MARITAL POWER AND MARITAL SATISFACTION AMONG AMERICAN
MUSLIMS

by

Aliya Razvi Chapman
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Committee:

_____   Director

_____

_____

_____   Department Chairperson

_____   Program Director

_____   Dean, College of Humanities
                                            and Social Sciences

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Aliya Razvi Chapman
Master of Arts
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Director: Lauren B. Cattaneo, Professor
Department of Psychology

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Dedication

Too few South Asian women have the same privilege of education that I have had. Therefore, I dedicate this work to my mother and father, who did not simply "let" me study, but who pried my frantic fingers off the lamppost on the first day of school, and kept taking me back until I walked on my own. It is also for my brother, whose intelligence, humor, and strength are so valuable to me. I owe everything to my family's love and encouragement.

This is also for my husband and his family, whose generosity, love, and patience are worth the work of ten dissertations. And for Nana – I know you would be so glad.

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Abstract

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Aliya Razvi Chapman, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2014

Dissertation Director: Dr. Lauren B. Cattaneo

American Muslims value marriage and report concern about rising divorce rates in their community. This reported rise may relate to shifts in spousal power dynamics that are evident in gender role ideologies: American Muslims often hold traditional gender role beliefs but become more egalitarian with exposure to dominant American norms. It is rare to find investigations of marital power among American Muslims. This study defined marital power as power bases (gender role ideology and religiosity) and power outcomes (division of household tasks, decision-making, and childcare). It explored the effect of marital power on marital satisfaction in a sample of 219 American Muslims, using original cross-sectional data analyzed with hierarchical multiple regressions. It also assessed the effect of participants' parents/in-laws on their power and satisfaction. Participants were highly educated, religious, long-term American residents. They reported high marital satisfaction in contradiction to the community's fears of high

marital discord. Participants' responses to measures of marital power indicated that they held egalitarian gender role ideology and divided household tasks and childcare in a moderately traditional way. Participants shared decision-making more equally than household tasks and childcare. Egalitarian power division predicted greater marital satisfaction for both genders. Very few participants reported that their parents/in-laws contributed to family tasks, suggesting that parents do not affect the marriage in this way. Overall, results indicate that participants' marriages are more similar to, than different from, non-Muslim American marriages.

Introduction

There are significant social implications in marital satisfaction. Failed marriages have deleterious effects on society and the individual, including increased mental and physical ill-health, and increased risk of mortality (Carrere, Buehlman, Gottman, Coan, & Ruckstuhl, 2000). Married individuals experience benefits in the areas of individual physical and psychological health, social interactions, happiness, self-perceptions, financial stability, prosocial behavior, and longevity, compared to their unmarried or divorced counterparts (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002; also see Waite, 2003). Unfortunately, marital satisfaction appears elusive for many couples. There is a high divorce rate in the Western world in general, and even communities that value marriage particularly highly and frown upon divorce report concern about their members' marital health. This includes the American Muslim community (Alshugairi, 2010; Beverley, 2002; Curtis, 2010; Ghayyur, 2010; Haddad, Smith, & Moore, 2006; Leonard, 2003; Siddiqui, 2009), with whom this study is concerned.

American Muslim religious leaders and counselors currently report unease with marital conflict and dissolution in their community (e.g., Kholoki, 2007, Nadir, 1998, Siddiqui, 2009). Many of the changes they perceive in American Muslim marriages involve the power dynamics inherent in gender roles and relations (e.g. Eid, 2005; Hogben, 1991). Traditional interpretations of Islam suggest that the Muslim husband

should hold the balance of power in the family – this is reflected in couples' gender-traditional division of family roles, including household tasks, childcare, and outside employment (Haddad et al., 2006). These interpretations are common among American Muslims who have emigrated from patriarchal countries, as well as those influenced by conservative understandings of Islam (Haddad et al., 2006). However, as Muslims spend more time in America, they tend to develop more egalitarian expectations of appropriate roles and behavior for each gender (Haddad & Lummis, 1987; Hogben, 1991; Leonard, 2003), including task division in the family, and women's employment and community leadership. Acculturation, via its effect on gender roles and gender role beliefs, thus leads to "shifts in the balance of power within families" (Lavee & Katz, 2002, p. 37). Still, many American Muslims also remain highly religious and attempt to live by their religion's teachings, including those concerning gender. For some, this involves continued adherence to traditional gender roles, and for others it means a more feminist reinterpretation of Islamic teachings (Haddad et al., 2006).

Despite this shifting landscape, research has not adequately explored marital power and satisfaction among American Muslims. Exploration of these concepts can improve services provided to American Muslim couples by evaluating the assumption that Muslims will neatly fit the patterns identified in Western non-Muslim couples. Such research should aim to develop an emic understanding of the nature of spousal power among American Muslims and its effects on their marital satisfaction. An emic concept is "culture-specific" – a pattern of perceiving, thinking, or behaving that is identified within a culture, through the culture's own "frame of reference" (Brislin, 1983, pp. 382,

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383). In contrast, an etic concept is "culture-general" in that it applies across cultures and forms a basis of comparison between two communities.

The connection of power and marital satisfaction is etic, in that the two concepts are shown to be connected in many cultures. Nonetheless, a concept can have emic aspects as well as etic aspects (Brislin, 1983): the specific way that power impacts marital satisfaction is likely to vary across cultures. The Western pattern is that egalitarian power distribution has the most positive impact on marital satisfaction (e.g., Amato, Johnson, Booth, & Rogers, 2003; Halloran, 1998; Lavee & Katz, 2002; Steil, 1997, 2001), but the power-satisfaction relationship may not function in this way for American Muslims. Emic influences in this community may include commonly-followed religious practices that engender traditional power distributions, as well as power relationships that are likely to include extended family, since community insiders indicate that many American Muslim parents are closely involved in the lives of their adult children from the time of mate selection onward (e.g., Eid, 2005). These factors may affect power distribution and how it relates to marital satisfaction.

In the present study, I identify emic aspects of the connection between power and satisfaction in American Muslim marriages. This literature review begins with a rationale for the study of marriage among American Muslims, including a discussion of the benefits of marriage, the value placed on marriage in Muslim communities, and the fear within the community of an increasing American Muslim divorce rate. The rationale is followed by a definition of marital satisfaction and marital power, and a discussion of trends in marital satisfaction and marital power distribution in mainstream research and

studies specific to American Muslims. Next, the literature review presents the connection between marital power and marital satisfaction in mainstream research and in American Muslim samples, and concludes with a rationale for an exploratory examination of the role of extended family, particularly spouses' parents, in American Muslims' marital power and marital satisfaction.

Why Study Marriage?

The study of marriage is important across cultures because of the social, physical, and psychological benefits reaped by married individuals and the societies in which they live. In the United States, married men and women experience "lower mortality, less risky behavior, more monitoring of health, more compliance with medical regimens, higher sexual frequency, more satisfaction with their sexual lives, more savings, and higher wages" than unmarried people (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002, p. 3). Divorced and separated individuals experience higher rates of "psychopathology, physical illness, suicide, homicide, violence, and mortality from disease" than individuals in intact marriages (Carrere et al., 2000, p. 42). Children in divorced and single-parent homes, and even children in homes with a step-parent, struggle more with low school achievement and dropout, poor mental health and more social/behavioral problems than do children with two biological parents in the home (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002).

Yet, failed marriages are disturbingly common in America. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that 20% of first marriages end in separation or divorce after 5 years; after 10 years, this rises to one-third of all first marriages (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002). This percentage varies considerably across racial and ethnic

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categories: for example, 32% of Caucasian women's first marriages end by the first decade, compared to 34% of Hispanic women's first marriages, 47% of African American women's first marriages, and 20% of Asian women's first marriages (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002). The benefits of marriage are also unequally distributed across gender: men reap more rewards than women (Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001) and are happier in their marriages (Kamp Dush, Taylor, & Kroeger, 2008). This suggests that marriage should be examined with attention both to gender and to the unique customs, beliefs and experiences of each community that may contribute to cultural differences in marriage and divorce.

Why Study Marriage among American Muslims?

American Muslims, similar to Muslims worldwide, strongly emphasize marriage as part of their Islamic duty. A common Muslim saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad states that marrying completes half of one's religious duties (Hogben, 1991), and Muslims believe that divorce is allowed but discouraged by God. Family is considered the unit of society, and its health directly affects the health of the larger Muslim community because of the family's task of passing along social and spiritual values (Hodge, 2005). Marriage among Muslims is considered a union not only of two people but also of two families, who often contribute heavily to mate selection (Haddad et al., 2006; Smith, 1999).

As may be expected from this emphasis on healthy families, much effort goes into safeguarding the Muslim couple's stability and healthy functioning (Alshugairi, 2010). Muslim spouses are encouraged to work hard to resolve marital disputes. Yet, they may

struggle to obtain the necessary support. For example, although religious teachings (e.g.,

Qur'an verse 4:35) recommend that spouses seek mediation from family in times of

marital conflict, immigrant American Muslims may not be able to use this option if their

extended family remains in their country of origin. Professional marital therapy is an

alternative, but studies suggest that American Muslims are reluctant to seek professional

help because of concerns about the therapist's cultural and religious competence (Ahmed

& Reddy, 2007; Hodge, 2005). American Muslim couples tend to turn instead to

religious leaders for marital counseling (Bagby, Perl, & Froehle, 2001), but research

indicates that fewer than half of these leaders have formal qualifications in a mental

health field (Abu-Ras, Gheith, & Cournos, 2008; Ali, Milstein, & Marzuk, 2005). Thus,

even if American Muslims who experience marital problems want to save their

marriages, they may experience difficulty because they are separate from familial

support, because they do not wish to seek assistance from professionals within

mainstream American culture, or because they seek assistance from religious leaders who

may not be formally qualified to counsel.

