, 98.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 86.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 93.

Ever mindful of international perceptions and the desire for foreign aid, the Habyarimana government “portrayed the killings as ‘spontaneous’ and ‘popular’ acts of ‘anger’ and ‘self-protection.’”²⁴⁴ In reality, the attacks were planned and systematic. Town meetings were called, where the native authority ordered the massacres in the ‘traditional’ language of communal ‘work’ assignments. Economic motivation also played an encouraging role, as the land and possessions of the slain were confiscated. Gourevitch describes the genocide as an extension of community building. The task may not be pleasurable for many, but it was viewed as a necessity--“Killing Tutsis was a political tradition in postcolonial Rwanda; it brought people together.”²⁴⁵

When Habyarimana agreed to sign the Arusha Peace Agreement with the RPF in 1993, amidst intense international pressure, the monopoly of the state to control the use of violence had already been lost. Hutu power militias were operating with complete impunity, and as the president’s plane was shot down on April 6th 1994, the last restraint to the unleashing of a genocide was removed.²⁴⁶ Within the first five days, over 20,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were systematically killed. Advocating pre-emptive self-defense, Hutu power radio RTLM chimed “We won’t let you kill. We will kill you.”²⁴⁷ The violence was brutal and personal, as “neighbors hacked neighbors to death in their homes, and colleagues hacked colleagues to death in their workplace. Doctors killed their

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 94.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 96.

²⁴⁶ Responsibility as to who shot down the president’s plane remains contested. Allegations abound that the president was targeted by the Hutu Power opposition, who resented Habyarimana’s home-base favoritism and willingness to compromise on the Arusha Agreement. See Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families*.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 114.

patients and school teachers killed their pupils.”²⁴⁸ Looting and rape became the norm, as young militia men were transported by bus from slaughter to slaughter, as if to a series of football games. Besides purifying the country, the genocide provided the added incentives of a new house, new land, radios, clothes, and the opportunity to rape. Money was offered for ‘cabbage’, a term applied to buying the heads of decapitated Tutsis,²⁴⁹ and “the work of the killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land, and every citizen was responsible for its administration.”²⁵⁰ When the RPF finally reached Kigali in July, effectively ending the genocide, an estimated 800’000 to 1’000’000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu (considered Tutsi collaborators) had been systematically killed by militias, state-forces and civilians alike.

3.1.9 Conclusion

The genocide in Rwanda was by no means a foregone conclusion. According to Mamdani, “just because the genocide took place within the boundaries of Rwanda, it did not mean that either the dynamics that led to it or the dynamics it unleashed in turn were confined to Rwanda.”²⁵¹ A historic set of institutional frameworks that bifurcated the state and created both ranked and differentiated groups in Rwanda, became the post-colonial framework for Rwandan independence. The ‘objective’ ethnicities became

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 115.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 123.

²⁵¹ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, xiii.

subjective under indirect colonialism, and further political after independence. As Hutu in-group competition for state-control mixed with fears of a Tutsi power-reversal, political outbidding further polarized ethno-racial (Hutu vs. Tutsi) and ethno-political (North vs. Southern Hutu) identities. The precedent was firmly established that the liberation of one race would be at the cost of the other, creating a security dilemma exacerbated by economic decline and renewed fears over power relations with the advent of multiparty elections. While the unfolding events in 1994 may appear as a sort of collective madness, mob mentality, or ancient genocidal hatred, “the ground for genocide had been well prepared.”²⁵²

The next sections of this thesis will examine the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, demonstrating that the three historic studies represent three points on a trajectory towards a potential for ethnonationalist violence. While Tanzania escaped the conflicts that became so prevalent in Kenya, Rwanda signifies the most extreme example of ethnic nation-building, failing both to deracialize and detribalize the state in its quest for “a postcolonial pursuit of justice so relentless that it turned into revenge.”²⁵³ As the next sections on Kenya and Tanzania will show, both states experienced the same bifurcated state system, and inherited a similar set of institutions and ‘tribalized’ ethnic groups. However, while Julius Nyerere of Tanzania rejected the colonial identities and advocated the creation of a national and common citizenry, Kenyatta of Kenya, like Kayibanda of Rwanda, embraced the colonial legacy and ethnonationalist basis for state compet

²⁵² Jennifer G. Cooke, “Rwanda: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 8.

²⁵³ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 33.

3.2 The Case of Kenya:

As far as the international community was concerned, Kenya in 2007 represented a model case of stability and opportunity.²⁵⁴ Nairobi boasts the UN's third largest base and the US' largest regional diplomatic mission, hosting a 'who's who' of foreign diplomats, dignitaries and multinational corporations. Kenya was a place where foreign governments parked their fleets and prestigious companies opened their offices. Unlike many of its dysfunctional neighbors, political economists rated Kenya's likelihood for Civil War after initiating multiparty elections at just 1%²⁵⁵ and with annual growth rates of over 6%, optimistic economists forecast "Kenya following East Africa's tigers and becoming another Newly Industrialized Country (NIC)."²⁵⁶ Just five years after Kibaki's election heralded the dawn of a new inclusive and accountable Kenya, however, his disputed 2007 reelection unleashed intense and brutal ethnic violence across the country. Almost overnight, "the myth of Kenyan exceptionalism—the notion that chaos associated with other parts of Africa simply 'didn't happen here'—[was] forever laid to rest."²⁵⁷ In images reminiscent of Rwanda's genocide, the world watched in horror as Kenyans took to the street with machetes, set up ID checkpoints and systematically massacred ethnic

²⁵⁴ Dorina Akosua Oduraa Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, eds., "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis," in *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2012), 154.

²⁵⁵ According to the CH model, risk of Civil War in Kenya during the 1990s was approximately 1%. K N, 124

²⁵⁶ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis," 154.

²⁵⁷ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 316.

members associated with the political opposition. In the months that followed the contested 2007 presidential elections, approximately 1500 people were killed and another 700'000 displaced.²⁵⁸

The crisis that rocked Kenya was largely unexpected. Widely considered “a bastion of peace and stability in a volatile region,” consistently high voter turnout, steady economic growth and relatively peaceful past elections made Kenya a model emerging democracy.²⁵⁹ Unsurprisingly, there was another side to Kenya, one which increasingly placed Kenya below the average for most of the World Bank’s Sub-Saharan Governance Indicators, including control of corruption,²⁶⁰ robust institutions, rule of law, effective governance and political stability.²⁶¹ The optimistic growth rates registered annually masked a growing inequality gap, as the number of poor spiked from 3.7 million in 1973 to 15 million in 2000.²⁶² Gross disparity in income distribution was also evident, with the poorest 20% of rural Kenyans garnering only 3.5% of the national income, most notably along distinct ethno-regional lines (UNDP 1999).²⁶³ Further, the upsurge of large-scale violence in 2007 correlated with a well tested political “strategy used and endorsed by political elites to secure control of the center, and by ordinary citizens to gain access to

²⁵⁸ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 2.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ ‘Kenya has frequently ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency International 2005. LL 231

²⁶¹ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 146.

²⁶² Liisa Laakso, “Insights into Electoral Violence in Africa,” in *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, ed. Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler (Stockholm; Scottsville, South Africa: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet ; University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 230.

²⁶³ Ibid.

land and other sources and/or as a form of preemptive defense.”²⁶⁴ Notwithstanding the widespread international shock at the violent outbreak, and the frequent references to Kenya historic existence as a “peaceful idyll,” 2007 was not the first time that ethnonationalist conflict shook the country.²⁶⁵ Violent campaigning and the outfitting and mobilization of ethnically based political youth wings led to ‘ethnic clashes’ in 1991, 1992 and 1997, resulting in an estimated fifteen hundred casualties and 300’000 displaced persons in Western Kenya alone.²⁶⁶

This case study will outline how the historic context of Kenya’s colonial heritage of ethnic differentiation and post-colonial competition for state control led to the 2007 violence as a strategic continuation of the previous cycles of violence--“consistent with ethnic readings of the past and present, mutually incompatible interpretations of social justice.”²⁶⁷ Rejecting the notion that Kenya’s past history of violence consisted of isolated instances of ‘sporadic ethnic clashes’ or ‘tribal banditry,’²⁶⁸ I will examine the identifiable preconditions that led to the 2007 ethnic violence, by examining the pre-colonial ethnic environment of Kenya, and the formation of current ethno-political identities and salient cleavages in the context of the post-colonial nation-state formation. In particular, I will examine the ethnic (tribalization and differentiation of ethnic groups into political ethnicities), socio-economic (growing inequality and group based

²⁶⁴ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 3.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Njuguna S. Ndung’u, “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?,” 124.

distributional inequalities), political (non-programmatic coalitions of convenience and the strategic use of violence) and institutional (highly centralized presidency and state bureaucracy) roots that set the stage for the 2007 post-election violence. According to Wrong, much of what takes place in Kenya “becomes incomprehensible if you try stripping ethnicity from the equation.”²⁶⁹ As with the Rwandan Case study, I will analyze the causes and the consequences of Kenya’s state formation, focusing particularly on the history of inclusion, exclusion, differentiation and post-colonial institution building that set the stage for Kenya’s 2007 post-election massacres.

3.2.1 Objective Identity in Pre-Colonial Kenya:

The territory that comprises present day Kenya emerged as a mosaic of diversity resulting from several waves of displacement and assimilation. Like Rwanda, the evolution of Kenya’s peopling can be traced back to a set of migrations. The first of these was the Bantu migration beginning around 2000 BC, originating in the West and eventually settling all across East, Central and Southern Africa. Like the Hutu of Rwanda, a large proportion of Kenya’s “42 distinct tribal groups”²⁷⁰ trace their origins to these Bantu migrants, including the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, Kamba, Luhya, Gusii, Kisii and Tharaka to name a few.²⁷¹ Around the 15th century, a second significant migration

²⁶⁹ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*.

²⁷⁰ Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Njuguna S. Ndung’u, “Sporadic Ethnic Violence: Why Has Kenya Not Experienced a Full-Blown Civil War?,” 126.

²⁷¹ Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics* (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 23, <http://site.ebrary.com/id/10394377>.

took place, as Nilotic and Cushitic groups pushed down from the North, and settled among the Bantu people. Modern day descendents in Kenya, like the Tutsi in Rwanda, include the Maasai, Kalenjin, Turkana, Samburu and Luo. On the coast, Omani Arab traders settled and interacted with local populations since the seventh century, transforming coastal communities and adding further diversity to the rich variety of different cultural identities already in existence.²⁷²

While these migrations were not always peaceful, pre-colonial inter-communal conflicts in Kenya lacked the ethnic dimension that has come to define them today. According to Lynch, “pre-colonial African identities were fluid, permeable, overlapping, and complex, [whereas] the more bounded and politically pertinent ethnicities of today are a modern phenomenon and a legacy of a colonial order of delineated control.”²⁷³ While clashes between the purely pastoral Maasai and the *shamba* dwelling Kikuyu over territory pre-dates the arrival of colonials for example, the two communities also intermarried and benefitted from each other, most notably by Maasai trading cattle with their “mixed farming neighbors.”²⁷⁴

Ethnicity existed in its ‘objective’ sense. Social status depended on various indicators such as age group and kinship ties in some communities, while “fundamental identity was tied up with their mode of existence,” in others.²⁷⁵ The Kikuyu for instance, did not assemble in localized villages, but rather shared power in a decentralized fashion,

²⁷² Ibid., 24.

²⁷³ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 14.

²⁷⁴ Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, 24.

²⁷⁵ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity.*, 103.

whereby the *kiamba*, or councils of elders, debated key communal issues.²⁷⁶ While age sets and kinship were the most important identity factors among many communities such as the Kikuyu, “kinship as a basis of association was never strictly descent-based,” and instead was tied to larger interrelated communal networks.²⁷⁷

While this point has already been made, it is important to keep in mind that the ethnic groupings that exist in Kenya today, and the ethnic communities that existed in pre-colonial Kenya are not the same, though in some instances the ‘tribal’ names may be. Pre-colonial societies that are currently known as the Kikuyu, for instance, did not self-identify as such. According to Heyer, what today spans various ‘ethnic groups’ such as the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu, was a single fluid network of communities, in which “exogamous ties between individual *mbari* (sub-clan) were central to the Kikuyu social economy. In this was maintained a particular definition of the relationship between sociality and wealth whereby movement and inter-clan relationships were dominant over individualism and intra-clan relationships.”²⁷⁸ Similarly, what today is known as the ‘Kalenjin,’ did not exist as a ‘tribe’ in pre-colonial Kenya, but rather “is a recent construct, dating from the mid-twentieth century, when it came to embrace a number of sub-groups²⁷⁹ administered as separate ‘tribes’ by the colonial authorities.”²⁸⁰ Similar

²⁷⁶ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 103.

²⁷⁷ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity*, 105.

²⁷⁸ Vigdis Broch-Due and Amrik Heyer, eds., in *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 46.

²⁷⁹ The exact composition of these sub-groups are often the topic of contestation as well, but are most common listed as including the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Sabaot, Pokot and Terik (wo are sometimes bracketed together with the Nandi.” Lynch, p. 4).