Given the high value placed on marriage in the American Muslim community, the

religious injunction to protect marriage where possible, and the acknowledgement of the

difficulty of doing so, there is fear that American Muslim marriages are failing at a

greater rate than historical standards for Muslims (e.g. Ba-Yunus, 2007; Curtis, 2010;

Nadir, 1998). However, very little empirical research has actually explored the health of

American Muslim marriages (Amer, 2010). One popularly-cited study that estimates an

overall American Muslim divorce rate is contested (Leonard, 2003), particularly because

there is very little information available regarding the methods of the study. The author

of the study (Ba-Yunus, 2000; see also Ba-Yunus, 2007) derived his statistic by

examining 10 years of official state marriage and divorce records in five American states

and one Canadian province selected for their large Muslim populations. He divided the

average number of Muslim divorces per state by the average number of Muslim

marriages per state, and then averaged the states' mean Muslim divorce rates to yield a

"nationwide" statistic of 32.33% (Ba-Yunus, 2007). This statistic should be considered

with caution, not only because of the lack of information about the sample and the non-

random selection of states, but also because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate figures

for Muslim marriages and divorces. Not all Muslims will document their marriages with

their state, some because they prefer religious ceremonies to legal ones (Macfarlane,

2012), and others because their marriages are registered in a country outside the United

States, so that the only American legal record is of their divorce (Ba-Yunus, 2000).

In contrast, nine percent of American Muslims reported being divorced or

separated in a nationwide study by the Pew Research Center (2007). Even more recently,

Alshugairi (2010) studied 751 primarily West-Coast American Muslims and divided the

number of self-reported divorced participants ($n = 71$) by the number of married

participants ($n = 333$) to yield "a rudimentary divorce rate for the sample of 21.3%,"

(2010, p. 264). The difference in these divorce rates is striking. The Pew Research

Center's statistic is only slightly higher than that of the general American population

(13%; Pew Research Center, 2007). Alshugairi's percentage closely matches the above-

mentioned ten year divorce rate of Asian women (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002) – an

important point, since approximately one-third of American Muslims are South Asian (Bukhari, 2003). Also important is the likelihood that self-reports of American Muslim marriage and divorce will yield a more accurate estimate than state records, for the reasons described above.

Regardless of its questionable accuracy, Ba-Yunus' statistic has filtered noticeably into mainstream American Muslim community publications (e.g. Ghayyur, 2010; Kholoki, 2007; Siddiqui, 2009), causing and/or reflecting significant unrest. The community's concern is echoed in statements by religious leaders (Alshugairi, 2010; Eid, 2005; Hogben, 1991) that they are witnessing a rise in broken marriages in their community. These leaders almost unanimously attribute this to a shift in attitudes and expectations of marriage, which they say detract from Muslims' willingness to commit to the marriage. No studies have examined whether this is actually the case.

In sum, marriage is extremely important to the American Muslim community, and there is concern within the community about rising rates of divorce, although the veracity of this claim has yet to be established. Regardless of the divorce rate, however, research on American Muslim marriages will increase the ability of therapists to provide culturally competent intervention, and may also contribute to training for American Muslim religious leaders who provide lay-counseling in their community. Very few studies provide reliable data about the mechanics of American Muslim marriages. This gap in the literature highlights the need for the present study, which investigates the marital health of the American Muslim community by examining how marital power affects community members' marital satisfaction.

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Why Study Marital Satisfaction?

Studies of marital health measure marital quality in several different ways, defining it as any of many factors including commitment, communication, friendship, sexual intimacy, or stability (see Stanley, 2007). Marital satisfaction, an individual's "overall appraisal" of contentment with his or her marriage (Kamp Dush et al., 2008, p. 212), is perhaps the most common outcome measure of marital health, given that "chronic and significant marital unhappiness would not be seen by most as healthy" (Stanley, 2007, p. 17). It is also an aspect of marital quality that applies across cultures. Measurement of marital satisfaction in non-Western (Qadir, De Silva, Prince, & Khan, 2005) and Western Muslims (Ahmad & Reid, 2008; Ali, 1992; Alshugairi, 2010; Asamarai, Solberg, & Solon, 2008; Chapman & Cattaneo, 2013; Haque & Davenport, 2009; Juhari, 1997; Shah, 2007) suggests that the concept is etic – even though individualist and collectivist cultures have different expectations of marriage (Dion & Dion, 1993), most people have some feeling about their marriage as a whole. Thus, marital satisfaction is a way of understanding marital health that is applicable to the American Muslim community.

Why Study Marital Power?

Marital power is shown to have a significant impact on marital health in several populations, and American Muslim religious leaders and counselors suggest that it affects the marriages of couples in their community. In order to understand the marital power-marital satisfaction relationship in the dominant American culture, and to review the little

that is known about power in American Muslim marriages, a definition of marital power is required.

What Is Marital Power?

Power, in general, refers to "the level of one's influence in social relations at any level of human interaction" (Cattaneo & Chapman, 2010, p. 647). Marital power is thus the level of influence in one's relationship with one's spouse. Influence occurs when the actions of an individual affect the thoughts, feelings, and/or behaviors of her spouse (Oyamot, Fuglestad, & Snyder, 2010). Equality of power (hereafter referred to as "equality") is an even distribution of influence between spouses. It refers to the quality of "sameness" in distribution of power – spouses with equal power have the same level of influence over each other. In contrast, equity refers to "fairness" or "justice" in distribution of power, and requires that each spouse perceives his or her portion of power as just and fair.

Marital power takes three forms: bases, processes, and outcomes (Cromwell & Olsen, 1975). *Power bases* are the answer to the question, "Why is this person able to influence his/her spouse?" They include external resources that are valued by the target of influence, such as financial assets and social connections, as well as internal resources that allow for effective behavior. Religiosity is an example of an internal resource, as is gender role ideology (GRI), which refers to "people's beliefs about the appropriate roles and obligations of women and men," (Olson et al., 2007, p. 298; also see Davis & Greenstein, 2009); gender roles, therefore, are tasks and responsibilities that are assigned to individuals on the basis of their gender. "Traditional" GRI describes the belief that

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men and women should divide roles and responsibilities in a gender-conventional way (e.g., men as breadwinners and women as homemakers). "Egalitarian" GRI refers to the belief that people are not limited to any particular role based on their gender, but instead have equal rights and responsibilities (e.g., both genders have the right to earn income and the responsibility to raise children and run the home).

Among American Muslims, a wife's power bases may include her level of education, her interpretation of religious teachings regarding how she should behave as a woman, her level of connection to extended family and the religious community, and her income generation. Different power bases lead to different reasons for successful influence (Orina, Wood, & Simpson, 2002; Raven, 2008). For example, if both spouses believe that the husband has the religiously-sanctioned ability to reward or punish the wife, the wife may comply with him in order to avoid punishment, gain reward, or because she believes that she is required by God to obey his authority.

Power bases may be related to one another, and changes in one may cause changes in another. An example is the positive relationship between education and egalitarian gender role beliefs. Similarly, a power base held by one spouse may become evident via changes in the other spouse's beliefs and/or behavior. For example, a wife's contribution to family income (her power base) may lead her husband to believe that women are equally fit to earn income and this may allow her more influence in family decision-making or freedom from laborious household tasks.

Power processes (referred to by many as power strategies) are the answer to the question, "How does this person attempt to influence his/her spouse?" Orina et al. (2002,

p. 460) describe power processes as "the general means by which influence agents frame their positions and emphasize their power bases so that the desired (advocated) response becomes the best choice among alternative responses for targets to accept." In other words, power processes are an individual's selection of power bases that are most likely to influence the spouse (Raven, 2008), and the use of these bases via behaviors intended to influence the spouse. An example of a power process is the demand-withdraw communication pattern (Christensen & Heavey, 1990), typically discussed in the context of marital conflict. An example of a power process in an American Muslim marriage may occur if the wife wishes to stay home with the children and reminds her husband that, according to their interpretation of Islam, she has the religious right to do this and leave income generation to him. He may be influenced by her use (power process) of religious interpretation (power base) and take responsibility for paid employment, leaving her free to raise the children. Power processes are best studied using observational methods that are suited to the analysis of behavior patterns (see, for example, Rehman & Holtzworth-Munroe, 2006).

Power outcomes are the answer to the question, "Did this person successfully obtain what he/she desired from his/her spouse?" They represent the extent to which the individual "got what he or she wanted" as a result of his or her own power processes. In the Western literature, power outcomes are typically conceptualized in terms of the roles a spouse plays in the family, particularly his/her level of authority in decision-making, portion of childcare and of household labor (Blanton & Vandergriff-Avery, 2001). Because these power outcomes are often observable and/or quantifiable, and because they

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are etic (families across cultures must divide the roles of childcare, household labor, and decision-making in some way), power outcomes are the most common measure of marital power and are used along with power bases in this study.

As is evident from the definition, power outcomes are synonymous with gender roles when taken in the context of heterosexual marriage. The roles that each spouse finds him or herself consistently performing represent his or her level of power. In the West, housework and childcare "are associated with low schedule control and poorer well-being, particularly increased depression" among Western couples (Steil, 2001, p. 347). Housework and childcare also detract from the ability to occupy powerful roles such as income generation, which represents a high level of power because it gathers important resources for the family (Steil & Weltman, 1991), raises personal social status, is "often a source of self-esteem and independence" (Steil, 2001, p. 347), and allows the income generator to avoid housework and childcare (Shelton & John, 1996) while still possessing high levels of influence at home (Steil & Weltman, 1991). Thus, in Western cultures, traditional gender roles (woman as homemaker and mother, man as authority figure and income earner) give more power to men because the culture values social roles such as income generation above household and family responsibilities. However, traditional gender roles may carry more power among those who value roles differently, such as American Muslims whose religious interpretations often extol traditional female roles (for an example, see Naseef, 1999). On the other hand, because of the influence of the dominant American culture, American Muslims may assign a similar amount of

power to traditional gender roles as do non-Muslim Americans. Evidence is mixed as to which of these scenarios is more accurate.

Overall, marriages may be labeled according to the distribution of power bases, processes and outcomes between spouses. Symmetrical marriages involve a relatively equal balance of power, while asymmetrical marriages feature a power imbalance (Oyamot et al., 2010). Blood and Wolfe (1960) proposed a detailed four-part taxonomy that is still in use today. Husband-dominant asymmetrical marriages ("traditional" marriages) are those in which the husband earns most of the family's income, has the final say in important decisions, controls the family finances, does less of the household work, and is generally more able to steer the family's fortunes than is the wife. Conversely, wife-dominant asymmetrical marriages are those in which the wife is in charge, perhaps because she earns more income, has a stronger personality, or a disinterested husband who resigns power to her (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). Spouses in autonomic symmetrical marriages have equal power but in separate spheres. For example, the wife may be fully responsible for deciding how to run the household and raise the children, while the husband manages family finances, family relocation, and family religion. Finally, spouses in syncratic symmetrical marriages share authority within spheres. Both spouses confer and decide together about such things as family budget, geographic relocations, child-raising, and household management. These categories are useful because they allow us to describe normative marital power distributions within a given community, and because they provide a simple nomenclature for discussion of how power distributions relate to different levels of marital satisfaction.

Research among American Muslims should use these categories in order to facilitate comparison between American Muslim communities and the dominant American culture in terms of normative power distributions and the most healthy power distributions for marriages in the community.

Research on Trends in Marital Satisfaction

Studies of marital satisfaction, predominantly focused upon Caucasian American adults, tend to find that wives express lower marital satisfaction compared to husbands. For example, Amato and colleagues (2003) found that wives reported less happiness in their marriages than husbands in 1980 and in 2000, although the gender gap in happiness decreased over this period. Men in Corra, Carter, Carter, and Knox's (2009) sample reported higher levels of marital happiness than women across four decades (1970s-2000s; $n = 6,018$ to $3,953$); and Bulanda (2011) found that men above age 50 reported significantly higher levels of marital happiness in 1992 than women in the same age range ($n = 7,372$). Independently of comparison with husbands, Kamp Dush and colleagues (2008) found that women had greater odds of being in a low marital happiness trajectory between 1980-2000 than a middle or high happiness trajectory ($n = 1,996$). These studies suggest that women may find it harder to feel happier in marriage than men, and that men's greater happiness has persisted across age and generation/cohort, although the gap is closing.

Little is known about American Muslim marital satisfaction in relation to the vast body of information about the general American public. The handful of empirical studies that estimate American Muslim marital satisfaction appears to contradict the

community's concern about rising levels of marital discord and divorce, indicating that American Muslims tend to report moderate to high marital satisfaction (Alshugairi, 2010; Asamarai et al., 2008; Chapman & Cattaneo, 2013; Haque & Davenport, 2009; Shah, 2007). Some of these studies are limited by sample size (Haque & Davenport, 2009; Shah, 2007). However, the three studies with the larger sample sizes (Alshugairi, 2010, n = 333; Asamarai et al., 2008, n = 173; Chapman and Cattaneo, n.d., n = 296) show the same gender-related pattern that is found in the mainstream research on Western Caucasian couples. Namely, women in these studies were significantly less satisfied with their marriages than men. Although there is clearly more research to be done, these studies suggest that patterns in American Muslims' satisfaction may mirror those of the dominant American culture.

Research on the Distribution of Marital Power

Research on marital power is comparable to research on marital satisfaction in that it is conducted primarily on middle-class Western Caucasian couples (Knudson-Martin & Mahoney, 2009; Steil, 1997). In this literature, power is typically defined as power outcomes. This literature provides a point of comparison for other communities. Understanding how American Muslims are similar to non-Muslim Americans in terms of the forms and distribution of marital power may help service providers to offer services to American Muslims that build upon providers' existing knowledge of marital power in the dominant American culture. Understanding how the American Muslim community is different will help establish knowledge of new concepts, as well as knowledge of which concepts do not apply or apply differently to American Muslim marriages. The following

section reviews the distribution of different forms of power in non-Muslim and Muslim American samples.

Power outcomes. Research indicates that, in terms of power outcomes, husband-dominant marriages are normative in Western cultures, including America (Steil, 2000). Division of household labor has become increasingly egalitarian (Davis & Greenstein, 2004), but the Western wife still does over two-thirds of the household labor (Greenstein, 2009), including the lion's share of traditionally female tasks (Bartley, Blanton, & Gilliard, 2005; Coltrane, 2000; Greenstein, 2009). These tasks are typically associated with lower schedule control, lower marital quality, and higher psychological distress (Bartley et al., 2005). Women also report less choice in undertaking these tasks (Steil, 2000). Further, although women who earn more income do less household labor, they still do more than their husbands (Bartley et al., 2005). Men who earn less income than their wives do not necessarily contribute a greater share of household work (Coltrane, 2000; Shelton & John, 1996).

Only one quantitative study (a dissertation) directly examines power outcomes among American Muslims. This represents a significant gap in research on this population, since power outcomes within families are observable constructs that are relevant across cultures. Ali (1992) collected descriptive data in 1986 from 53 first-generation American Muslim couples (*n* = 106 individuals) recruited from religious centers. Measures created for the study asked respondents to state the proportions of childcare and housekeeping that they perceived themselves and their spouse performing. Together, spouses were considered to perform 100% of the work. Childcare referred to

several specific tasks related to raising children below age 10, while housekeeping included traditionally "male" tasks such as making minor house-repairs, and traditionally "female" tasks such as cooking and cleaning (Ali, 1992, p. 59). Couples in Ali's study generally reported a traditional division of labor – 62% of wives were unemployed, women reported contributing most of the work in most traditionally "female" areas, and men reported doing most of the work in "male" tasks such as handling finances. Both spouses, however, perceived that certain duties were shared equally – on the husbands' side, these involved lighter childcare tasks such as playing with and purchasing items for children, while wives tended to contribute to taking out the garbage and making minor house repairs.

Ali's (1992) investigation is a good beginning in terms of power outcome studies on American Muslims. Nonetheless, the data gathered are more than 25 years old, and the study had several limitations. First, it did not explore which variables predict task division. Second, because Ali limited his sample to first-generation Muslims, it is impossible to say whether spouses who were more acculturated shared more tasks or developed preferences for a different type of task division as they became more acculturated to America. Third, the small sample size limits findings by reducing statistical power. Fourth, it is possible that other family members contributed to the tasks in Ali's measure, and thus the requirement for respondents to consider each task as though they and their spouses did 100% of the work may have interfered with their ability to answer accurately. Finally, the author did not examine the effect of religious beliefs or religiosity on task sharing. This exploration of the connection between

different types of marital power would have been particularly useful for those who wish to understand how religious Muslim couples compare to non-religious couples or couples affiliated with other religions.

Two qualitative studies and a quantitative study offer some update to Ali's (1992) study of power outcomes. Carolan and her colleagues (2000, p. 72) stated that "most of the women [in a qualitative sample of 40 American Muslims] were employed outside of the home and most of the men participated in housework and child care to the same degree that most men in US society participate." This suggests a shift from Ali's study, in which less than half the women were employed; yet, like participants in Ali's study, Carolan and colleagues' interviewees suggested that despite men's contribution, women were more responsible for parenting young children, and also bore most responsibility for the household. Similarly, most of the 40 first-generation American Muslim women interviewed by Ross-Sheriff (2001) worked outside the home, and they, too, reported that they felt responsible for the majority of housework and childcare. They added that they felt unsupported by their husbands in these tasks. Most recently, Read (2002) found that 71.4% of 182 Arab-American Muslim women were employed, roughly twice the percentage of employed women in Ali's study.

Taken together, these studies imply that the balance of power outcomes tends to lie with American Muslim men. They suggest that American Muslim women are employed in the public space in greater numbers since Ali's (1992) data collection in 1986, but also that they may be less likely to be employed full time than non-Muslim women, and more likely than Muslim men to possess primary responsibility for

household labor and childcare. There is no empirical information about decision-making in the home. Overall, however, not enough information exists to confidently describe American Muslims' current power outcome distribution or to compare it to information on non-Muslim Americans.

Power bases. As noted earlier, power bases may include resources such as education and disposable income, as well as beliefs about appropriate or morally correct gender behavior. Gender role ideology (GRI) and religiosity are particularly relevant to a population selected on the basis of religious affiliation. Research suggests that American Muslims demonstrate variation in their GRI and religiosity in ways that may affect other forms of marital power distribution and power's connection with satisfaction.

Gender role ideology. Egalitarian GRI, which is positively related to higher education, tends to increase the likelihood of egalitarian power outcome division among Western couples (Buunk, Kluwer, Schuurman, & Siero, 2000; Shelton & John, 1996). Individualistic cultures such as the dominant culture in the United States generally express more egalitarian GRI than collectivist cultures (Gibbons, Stiles, & Shkodriani, 1991; Olson et al., 2007). American public policy (for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964) supports gender egalitarianism at the national level by prohibiting gender discrimination in employment and education. As such, America is generally considered to espouse egalitarian gender role ideology (Cooke, 2006). Within this egalitarian social context, however, a large body of research identifies particular groups who tend to endorse a more traditional gender role ideology. Traditional GRI is more common among older Americans and those with less education (Bryant, 2003; Davis &

Greenstein, 2009; Harris & Firestone, 1998; Kulik, 2002a; Olson et al., 2007; Steil, 2001). Perhaps in relation to the effect of education, traditional attitudes are associated with poorer economic conditions at a nation-wide level (Olson et al., 2007). Traditionalism in GRI is also commonly found among those who affiliate with conservative religious interpretations and cultural norms (Bryant, 2003; Ellison & Bartkowski, 2002; Gibbons et al., 1991); this may reflect an interest in adhering to religiously prescribed behaviors or maintaining status or connection with the cultural community, as well as heightened exposure to traditional ideas and norms. Last, men are consistently more traditional in their gender role ideology than women, both in America and in other parts of the world (Bryant, 2003; Chia, Moore, Lam, Chuang, & Cheng, 1994; Dasgupta, 1998; Gibbons et al., 1991; McHugh & Frieze, 1997; Morinaga, Frieze, & Ferligoj, 1993; Olson et al., 2007; Steil, 2001). Women have more interest in espousing equality: relative to a traditional "status-quo," women gain power in an egalitarian relationship, while men cede it.

Historically collectivist groups that live within individualistic cultures may express some blend of egalitarian and traditional GRI. American Muslims are an example – they may experience influences from multiple social contexts, including the dominant American zeitgeist, but also "traditions and personal circumstances in which males are the dominant voices within the family circle. Virtually all traditional Muslim cultures support male authority" and endorse a traditional division of labor (Haddad, Smith, & Moore, 2006, pp. 90-91; also see Beverley, 2002; Curtis, 2010; and Hodge, 2005). As a result, there is theoretical support for competing hypotheses: depending on

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which influences are strongest, American Muslims may endorse traditional or egalitarian GRI.