²⁸⁰ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 3.

amalgamations and differentiations are evident for all of Kenya's currently listed 'official ethnic groups,'²⁸¹ including Kenya's most salient political identities such as the Maasai, Luo, Luhya, Kisii and Mijikenda.²⁸²

It is in this context that Sir Charles Eliot arrived in present day Kenya and found a territory roughly the size of France inhabited by a mere couple of million indigenous Africans.²⁸³ In what is a prime example of European misreading of the local context, Eliot declared that what "we have in East Africa [is] the rare experience of dealing with a *tabula rosa*—an almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where we can do what we will."²⁸⁴ Far from uninhabited and unclaimed, however, much of Kenya's most productive land was in reality very much in use—"the well-watered foothills of Mount Kenya were being intensively farmed by the Kikuyu; the nomadic Maasai drove their cattle the length of the Rift Valley; and on the western fringes of this natural cleft Nandi-speaking tribes—later to be rebaptised the Kalinjin—tended crops and livestock."²⁸⁵

²⁸¹ The Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics for example, uses the labels 'tribe,' 'nationality' and 'ethnic affiliation' synonymously. See <http://www.knbs.or.ke/censusetnic.php>

²⁸² Currently, the 'Maasai' subsume all Maa speakers, including the Samburu, Chamus, Maasai, Ariaal, Arusha and Laikipiak. The Maasai themselves incorporate 18 sections spanning across Kenya and Tanzania. See for example <http://www.maasai-association.org/maasai.html>. Further, the Luhya subsume 16 other Bantu sub-groups, while both the Luo and Kisii also subsume dozens of sub-clans. Similarly, the Mijikenda label incorporates the Giriama, Digo, Rabai, Chonyi, Kauma, Ribe, Duruma, and Jiban. The important point to take from this is that the popularly accepted ethnic landscape of Kenya as comprising of 42 or sometimes 50 'ethnic groups,' as with the bipolar view of Rwanda, is deeply misleading. This brief overview is geared at demonstrating the wider communities that were at times split and at other times amalgamated to create new tribal administrative districts. As these tribal units were not entirely invented, nor entirely 'primordial,' this understanding sets the stage for post-colonial 'ethnic block' formations apparent today. See also Posner, 261

²⁸³ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 46.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

While it would be a gross misstatement to claim that ethnic distinctions did not exist in pre-colonial Kenya, as socially salient political identities they did not. Far from Kenya's tribes being rooted in history, "what is believed to be traditional society is not something that has existed in any past. It is essentially what has existed in the colonial and neo-colonial present."²⁸⁶ With the granting of a royal charter to the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888, Kenya was set to be transformed. In this next section I will examine how Kenya's colonial experience altered the social, cultural, political and economic conditions of the region, by tribalizing "numerous stateless societies."²⁸⁷ into ethno-political administrative units, converting Kenya's objective ethnic affiliations into differentiated 'subjective' ethnic identities.

3.2.2 Colonialism and Subjective Ethnicity in Kenya:

The colonial territory that would become known as Kenya emerged almost as a by-product of German and British imperial competition. Setting their sights on the resource rich Kingdom of Bagunda, Britain's Queen Victoria granted the Imperial British East Africa Company a charter in 1888 to build a railroad linking the Swahili coast to Lake Victoria. As such, Kenya's formation was the result of a strategic go-between, "a geographical access route to somewhere seen as far more important."²⁸⁸ When the

²⁸⁶ Yusufu Bala Usman, *Beyond Fairy Tales: Selected Historical Writing of Yusufu Bala Usman*. (Zaria, Nigeria: Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research, 2006).

²⁸⁷ Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, 24.

²⁸⁸ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 46.

Imperial British East Africa Company went bankrupt in 1895, Britain established the British East Africa Protectorate, imported thousands of Indian indentured laborers and completed over 1000km of railroad track connecting Kisumu to Mombasa. The railroad would have a central implication for the development of Kenya and the transformation of her people, ensuring that Kenya became the strategic hub for the regions development, and correspondingly, a British ‘settler colony.’²⁸⁹

Between 1903 and 1950, close to a hundred thousand land-hungry *Wazungu* flocked from Britain to Kenya’s fertile lands, necessitating a series of regulations by the turn of the century in order to satisfy the growing demand for European settlement farms.²⁹⁰ Decreeing that any “waste and unoccupied land” would become Crown property, Britain took full advantage of the transitory nature of native land occupation, appropriating large tracts of ‘uninhabited’ land and subsequently disposing of it as they saw fit—“usually in the form of 99-and 999-year leases to settlers.”²⁹¹ By the time Kenya became an official crown colony 25 years later, white settlement was securely institutionalized.²⁹²

Unsurprisingly, it was the most fertile areas where land alienation was most common. As the colonial administration established the ‘White Highlands,’ it simultaneously dispossessed numerous ethnic communities, most notably Kenya’s pastoralist, of their traditional grazing grounds. Land allocation was not the colonial

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 47.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, 47.

administration's only challenge however. Faced with a burgeoning need for cheap labor to satisfy Kenya's developing cash crop economy, and a shortage of colonial administrators to directly ensure alien rule, Britain approached the 'native question,' with a practice long perfected via its previous colonial experiences—Indirect colonial rule.²⁹³

3.2.3 British Indirect Rule and Subjective Ethnicity:

Assessing the historic backdrop on the eve of colonialism, pre-colonial Kenyans were undoubtedly aware of cultural differences among their ethnic communities. From modes of subsistence, to language, customs and social structures, Kenya's indigenous groups were certainly diverse. This awareness, however, "was a fluid, shifting concept,"²⁹⁴ and directly at odds with the European imaginings of every 'native' belonging to a tribe and tribal homeland. In essence, "the settlers wanted Africans to act small, think local."²⁹⁵ As previously explored in this thesis, the practice of indirect rule was a distinct system of colonial administration via an ethnically based substructure of governance, whereby colonial policy was implemented and enforced by a 'native traditional' leadership.²⁹⁶

This "doctrine of differentiation" was not aimed at assimilating the native population and civilizing them in the image of Europeans. Instead, indirect rule demanded "specifically 'native' institutions through which to rule subjects, but the

²⁹³ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 3.

²⁹⁴ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 49.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 150.

institutions so defined and enforced were not racial as much as ethnic, not ‘native’ as much as ‘tribal.’ Racial dualism was thereby anchored in a politically enforced ethnic pluralism.”²⁹⁷ As such, the state in Kenya was to be bifurcated, whereby ‘native’ Africans were excluded from a racialized civil society, but administered to locally by a customary authority—operating at the behest of, but subordinate to the racialized state authority.

According to Mamdani, the European imaginings of what a tribal society ‘traditionally’ looked like, was based on a single model of native authority—“monarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian.” As such, what colonials interpreted as legitimate customary tradition, “presumed a king at the centre of every polity, a chief on every piece of administrative ground, and a patriarch in every homestead or kraal.”²⁹⁸ The fact that most of Kenya’s ethnic communities did not fit the British idea of a model ‘traditional’ society in no way hindered the establishment of ‘native authorities.’ According to Iliffe, Colonial officials set out to map and demarcate the local population, to uncover and define ‘tribes’ and to identify tribal leaders with whom they could work.²⁹⁹ Where none could be found, as in the many ‘stateless societies’³⁰⁰ of Kenya, “the British simply appointed their own chiefs from the ranks of the translators, mercenaries and other ‘friendly’ willing to collaborate.”³⁰¹ This process often translated into the creation of

²⁹⁷ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 7.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 39.

²⁹⁹ Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 318–319.

³⁰⁰ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 39.

³⁰¹ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 48.

entirely new ethnic groups, or the amalgamation of certain ‘unnatural’ groups under the dominion of other, more structured communities.³⁰² The ‘traditional native’ “Chiefship was similarly manufactured and chiefs imposed—“If marginal men who shifted alliances at the sight of a more powerful invader could not be found, others were brought in from the outside.”³⁰³

By simple virtue of their social structure, mode of subsistence and highly coveted traditional grazing grounds, the greatest losers in this process were without a doubt Kenya’s pastoral communities.³⁰⁴ As colonial recognition of traditional landownership rights were based on evidence of permanent villages, more often than not, societies like the Maasai, Nandi (later on Kalenjin) and Samburu, lost access to significant portions of their traditional grazing grounds. Further, since these ‘stateless communities’ rarely followed a strict hierarchical structure, “colonial imposition could not resonate with any aspect of tradition,”³⁰⁵ further setting them at a disadvantage in the new colonial landscape. As previously examined, such differentiation in opportunities leads directly to the juxtaposition of ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ group perceptions. The impact of indirect rule on Kenyan ethno-nationalist identity formation was immense. By the early 20th century, each community had been classified into a tribal unit, and tied to a ‘tribal homeland.’ The superimposed and collaborative ‘native’ administration was then tasked with formulating ‘customary’ laws for each tribal district, as well as classifications as to

³⁰² Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 318–319.

³⁰³ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 41.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

which groups settled in the district were ‘native’ and which were ‘migrants.’ Since only those groups designated as ‘native’ by the native authority could participate in public affairs “and claim land in the tribal homeland,”³⁰⁶ certain groups found themselves systematically disenfranchised in the only home they had ever known. Ethnicity hence became reified into tribe, and redefined as “culture pinned to a homeland, culture in fixity, politicized, so that it does not move.”³⁰⁷

While the initial notion of a tribal Africa was an artificial construct of the colonial imagining, the bifurcation of the state into national laws between races, and native laws between tribes, created a “politics of territoriality,” whereby “understandings of who is ‘really local’ associated the relevant *demos* with a spatially fixed *ethnos*.”³⁰⁸ Further, the perception that some groups lost more than others, and the fact that some communities were being administered by an ethnic ‘other,’ fostered a sense of in-group ethnic differentiation and consciousness, providing Kenyans “with powerful incentives to imagine ethnic content and to think and act ethnically.”³⁰⁹

By 1938, Kenya had been subdivided into twenty-four native reserves, each a ‘tribal’ homeland to a newly constructed ethnic configuration. The fertile ‘White Highlands’ remained exclusively open to European settlement only, prohibiting Africans from owning any land in that area. Natives were issued with tribal passports, and African men were prohibited from travelling outside their native reserve unless they carried their

³⁰⁶ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity*, 3.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁰⁸ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 18.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

tribal identity card, the *kipande*, around their necks. As population numbers soared, and the native reserves became increasingly overcrowded, land became the most scarce and valued asset to all natives, henceforth to be distributed along purely ethnic lines. Natives who had been catalogued as originally alien in origin, and hence of a migrant status, faced increased taxes, forced labor and total exclusion from the administrative participation and legal projection. Ethnic ‘origin’ superseded all claims to residence, meaning that no matter how many generations a group had been living on a newly demarcated reserve, they would never achieve ‘native’ status. Such groups, who refused to assimilate to the conditions, were forcibly relocated to their perceived homeland of origin, usually an equally overcrowded reserve totally foreign to them, inhabited by strangers hostile to their arrival.³¹⁰ The most lasting legacy that has emerged from this period in Kenyan history is the association by certain ethnic groups “with a particular area, as geographic space became intertwined with a sense of legitimate control and rightful occupancy by particular *ethnie*.”³¹¹ What previously existed as fluid ethnicities was now transformed into competitive tribalism. Ethnic reserves were administered like miniature nation-states, each fiercely guarded from ‘foreign’ encroachments.

3.2.4 Ethnic Migrants: ‘Foreign’ vs. ‘Native’ Homelands

According to Horowitz, despite all ‘native groups being structurally subjugated under the colonial administration, certain ethnic groups emerged as ‘advanced’ by virtue

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

of an uneven ethnic distribution of colonial opportunity. Opportunities included factors such as location and community structures as already discussed, but also consisted of diverging responses adopted by various communities, such as “self-selection for migration, education and employment.”³¹² By 1920, the colonial administration introduced laws banning native Africans from competing with European farmers, “who alone enjoyed the right to grow tea, coffee, pyrethrum and other crops for export.”³¹³ This development of a white-settler economy, restructured the land from a means of subsistence, to a means of wealth, as the colonial administration developed the cash crop industry linked to the global markets, and the burgeoning demand for agricultural goods.³¹⁴ Since white-owned farms were chronically short of labor, the colonial government further levied a hut and poll tax, effectively forcing Africans to migrate out of their reserves in order to seek paid work as farm-hands.³¹⁵ Accordingly, it was the traditionally farming communities like the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and Kisii, who migrated en masse from “regions too poor to support their populations,” that could meet this instrumental need, and who further had a comparative advantage to pastoralist communities in terms of required labor skills. According to Horowitz, “by the time of independence, about two out of every five Kikuyu lived outside their home region.”³¹⁶ Further, and unlike the Maasai and Nandi communities whose rejection of assimilation and farming left them condemned to marginalization, “many Kikuyu eagerly embraced

³¹² Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 151.

³¹³ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 47.

³¹⁴ Broch-Due and Amrik Heyer, 46.

³¹⁵ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 47.

³¹⁶ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 153.

the new ways, deciding that the route to success lay in adopting Christianity and Western Customs.”³¹⁷ Ironically, it was at the same time that politics, ethnicity, and territoriality were irrevocably linked, that “economic imperatives encouraged the controlled migration of ethnic ‘outsiders’ into certain territorial spaces.”³¹⁸ It is this historic development that lies at the root of Kenya’s persistent land disputes, resulting in the repeated and brutal confrontations between “self-professed autochthons” who claim ancestral ownership rights to land by virtue of origin and nativity, and migrant ‘foreigners,’ who assert worker and user rights by virtue of labor to that same land.³¹⁹

3.2.5 Contextualizing Mau Mau

In his book, Kenya’s first President Jomo Kenyatta, describes the complex Kikuyu system of land-ownership and cultivation that underlined pre-colonial communal identity and worth. Contrary to what the colonials assumed, land was never communally owned in Kikuyu society. Instead, “formally bought, carefully demarcated and privately owned,” it was the “ability to force the land to yield its riches” that imparted Kikuyu status and self-worth.³²⁰ According to Wrong, it was precisely ownership to land that colonialism placed at risk, not due to land alienation—which fell disproportionately to the pastoral communities—but rather because a strictly delineated tribal homeland

³¹⁷ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 106.