There is a small body of qualitative evidence that Muslims in America endorse a traditional, husband-dominant family structure (Haddad et al., 2006). For example, American Muslims participating in qualitative interviews tend to describe the husband as the head of the household (Ali, Mahmood, Moel, Hudson, & Leathers, 2008; Hassouneh-Phillips, 2001). On occasion, these interviews present a discourse favoring mutual respect and complementary roles over equality in gender roles: Carolan and colleagues (2000, p. 72) found that "both men and women resonated to the notion of respect rather than equality… They believed that women were entitled to be provided for by spouses … They did not necessarily see equality as defined in Western terms as a privilege." It is possible that, if "complementary roles" are preferred by American Muslims, then traditional GRI may not relate to marital dissatisfaction as it is often shown to do in research on non-Muslim Americans. "Complementary roles" may reflect autonomic symmetric marriages.

In contrast, quantitative research finds that American Muslims report egalitarian gender role attitudes. For example, Juhari's (1997) dissertation study of 84 Malay Muslim couples temporarily residing in America found that, on average, husbands and wives scored well above the midpoint of the range of possible scores on the Sex Role Egalitarian Scale (Beere, King, Beere, & King, 1984), suggesting that the sample trended toward egalitarian ideology. Also, 84 long-term resident American Muslims (51% women) in a study by Chapman and Cattaneo (2009) responded in an egalitarian manner

to a measure of gender role beliefs created for the study, as well as to a measure of attitudes toward women (Islamic Attitudes Toward Women; Khalid & Frieze, 2004). Notably, however, responses to the measure of gender role beliefs spanned the entire range of the scale, while responses concerning attitudes toward women were concentrated on the egalitarian end of the IATW scale. This suggests a difference in the construct under measurement – respondents were more likely to report traditional beliefs about appropriate gender roles for married women than traditional attitudes towards women in general.

Variance in American Muslim GRI may reflect the effect of acculturation. American Muslim attitudes appear to shift toward those of the dominant American culture as they live longer in America (e.g. Haddad & Lummis, 1987; Read, 2003; Ali et al., 2008; Chapman & Cattaneo, 2009). Chapman and Cattaneo's (2009) participants were highly acculturated to America, and results indicated that higher degree of connection to the Muslim community was associated with higher traditionalism in attitudes toward women and beliefs about appropriate gender roles, while lower traditionalism was related to exposure to and identification with the American culture. Read (2003) also found that acculturation decreased traditionalism in gender role beliefs, and noted that that 79.8% of her sample of 182 Muslim Arab-American women opposed letting their husbands make all the major family decisions. Further, 89.1% felt that if both spouses work full-time they should share equally in the housework, and 86.8% said that parents should encourage equal independence in children of both genders (Read, 2002). Alshugairi (2010) and Ghayyur (2010) found that Muslim marriage and divorce

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patterns change with longer residence in America: American Muslims with higher levels of acculturation were less likely to marry than less-acculturated Muslims, more likely to search for a companionate marriage (more typical of individualistic cultures than of collectivist cultures; Dion & Dion, 1993), more likely to marry outside their ethnic community, and more likely to divorce.

Education also plays a role in shaping Muslims' GRI, both in America (where Muslims tend to be highly educated; Read, 2008) and abroad. Lower education was related to beliefs favoring wife abuse in a sample of 176 Muslim men in Pakistan (Fikree, Razzak, & Durocher, 2005) as well as in a sample of 78 South Asian women in America (53% Muslim; Adam & Schewe, 2007). Higher education related to egalitarian gender role attitudes among 6,593 Afghani Muslims (Manganaro & Alozie, 2011), egalitarian attitudes towards women among 81 Canadian Muslims (Damji & Lee, 1995), and decreased support for traditional gender roles (including marital, parental, and public roles) in a sample of 197 Arab-American Muslim women (Read, 2003). It is possible that education played a role in increasing the egalitarianism of Juhari's student sample despite their strong connection to a traditional Muslim country.

Gender differences in American Muslim GRI appear to follow the pattern identified in studies of non-Muslims, in that women tend to report more egalitarian attitudes than men (Chapman & Cattaneo, 2009; Juhari, 1997). Overall, the limited amount of evidence suggests that American Muslims may vary in their gender role ideology, and that variation may be related to the effect of education or acculturation. Additional evidence is required in order to shore up these preliminary conclusions.

Religion. Within the marital health literature, the influence of religion is typically operationalized as religiosity, which refers to the individual's religious beliefs and behaviors as well as the subjective importance of religion to the individual. Religiosity in Western couples is often studied in terms of its connection with other forms of marital power, where it typically correlates positively with traditional GRI (Baker, Sanchez, Nock, & Wright, 2009; Denton, 2004). Religiosity also appears to relate to certain power outcomes - for example, it is positively related to women's performance of household labor, particularly of traditionally female tasks (Ellison & Bartkowski, 2002). However, the influence of religiosity varies across type of power outcome: for example, some research suggests that it has little relationship with marital decision-making. Denton (2004) found that conservative Protestants ($n = 809$ couples) were just as likely as "theologically liberal" Protestants ($n = 430$) to say that husbands "gave in" to wives during decision-making, despite their far greater odds of believing that husbands were the head of the family. Supporting Denton's results, several participants in Bartkowski and Read's (2003) qualitative study of 23 highly religious Evangelical Protestant women evaluated traditional doctrines in ways that allowed egalitarian decision-making in their marriage.

These findings suggest that the beliefs held by a particular religious group may not necessarily translate to practice. It is possible that religious Americans' practice of religious discourse is affected by the pervasive egalitarian ethos in America, which may encourage religious couples to be egalitarian in order to avoid social stigma as well as practical difficulties (such as financial struggles if only one partner earns money). As

noted by Denton (2004, p. 1173), "the process of negotiating cultural values and schemas in the context of pragmatic realities determines to a large extent how various ideological positions work out in practice."

American Muslims are exposed to several different norms. Their personal religious beliefs may reflect the egalitarian American cultural discourse, the often-conservative religious beliefs and practices of their own community, feminist views of Islam, or some combination of the above, as Islamic texts allow for widely different interpretations. American Muslims do tend to report that religion is important to them (Wadud, 2003), and thus religious beliefs form an important power base that merits exploration.

The power inherent in religious beliefs is often studied qualitatively in this population, and these studies examine power at a broad level rather than in the specific context of marital relations. For example, seven Muslim women interviewed by Ali, Mahmood, Moel, Hudson, and Leathers (2008) labeled themselves as feminists and typically stated that their religion supported feminism (which they described as "pertaining to the equality of women, women's rights, and/or empowerment," p.43). Twelve veiled women in a sample of 24 religious American Muslim women (Bartkowski & Read, 2003) tended to state that the religious act of veiling allowed them power to be taken seriously by others and freedom to move about in society. However, demonstrating that Muslims can interpret their religion in many different ways, unveiled Muslim women in the same sample saw veiling as a means to oppress women (Bartkowski & Read, 2003). Additionally, Ayyub (2000) and Hassouneh-Phillips (2001) qualitatively

described the ways that religion is interpreted in support of domestic violence and restriction of women's freedom in some parts of American Muslim society. The effect of religion on these qualitative study participants clearly depended on the individual's particular interpretation of Islamic teaching: some interpretations allow equality for women (e.g. Barlas, 2002), while others advocate traditional gender roles and submission of women to men (see Naseef, 1999).

Quantitative studies of American Muslim religiosity suggest that high religiosity may relate to traditional distribution of other power bases – for example, GRI. Chapman and Cattaneo (2009) found that religiosity was positively related to traditional GRI in a sample of 84 American Muslims, Read (2003) found that religiosity predicted traditional gender role attitudes among 197 Arab-American Muslim women, and Abu-Ali and Reisen (1999) found that religiosity was positively related to stereotypically feminine attributes in 96 American Muslim teenage girls. American Muslims may also distribute power outcomes more traditionally than members of other religious communities: Read (2002) noted that her sample of Arab-American Muslim women was half as likely to be employed as a comparison sample of Arab-American Christian women, and also much less likely to be employed full-time (37.3% vs. 54.8% of Arab-American Christian women).

These quantitative studies imply that religious American Muslims may interpret Islam as endorsing traditional gender roles, but more studies are needed to support this hypothesis, given the results in the qualitative studies mentioned above. Taken in sum, it is possible to conclude that religious Muslims may connect Islam with traditional or

egalitarian beliefs. This important power base clearly needs to be explored further in order to fully understand how interpretation of religion and religiosity may relate to other forms of marital power.

Power processes. The demand-withdraw communication pattern, typically discussed in the context of marital conflict, represents a power process because it involves behaviors aimed at influencing the spouse. In research on Western couples, the demanding partner is typically the less powerful member of the dyad who wants change, while the withdrawing partner is the more influential partner who is attempting to maintain the status quo in which they possess greater power (Christensen, Eldridge, Catta-Preta, Lim, & Santagata, 2006; Heavey, Layne, & Christensen, 1993). This research consistently finds that women are most likely to demand, while men withdraw (Caughlin & Vangelisti, 2000; Christensen et al., 2006; Vogel, Murphy, Werner-Wilson, Cutrona, & Seeman, 2007).

In comparison, and in support of the idea that marital power has both etic and emic aspects across cultures, there is evidence that Pakistani Muslim couples display the reverse pattern of demand-withdraw behavior. Rehman and Holtzworth-Munroe (2006) observed the demand-withdraw pattern in the interactions of 52 Pakistani couples, 48 first-generation Pakistani American couples and a comparison sample of 50 Caucasian American couples. Although they did not assess religious affiliation, approximately 95% of Pakistanis are Muslim, and thus the majority of their Pakistani subsample may fit this description.

Rehman and Holtzworth-Munroe (2006) found that Pakistani and Pakistani American husbands were more likely than their wives to make aggressive demands, while the reverse was true among their comparison sample of Caucasian American couples (consistent with the common research findings on Western couples). Withdraw behaviors were also distributed in a reverse pattern to that found in research on Western couples: Pakistani and Pakistani American wives were more likely to withdraw than their husbands, while husbands in the Caucasian American comparison sample were more likely to withdraw than wives. Comparing genders across cultures, the authors found that Pakistani and Pakistani American husbands demanded more often than Caucasian American husbands, and that Pakistani and Pakistani American wives withdrew more often than American wives. When they did demand, Pakistani and Pakistani American wives were unassertive (e.g., demanding through whining or flirting), while American wives made aggressive demands, "stated in a domineering, belligerent, contemptuous, hostile, or angry tone" (p.758).