³¹⁸ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 18.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 104.

effectively curtailed any future potential land accumulation. Whereas traditionally “the Kikuyu had always successfully negotiated access to an ever-widening area for their growing population with either the Dorobo or the Maasai, that territory had now been swallowed up by the White Highlands,” permanently blocking any future acquisitions.³²¹ Further, as land was a customary possession, the right of land allocation was now at the express whims of the ‘traditional Chief.’ Members of the ‘tribe’ who could not afford the steep taxes, duties and obligations necessary to compete for the ever diminishing plots, were forced out of the reserve and into the growing slums of Nairobi, or onto white-owned farms as laborers.³²²

Since it was land ownership that traditionally enabled Kikuyu men to earn their living and be productive members of the community, these developments had an intense social impact as well, as young Kikuyu who lacked both an inheritance and access to land found themselves “demeaned” and unable to marry.³²³ With the advent of mechanized farming, these disenfranchised Kikuyu faced another phase of dispossession, as the “Kikuyu squatter labor forces were rendered redundant and an unwanted burden on the white farmers.”³²⁴ What slowly emerged was a deep and violent intra-communal split between the privileged Kikuyu elite, who had emulated Western ways and assimilated into Western culture, and the poor land-less Kikuyu, who suffered dispossession and

³²¹ Ibid., 105.

³²² Ibid., 106.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 06.

marginalization within their own community, yet were perceived as ‘advanced’ invaders by those indigenous groups on whose land they now squatted.

By the start of the 1950s, intense grievances on the part of both the Kikuyu elite and the dispossessed came to a head. What came to be known as the Mau Mau rebellion must in large part be analyzed by one of the “most profound contradictions of colonialism – the establishment by European rulers of modernity as the benchmark for citizenship while restricting the ability of colonized peoples to attain that standard. Denied access to education, land, state institutions, and public services, Kenya’s African communities were socially alienated, economically marginalized, and politically disenfranchised.”³²⁵ The feeling of frustration was especially high among the Kikuyu, as they had been one of the first groups to embrace European ways—adopting Christianity, learning English, relinquishing cultural traditions, and collaborating closely with the colonial authorities—and in return expected progressive advancement. The close alliance of the Kikuyu with the colonial administration was a mutually beneficial arrangement, as the colonial administration provided opportunities for paid labor, and the Kikuyu native administration “provided the auxiliary manpower necessary to support the military expeditions through the Central Highlands and the establishment of administrative centers” for the colonial authority.³²⁶ The favored status of Kikuyu collaborators hence enabled them to set up new systems of patronage and obligations, ideally situated to exploit the growing agricultural boom, yet failed to provide the stratified Kikuyu

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 29.

community with what they really wanted—land for the poor and “black rule” for the educated elite.³²⁷

In the late 1940s, the banned Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) began recruiting rebel fighters for “a coordinated campaign of civil disobedience.”³²⁸ While the KCA were secretly (and often forcefully) engaging young rural Kikuyu to swear oaths of loyalty, the educated Kikuyu elite, as exemplified by Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenya African Union, were simultaneously pushing for greater elite inclusion via parliamentary channels.³²⁹ Troubled by the growing incidents of attacks against white farms and suspected colonial collaborators, the colonial government enacted a state of emergency in 1952, deployed state forces and arrested hundreds of Kikuyu elites who had been active in the parliamentary debates, including Kenyatta. Ironically, Kenyatta had so little sympathy with the ‘Land and Freedom Armies,’ that its members targeted him as a colonial collaborator and a potential target for assassination. In fact, “the British decision to sentence this supposed ringleader to seven years’ hard labor simply turned him into a national hero,”³³⁰ something that Kenyatta capitalized on during Kenya’s upcoming transition towards independence.

The Mau Mau rebellion cannot simply be viewed as a struggle against the white settler race. Instead, it transpired predominantly within and against vertical factions of Kikuyu society. On the one hand stood the wealthy, mission educated, landowning

³²⁷ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 106.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ 1951—Government refused to increase the number of elected Africans on the Legislative Council (from 5 for a population of over 5 million). MW, 107

³³⁰ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 107.

Kikuyu elite, “who had prospered by collaborating with the British,” and who vehemently “rejected Mau Mau’s call for a return to traditional Kikuyu roots,”³³¹ and the redistribution of land. This sector of Kikuyu society did not wish to deconstruct the colonial construct, but rather to dominate it. Their part in the Mau Mau rebellion is played most prominently by the Home Guards, a predominantly Kikuyu militia loyal to the colonial government. On the other side of the conflict, stood “Mau Mau’s natural recruits: desperate young men, many of them landless squatters,” who rejected the artificial ‘native’ authority and sought to reclaim its traditional heritage, customs and rights.³³²

By 1945, the Mau Mau rebellion claimed approximately 25’000 African lives as a direct result of overt physical violence, much of which was marked by exceptional brutality, perpetrated against the predominantly Kikuyu civilian populations.³³³ According to Branch, “more than 90 per cent of the officially acknowledged casualties of the war were Kikuyu, most in all likelihood killed by their fellow inhabitants of Kenya’s Central Highlands.”³³⁴ In contrast, a total of 95 Europeans were killed, two-thirds of whom acted as European combatants. Most fundamentally, it was the colonially recruited indigenous allies in the Home Guards, who played the “critical role” in the successful counterinsurgency movement, “inflicting 50 percent of Mau Mau casualties by the end of

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 108.

³³² *Ibid.*

³³³ Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya*, 5.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 05–06.

1954.”³³⁵ That same year, some further 15’000 suspected rebel sympathizers were rounded up, and “sent to bleak concentration camps to be broken, ‘cleansed’ and rehabilitated--guarded by twitchy Home Guards.”³³⁶ With increasing calls for self-governance resonating across Europe in the 1960s, “the British authorities had won the battle, but lost the argument.”³³⁷ In the wake of the Mau Mau uprising and a move towards self-rule, the colonial government sought to reward its loyalists and foster “a political class with which it could build a collaborative partnership of government.”³³⁸ It was hence the educated native political elite--who not only shared little in common with, but were largely responsible for the defeat of the peasant Mau Mau freedom fighters—who would inherit the state. It is at this critical juncture that the emergence of an ethnically based “bureaucratic bourgeoisie,”³³⁹ sets the stage for the post-colonial adoption of the bifurcated state system, and the subsequent institutionalization of an ethnic bureaucracy.

3.2.6 Independence and Ethnic Politics: Kenyatta 1952-1978

At the dawn of independence, Kenya already faced a number of critical challenges that would come to haunt its evolution as a nation-state. Like so many African states, Kenya inherited arbitrary and conflict laden borders from its colonial past. To the

³³⁵ Ibid., 5.

³³⁶ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 108.

³³⁷ Ibid., 109.

³³⁸ Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*.

³³⁹ Ibid., 26.

south, for instance, “the reality of whether thousands of Africans are today citizens of Kenya or Tanzania was decided by the bestowing of a birthday present,” by Queen Victoria of Mount Kilimanjaro to the future Kaiser Wilhelm II.³⁴⁰ Similarly, to the west, Kenya’s border with Uganda transects around a dozen ethnic cultural communities, dividing into separate states what had historically been one land and peoples.³⁴¹ To the East, Kenya inherited what would soon become “an irredentist guerrilla war,” when the imperial scramble for Africa divided the Somali ethnic groups into five separate states, resulting in entire communities associating first and foremost with their ethnic kin across the border, rather than with the state to which they supposedly belong.³⁴²

On the micro-level, the colonial legacy of indirect rule fundamentally linked questions concerning power, ethnicity and land distribution to the political consciousness of individual Kenyans. As was the case in Rwanda, the bifurcation of the state into a racialized civil and tribalized customary sphere ensured that “the provincial administration became the key interface linking state and society—as the major channel for distributing state largess and as the principal instrument of state control.”³⁴³ Perceptions of inequality and justice were hence framed in an ethnic lens, whereby access to state resources was directly contingent upon a members relationship with the ‘ethnic’

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² *Ibid.*, 25.

³⁴³ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 16.

communal authority.³⁴⁴ According to Lynch, this development in Kenya's community-leadership relationship meant that "references to common kinship became a way to approach, petition, and plead with administrators and ethnic kin, just as references to ethnic difference could serve as a way to question the legitimacy of administrative powers and/or the presence of ethnic 'outsiders.'"³⁴⁵ Further, the development of regionally delineated ethnic inequalities led to the perception (both real and imagined), that ethnically based differentiation placed certain groups such as the Kikuyu in an 'advanced' power position, as compared to the marginalized and 'backward' pastoral groups, such as the Kalemjin, Maasai, Samburu and Turkana. All these conditions ensured that "tribalism achieved its primary importance as a political tool in the bid for control over the state," tying individual welfare directly to 'subjective' ethnic indicators, whereby security is invariable linked to state control, and wholly defined by communal identity.³⁴⁶

Competition over who would inherit Kenya emerged in the wake of the brutal Mau Mau rebellion. Linking elements of ethnicity, class, redistribution and land grievances, Mau Mau's "legacy was not just to make majority rule inevitable in Kenya, but to inextricably link nationalism to ethnicity."³⁴⁷ The fact that no single colonial tribal construct encompassed more than a fifth of Kenya's total population, meant that tribes

³⁴⁴ Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley Conflict in Kenya & Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992), <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=7231>.

³⁴⁵ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 16.

³⁴⁶ Broch-Due and Amrik Heyer, 47.

³⁴⁷ John G. Galaty, "Double-Voiced Violence in Kenya," in *Violence and Belonging: The Quest for Identity in Post-Colonial Africa*, ed. Vigdis Broch-Due (New York: Routledge, 2005), 179.

early on had to enter ‘marriages of convenience’ to achieve a salient majority.³⁴⁸ Amalgamation was not only a result of strategic vote counting however, as ethnic groups began to consolidate along pre-colonial cultural and linguistic lines to form larger and sustainable ethnic voting blocks, that are still in evidence today.³⁴⁹

Political parties in Kenya formed along two main axis. The first was an alliance between Kenya’s two largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo, creating the Kenya African National Union (KANU). According to Barkan, “KANU was an ethnic coalition of the ‘bigs’ and the ‘haves,’” eventually consisting of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru, Luo and Kamba,³⁵⁰ collectively pulling together 53% of the total population.³⁵¹ The speed at which different ethnic groups amalgamated and further formed ‘coalitions of convenience’³⁵² makes it clear that expectations of strictly ethnically based voting was already in full formation at the dawn of independence. The second political alliance consisted of the “have nots”—Kenya’s marginalized and uprooted Rift Valley Pastoralists, such as the Kalenjin and Maasai, who formed the Kenya Democratic Union (KADU).³⁵³ Not only did these groups consolidate along linguistic lines, but more fundamentally, along modes of subsistence and feelings of marginalization. The KADU

³⁴⁸ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 51.

³⁴⁹ Examples of this are found with GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association) and the opposing pastoralist KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu Association).

³⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that each of these groups bases their subsistence traditionally on farming, and experienced large degrees of out-migration in search of land and work during the colonial period.

³⁵¹ Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability” (CSIS- Center For Strategic and International Studies, June 2011), 5.

³⁵² See Elischer, “Ethnic coalitions of convenience and commitment.”

³⁵³ Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 5.

coalition “feared domination by Kikuyu and Luo within a one party state; Kalenjin and Maasai in particular were apprehensive that their historical claims to European settler lands in the Rift Valley would be superseded by Kikuyu claims.”³⁵⁴ Further, KADU raised urgent concerns about anticipated inter-group and regional discrimination that is likely to occur “in a centralized state dominated by the larger ethnic groups, to the detriment of smaller communities.” KADU hence adopted a platform based on *majimboism*, whereby the power of the colonially constructed and territorially bound Native Authority is secured, “through decentralizing state power in a bicameral parliament and creating strong regional authorities.”³⁵⁵ In contrast, the KANU alliance “supported an administratively centralized state, and the assurance of non-discrimination through guarantees on the security of persons, property and basic human rights.”³⁵⁶ While each group couched their platforms in terms of the protection of minority or human rights, what the coalitions really indicated was first, that neither party planned on overturning the colonial institutions, and secondly, that whoever controlled the state could and would allocate resources along ethnic lines. Land especially was set up as a lootable commodity in post-colonial Kenya, and would be the basis for rewarding supporters and punishing opponents for the years to come.

Consisting of the largest and most powerful ethnic communities, as well as supported by the exiting colonial regime, KANU had an easy win in 1963. After forming a transitional government, KANU under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta , assumed full

³⁵⁴ John G. Galaty, “Double-Voiced Violence in Kenya,” 179–180.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 180.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

leadership upon independence. Facing increased marginalization, KADU dissolved itself the next year, with its leading figures assuming significant roles in the ruling party administration. Daniel Arp Moi, ethnically a Tugen subsumed under the Kalenjin identity, became Kenyatta's Vice President.³⁵⁷ Claiming that 'We all fought for Uhuru,' (freedom), "Kenyatta blithely rewrote history"³⁵⁸ including his elite power base in the strive for African independence and freedom. Calling Mau Mau "a disease" which had been exterminated and must be forgotten, Kenyatta made it clear that the great socialist transformation hoped for by so many would not take place; "Kenyatta stood for continuity, not change."³⁵⁹

Not surprisingly, in the wake of the white exodus, it was the Kikuyu loyalists who could afford the farms of departing settlers, meaning that the land-rich political elite emerging "was solidly Home Guard."³⁶⁰ According to Wrong, "it was the collaborators, rather than the heroes of the revolution, who inherited the earth," and as Kenyatta set about deracializing and Africanizing the state, thousands of jobs previously restricted solely to whites or Asians became available to the Kikuyu and their allies. Further, with soaring prices for Kenya's agricultural exports, the Kikuyu found themselves benefitting doubly—by virtue of having adopted western ways and by controlled the government.³⁶¹

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 110.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 112.