The authors concluded that demand and withdraw behaviors had opposite meanings in the two cultures, with demand behaviors carrying more power in Pakistan than they do in America. In support of this conclusion, the authors found that, as Pakistani and Pakistani American couples' income disparity increased (with husbands holding greater resources), husbands became more likely to aggressively demand, and wives to withdraw and unassertively demand. Further, Pakistani Americans' increasing acculturation was associated with behavior that more closely resembled Caucasian

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American spouses, suggesting that Pakistani Americans assimilated new meanings of power processes from their host culture.

This information about the emic pattern of demand-withdraw behaviors reinforces the importance of examining the nature of marital power distribution across cultures. Further, the demonstrated effect of acculturation on couples in Rehman and Holtzworth-Munroe's study further indicates the importance of studying American Muslims, who are exposed to competing influences from their religious communities as well as the American culture.

Overall, there is insufficient information about marital power distribution in American Muslim couples, and more is needed in order to add support to burgeoning trends, to make hypotheses where no data exists, and to understand how marital power affects American Muslim marital satisfaction. A few studies suggest that American Muslims may distribute power outcomes more evenly than they did 25 years ago, but this information does not adequately describe current household task distribution, childcare, and decision-making, or explore the factors that predict power outcome distribution. Information about the distribution of power bases is similarly limited. There is qualitative evidence suggesting traditionalism in American Muslim GRI, whereas quantitative studies report that American Muslims are egalitarian in their attitudes. There is also evidence for both feminist and traditional interpretations of religious doctrine, although quantitative measures of religiosity suggest it connects to traditionalism. In all cases, more information is needed, and the single study on American Muslim power

processes is a reminder to avoid the assumption that power looks the same in this community as in others.

Research on the Relationship between Marital Power and Marital Satisfaction

The literature on marital power is not limited to explorations of its distribution between spouses. A large body of research conducted on Western Caucasian samples supports the theory that equal distribution of marital power is positively associated with marital satisfaction for Western couples, and a small but growing literature on American Muslims suggests the same.

Power outcomes. Cooke (2006) found that, in comparison to American couples whose earnings and/or household tasks were distributed unequally, American couples who earned similar wages and/or distributed household labor relatively equally had a lower divorce rate (n = 506 couples, 77% Caucasian). Other studies similarly demonstrate this effect of power outcome distribution on marital health, and some studies add the finding that this effect often appears particularly strong for Western women. For example, Amato and colleagues (2003) found that equal power in decision-making predicted increases in marital satisfaction for both genders in 1980 and 2000 (using large, predominantly Caucasian American samples; 1980 n = 2,034; 2000 n = 2,100), but wives' regression coefficients (b = .50, $p < .01$ in 1980; b = .40, $p < .01$ in 2000) were far larger than husbands' (b = .14, $p < .05$ in 1980; b = .13, ns, in 2000). Wives' marital satisfaction was also positively associated with husbands' participation in housework in 1980 and 2000, while husbands were notably *un*happier with their marriages when they did housework. Rabin and Shapira-Berman (1997) found that egalitarian role division

was positively associated with women's, but not men's, marital satisfaction in a sample of 150 Israeli couples. In the same study, egalitarian decision-making was negatively associated with women's marital tension in areas of marital conflict, while equality in role division and decision-making was positively associated with men's tension (Rabin & Shapira-Berman, 1997).

These results make sense when considering that, relative to the traditional status quo, husbands tend to cede power and wives gain it when a couple divides decisions and roles equally. In contrast, however, other studies have found that husbands are more satisfied than wives when couples divide power outcomes equally. For example, decision-making equality was associated with higher sexual desire and marital satisfaction for both spouses, but more strongly for husbands, among 57 predominantly-Caucasian married American couples in their mid-30s (Brezsnyak & Whisman, 2004). In a study of 116 retired Israeli couples (Kulik, 2002), decision-making equality was positively correlated with marital satisfaction for wives, but even more strongly positively correlated for husbands. One possible explanation for this is that wives' contentment when they possess an equal share of decision-making positively affects husbands' happiness. Decision-making power may also be easier for husbands to cede than power in terms of household labor division, which was the independent variable in many of the above-cited studies where women reported greater satisfaction than men. Taken together, however, these studies suggest that power outcome differentials result in lower marital quality, while a power balance optimizes marital health.

There is little information about whether these patterns hold for groups such as American Muslims, because only one known study (Ali, 1992) directly assesses the relationship between power distribution and American Muslim marital satisfaction. Ali's study indicates that power distribution is correlated with American Muslim marital satisfaction, and that some aspects of the relationship are emic while others are etic in nature. For example, wives' marital satisfaction in Ali's sample was not correlated with the overall division of childcare and housekeeping, or with their husbands' contribution to most traditionally female tasks. This contradicts findings on power outcomes in Western samples that suggest wives prefer egalitarian divisions of labor. Yet, wives were more satisfied when their husbands shared the task of cleaning, bathing and dressing the child, and less satisfied when they (wives) contributed to traditionally "male" tasks. This may indicate that wives preferred their husbands to contribute to some of the more time-consuming or intensive "female" tasks, while other tasks were not as important. Other etic patterns included wives' increased satisfaction when they were employed outside the home, and husbands' increased satisfaction when they did less housework.

Given that Ali's data was collected in 1986, the results of his study must be interpreted with caution. Results are further limited in that Ali (1992) did not perform any significance tests to establish which variables predicted marital satisfaction, nor did he examine the effect of any other types of power (e.g. GRI) on the relationship between power outcomes and marital satisfaction.

Power bases.

Gender role ideology. Among Western couples, GRI appears to moderate the power outcome-marital health relationship. This effect varies by gender. Western women are unhappier in a husband-dominant marriage if they espouse egalitarian GRI (Amato & Booth, 1995; Blair, 1998) than if they espouse traditional GRI. Greenstein (1996) found that, among 4,960 predominantly-Caucasian American couples, women who reported egalitarian GRI were more likely than their traditional counterparts to describe unequal divisions of household labor as unfair. These egalitarian women also reported more marital instability and unhappiness than traditional women when reporting inequitable labor division. It is possible that inequality affected them more strongly than it did traditional women, because they believed they were entitled to equality (see also Buunk, Kluwer, Schuurman, & Siero, 2000).

On the other hand, men's happiness increases when they endorse egalitarian GRI (Amato & Booth, 1995). These men are less likely to divorce (Kaufman, 2000) and more likely to report marital happiness (Amato & Booth, 1995). This may be because they tend to put their beliefs into practice by making a greater contribution than traditional men to household labor (Tichenor, 1999) – and "men who want to share chores with their wives are not likely to hear objections from their wives" (Kaufman, 2000, p. 140). In other words, egalitarian men's greater tendency to help around the house has the dual effect of producing congruence between their beliefs and their actual marital power distribution, and of increasing the satisfaction of the wives on whom their happiness (in part) depends. On the other hand, women who endorse egalitarian GRI are less able to change divisions of labor in their favor by influencing their husbands to participate. They

are thus more likely to experience a distressing mismatch between beliefs and reality of power distribution.

The moderating effect of GRI is also evident at the community or national level. For example, Cooke (2006) found that 559 West German couples, whose country's policies endorsed traditional GRI, were less prone to divorce if they had a traditional division of paid and domestic labor. In the same study, 506 American couples (who do not live with these policies) were most stable if they demonstrated gender equality in paid and domestic labor. This suggests that couples are often most comfortable when they are in line with the general social trend of their community.

Notably, the connection between GRI and marital satisfaction is rarely studied in American Muslim samples, and its effect as a moderator is not studied at all. Such investigation is strongly warranted, given that American Muslims are influenced by multiple social contexts. It is uncertain, for example, how an American Muslim woman's marital satisfaction could be affected by the combination of a personal egalitarian GRI, community-level traditional GRI, and an American national-level egalitarian trend. It is also possible that American Muslim women who want equality in their marriage may have a more difficult time achieving it than non-Muslim American women, given the likelihood that they contend with stronger community-level norms favoring traditionalism. This suggests that they may be especially likely to report dissatisfaction when they hold egalitarian gender role beliefs.

The few existing studies find that egalitarian GRI is connected with greater marital happiness among American Muslims. Ahmad and Reid (2008) found that

egalitarian GRI was associated with higher marital satisfaction for both husbands and wives in a sample of Canadian South Asians ($n = 114$; 79% Muslim). There were no significant gender differences in satisfaction; thus, the study corresponds with the finding that egalitarian men in Caucasian Western samples report higher marital satisfaction than their traditional counterparts. However, it provides no basis on which to compare American Muslim women with women in these mainstream samples. In other words, the study did not allow evaluation of the moderating influence of GRI across gender because it did not examine actual power outcome distribution.

A dissertation on 97 Malaysian Muslim student couples residing temporarily in America (Juhari, 1997) also found that husbands who reported egalitarian GRI reported higher marital adjustment than husbands with traditional GRI. Interestingly, unlike Ahmad and Read (2008), Juhari found no relationship between wives' GRI and their marital adjustment. Once again, it is not possible to evaluate the moderating influence of GRI across gender from Juhari's findings, because actual power outcomes were not examined. It is possible that the couples in Juhari's study divided power outcomes equally, thus leading to women's higher satisfaction regardless of their GRI. Alternatively, it is possible that American Muslim wives changed in the decade between Juhari's (1997) and Ahmad and Read's (2008) studies, valuing egalitarian roles more strongly at the time of the later study. The nature of GRI's impact on other forms of marital power and on marital health among American Muslims remains largely unknown, and these studies emphasize the importance of examining multiple forms of marital power at once.

Religiosity. In the Western marital health literature, religiosity is most often studied in terms of its association with marital stability. The most common finding is that religiosity is associated with lower odds of divorce (e.g., Vaaler, Ellison, & Powers, 2009). Studies suggest several mechanisms that may be responsible for this finding, including religiosity's association with lower probability of considering divorce (Booth, Johnson, Branaman, & Sica, 1995), higher probability of remaining sexually faithful (Dollahite & Lambert, 2007; Wilcox & Wolfinger, 2008), lower probability of substance use or unemployment (which lead to less satisfactory marriages), and higher probability of positive interpersonal interactions (leading to more satisfactory marriages; Wilcox & Wolfinger, 2008). Religiosity also appears to increase marital adjustment, particularly among spouses who share similar denomination affiliations (Schramm, Marshall, Harris, & Lee, 2012) and similar levels of religiosity (Lichter & Carmalt, 2009; Schramm et al., 2012). Belief in the sanctity of marriage appears to lessen the distress typically associated with power inequities, particularly for wives (DeMaris, Mahoney, & Pargament, 2010), perhaps because gender role traditionalism is conceptualized as a service to God (Baker et al., 2009). There are no known studies of the effect of American Muslim individuals' religiosity on their marital satisfaction.

Power processes. Power processes are not a focus of the current study, and subsequently this literature is not reviewed in detail. However, there is support for the role of marital power processes in American Muslim marital satisfaction. In the mainstream literature, unequal power processes have a consistently negative relationship with marital health (Bradbury, Fincham, & Beach, 2000; Heavey et al., 1993; Rehman,

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Holtzworth-Munroe, Herron, & Clements, 2009; Schwarzwald, Koslowsky, & Izhak-Nir, 2008). Rehman and Holtzworth-Munroe's (2006) study of 48 first-generation American Muslim couples found that unequal power processes have a similarly negative impact on American Muslim marital satisfaction. The authors also found that income disparity in favor of husbands changed power processes among these couples, such that husbands in couples with a larger husband-to-wife income ratio used stronger power processes, their wives used weaker ones, and these power processes then decreased their marital satisfaction.

The Role of Extended Family in Marital Power and Marital Satisfaction

Although members of the mainstream American culture value extended family, including intergenerational family relationships (Swartz, 2009), their daily life tends to focus on the traditional nuclear family unit (Georgas, 2011). Different generations and extended family members tend to live in separate households (Kahn, McGill, & Bianchi, 2011; Sarkisian, Gerena, & Gerstel, 2007; Swartz, 2009); parental assistance to adult children is more likely to be in the form of advice and emotional support than practical support such as housework (Kahn et al., 2011); and Western parents' influence on their children's choice of marital partner is generally limited to expression of approval or disapproval (Buunk, Park, & Dubbs, 2008) and restriction on dating activity. In effect, a certain distance is maintained within these extended family relationships.

An emic aspect of Muslim American marriages, therefore, is the high involvement of extended family, particularly spouses' parents, in couples' marriages. Aging parents often live with their Muslim adult children (Hasnain & Rana, 2010), and

Muslim families are likely to value higher levels of connectedness, harmony, and structure in the extended family than are families in the dominant American culture (Daneshpour, 1998), because of religious and cultural norms as well as strong structural connections (e.g., financial interdependencies; Knox & Schacht, 2007). A significant body of non-empirical articles (e.g. Ahmed & Reddy, 2007; Daneshpour, 1998; Hodge, 2005), written to advise providers on culturally competent services to Muslims, emphasizes the loss of extended families that occurs when Muslims immigrate and the significant cost that this represents to Muslim spouses who can no longer rely consistently on family support during times of marital trouble. Many describe how extended families, including parents and parents-in-law (hereafter referred to as "parents/in-law"), begin their role in a couple's marriage with heavy involvement in the choice of spouse (Carolan et al., 2000; Daneshpour, 1998; Haddad et al., 2006), and allude to ways that extended family, if present, continues to provide practical assistance such as childcare, help with chores, and financial aid, as well as psychological support, advice, marital conflict resolution, and companionship (Ahmad & Reid, 2008; Carolan et al., 2000; Daneshpour, 1998; Eid, 2005; Goodwin & Cramer, 2000). The lack of empirical exploration of this aspect of American Muslim family life is notable.

In addition to discussing this high level of positive connectedness, some scholars within the Western Muslim community have recorded their observations of parents'/in-laws' ability to disrupt the marriage by interfering with running of the home and raising of the children, particularly in cases when the parent/in-law lives in the same household (Eid, 2005). Two studies (one in America and one in Britain) offer evidence that

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parents/in-laws can have a negative impact on Muslim spouses. In Chapman and Cattaneo's (2013) investigation of marital health in 238 American Muslims, 18% reported that family and/or friends were a moderate to major problem for their spousal relationship, and 29.7% reported that in-laws were a moderate to major problem. Of this latter group, women were significantly more likely than men to report that in-laws were a problem ($t = -2.71$, $p < 0.01$). Sonuga-Barke, Mistry, and Qureshi (1998) found that British Muslim mothers who lived in a 3-generation extended family household had highly elevated rates of depression and anxiety as a function of intergenerational differences in attitudes about child-rearing. Differences in these opinions between grandmothers and mothers increased with mothers' acculturation and were related to higher levels of mothers' depression and anxiety.

These few studies imply that the impact of parents/in-law on marital satisfaction may vary according to the level to which they "intrude" or regularly offer unwanted interference in the couples' lives, versus the level to which they are genuinely helpful in the practical tasks of family life as well as in provision of psychological support. This dynamic has not been explored. Given the preliminary evidence that parents/in-laws represent a source of struggle for Western Muslim spouses (particularly wives), an examination of parents/in-laws' role in marital satisfaction is warranted.

Summary and Hypotheses.

Given the general emphasis on marriage in Muslim cultures, the specific concern in the American Muslim community about its members' marital health, and the etic role of marital power in marital satisfaction, it is important to study the effect of marital

power on the marital satisfaction of American Muslims. Gender patterns in American Muslims' marital satisfaction suggest that power may play a role in couples' happiness, because these patterns are connected to power in other samples. Yet, marital power is rarely studied among American Muslims. Existing studies do not evaluate the relationships between power and satisfaction at a level commensurate with the complexity of these constructs. There is a striking absence of attention to the effect of emic forms of power, such as religiosity, on marital satisfaction in the American Muslim community. Information on other emic influences on marital satisfaction, such as the role of extended family, is similarly scarce. It is difficult to draw confident conclusions from research on samples of other sociocultural backgrounds, because marital power affects couples of different backgrounds in varying ways depending on their social context and community-level norms.

The present study fills this gap by examining links between power bases, power outcomes and marital satisfaction in a sample of American Muslims. It does not examine power processes, as these are best studied with observational methods. It explores relationships between different types of power, focusing not only on etic variables, but also on variables that are likely to play an emic role in the community: religiosity and gender role ideology. It also examines parents/in-laws' effect on marital satisfaction. Its purpose is to inform prevention programming and interventions for distressed couples through its contribution to the body of culturally-relevant information about relationships within American Muslim families.

The three primary research questions and hypotheses for the present study are as follows:

1. **What are the relationships between power bases and how do they differ across men and women?**

    Exploratory question 1: Religiosity correlates with GRI. Some quantitative research suggests that religiosity is correlated with higher traditionalism, while some findings from qualitative research suggest that religiosity could correlate with egalitarian attitudes. Therefore, I made no hypothesis for a direction or gender difference in this relationship.

2. **What are the relationships between power bases and power outcomes, and how do they differ across men and women?**

    Exploratory question 2a: Religiosity correlates with power outcomes. For the same reason described in Exploratory question 1, I made no hypothesis for a direction or gender difference in this relationship.

    Hypothesis 2b: Egalitarian GRI correlates positively with egalitarian power outcomes for both genders. Given the likelihood that men have a greater ability to influence power outcomes than women, I expected that this relationship is stronger for men than for women.

3. **How does power affect marital satisfaction, and how does its impact differ across men and women?**

    Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between egalitarian division of power outcomes and marital satisfaction is positive for women but negative for men.

Hypothesis 3b: Egalitarian GRI increases the strength of the positive relationship between egalitarian power outcomes and marital satisfaction for women, and reverses the direction of the negative relationship for men.

Exploratory question 3c: Religiosity moderates the relationship between power outcomes and marital satisfaction. I made no hypothesis for a direction or gender difference in this relationship.

4.   **How do parents/in-laws' contributions to common family tasks, childcare, and decision-making affect marital satisfaction?**

Exploratory question 4: Parents' contribution relates to marital satisfaction, but there is insufficient evidence to formulate a hypothesis for direction or gender differences in this relationship.

Method

Procedure

Participant recruitment for the present study took place via Internet communication (all recruitment documents are reproduced in Appendix B). Participants also completed the study online. Alshugairi (2010) remarked upon the high response rate that she obtained when using internet surveys with her American Muslim sample, comparing it favorably to the response rate that she obtained from paper-and-pencil surveys. Chapman and Cattaneo (2013) also successfully used the internet in previous research to recruit and survey American Muslim samples.

I employed three strategies to recruit participants[1]. First, I recruited participants from a sample of 131 American Muslims (58.8% female) who participated in a study on marital health between May 2009 and May 2010, and gave permission to be contacted for further research. This sample is representative of the group that participated in the earlier study (overall $n = 296$; Chapman & Cattaneo, 2013). It consists of individuals who were generally young (over half were under 35 years at the time of the earlier study), well-educated (over three quarters had a college degree), and religious. Over half of the individuals were South Asian, nearly half reported living in Virginia, and two-thirds said

[1]Software settings did not allow us to track which participants were drawn from which recruitment strategy.

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that they had lived in America for 20 years or more. At the time of the earlier study, this

sample was married and reported moderate to high marital satisfaction on the Kansas

Marital Satisfaction Scale (Schumm et al., 1986). These participants received an email

reminding them of their participation in the earlier study and their willingness to receive

communication about future research participation. I invited them to participate in the

current study if they were still married. They received a link to the study with

instructions for completion.

Second, I recruited American Muslim participants from a general email sent

through local American Muslim community organizations that permitted me to use their

listservs. Given my prior use of this recruitment method in this geographic region, I

anticipated that the sample resulting from this recruitment method would also be

composed mainly of young, long-term American residents of South Asian ethnicity, who

would report high education and religiosity.

Third, I employed snowball sampling by emailing personal acquaintances in the

community to request their assistance in distributing the link to the study instruments via

email. Again, I expected that highly educated South Asians would be overrepresented in

the sample gathered from this recruitment technique.