Kenyatta's presidency is interpreted as a time of Kikuyu ascendancy and hegemony over the civil service, the economic environment and most fundamentally, over land acquisition.³⁶² Materializing KADU's worst fears, Kikuyu and KANU allies "flooded in their hundreds of thousands into the previously off-limits Rift Valley, seizing lands the Kalenjin and other communities regarded as having been temporarily appropriated by the white man, but rightfully theirs."³⁶³ Further, Kenyatta made sure that his Kikuyu kinsmen (again, not all Kikuyu), got served first when it came to 'eating' the national cake. From constituency funding to land allocation, Kenyatta's administration, like so many others in post-colonial Africa, "dedicated his energies not to overturning but to inheriting the system left behind by the colonial power."³⁶⁴ By deracializing the state, the bifurcation of the colonial legacy was by no means overturned, as questions of racially based justice simply translated into tribally based benefits.

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Kenyan government implemented a set of land-buying and settlement schemes surrounding the newly available territories. Leaders of farming constituencies and Kenyatta-associates actively began to lobby the government to define the Highlands as state-owned land, which consequently could legally be distributed as rewards among their political constituents facing internal land-shortages or as rewards for political support. In contrast to the poorly educated and marginalized pastoral communities, "these politicians had the upper hand in the national political game, for their constituencies were better mobilized, more connected to the

³⁶² John G. Galaty, "Double-Voiced Violence in Kenya," 181.

³⁶³ Usman, *Beyond Fairy Tales*, 112.

³⁶⁴ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 50.

modern state and economy, wealthier, better educated, and more numerous.”³⁶⁵ Since land allocations were directly controlled by state officials, and the state officials were directly appointed by the increasingly centralized office of the president, allocation remained tied to “personalized political relationships.”³⁶⁶ Causing even greater fear and resentment among Kenya’s excluded ethnic communities was the implementation of ‘settlement schemes’ as the “physical extensions of the adjacent native reserves,” meaning that land was not merely lotted out to individual families/groups who settled in an intact ‘native reserve,’ but rather transferred to and becoming part of neighboring tribal homelands.

Since the economy quadrupled during the 1960s, the prosperous 50’000 families who now owned over two thirds of Kenya’s previously white settler land benefitted disproportionately.³⁶⁷ The ‘theft’ of over a million acres of pastoral lands, coupled with ethnically based job, contract and state service allocations, created an institutionalized ethnic bureaucracy, which resulted in increased feelings of out-group marginalization, domination and subjugation. Previous feelings of relative deprivation by pastoral groups such as the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu morphed into acute horizontal feelings of injustice, fear and threat, raising the stakes of political competition “above a threshold at which the common person figures that he or she can ‘afford to lose’ the

³⁶⁵ Catherine Boone, “Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geography of Electoral Violence: The Case of Kenya in the 1990s,” *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 10 (2011): 1322.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 1325.

³⁶⁷ John G. Galaty, “Double-Voiced Violence in Kenya,” 181.

election.”³⁶⁸ Further, in 1964 KANU betrayed its electoral promise to the Luo for inclusion and abolished the Office of the Prime Minister. By initiating a set of centralizing constitutional amendments, Kenyatta became both the head of state and the head of government. By 1968, nine other amendments to the constitution were passed, “simultaneously increasing the powers of the executive, while restricting the authority and autonomy of other state branches.” Since these amendments included acts such as ‘preventative detention,’ opposition rapidly withered away, as “parliament became little more than a rubber stamp for the executive.”³⁶⁹ Within a few years of independence, Kenya had seemingly picked up where the bureaucratic authoritarianism of the colonial era had left off. Not surprisingly, it was with a growing sense of panic at a potential role reversal that some of Kenyatta’s administrative elites noticed his failing health. In a desperate ditch to prevent the Kalenjin vice president from taking over the presidency in the case of Kenyatta’s death, a hard-line party within KANU was established--the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA), whose aim was to amend the constitution and consolidate future power in the hands of Central Province co-ethnics. Despite these best efforts, however, such political manipulations came to nothing and upon Kenyatta’s death, Moi assumed control of the state--“It was now the Kalenjins’ turn to ‘eat’.”³⁷⁰ Further exacerbating the emerging security dilemma, Moi would consolidate his platform based on fear, mobilizing support solely in opposition to a repetition of Kikuyu rule.

³⁶⁸ Boone, “Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geography of Electoral Violence,” 1313.

³⁶⁹ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 161.

³⁷⁰ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 113.

3.2.7 Economic Decline and Multiparty Elections: Moi 1978-2002

With the ascendancy of Daniel Arap Moi to the presidency, Moi also inherited the KANU political party. Instead of representing a political platform, KANU radically transformed its constituency base towards the original KADU members, effectively reversing the patronage system that had consolidated power in the hands of the Kikuyu party and their allies.³⁷¹ Almost immediately upon ascending to the presidency, Moi began systematically reversing Kikuyu dominance in almost every aspect of society, including business opportunity, the civil service and land allocation. Despite having previously campaigned on a platform of decentralization, and a more federally based form of government, once in power Moi “continued Kenyatta’s policy of centralization to carry out his policy of redistribution,” simply reversing the distributional arrow.³⁷² Senior Kikuyu civil service, administrative and military posts were systematically replaced, overwhelmingly benefitting his own Kalenjin support base, who suddenly found key jobs in the civil services, the army and state-owned companies that had hitherto been closed to them.”³⁷³ By establishing educational quotas, the Moi regime effectively limited the number of students admitted to university based on their district of origin, not merely impacting out-group access to opportunities in the immediate term, but potentially curtailing their economic and social opportunities for generations to come. State sponsored resource allocation including infrastructure allotments and secondary school

³⁷¹ Boone, “Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geography of Electoral Violence,” 1323.

³⁷² Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 6.

³⁷³ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 51.

development was also disproportionately allocated to KADU districts in a bid to satisfy in-group expectations of redistributive justice and reverse the ‘backward’ status of his own constituency base. In every aspect Moi became “a major form of patronage during his presidency,” consolidating state control, while institutionalizing educational segregation and reinforcing the link between ethnicity, state control and resource allocation.³⁷⁴

By 1980, Kenya had undergone a complete reversal in governance. While Kenyatta had also overwhelmingly favored his own Kikuyu constituency and fellow co-ethnics, the previous administration had “valued performance.”³⁷⁵ This too changed under Moi, whereby more highly qualified out-group members were perceived to be ‘advanced,’ having achieved a competitive advantage at the expense of other less powerful ethnic minorities. Unlike Kenyatta, “Moi had to take away before he could give.”³⁷⁶ Systematically dismantling the economic hegemony of Kikuyu elites and reversing the policy of patronage of the Kenyatta years to benefit his own ethnic group supporters, Moi began dismantling some of Kenya’s most successful enterprises, destroying Kikuyu agricultural associations, and filling “the civil service, parastatals, and the university with unqualified individuals from his own ethnic group.”³⁷⁷

When the economy began to react negatively to these institutional changes, former Kikuyu elites staged a series of failed attempted coups and assignation attempts.

³⁷⁴ Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 6.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁶ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 149.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 150.

As opposition from out-groups increased, so did Moi's increasing intolerance towards dissent. Following the lead of Kenyatta, Moi amended the constitution and turned Kenya into a de jure one-party state—making KANU's dominant position increasingly unassailable. By 1991, the Kenyan constitution had been amended over thirty times, including moves that abolished the autonomy of the judiciary, expanded executive powers of detention and consolidated all formal power in the presidency—"backed by the increasing use of patronage and repression to maintain presidential authority."³⁷⁸ Unsurprisingly, the net effect of these policies was severe, resulting in increased instances of systematic violence, ethnic polarization and in-group consolidation motivated towards the capture of the state.

3.2.8 Multiparty Elections and Political Outbidding: 1992 and 1997

By the mid-1980s, Kenya's economy which averaged more than 5% a year was in decline. By the 1990s, Kenya was "weltering in a political, economic and moral miasma."³⁷⁹ As inflation and poverty increased, Nairobi's slums swelled to become the largest in Africa. In a further loss of legitimacy, it increasingly fell to Western NGOs, not the state, to provide basic services to Kenya's burgeoning poor.³⁸⁰ With the rapid decline of governance, the Moi administration increasingly relied on privatized forms of repression to consolidate power introducing a routinized violence into an already volatile

³⁷⁸ Joel D. Barkan, "Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability," 6.

³⁷⁹ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 10.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

political context. It was in this increasing climate of fear, censorship and repression, that the end of the Cold War heralded a growing demand for change in Kenya.

As the pro-democracy movement gained momentum all over Africa, former Kikuyu ministers began calling for political rallies. Since “controlling the state was the means to entrench an ethnically defined class and to ensure enrichment,”³⁸¹ the Moi regime was unresponsive to calls for democratic election. When in 1991 Moi refused to allow multi-party elections, foreign donors suspended \$350 million in aid. Within the same year Moi capitulated and amended the constitution once again, this time to allow multiparty elections. The constitutional amendments of 1991 set the stage for the upcoming multiparty election, identifying the rules for a winning candidate at a minimum of 25% of the votes in five out of eight of the provinces.³⁸² While Moi went through the pre-election steps to satisfy his foreign donors, he had no intention of relinquishing power to the majority ethnic groups. The 25% threshold was particularly concerning for Moi, as the early 1990s saw an increased flood of Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo and Luhya migrants into the Rift Valley, “raising anxieties about land shortages and the changing demographics for the upcoming elections.”³⁸³

In particular, Moi feared that these migrant votes would be cast in favor of upcountry opposition politicians, threatening his chances of obtaining the 25 % needed to secure the Rift Valley Province. Further, while Moi may win the presidency, the loss of any parliamentary seats could overturn his majority hold on Parliament, curtailing his

³⁸¹ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 150.

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 151.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, 152.

monopoly on power. As a result of these fears, Moi employed a variety of mobilizing tactics, including political outbidding, the systematic employment of harassment against opposition parties, and the use of ethnic youth wings to enact a series of provincial ethnic cleansings. As a result, Kenya's first multiparty election in 23 years resulted in the escalation of the security dilemma, and a zero-sum approach to political competition.

In the run-up to the 1992 elections, KANU became synonymous with a defensive ethnic voting bloc. Employing a toxic "mixture of repression and anti-Kikuyu epoxy,"³⁸⁴ Moi appealed directly to historically marginalized ethnic communities such as the KAMATUSA and Coastal communities, resentful of continuous Kikuyu influxes and economic advantage. KANU was by no means the only party to retreat into ethnic citadels during the electoral campaign. According to Galaty, "most local strategists—the most adept being President Moi—focused on what in the Kenya context had always been most crucial: ethnicity, power, patronage and land."³⁸⁵ For Pastoralist communities still reeling from the injustice of the Kenyatta years, the 1992 elections were about local self-determination, moral justice and the security of the ethnic homeland. For GEMA associated groups, the elections took on a desperate need for political inclusion and economic opportunity. In both cases the competition for political control became synonymous with ethnic exclusion and ethnic repression.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 151.

³⁸⁵ John G. Galaty, "Double-Voiced Violence in Kenya," 182.

The 1992 elections are most noted for the high level of violence that was injected into the political contest. Adopting a “competitive authoritarian”³⁸⁶ model, the KANU strategy revolved around a series of harassment tactics against opposition groups, including police raids, the withdrawal of permits, latent and overt physical threats, car chases and media manipulation.³⁸⁷ The rise in ethnically based political rhetoric increased anxiety among ‘native’ inhabitants that the presence of ‘foreign opposition’ voters could threaten to dislodge their KANU candidates. The presence of squatters, a past source of grievance among Rift Valley ‘natives,’ suddenly took on a more serious and ominous note, as these people could drastically alter the demographic makeup of their native district. In response, KANU began to employ the use of “privatized gangs” in an attempt “literally to eliminate” the opposition.³⁸⁸

The fact that most of these youth gangs were formed, financed and protected by key politicians was well documented by several human rights reports including *Africa Watch*³⁸⁹ and the *Akiwumi Report*.³⁹⁰ While violence was certainly employed to vent frustrations, punish likely opposition voters, and strategically discourage future migrant influxes, it was equally apparent “that many on the ruling party side saw ‘ethnic cleansing’ of parts of the Rift as politically expedient: The attackers targeted members of

³⁸⁶ Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 6.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁸⁸ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 153.

³⁸⁹ Africa Watch, “Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya” (Human Rights Watch, November 1993).