The study limited participation to American Muslims who were currently married

and were fluent in English. Further, all recruitment emails and preliminary documents

(e.g., the informed consent) included an instruction that only one member of the couple

should complete the survey – this policy reduced the risk of dependency in the data.

Each participant was also notified that he/she would be invited to enter a drawing to win

one of several Amazon.com online gift cards after he/she completed the study, in thanks

for his/her participation.

Participants completed the study online using the Limesurvey software platform

(Schmitz, 2012). Software settings required participants to complete all questions on a

page before passing onto the next; therefore, missing data occurred as attrition rather than

as missing data-points. The final sample was composed of $n = 219$ American Muslim

adults (64.8% female). Of these, 165 participants (75.34%) completed the full survey,

and 54 (24.66%) did not complete the survey.

I used G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to conduct a-priori

power analyses that estimated the minimum sample size required to detect significance at

a medium effect size ($f^2 = 0.15$) with a power of .80 and an alpha of .05. According to

these analyses, the highest minimum sample size was $n = 77$. Yet, Jaccard and Wan

(1995) note that statistical tests have less power to detect significant interaction effects,

because the reliability of the product term is heavily dependent on the reliability of its

component parts. Moderated multiple regression is the preferred strategy for assessing

interaction effects in terms of statistical power (Stone-Romero & Anderson, 1994); Green

(1991) suggests a minimum sample size of $n = 115$ for the parameters noted above. I

concluded that the present sample's $n = 219$ was more than adequate for detecting

medium effects.

Missing data management. As noted above, missing data resulted only from

participants failing to complete the survey, and occurred in 24.66% of the sample ($n = 54$;

see Table 1). Missingness did not relate to any study variable except length of residence

in America , such that complete responders tended to live in America for longer than incomplete responders (Mann-Whitney U = 3392.50, p = .001, r = -.22). In turn, length of residence in America was not related to other variables of interest (see *Results*, below). As such, incomplete data fit the description of "missing at random" (MAR; Howell, 2007), which allowed the use of multiple imputation (MI) to manage the incomplete data.

MI creates several copies of the dataset of interest. Each copy includes the original, already-observed values plus "imputed" values that replace missing observations. Imputed values are sampled from a predictive distribution that is based on regression analyses of the observed data; random error is then added to each variable to help account for the inherent uncertainty of predicted data (Howell, 2007). This process is repeated *m* times to produce *m* datasets; the general recommendation is *m* = 5 (Schafer, 1999). Imputed values vary across datasets, so after standard analyses are conducted on each imputed dataset, the results from each dataset are averaged to create pooled estimates for the quantities of interest (Honaker, King, & Blackwell, 2006). This procedure provides a more consistent, less biased estimate than other common approaches to missing data, such as casewise deletion (e.g., Dow & Eff, 2009).

I created five imputed datasets using IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 20.0, and used the imputed data for the main study analyses, though not to generate descriptive statistics or bivariate correlations. I used up-to-date imputation recommendations as follows:

Use auxiliary variables. Auxiliary variables are related to the variables of interest, but are not in themselves a primary focus of the analyses. Inclusion of auxiliary

variables in the imputation phase of MI reduces bias in the data and restores some of the power that is lost due to missingness (Howell, 2007). It is particularly helpful to include auxiliary variables that are potential causes of missingness (Dow & Eff, 2009). I used several auxiliary variables, including length of residence in America, during imputation (Table 1).

Do not transform variables. MI operates under a normality assumption, and many researchers transform skewed variables before imputation in order to fit data to this assumption. However, von Hippel (2013) cautions that transforming non-normal data before imputation often increases the bias of the normal model by introducing nonlinearity and non-normal residuals (Von Hippel, 2013). He suggests that imputing skewed variables causes only mild bias, especially for common estimates of interest such as regression coefficients (used in this study). Schafer (1999, 2010) similarly notes that MI is robust to violations of normality, particularly when regression is the main analysis of interest. I followed von Hippel's (2013) recommendation of imputing skewed variables (i.e., without transformation). I transformed skewed variables as necessary after imputation.

Do not round variables. Study variables are often set to a particular scale, and researchers often round values before or after imputation in order to constrain variables to their original scales. However, "the MI strategy was designed to yield the correct variability," and rounding adds an undesirable amount of extra variability that can lead to biased parameter estimates (Graham, 2009, p. 561). I followed Graham's (2009) suggestion and did not round variables.

Impute interaction terms. A general rule in MI is to impute any and all variables that will form part of the subsequent analyses. This includes interaction terms. Multiple imputation assumes that there is no correlation between the variables in the imputation model and the variables outside of the model; therefore, if an interaction term is excluded from the imputation phase, the post-imputation correlation between it and the dependent variable will be biased toward zero (Graham, 2009). I imputed all necessary interaction terms as recommended. I also followed Graham's (2009) suggestion that researchers impute whole scales instead of their component items, to help keep imputed variables to a manageable number.

Measures

Given the relative lack of attention to American Muslims in the empirical psychological literature, it is important for new studies to establish this population within the current knowledge base by using existing psychometric instruments and comparing results across studies. Although Gibbons and Hamby (1997) caution that instruments developed in Western contexts may not apply to non-Western samples, Davis and Greenstein (2009), McHugh and Frieze (1997) and others strongly encourage the use of pre-existing measures where appropriate as a way to allow comparison of samples across studies. I followed these authors' recommendation, selecting measures with attention to their successful prior use in non-Western cultures or Western minority groups (among Muslims, where possible) and their content validity for American Muslims, as well as for psychometric soundness. All measures used in this study are reproduced in Appendix D.

Gibbons and Hamby (1997) recommended that measures undergo review by a "cultural informant" before use in a sample that is culturally different to the samples on which the measures were based. This study was reviewed by an Islamic Studies professor; further, I used my own cultural knowledge as a member of the American Muslim culture as well as a researcher in the community, to select and modify instruments.

Demographics. Participants provided their age, education, income, spouse's education, spouse's income, length of residence in America, city and state of residence in America, number of marriages, length of current marriage, number and ages of children, and whether parents of either spouse live in the home or within easy distance (10 miles).

Power bases. Participants' power bases were measured via their religiosity and gender role ideology.

Religiosity. Participants completed the Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI-10; Worthington et al., 2003), which is recommended by multiple reviewers as a valid and reliable measure of individuals' adherence to and daily use of religious practices, values and beliefs (e.g., Hill, 2005; Richards & Worthington, 2010). Its psychometric properties were initially examined across six studies of married Christians, religiously diverse university students attending both secular and Christian institutions, and counselors and clients at Christian and secular settings (total $n = 1717$; Worthington et al., 2003). The RCI-10 demonstrated good internal consistency ($\alpha = 0.88$-0.98 across the six studies), 3-week and 5-month test–retest reliability, construct validity, and discriminant validity. It was subsequently used in studies of American adolescents

(Ahmed, 2009; $\alpha = 0.93$) and Malaysian adults (Mokhlis, 2009; internal consistency not reported) in which Muslims comprised at least half of each sample. In this study, the RCI-10's internal consistency was $\alpha = 0.89$.

The RCI-10 consists of 10 items (with 5-point Likert response choices) that tap religious activities of a solitary and/or cognitive nature as well as those involving connection to one's religious organization or others of one's faith. RCI-10 scores are derived by summing scores across all 10 items, and higher scores indicate greater religiosity. Factor analysis conducted by the scale authors suggests two subscales reflecting a personal, private, or cognitive aspect of religious commitment ("Intrapersonal Religious Commitment"), as well as a relational, public, behavioral aspect ("Interpersonal Religious Commitment"). In this study, internal consistency for these two subscales were $\alpha = 0.86$ and $\alpha = 0.78$, respectively. However, the high correlations between the two subscales (in this study, $r = .67$, $p < .001$) indicate that it is preferable to analyze the RCI-10 as a unitary construct. Worthington et al. report that the mean for a normative sample of U.S. adults is 26 with a standard deviation of 12 (2003, p. 94), and suggest that individuals who score one standard deviation above the mean may be considered highly religious.

The RCI-10's good psychometric properties, its prior use in Muslim samples, and its neutral language that allows for use among members of multiple religions, made it desirable for use in this study. However, because the measurement of American Muslim religiosity is still in its infancy, I collected information on participant religiosity from an additional measure: the Islamic Duties subscale of the Psychological Measure of Islamic

Religiousness (PMIR-ID; Abu Raiya, Pargament, Mahoney, & Stein, 2008). The PMIR

was created in three stages, including semi-structured interviews to identify dimensions

of Islamic religiousness, construction and pilot-testing of an item pool reflecting these

dimensions, and verification of the factor structure, reliability, and validity of the PMIR.

The third stage was conducted on a sample of 340 highly educated Muslims adults

(60.8% female, 53.9% North American residents, 78% at or below 45 years old, 32.2%

married).

The Islamic Duties subscale (5 items from a subscale comprising 12 items; 6-

point Likert responses; $\alpha = .77$) measures participation in religious behaviors that are

commonly practiced by religious Muslims. It is scored by summing item scores; higher

scores reflect greater adherence to the behaviors specified in the subscale (range 5-30). I

selected the PMIR-ID with reference to the recommendation of the first author of the

PMIR (Abu Raiya, personal communication, December 15, 2011), who also suggested

that it would be appropriate psychometrically and for conceptual reasons to use a selected

section of a larger PMIR subscale. In this study, the internal consistency of the PMIR-ID

was $\alpha = .80$.

The RCI-10 and the PMIR-ID were strongly correlated ($r = .67, p < .001$). A

combined religiosity variable was created by standardizing both the RCI-10 and PMIR-

ID and then summing scores (higher scores indicate greater religiosity), to help reduce

redundancy and avoid inflated error terms (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The internal

reliability of the combined religiosity scale was $\alpha = .91$; this scale was used in subsequent

analyses.

Gender role ideology. I used the Sex-Role Egalitarianism Scale (SRES; Beere,

King, Beere, & King, 1984; King & King, 1986) to measure participants' gender role

ideology. The SRES authors defined "sex-role egalitarianism" as "an attitude that causes

one to respond to another individual independently of the other individual's sex," (Beere

et al., 1984, p. 564). The scale measures beliefs and judgments about the role behaviors

of both genders. Items reflect the extent to which participants judge male and female

behaviors and characteristics in ways that are typical of traditional gender role ideology;

higher scores indicate a more egalitarian ideology.