³⁹⁰ Kenya, Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, and A. M. Akiwumi, *Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya* (Nairobi: The Commission, 1999).

ethnic groups that were assumed to be (and to a large extent were) pro-opposition.”³⁹¹ By the end of 1992, approximately 1500 people were killed, with another 300’000 displaced.³⁹²

The 1997 election was in many ways a repeat of 1992, simply to a more violent degree. The distribution of ‘hate leaflets’ in Kenya’s Coastal community also resulted in attacks against ‘upcountry migrants’ such as the Kikuyu and Luo, resulting in over 100 casualties, beatings, rapes and extensive damage to property.³⁹³ In the Rift Valley, Maasai MP’s like William Ntimama used the ‘right of eminent domain’ to encourage popular participation in evictions and re-appropriation of land.³⁹⁴ 1997 also saw the distribution of “coded hate messages”³⁹⁵ and the advocacy for majimboism, which in this context was not a call for federalism, “but rather an obligatory repatriation” of tribes into ‘ancestral homeland.’³⁹⁶ In total, the 1990s saw over 2000 well documented killings, as well as over half a million displaced persons, 70% of whom had not returned by 2002.³⁹⁷ The rise in violence and the use of militias and armed political youth wings introduced violence as routine measure for political competition, setting the stage for more violent conflicts to come. Further, the sharp rise in extra judicial killings and militia activity further increased fear and anxiety, as the state increasingly lost its monopoly on the use of

³⁹¹ Boone, “Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geography of Electoral Violence,” 1315.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 1321.

³⁹³ Liisa Laakso, “Insights into Electoral Violence in Africa,” 233.

³⁹⁴ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 153.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 154.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

violence. Firmly entrenched was a “a pattern of competing ethnic elites, rotating over time, a zero-sum game, with one group’s gain inevitably entailing another’s loss.”³⁹⁸ The unequal resource distribution by ethnically based administrations implied that a reversal of opportunity or marginalization could take place with each consequent change in political administration.³⁹⁹ While the institutional changes of 1991 marked a step forwards in Kenya’s political evolution, multiparty elections also introduced increased ethnic outbidding and violence into the electoral system, heightening the security dilemma, and created a self-perpetuating “arms race,”⁴⁰⁰ geared at preemptive self-defense.

3.2.9 Corruption and Electoral Violence: Kibaki 2002 and 2007

By the time the 2002 elections rolled around, the various ethno-political associations had recognized the limitations of campaigning solely on the basis of ethnic pluralism. In both the 1992 and 1997 elections KANU captured a slim majority when ethnic coalition parties split and fragmented throughout the course of the election campaigns. In a marked contrast to such previous patterns, the new opposition alliance, called the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) ran predominantly on an anti-Moi and anti-corruption platform, creating “a national alliance that constituted the original KANU in the early 1960s...stitching together a coalition that included the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru,

³⁹⁸ Wrong, *It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 52.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 154.

Luo and the Kamba.”⁴⁰¹ By promising a power sharing alliance between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, NARC consolidated the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic vote under the NARC umbrella. With slogans like ‘Kula Kwa KANU, Kura Kwa NaRC – “Take/Eat from KANU, Vote for NaRC”’--Kibaki promised a return to economic growth and prudent governance, heralding a new beginning devoid of chronic graft, arbitrary arrests and political assassinations that came to be synonymous with the Moi era.⁴⁰²

While the relative peaceful nature of the 2002 election was greeted with a collective sigh of relief, it did not take long for the political climate to begin unraveling. Rather than the promised coalition and vision of inclusive democracy, Kibaki’s visualization proved to be more along the lines of “a return to competent government staffed by Kenya’s best bureaucrats and professionals”—i.e. the Kikuyu and their co-ethnics.⁴⁰³ In a ‘winner-takes-all’ system like Kenya’s, whereby real political power is concentrated almost exclusively in the Office of the President, the almost unchecked powers of appointment and arbitration ensures that once victory has been secured, campaign promises of power-sharing need not be upheld.⁴⁰⁴ For the Luo constituents, whose access to office had evolved into a desperate need to reverse the “purposeful underdevelopment” of their province, this “repeated betrayal and marginalization at the hands of ethnic ‘others’,” fuelled increased perceptions of injustice.⁴⁰⁵ What began as a

⁴⁰¹ Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 8.

⁴⁰² Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 145.

⁴⁰³ Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya: Assessing Risks to Stability,” 7.

⁴⁰⁴ Lynch, *I Say to You*, 227.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 223.

broad-based coalition of hope for a united and better Kenya, soon devolved into a deeply polarized government reminiscent of past ethnic bureaucracies. It is in this context that the increased expectation for change and rewards among new or continuing out-group members transformed into a corresponding increase in frustration, ethnic polarization and violent ethnic mobilization.

Despite widespread optimism, the 2002 elections were not entirely violence free. Ethnically based youth wings often clashed at political rallies in the prelude to the 2002 election. In one instance twenty people were killed and thousands fled the looting and pillaging that followed.⁴⁰⁶ Further, the deep divide between the Kikuyu elite and Kikuyu poor emerged in the new form of Mungiki, a Kikuyu youth group claiming to be the natural successor of the betrayed Mau Mau rebel fighters and representing Kenya's large and disenfranchised Kikuyu youth. Associating Kibaki with the corrupt Kikuyu elite of old, this slum-based 'shake-down' gang disrupted KANU rallies and threatened voters with violence" if they elected anyone other than Kenyatta."⁴⁰⁷ The formation of the NARC coalition was equally plagued by violence, as ethnically based youth groups attacked each other with rocks and sticks during some of the preliminary meetings. Similar incidents were reported among various KANU youth groups, who despite a political coalition attacked each other in repeated violent clashes. Though none of these fights resulted in anything close to the systematic ethnic cleansing of 1992 and 1997 they

⁴⁰⁶ Liisa Laakso, "Insights into Electoral Violence in Africa," 235.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 236.

are indicative of a growing frustration among Kenya's youth and a perception that resorting to violence in the face of political opposition is legitimate.

3.2.10 Coalitions of Convenience and Ethnic Favoritism:

According to Sebastian Elischer, the rapid disintegration of NARC upon assuming power is consistent with Horowitz' arguments on 'coalitions of convenience,' instead of commitment. In the Kenyan context, and as the various youth-based violence suggests, "ethnicity has consistently proven to provide a stronger rallying ground for political activity than party structures."⁴⁰⁸ This seemed to be the case on the micro and macro level, as Kibaki and his co-ethnics (based on coalitions of commitment) immediately set about securing state resources and the bureaucracy's most powerful positions--including finance, defense, justice and internal security.

To understand the full extent of financial benefits that 'winning' entails, it is necessary examine the degree of state looting and ethnically based redistribution that occurred under the Kibaki regime. According to the Society for International Development, for example, "allocations to the home constituencies of vocal government critics were nearly 320 times less generous than those to constituencies of trusted presidential aides."⁴⁰⁹ The broken election promises hence implied that out-group

⁴⁰⁸ Elischer, "Ethnic coalitions of convenience and commitment," 24.

⁴⁰⁹ Wrong, *It's Our Turn to Eat*, 53.

districts would suffer disproportionately from a lack of infrastructure, job opportunities, medical service and educational opportunities. Major corruption scandals further rocked the Kibaki administration. Since Kibaki overwhelmingly assigned key state positions to his own ethnic community (Kikuyu, Embu and Meru), the involvement of his top ministers—who became known as the Mount Kenya Mafia—meant not only that political elites were stealing state funds, but that ethnic ‘others’ reaped the rewards. According to the Goldenberg Commission, Moi and his family “misdirected over \$2 billion in state funds towards private use.⁴¹⁰ Similarly, the Anglo-Leasing scandal, which involved Government contracts to non-existent European companies, amounted to over \$751 million.⁴¹¹ Another report by Transparency International and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights revealed that what NARC officials spent on luxury cars “could have provided 147,000 HIV-positive Kenyans with anti-retroviral treatment for a year.”⁴¹²

The 5th Human Development Report of 2006 highlights the direct human cost of the current political climate. According to the report, the growing gap between rich and poor was based on distinct geographic (i.e ethnic) lines. Results showed that “a Kikuyu inhabitant of Nyeri, just North of Kibaki’s constituency, could expect to live 23.4 years longer, on average, than his Luo counterpart in Raila’s home town of Kisumu.”⁴¹³ Further, the Kikuyu stronghold of central province was twice as likely to have access to

⁴¹⁰ Bekoe and Susanne D. Mueller, “The Political Economy of Kenya’s Crisis,” 162.

⁴¹¹ *Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat*, 165.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, 80.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, 282.

doctors and 5 times as likely to be literate than opposition constituencies.⁴¹⁴ These and several similar reports have demonstrated how an ethnitized bureaucracy does not merely imply access to resources, but extreme deprivation resulting in death. In such cases, voting is as much about electing your in-group, as it is making sure that the ethnic ‘other’ is kept from power. In this context, the political contestation has reached a critical point in the security dilemma.

3.2.11 The 2007 Election: Post Election Violence

On the eve of the 2007 electoral violence, Kenya’s prospects looked decidedly positive. The stock market was booming, tourism and FDI were up, the Kenyan shilling was strong, and Kenya was in the midst of a building boom. Based on the economic growth indicators alone, financial advisers “boldly classified the forthcoming polls as ‘zero risk’.”⁴¹⁵ Such assessments obviously excluded any distributional data on the economic growth, or the deep ethnic cleavages that had emerged based on distributional inequalities so apparent in past elections. Leading up to the 2007 election, opposition leader Raila Odinga resumed his calls for ‘majimboism,’ and as in previous elections, an appeal for majimboism was an appeal for ethnically homogeneous ‘native homelands.’ Naturally given the history of certain ethnic migrations and the past instances of ethnic cleansing, it was clear to voters “who the main target would be.”⁴¹⁶ Mimicking Kibaki’s

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., 291.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., 269.

anti-Moi campaign strategy in 2002, “41 vs. 1” became a rallying cry for Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement party, making the issue of ‘ethnic favoritism’ their main campaign issue, and calling for all 41 ethnic groups to unite against the Kikuyu.

Reminiscent of Rwanda’s Hutu Power Radio, the Rift Valley radio stations broadcasted messages like ‘clear the weed’ and remove the ‘foreign settlers.’⁴¹⁷ Considering the context of deep historic grievances, the institutionalization of an ethnic bureaucracy by successive administrations, and the uneven distribution of resources along ethnic lines, such narratives resonated deeply with aggrieved communities. Hate leaflets and inflammatory ethnic rhetoric also won support among Kenya’s Swahili coast, where local Muslim populations had long resented the influx of Kikuyu ‘upcountry’ people, and their monopoly on the coastal tourism industry. Similarly, Kibaki and his administration systematically began to mobilize the Kikuyu community under the Party of National Union (PNU)--“Bit by bit, an Ethnic siege mentality was created.”⁴¹⁸

Leading every public opinion poll in the run-up to the election, Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) were confident of an electoral win. Indeed, Odinga led the electoral count by almost 400’000 votes in the first two days following the election, when subsequent results were suddenly delayed. In the slums of Kisumu, ODM supporters did not wait to hear the results or wait for explanations. To them the delay was an obvious indication of electoral fraud. Taking to the streets, Kisumu’s poor vented their

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 297.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

fury “on Kikuyu and Kisii residents assumed to have voted for the government.”⁴¹⁹ Amidst growing concerns and evidence of electoral irregularities, Kibaki was summarily announced as the victor. Within minutes of the announcement, “the multi-ethnic settlements of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and Kakamega erupted.”⁴²⁰ For two months Kenya burned. Redolent of Rwanda’s genocide, make-shift road-blocks were erected and ID cards checked in order to determine ethnic origin and likely political affiliation. The fact that many of the youth targeted had very likely voted for ODM was considered irrelevant, as ethnicity became the only salient cleavage on which people were judged and condemned.

In similar scenes, Kenya’s Rift Valley erupted into renewed cycles of ethnic cleansing, as Kalenjin ‘warriors’ systematically targeted Kikuyu, Embu and Meru farms. Armed and supported by local leaders, Kalenjin youth groups “were ferried around in trucks, evicting hundreds of thousands of so-called ‘foreigners’—many of whom had never lived anywhere else.”⁴²¹ Following the Rift valley attacks, PNU hardliners allegedly mobilized youth groups like Mungiki, who suddenly had access to stockpiles of new Machetes and transportation.⁴²² The violence that followed was brutal, personal and at an immense human, economic and environmental cost. By the time Kenya’s political elites finally entered into a power-sharing agreement in 2008, over 1500 Kenyans were

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 302.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, 307.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 308.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 312.

killed and another 600'000 displaced—many feeling to ‘native homelands’ that they had never seen.⁴²³

3.2.12 Conclusion:

In the wake of Kenya’s contested 2007 election, the country staggered on the brink of Civil War for several weeks. Shocking the world with brutal images of ethnic-cleansing and looting, the image of Kenyan exceptionalism was shattered forever. Kenya is a perfect example of how complex mobilizing dynamics can evolve into violent ethnic conflict, while operating simultaneously alongside positive indicators such as economic growth and high voter participation. As in the case of Rwanda, a historic set of colonial institutions transformed the state structure into a bifurcated system, resulted in deep-rooted perceptions of differentiation and marginalization. Among Kenya’s pastoral communities, the colonial legacy constructed a dual process of exclusion—First in the form of land alienation, and secondly, due to uneven colonial opportunities. The forging of tribes as fixed administrative units grounded in a native homeland, ensured that perceptions of justice, grievance and distribution were framed through an ethnic lens. Group perceptions of differentiation in terms of ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ hence set the political-contestation framework for post-colonial Kenya. As Kikuyu political ascendancy mixed with pastoral fears of renewed marginalization, the subsequent centralization and ethnitization of the state bureaucracy heightened grievances and ethnic

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 314.

polarization. With each subsequent administration's failure to detribalize the state, a change in political domination implied a corresponding reallocation of structural inequality. As political victory becomes synonymous with ethnic exclusion, electoral competition took on a zero-sum scenario whereby one group's win necessitates the other group's loss. As such, the 2007 election violence can be contextualized in what was an ongoing and escalating security dilemma, whereby questions about who *must not* get control of the state's resources became as urgent as the question of who would.

In the next section of this thesis I will examine the final case study of Tanzania. Unlike Rwanda and Kenya, Tanzania has managed to avoid both civil war and non-state armed conflicts, despite having experienced indirect colonization and the bifurcation of the state system. However, while both Kenya and Rwanda adopted an ethnonationalist framework for state competition, Tanzania's post-colonial legacy is rooted in a nationalist framework, based on the dual process of deracilization and detribalization.

3.3 The Case of Tanzania

As the country that we know it today, Tanzania did not come into existence until the nineteenth century. Taking an active part in the imperial scramble for Africa, Germany claimed *Deutsch Ostafrika* as its sphere of influence, encompassing Tanzania and what is present day Rwanda and Burundi. Home to Mount Kilimanjaro, and some the world's most diverse arrays of flora and fauna, Tanzania is also host to one of the most multi-cultural societies in Africa. It is estimated that Tanzania, or Tanganyika as it was called prior to independence, has over 100 different Bantu languages, and is currently listed as entailing 130 'distinct ethnic' groups.⁴²⁴ Like Rwanda and Kenya, Tanzania was the destination of many diverse group migrations and conquests, creating a rich mosaic of distinct looks, languages and cultures. Unlike Rwanda and Kenya, however, Tanzania's cultural diversity has not transformed and been mobilized into ethnic polarity. This differentiation between Tanzania and many of its conflict ridden neighbors (past and present) is particularly interesting when considering that Tanzania not only shares a similar pre-colonial ethnic composition and colonial history, but additionally has been and still is one of Africa's poorest countries.⁴²⁵ Further, Tanzania is not only resource rich,⁴²⁶ but also faces considerable challenges of state consolidation due to low

⁴²⁴ As with Rwanda and Kenya, this number is rather arbitrary, and is variously listed from anywhere between 120 to 135.

⁴²⁵ Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War"; Collier et al., *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*.

⁴²⁶ Philippe Le Billon, *The Geopolitics of Resource Wars: Resource Dependence, Governance and Violence* (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005).

population densities, spread over a large expanse of territory.⁴²⁷ Finally, according to the East African Bribery Index, Tanzania's aggregate corruption index stands at 39.1%, and far surpasses that of both Kenya (29.5%) and Rwanda (2.5%). With a history of ethnic grievances,⁴²⁸ poor infrastructure and evidence of increased rent-seeking,⁴²⁹ as well as notoriously unruly neighbors, Tanzania's consistent stability is a welcome though puzzling case.

This case study will outline the origins of Tanzania's ethnic plurality, as well the historic context of Tanzania's colonial heritage and identity transformations. In particular, I will analyze the causes and consequences of Tanzania's distinct approach towards state formation and trace the salient causal mechanisms in order to identify points of convergence and divergence between the Rwandan and Kenyan case studies. By examining Tanzania's ethnic (tribalization and differentiation of ethnic groups into political ethnicities), socio-economic (poverty and growing inequality), political (the banning of religious or ethnic outbidding) and institutional (process of deracialization and detribalization) transformations, I hope to add explanatory value to the current understandings of ethnic con/destruction, as the processes of ethno-nationalist mobilization and deactivation. Drawing on select examples, I will explore Tanzania's history of inclusion, exclusion, differentiation and post-colonial institution building.

⁴²⁷ Jeffrey Ira Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁴²⁸ Gurr, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and Center of International Studies, *Why Men Rebel*.

⁴²⁹ Pius V Fischer, *Rent-Seeking, Institutions and Reforms in Africa Theory and Empirical Evidence for Tanzania* (New York: Springer, 2006), <http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=337480>.

3.3.1 Objective Ethnicity in Pre-colonial Tanzania:

Earliest records indicate that Tanzania was home to a people closely related to the Khoikhoi, a community indigenous to the Kalahari desert. Evidence suggests that these people were overpowered by Bantu immigrants, arriving from West Africa, who trace their descendants to the Bantu communities of Africa today.⁴³⁰ Pre-dating the artificial boundaries associated with the continent today, these migrants settled evenly in the Eastern, Central and Southern territories of Africa. As in Rwanda and Kenya, a second wave of migrants originating from the North and East also settled in present day Tanzania. These Cushitic and Nilotic people similarly still have descendants living in Tanzania, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda. Migrating in waves between 300-400 AD, Nilots still constitute a significant part of the Tanzanian population today. The Maasai and the Datoga are two large and well known descendants of these Nilotic migrants, who still inhabit large parts of Tanzania today.

Along Tanzania's coast, Shirazi immigrants from Persia settled in large numbers, and contributed significantly to Tanzania's ethnic and cultural diversity. Particular influences of Arab colonization on African identity formation will be examined later on, though one obvious and significant impact that these Arab traders imported to Tanzania was Islam—currently one of the major religions in Tanzania today. Tanzania's national language, Kiswahil is also testament to Tanzania's Arabic influence, as Swahili is derived

⁴³⁰ John Ndembwike, *Tanzania: The Land and Its People* (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2006), 12.

from the Arabic word of ‘*Sahil*; meaning ‘coast.’ Like Kenya, Tanzania also has a more recent though very significant Asian community, immigrants mainly from India and Pakistan, who often arrived as indentured servants and today constitute one of the most influential economic communities in Tanzania.

Though plentiful and diverse, scholars on Tanzania conclude that ethnic communities in pre-colonial Tanzania lacked a political dimension. Jerman, who completed one of the few studies on Tanzanian ethnic identities, refers to the pre-colonial communities as ‘objective’ ethnicities. As defined previously, ethnicity can be viewed as objective in that it was a “characteristic which united a group of people in the frame of a certain social system.”⁴³¹ In terms of socially salient status indicators, these differed from community to community, but often included factors concerning age groups, kinship ties, modes of subsistence and religious beliefs.⁴³² Various studies have demonstrated that while pre-colonial Tanzania had a diverse and complex amount of ethnic communities, none consisted of an ethnically significant and fixed political identity.⁴³³ This was the case not only among Africa’s native migrant settlers, but also among the Persian settlers, who eventually domination large tracts of the East African Coast.

Descendents of Tanzania’s Persian communities are prominently evident all across Tanzania. In the current context, Tanzania’s Persian community is viewed as a

⁴³¹ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 59.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, 60.

⁴³³ See for example Terence Ranger, “European Attitudes and African Realities: The Rise and Fall of the Matola Chiefs of South-East Tanzania,” *The Journal of African History* 20, no. 1 (January 1, 1979): 63–82, doi:10.2307/181974; Eva Tobisson, *Family Dynamics among the Kuria: Agro-Pastoralists in Northern Tanzania* (Göteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1986); E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

distinct ethno-racial community, much like the Tutsi of Rwanda. Increasingly, members of these communities have called for autonomy and for those living on Zanzibar, secession from Tanzania. As such, Persian ethnicity is both fixed (by virtue of birth and descent) and ‘subjective’ (conferring status and political identity). The formation of Persian and Afro-Arabic ethnicity as a ‘ranked’⁴³⁴ racial category is not rooted in historical legitimacy, but rather is a product of a colonial construct.

As with the Hutu and Tutsi distinction, to be Arab or Persian was first and foremost a social category conveying class. While Arab migrants considered themselves to be superior to the native African, this status could/would change with a conversion to Islam. Unlike the fixed categories in evidence today, social mobility was possible between ethnic groups. The creation of the ‘*Swahil*’ identity is a perfect example, as it originally referred to the free but landless and poor inhabitants of the coast. Delineating a socio-economic status, Swahil was eventually applied to those people of the lowest social strata (economically). In contrast, the highest social strata was occupied by those who ‘claimed’ origin from Arabia and Persia—often changing African to Arabic names in order to further legitimize the process.⁴³⁵ While social mobility may not always have been easy, it was certainly and often possible. As with tracing the origins between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, it is not my argument here that there was no distinction, but rather that these ethnic distinctions were not fixed and political.

⁴³⁴ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

⁴³⁵ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 101.

Based on the kinship studies conducted by Misiugin, the coast of East Africa was divided into distinct social categories:⁴³⁶

- wenyi-mkuu*- rulers
- watu wa mji*- sheiks
- wana wa watu*- nobles
- waungwana*- free according to birth
- wageni*- from strange countries
- watumwa wa shamba*- agricultural slaves
- watumwa wa nyumba*- household slaves

Status between and within the groups was based on factors such as occupation, family name, wealth, landholding, and certainly also heritage and religion. Social mobility up and down the rungs of the ladder was possible and common. Contrary to popular belief, it was only around a century ago, that ‘Swahili’ was first characterized as a fixed identity in the colonial tribal index.⁴³⁷

3.3.2 German Indirect Rule and Subjective Ethnicity:

When Europeans began to arrive in Tanzania, they conceptualized the Swahil as a *distinct* ethnic and not socio-economic group. Prior to this time, the status of Swahil was

⁴³⁶ Viacheslav Misiugin, “Kinship Terminology in Zanzibar,” *St. Petersburg Journal of African Studies* St. Petersburg Journal of African Studies no. 5 (1995): 70–88.

⁴³⁷ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 103.

transitory, a is exemplified by the consensus data for Zanzibar between 1931 and 1953, showing a marked decrease in the percentage of Swahili ethnic members, and a corresponding increase in other ethnic categories. Since a person could change their categorization from Swahili to Arab, for example, the switch between groups in the consensus figures makes palpable sense when examined in the colonial context of ranking, differentiation and tribalization.⁴³⁸

With the advent of colonial rule, ethnic communities were transformed and often redefined. By 1919 for example, the colonially defined category of ‘Arab’ was assigned to the same administrative category as the ‘Swahili,’ permitting social mobility between the two groups. That year, however, ‘Arab’ was reclassified by the colonial authority. In this new context, ‘Arab’ only applied to the current upper-class strata, fixing them as a subjective racial category, and classifying them as ‘non-native/indigenous.’ As such, Arabs were exempt from taxation. This reclassification accounts for the large change between ‘Swahili’ and ‘Arab’ registered in the consensus. Forming the foundations of deep rooted grievances, the newly reclassified foreign Arabs were ranked as racially superior (though inferior to the whites) and employed as local-level colonial agents under indirect rule. The ethnic cleavages surrounding this transformation remain exceptionally salient today, frequently erupting in violence.⁴³⁹

One of the most common propositions for Tanzania’s lack of ethnic conflict is that Tanzania’s pre-colonial ‘objective’ communities were never subject to sufficient

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 104.

⁴³⁹ “Religious Violence Growing in Tanzania | The Media Project,” accessed August 23, 2013, <http://themediaproject.org/article/religious-violence-growing-tanzania>.

colonial tribalization, differentiation and/or ranking to create salient political identities.⁴⁴⁰ As the previous exploration of ‘Swahili’ identity transformation demonstrated, however, such arguments are not consistent with scholarly literature on the subject. In his examination of ethnic differentiation, Horowitz also finds evidence of the ‘advanced’ vs. ‘backward’ juxtaposition in Tanzania. Like many of the stateless and loosely bound ethnic communities in Kenya, the Tanzanian Chagga was a colonial construct, amalgamated from seventeen different groups, who suddenly “found themselves pulled together into a single administration,” modeled along neighboring kingdoms, as the British “found the monarchical form congenial to centralized control.”⁴⁴¹ A clear example of an ‘advanced’ group, the Chagga by virtue of their tribal homeland location, farming background, and willingness to westernize, thrived amidst the colonial environment, emerging in post-colonial Tanzania “not only [as] prosperous coffee farmers but successful businessmen, students, and bureaucrats.”⁴⁴² Chagga chiefs became closely linked with the colonial administration, even taking an active part in the suppression of the *Maji Maji* rebellion against neighboring tribes.

Conducting field research in the aftermath of the 2010 elections in Tanzania, Carl Gahnstroem noted that colonially constructed ‘advanced’ ethnic groups “like the Haya, Chagga and Nyakyusa are perceived to have had an educational advantage from colonial times, which subsequently translated into an occupational advantage in post-colonial

⁴⁴⁰ Alicia Erickson, “Peace in Tanzania: An Island of Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa”; Anke Weber, “The Causes of Politicization of Ethnicity: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania.”

⁴⁴¹ Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 149.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, 152.

Tanzania.”⁴⁴³ Further, Gahnstroem, Iliffe and Jerman have documented how current perceptions of ‘advanced’ groups corresponds to those groups whose ‘native homelands’ were “disproportionately favored in terms of investment and production” in colonial times.⁴⁴⁴ Such perceptions are not always benignly interpreted, as the research on the Haya indicates. Not only are they perceived to have been disproportionately favored, dominating key administrative positions and parastatals, they are also perceived to be ‘ethnic chauvinists’ with tribalistic tendencies that always favor their own co-ethnics.⁴⁴⁵ According to Posner and Illiffe, groupings of ‘advanced’ communities have increasingly amalgamated, as for example the Chagga, Haya, Kuria and Zigua, as a coalition of shared interest.

Similarly, Tanzania has abundant examples of ‘backwards’ groups, such as the traditionally marginalized Sukuma, Wabena, Pangwa, Kinga, Maasai and Barabaig to name just a few. Similarly, such feelings of marginalization also correspond to the actual marginalization of the corresponding districts. The people of Njombe, for example, have a severe feeling of exclusion. Situated in unproductive areas, these districts did not benefit from any investment, forcing the ‘natives’ to seek employment as ‘migrant’ workers. According to Giblin & Giblin, such perceptions of “exclusion bred a feeling of deprivation,”⁴⁴⁶ as the “exclusion from knowing the workings of the colonial economy

⁴⁴³ Carl Sebastian Laurentius Gahnstroem, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Tanzania: The 2010 General Elections and Mwanza Region,” 45.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. See also Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*; Jerman, *Between Five Lines*.

⁴⁴⁵ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 325–328.

⁴⁴⁶ Giblin and Giblin, *A History of the Excluded*, 2.

made them feel acutely disadvantaged...[and] severely handicapped in competition with those who had fuller knowledge.”⁴⁴⁷

Similarly, Tanzania’s largest tribe, the Sukuma, is consistently described as ‘backward,’ or “from the bush,” also ‘simple’ and those “who don’t understand things.”⁴⁴⁸ This view of ‘backward’ differentiation also corresponds with the Sukuma homeland of Mwanza and Shinyanga, which are “considered among the most economically backward areas of the country.”⁴⁴⁹ Recent evidence of amalgamations into broader coalitions, between the Sukuma and its co-ethnics, such as the Nyamwezi, the Kimbu, Konongo and Samburu could have a significant impact on the Tanzanian ethno-political landscape. If only the Sukuma (who approximately comprise 5.5 million) and its ethnic cousin the Nyamwezi (approximately 1.5 million) join forces, they would constitute the largest ethnic bloc in Africa.⁴⁵⁰ With the discovery of substantial natural resources in Mwanza, and a corresponding increase in Sukuma opposition support and ‘regionalism,’ such ethnic amalgamations are a distinct and even likely possibility.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁷ Maddox and Giblin, *In Search of a Nation*, 1.

⁴⁴⁸ Carl Sebastian Laurentius Gahnstroem, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Tanzania: The 2010 General Elections and Mwanza Region,” 60–61.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁴⁵⁰ Anke Weber, “The Causes of Politicization of Ethnicity: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Tanzania.”

⁴⁵¹ Carl Sebastian Laurentius Gahnstroem, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Tanzania: The 2010 General Elections and Mwanza Region.”

3.3.3 Ethnic Resistance in Tanzania: Maji Maji

The combination of a decentralized social structure, and the stateless nature of most ethnic communities in Tanganyika, made the colonial conquest easy for the Germans. Following on the heels of explorers and colonial administrators, came the missionaries. While the colonial officials counted, categorized and defined the natives, the missionaries converted. Despite the relative ease with which Germany managed to secure the territory, any indication of dissent or rebellion was ruthlessly subverted. In response to Arusha and Meru missionary resistance, for instance, the German administration responded with a series of brutal attacks, including killings, the looting and burning of food stores, and the confiscation of cattle. Once the tribal society had been sufficiently broken down, the colonial administration replaced all local Meru and Arusha chiefs, and instead installed colonial agents in 'native' authority positions. As previous discussions on the chiefly powers has highlighted, the native authority had a very broad authority, and could extract forced labor and taxes, while withholding resources like land. According to Spear, by "raiding their neighbors, they became wealthy in cattle and wives, effectively subverting the control over wealth and people previously exercised by elders."⁴⁵² As the wealth and power of the native authority grew, so did the native patronage system, effectively dismantling the traditional and authentic, and replacing it with an alien despotism. This short example of the institutionalized violence inherent in

⁴⁵² Gregory Maddox, James Leonard Giblin, and Thomas Spear, eds., "Indirect Rule, the Politics of Neo-Traditionalism & the Limits of Invention in Tanzania," in *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority & Dissidence in Tanzania* (Oxford; Dar Es Salaam; Athens: James Currey ; Kapsel Educational Publications ; Ohio University Press, 2005), 76.

colonial rule highlights the brutality of the Tanzanian colonial experience. Far from 'getting off lightly,' Tanzanian ethnic identity was forged in the context of violence, land alienation and differentiation.

As with the British and the Belgians, the German's viewed ethnicity in an instrumental capacity, as a means to social and political ends. By 1913, the government divided the protectorate into 19 civil districts, effectively segregating the territories and its people. Following the British model of indirect rule, the German colonial administration instilled direct administrators into each newly created district and corresponding tribe. According to Nimtz, the German understanding of indirect administration was almost exact to that of the British. Local ethnic communities were first and foremost catalogued and categorized, namely into "whites and coloreds," and further into "natives" and "non-natives."⁴⁵³ Similarly as in Rwanda and Kenya, Tanzania's ethnic communities were tribalized, differentiated, and pinned to a native-homeland.

Through the new administrative approach, political power was effectively removed from the traditional leaders, and traditional social relations were disrupted and dissolved. Further, the colonial imposition of taxes and forced labor often led to increased poverty, starvation and what effectively amounted to slavery.⁴⁵⁴ In response to these harsh conditions, native groups fought a desperate rebellion against the German Colonial Administration from 1905-1907. In what has remained Tanzania's most marginalized

⁴⁵³ August H Nimtz, *Islam and Politics in East Africa: The Sufi Order in Tanzania* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 110.

⁴⁵⁴ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 201.

areas, tribes from Southern Tanzania unite against German repression. The *Maji Maji* wars, while almost costing the Germans the colony, took a devastating human, social and cultural toll. Over a two year period, over 200,000 people died. In response to the rebellion and perceived local collaboration or sympathy, the German authority implemented a “scorched-earth policy,” confiscating land, razing villages, appropriating food, and meting out terrible corporal punishments to dissuade followers. While comparatively short in contrast to other rebellions across Africa, *Maji Maji* still counts as one of, if not the most deadly conflict in Africa’s history.⁴⁵⁵

After the rebellion was crushed, the colonial authority consolidated its rule and power over the population by socially disintegrating the population into manageable tribal units. The creation and imposition of ethnic categories meant that ethnicity became “decisive for people’s existence and status.”⁴⁵⁶ Individual rights were based on colonial imaginings of “color, caste and class articulated in groups of natives, non-natives and ‘tribes.’”⁴⁵⁷ This process of amalgamation and deconstruction demonstrates once again how the current listing of ‘130’ ethnic groups can be misleading when examining Tanzania’s ethno-political climate. Not entirely new, though not wholly unchanged, pre-colonial ethnic loyalties combined with newly emerging cleavages to produce a whole new set of politically salient identities. By the time the British arrived in Tanganyika, the population was already heavily divided into ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ groupings,

⁴⁵⁵ Ndembiwe, *Tanzania*, 16.

⁴⁵⁶ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 217.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 219.

together with a growing resentment of the local colonial administrator so actively involved in colonial collaboration and the ongoing slave trade.

By the 1900's, the German colonial government estimated that there were about 400,000 slaves in German East Africa. The institution of slavery in Tanganyika since about 1800 was heavily influenced by the colonial presence. Our final example, namely 'Slave' as an ethnic identity, represented the most inflexible and violent form of ethnic differentiation. With extremely minimal possibility for social mobility, the life of a slave was one of poverty, marginalization, exploitation and "second-rate affiliates."⁴⁵⁸ Slavery was mainly promulgated among the Swahili coast and islands. Since the German Authority felt that the abolition of slavery "would undermine the authority and prosperity of the local slave-owning elites, whose effective collaboration was believed to be indispensable to the functioning of the colonial administration,"⁴⁵⁹ the practice of slavery was essentially legitimized in colonial Tanganyika. Further, the German authority relied heavily on the Swahil/Arab community to provide the manpower to fill the 'native' authority all over Tanzania. The distinct remnants of the asymmetrical relationship between Arabs and Africans is still highly visible today. Forged in a context of ethnic ranking, subjugation and institutionalization, these relationships contain deep perceptions of grievances, evident in the negative stereotypes and religious violence that flares up in Coastal Tanzania and Zanzibar every so often.

⁴⁵⁸ Jan-Georg Deutsch, *Emancipation without Abolition in German East Africa, c.1884-1914* (Oxford [England]; Athens, Ohio: James Currey ; Ohio University Press, 2006), 243.

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 244.

3.3.4 British Indirect Rule and the Bifurcation of the State

The British conquered Northern Tanganyika in 1916. The rest of the territories were mandated over to Great Britain by the League of Nations in the aftermath of WWI. Institutionally, very little changed for the people of Tanzania, as Britain simply picked up where the Germans left off. Historically, however, the advent of British control would have lasting implications.

World War one had a devastating impact on Tanganyika. By the time the British inherited the territory:⁴⁶⁰

Vast areas of the country were devastated, turned into wasteland; economic life was disrupted; the social fabric of different tribes or ethnic groups was torn apart; rampant disease and extreme poverty further destroyed life; and thousands of African soldiers who had fought in the war succumbed to famine, malaria and other diseases.

The situation was compounded by the fact that the British had no interest in cultivating, investing in or re-building parts of Tanganyika. Unlike Kenya's flourishing settler colony, colonial settlement was not encouraged in Tanganyika. According to Ndembwike, Tanganyika was 'No White Man's Country.' While the German colonials greatly relied on the Swahili/Arabs to act as indirect administrators over native tribes, Britain--who had at this point had significant experience in Asia and Africa--successfully implemented systems of indirect rule, administering tribal units via the colonially appointed 'native authority.' As the German's before them, the British colonial

⁴⁶⁰ Ndembwike, *Tanzania*, 16.

administration was “preoccupied with placing people in neat, inflexible categories and when none existed, they invented them.”⁴⁶¹ Though partially rooted in context, and partially artificial, these new tribal units soon took on social meaning, as all forms of personal advancement were inextricably tied to the tribe, ethnic identity and native authority.

3.3.5 Artificial Tribal Constructs and the Growth of Ethnocentrism:

As Britain began partitioning Tanganyika, cultural borders were ignored. Just as the Germans partitioned Dar es Salaam into sets of racial zones in 1912, continued partitioning and re-zoning of the rest of the country was geared towards maximizing state consolidation, while breaking up extensive ethnic communities. Under the British administration, the total demarcation, partitioning, and tribalization of Tanzania was completed. According to Jerman, the British Indirect rule administration was particularly effective in Tanzania, as “the system of tribal divisions within the frame of the native administration and the resultant adoption of it on all levels of life thus produced a reaction among people: it was manifested in an enhanced social significance of ethnicity among people. It was possible to manipulate ethnicity.”⁴⁶²

At this point, the tribalization of Tanzania and the creation of an ethno-political consciousness matches those examined in the case study of Rwanda and Kenya. Since all forms of advancement were tied to the native homeland and the native authority, ethnicity

⁴⁶¹ Veney, *Forced Migration in Eastern Africa Democratization, Structural Adjustment, and Refugees*, 42.

⁴⁶² Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 244.

became the most salient self-referent and mobilizing force in Tanzania. According to Jerman, this period in Tanzania's colonial history witnessed a distinct growth in ethnocentrism, including instances of political outbidding, whereby chief's mobilized constituents by invoking emotional appeals to 'origin'-- "as 'tribe' *perceived* other 'tribes' in their contest for political power or economic benefit."⁴⁶³ The competition for scarce resources, the positions of authority in the native administration, and the relative power position of the in-group amidst the social system was now solely dependent on race and ethnicity.

3.3.6 Independence and Nationalist Identity

In many African cases, the colonial rule ended as abruptly as it began. Notoriously unaccountable to the local people, the swift departure of colonial administrations often left the African nations inadequately prepared for self-governance. In many instances, the departing colonials imparted constitutions and state structures on the new state, at times wholly incompatible with the local context, traditions and capabilities of the territory and its peoples. A British based 'first-past-the-post' model has often proved particularly unstable when a society is ethnically polarized and lacking the skills to implement the system effectively. Kenya was one such example. While the move towards independence was not as abrupt in Tanzania, the formation of the Tanganyika

⁴⁶³ Ibid., 247.

African Association (TAA or AA) and the Shirazi party was not a welcome move by the British administration.

Due to the lack of investment and territorial development under the colonial authority, Tanzania greeted independence with an exceptionally weak social infrastructure, and this “even in contrast to other African colonies.”⁴⁶⁴ Since Tanzania experienced high levels of racial ranking, as well as ethnic differentiation, it was particularly challenging to unite people into a nationalist coalition. By 1961, Tanzania’s health care system was almost non-existent. Further Tanzania was inheriting a significant educational problem. Since “the education system was stratified by racial categories”⁴⁶⁵ a large majority of the population was entirely illiterate.

A World Bank Report on Tanganyika just prior to independence estimated that less than 1 in 8 of students reached the final standard XII level. There was no University or College in Tanganyika, and natives were not encouraged to attend higher schooling. There was an immense distributional inequality between racial groupings and educational opportunities, as pervasive racial segregation was in fully practiced until about 1948. On the tribal level, it is important to keep in mind the social and political significance that ‘tribe’ represented. While the departure of the colonial authority meant that the state was no longer under colonial domination, it did not automatically imply that the social significance of tribalism was erased with independence. As the case studies of Rwanda

⁴⁶⁴ S. M Wangwe, Brian Van Arkadie, and Economic and Social Research Foundation (Tanzania), *Overcoming Constraints on Tanzanian Growth: Policy Challenges Facing the Third Phase Government* (Dar es Salaam; Oxford, UK: Mkuki na Nyota ; African Books Collective Ltd. [distributor outside Africa], 2000), 37.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

and Kenya demonstrated, it is the adoption of, or mere partial reversal of the bifurcated state system and the colonial institutional legacy that contributed so obviously to ethno-nationalist mobilization and conflict. Unlike in Rwanda and Kenya, however, the Nationalist movement of Tanganyika adopted a drastically different direction.

3.3.7 Post-Colonial Ethnicity and the formation of a Nation:

The African Association (AA), predecessor to The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) became the leading force in the struggle for independence in Tanganyika. Even before independence, the members of TANU departed radically from the patterns observed in my two previous case studies. Rejecting both the colonial and the native authority, TANU nationalists stressed the need for one Africa, one nation, one unity and one identity. Tribal Chiefs also became the natural enemy of TANU. As instruments of the colonial government, chiefs were accountable to the colonial domination and not to the people. Since local chiefs were picked strategically, by virtue of their collaborative nature or colonial loyalty, native authorities usually “proved effective colonial administrators, collecting tax, recruiting labor, and adjudicating disputes, however, they also looked after their own interests and those of their clients, accumulating large herds of cattle, extensive land holdings, acres of coffee, and large families for themselves and granting land, jobs and justice to others.”⁴⁶⁶ As nationalist sentiment began to rise in Tanzania, the chief became the symbol of ‘artificial’ tradition, colonial collaboration and

⁴⁶⁶ Maddox, Giblin, and Thomas Spear, “Indirect Rule, the Politics of Neo-Traditionalism & the Limits of Invention in Tanzania,” 77.

the reinforcement of inequality through tribalism. Unlike the case in Rwanda and Kenya, whereby the colonial institutions were faithfully adopted and clientelism perpetuated, the nationalist movement burgeoning in Tanzania singled out the ‘native chief’ for eradication, as he represented “the local manifestation of colonial rule.”⁴⁶⁷

During the third territorial government in 1945 the AA stressed their desire to do away with all tribal, religious, cultural, education and racial differences, adopting a slogan of “unity is strength.”⁴⁶⁸ In 1954 the AA became TANU, and the first President Julius Kambaraga Nyerere, stressed national unity over African unity. The primary objective was freedom from Colonial rule, and the need for a nationalist movement. Nyerere, like the AA, recognized the dangers of tribalism as the manifestation of colonial oppression at the local level. The dangers of unleashing a subjective ethnicity through political outbidding was apparent in other parts of Africa, and hence required a two pronged reconstruction of the colonial heritage—on the civic level and on the local/tribal level.

Tribalism, however, could not be reversed and deconstructed overnight. To begin with, Nyerere and his party had to lay the basic framework to avoid the onset of political outbidding in conjunction with growing ethno-nationalism. More than simply a declaration of economics and self-reliance, the Arusha Declaration exemplified a sharp new approach to ethnic administrative practices. Instead of de-racializing the state and redistributing the spoils along ethno-regional lines, Nyerere knew that appeals for de-

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 256.

racialization implied corresponding appeals for tribal redistribution. In 1967, as the Arusha Declaration was published, Nyerere made a clear call to Tanzanian national identity when he declared that “we are Tanzanian and wish to remain Tanzanians as we develop.”⁴⁶⁹ While this may not seem particularly novel, at a time when individuals identified first and foremost with their tribal identity, Nyerere’s call for a nation before a state marks the point of departure from our other two case studies. While Tanzania experienced indirect rule, the bifurcation of the state, ranking and differentiating of ethnic groups and an ethnic bureaucracy, he failed to institutionalize the ethnic bureaucracy and so marks a significant point of departure. The link between post-colonial justice, retribution, redistribution and ethnicity was for the first time directly addressed and progressively dismantled.

The Declaration firmly rejected the colonial divisions along religion, race, color, tribe and national origin. To create one people, Nyerere articulated a Tanzanian national identity that should transcend previous tribal, racial and religious loyalties. In his Election Broadcast and numerous speeches and articles,⁴⁷⁰ Nyerere emphasized his rejection of the ‘native’ culture as a tool of oppression. During every election campaign, Nyerere stressed a platform of unity. Fearing political outbidding and ethno-nationalist mobilization, TANU implemented election regulations that forbid the use of tribalism and racism as well as appeals based on religion and sex in the campaign.⁴⁷¹ While not a guarantee

⁴⁶⁹ (1968, 315-326).

⁴⁷⁰ See for example Nyerere, (1968) *Uhuru na Ujamaa*, 259-268, 335; (1967) *Uhuru na Umoja*, 4, 8; (1973) *Uhuru na Maendeleo*, 74-79, 373.

⁴⁷¹ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 79.

against ethno-nationalist sentiment, these institutional changes significantly curtailed the possibility for political outbidding.

Such laws are significant in understanding the ethno-political threat faced by post-colonial Tanzania. Nyerere recognized the dangers associated with historic grievances implanted within the current ethnic consciousness. According to Herzog, “ethnic identity is not in itself a resource for political power unless defined as such in the process of political negotiations.”⁴⁷² By changing the rules of the political contest, TANU effectively changed the point at which ethnicity usually enters the political arena, and the extent to which it could be instrumental for electoral mobilizations.

For Nyerere the emotional implications of ethnic division were clear, as the process of detribalization had to be an all encompassing endeavor, and included the official abolishment of the term *kabila* which meant ethnic group as a tribe. Instead, TANU introduced the word *jamii*, meaning society, in all official documents and publications. The difference in meaning is a fine one—“*kabila* implies tribal division and *jamii* emphasizes national unity.”⁴⁷³ For the unification of all *jamii*, Nyerere next targeted a national language, a common and unified political party, and an economic policy that could eradicate the tribal inequalities and grievances based on resource allocation and native homeland distributional inequalities.

The Arusha Declaration released in 1967 sought to change Tanzania into a self-reliant state, capable of providing free social services to a unified and stable country. The

⁴⁷² Hanna Herzog, “Ethnicity as a Product of Political Negotiation: The Case of Israel*,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 7, no. 4 (1984): 517, doi:10.1080/01419870.1984.9993465.

⁴⁷³ Jerman, *Between Five Lines*, 274.

declaration had a very egalitarian vision-- free education, health care, housing and clean water. One major goal of the new government was simply to make primary education universal, obligatory, and most importantly, affordable for all. The aim of this policy was for each village to have its own school, and most of the 10,900 primary schools operating now were the product of these 1970's policies. A similar goal was articulated by the new government in regards to health care. According to the World Bank reports, the number of government operated health care facilities in rural areas increased by more than 300% between 1969 and 1978. In 1969, there were only about 50 health centers in what is now Tanzania, and about 1,444 dispensaries. By 1979, this number had increased to an astounding 183 rural health centers and 2,282 dispensaries. In the water sector, the main objective was to bring water within 400 meters of most households in rural areas. Between 1971 and 1980, the proportion of the population who had access to clean and free water nationally increased from 12 to 47 percent.⁴⁷⁴ The provision of such basic services was key to breaking the tribal link, as it set the nation-state as the legitimate unit of service provider, and no longer the ethnic leaders or tribal group.

The move towards a unified and self-sufficient state, was hence grounded in accountability and uniform redistribution. In terms of the African socialist experiment or *ujamaa* the results were less positive. In 1980, twenty years after independence, Tanzania received \$600 million in economic aid. Without this aid, Nyerere was quite candid in

⁴⁷⁴ Wangwe, Van Arkadie, and Economic and Social Research Foundation (Tanzania), *Overcoming Constraints on Tanzanian Growth*, 40.

stating that Tanzania would have starved.⁴⁷⁵ While the ujamaa projects failed to make Tanzania economically self-sufficient, the failed project did have one positive result in terms of detribalization. According to Mamdani, *Ujaama* was as much a political strategy as an economic one. While economically it was a catastrophic failure, the political implications of *ujamaa* were successful. Nyerere's insight was to understand that the "heart of colonial governance was its legal and administrative, and not military, apparatus; if the legal and administrative apparatus was not reformed, the colonial state would continue to exist even if the colonial military, police and officials left Tanzania."⁴⁷⁶ The forced relocation of villages from their 'native homeland' effectively abolished local governance, by removing the constituency from the local land, and so disrupting the native reinforcing power of consolidation, obligation and redistribution.

3.3.8 Conclusion:

When reflecting on his presidency, Nyerere was quoted in 1999 London's *Sunday Times* as saying:

We took over a country with 85 percent its adults illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were two trained engineers and 12 doctors. When I stepped down there was 91 percent literacy and nearly every child was in school. We trained thousands of engineers, doctors, and teachers.

⁴⁷⁵ Dickson A Mungazi, *We Shall Not Fail: Values in the National Leadership of Seretse Khama, Nelson Mandela, and Julius Nyerere* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 101.

⁴⁷⁶ Mamdani, *Define and Rule Native as Political Identity.*, 122.

The construction of Tanzanian unity is the construction of a Nation. Whereas our other two case studies inherited a state, Nyerere and the TANU party recognized that inheriting the state did not translate into automatic nationhood. While Tanzania has a comparable history of migration and settlement as relates to Kenya and Rwanda, a violent history of indirect rule, the creation of a bifurcated state, and both the ranking and differentiation between tribalized ethnic groups, Tanzania is the only case that managed to avoid the ethnic conflict trap. In stark contrast to the Hutu manifesto, the Arusha declaration stressed a national identity and unity, and rejected the colonial ethnic and racial hierarchies. Instead, TANU stressed National Unity through a common party, language, education system and state symbology.⁴⁷⁷ By both deracializing and detribalizing the state, Nyerere avoided pleas for distributional justice, whereby the spoils of colonial administrative change are ethnically reallocated but institutionally reproduced. The appeal to a Tanzanian identity gradually superseded loyalties of race, religion and tribe. Coupled with the institutionalization of strict campaign guidelines, the risk of political outbidding and ethno-nationalist mobilization remains low in Tanzania even today.

⁴⁷⁷ Miguel, "Tribe or Nation?".

IV THESIS CONCLUSION

By 1999, one in five Africans was living in a conflict ridden country. Over 90 percent of the casualties in these war torn states were civilians, leading to over 3 million refugees and about 16 million internally displaced persons.⁴⁷⁸ The importance when looking at protracted social conflicts is to determine in what context ethnicities become politicized, and what are the historical cleavages that are present and potentially exploited in each context. This thesis has examined ethno-nationalist mobilization in the context of state formation. The case studies have demonstrated that ‘who’ is accessing state resources, and ‘how’ resources are allocated plays a vital role in ethnically polarized societies and the potential for ethno-nationalist mobilization.

While trying to answer these questions, I found the method of historical process tracing to be very helpful. Based on the findings of this research, ethno-nationalist violence in the Great Lakes region has its identity rooted in the colonial construct. The administration of indirect rule has left a profound impact on ethnic identity and its relation to the state and to the locality. Further, the division between civil law and customary law, and the creation of a bifurcated state continuously reinforced a system of ethnic favoritism and exclusionary politics. The three cases examined in detail show how three comparative case studies, each of which possess the ingredients for conflict,

⁴⁷⁸ (World Bank 2000: 55).

evolved into divergent post-colonial directions. Each of the three cases can hence be viewed as exemplifying stages in a process. Rwanda became the tragic case of the Great Lakes region, shocking the world with the brutality of the civil war and the genocide that followed, while Tanzania managed to remain a bastion of stability, surrounded by the horrific events unfolding beyond its borders. Kenya represents an intermediate case, whereby the state and political parties tap into polarized ethnic identities in order to mobilize voters and secure the state.

The purpose of this thesis has been geared at theory building, allowing for its findings that resolve the apparent puzzle of Tanzania, to be logically applied and generalized to other comparable cases such as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and the DRC. Each of these states experienced the creation of artificial arbitrary borders, the splitting of groups who share a common history, language, and culture into different countries, and the institutionalization of artificial and grievance laden ethnic identities during the strive for political power and state ownership. Unlike Tanzania, however, all these countries fell victim to political violence and ethnic mobilization.

In this thesis I have introduced macro-historical pathways that merged the strengths of different theoretical frameworks. This thesis has sought to answer the question, of why do we observe different outcomes in regards to the outbreak of civil war in Tanzania, despite similar or poorer economic performances to Kenya and Rwanda, increased ethnic fragmentation, the same Colonial history and bifurcated state system, and transition to independence. Through theoretical frameworks and empirical case studies, I have found that the most important prerequisite to elite mobilization is the

creation of a subjective ethnic identity. Further, this political ethnicity must be differentiated from at least some other identity groups, setting up the ethnic group in direct competition with, and opposed to the 'other' out-groups. Finally, groups must perceive of themselves as horizontally and relatively deprived to other groups, and able to invoke shared conceptions of past grievances and future expectations.

In the Great-Lakes region of Africa, this historic marginalization must be examined within the colonial context, and as a process of indirect administration, tribalization, ranking and differentiation. This development creates diverging frames for in and out-group evaluation, setting some as ranked, and/or 'advanced' and 'backward.' Since the colonial legacy has left ethnicity, land, and resource security inherently linked to the 'native' group, the control for the state has become a zero sum ethnic competition for exclusive resource control. Mobilization is hence based on mutual perceptions of fear and anxiety (based on past grievances) and conceptions of justice (the right for redistribution), embedded within the struggle for political power and the allocation of the state's resources and costs. Finally, the decision by political leaders to institutionalize racial/ethnic categories and participate in political outbidding as part of the distributional conflict, increase the security dilemma, turning contentious environments into violent ethno-nationalist movements.

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BIOGRAPHY

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