The full version of the SRES contains 95 items (19 per domain) that represent five

domains of adult life: marriage, parenthood, employment, social relationships, and

education. Five-point Likert scales record responses ranging from strongly agree to

strongly disagree, and scores are summed. This study used the marital and parental

domains of the SRES Form K (38 items; $\alpha = 0.88$ and $\alpha = 0.89$ respectively; Beere et al.,

1984). Juhari (1997) successfully used these subscales with Malaysian American Muslim

adults: her results closely matched the scale authors' original psychometric data (men's

total $\alpha = 0.89$; women's total $\alpha = 0.88$). In the present study, three items in the parental

domain were slightly reworded to fit common behavioral norms and values of the

American Muslim community: specifically, three references to children's dating, summer

camp, and sex education were replaced with references to "who children spend time

with," "summer activities," and "religious education," respectively. The internal

consistency of SRES marital and parental domains were $\alpha = 0.79$ and $\alpha = 0.88$

respectively in this study. The high correlation between the two SRES domains ($r = .76$,

p < .001) suggested that the domains are best combined. Thus, a total gender role ideology score was derived by summing scores across these two domains (higher scores indicate a more egalitarian gender role ideology; range 38 to 190). Internal consistency for this total score was $\alpha = 0.91$.

The connection between religion and gender role ideology. I designed three items to measure the extent to which participants believe that gender roles are necessary or central parts of a Muslim life. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale from "strongly agree (1)" to "strongly disagree (5)." The items included: "Islam prescribes specific family roles and/or tasks for men and women," "An important part of being a Muslim is taking on certain family roles and/or tasks that are specific to my gender," and "An important part of being a Muslim is not doing the family roles/tasks meant for the other gender." The items were summed to form an index of the GRI-religiosity connection that ranged from 3 (strong agreement that gender roles are central to being a Muslim) to 15 (strong disagreement that gender roles are central). The internal consistency was $\alpha = 0.72$.

Power outcomes. Participants responded to the popular "Who Does What?" (WDW) questionnaire (Cowan & Cowan, 1988) to describe their division of labor with their spouse. The WDW consists of three domains: Task Division, which assesses participants' division of household tasks (13 items; $\alpha = 0.93$; Cowan & Cowan, 1990); Decision-making Influence, which assesses participants' level of influence in family decision-making (12 items; $\alpha = 0.98$; Cowan & Cowan, 1990; plus one question about overall influence); and Childcare, which assesses division of childcare in reference to the

oldest child (12-20 items that vary according to the child's age; $\alpha = 0.95$; Cowan &

Cowan, 1990). Participants without children respond to the version for parents with

newborns and are asked to think about how tasks would be divided if they had a child.

The WDW asks participants to describe each family task in terms of "How it is

now" and "How I would like it to be." Participants respond to each item on a 9-point

Likert scale. A score of 1 corresponds to "she does it all"; 9 corresponds to "he does it

all"; and 5 corresponds to "we both do this about equally" (Cowan & Cowan, 1990).

The WDW yields two kinds of scores in each domain. The first is a Task Sharing

Score, computed by subtracting each item's score from 5, and averaging the resulting

absolute values. The Task Sharing score indicates the extent to which participants tend to

share tasks in each domain. The three Task Sharing Scores (one per domain) were the

primary measures of power outcome division in this study. The second type of score is a

Role Arrangement/ Involvement Score that reflects the average of scores in each domain.

As suggested by the Likert scale anchors, a score above 5 indicates greater involvement

by men in the given domain, and a score below 5 indicates greater involvement by

women. I examined Role Arrangement/Involvement scores to assess who did the tasks

that were unequally divided. Role Arrangement/Involvement scores showed that, when

tasks were not shared, they were typically divided traditionally as described in the

literature review.

I modified the WDW presentation and scoring for five purposes (Appendix D).

First, I modified instructions and response choices to allow for the possibility that other

people besides participants and their spouses contributed to the family tasks listed in the

WDW. I added an instruction that requested all participants to consider only the portion of each household, childcare, and decision-making task for which they and their spouse were responsible ("Although other people may help you with these tasks, for now please consider only the portion of each task that is completed by you and your spouse"). I also included a response choice of "Neither of us do this (0)," in the Likert scales. The averaged Role Arrangement/Involvement scores and Task Sharing scores average did not include items to which participants responded with "0."

Second, I rearranged scores so that traditional/egalitarian anchors were always on the same ends of the Likert scales. I reversed the Likert scale for individual items that presented tasks and decisions that are traditionally completed by men, such that the lower end of the Likert scale (1) always reflected gender-traditional responses, and the higher end (9) always represented non-gender-traditional responses. Male-traditional items were identified via my consensus with two members (male and female) of the Muslim community, and examination of the data trend. I also reversed the summary scores so that a lower Task Sharing Score (range 0 to 4) indicated less sharing between spouses in task completion across all three domains, and a higher score indicated more sharing, or greater equality (Cowan & Cowan, 1990).

Third, I omitted parts of the WDW in order to reduce participants' time commitment to the study. I did not ask participants to describe tasks in terms of "How I would like it to be – they responded only in terms of "How it is now." I also omitted questions in the childcare domain that assessed division of childcare by hour of the day.

Fourth, I modified the Task Division domain to help address poor internal consistency. I calculated Cronbach's alpha for each WDW domain using the absolute value of item scores to better reflect the fact that the Task Sharing score is an average of absolute values. The Childcare domain demonstrated acceptable to excellent internal consistency of $\alpha = .76$ to $\alpha = .99$ across age subsets, and the Decision-Making Influence domain demonstrated an acceptable internal consistency of $\alpha = .79$. The Task Division domain, however, demonstrated an internal consistency of $\alpha = .61$, which is generally considered below the acceptable threshold of $\alpha = .70$ for basic research (Nunnally, 1978).

I subjected the Task Division domain to exploratory factor analysis using Oblimin rotation and a minimum loading of 0.50, the threshold for "adequate to strong" loadings (Costello & Osborne, 2005). This procedure yielded a three-item scale (items B, D, and H on the Task Division domain) that reflected the most onerous and repetitive female-traditional chores: cleaning up after meals, house-cleaning, and laundry (see Himsel and Goldberg, 2003, for a closely similar index adapted from the WDW). The internal consistency on this scale matched that of the full Task Division domain ($\alpha = .61$) when absolute values were examined; however, the internal consistency was $\alpha = .73$ using original scores (the internal consistency of the full Task division domain using original scores was $\alpha = .69$). Given that the internal consistency improved when using original scores, and because the factor represented a meaningful and interesting construct that tapped an important aspect of marital power (which spouse does onerous chores), I decided to use the factor-analyzed domain score, though with caution.

Fifth, I transformed the Decision-making Influence score post-imputation to correct a severe negative skew, using the following equation: NewY = LG10 (K-Y). In this equation the constant K equals the largest Y value plus 1, such that the smallest value of (K-Y) equals 1. A log10 transformation reverses the meaning of the variable, and therefore I conducted a second step in the transformation such that FinalY = K-NewY (where K is as above).

Parents' contribution. In order to measure the role of parents/in-laws in power outcomes, participants stated whether their parents or parents-in-law contributed to any of the tasks listed in the WDW. If participants responded positively, they were asked to report the amount that their parents/in-law contributed to each task. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale, with 0 indicating that parents/in-law "do/does not contribute", and 5 indicating that parents/in-law "do/does it all". Scores were averaged to provide a summary of parents/in-law contribution across the three domains, with a higher score indicating more involvement on the part of the respondent's parents/in-law.

Marital satisfaction. I used the 16-item short form of the Couples Satisfaction Index (CSI-16; $\alpha = 0.98$; Funk & Rogge, 2007) as an outcome measure of marital satisfaction. CSI scores are summed across items, and range from 0-81. In the original scale, higher scores indicate greater satisfaction, and the cut score for marital distress is 51.50 (Funk & Rogge, 2007, p. 579). In this study, the internal consistency of the CSI was also $\alpha = 0.98$.

I transformed the CSI post-imputation to correct a moderate negative skew, using a reflect and square root transformation: NEWY = SQRT(K-Y), where the constant K

equals the largest Y value plus 1. This reversed the meaning of the variable, such that higher scores indicate lower marital satisfaction.

Results

Sample Description on Demographic Variables.

Participants (*n* = 219, 64.8% female) were between the ages of 18 and 81. The average age was 35.73 years, though this average was affected by gender differences as described below (*SD* = 10.95 years, *Mdn* = 33 years, *Mo* = 28 years). Participants were highly educated, with 53.6% reporting they had obtained a graduate degree, and 53.6% reporting that their spouses had obtained a graduate degree. The majority (73.9%) earned income (54.1% earned $40,000 or above), and 78.3% reported that their spouses earned incomes (62.3% stated their spouse earned $40,000 or above). Participants were generally long-term residents of America (69.4% had lived in America 20 years or more) – common states of residence included Virginia (32.1%), Michigan (14.0%), Maryland (10.7%), and California (8.8%). The majority were Asian (66.7%); 18.7% were White/Caucasian and 5.9% were Black/African-American. Nearly 5% described themselves using two or more ethnicities.

In terms of their relationships, participants were married to their current partners for an average of 10.06 years – this average was raised by older participants (*SD* = 10.12 years; *Mdn* = 7 years, *Mo* = 2 years). Most (90.0%) were currently in their first marriages. All those who reported previous marriages (10% of the sample) stated that those marriages ended with divorce (9.1%), separation, or annulment. Just over half of

the participants (59.6%) were caregivers for children under 18. Several (16.1%) also housed one or more parent/in-law.

Female participants were significantly more likely to be younger (t [112.78] = 3.36, p = .001) and married for less time than male participants (t [120.37] = 2.39, p = .02). Women also reported that their spouses had higher education (t [205] = -2.73, p = .007) and higher income (t [124.78] = -8.69, p < .001), and they described their own income as lower than did male participants (t [170.95] = 10.37, p < .001). These gender differences and all gender differences discussed in this sample description should be interpreted with caution, given that there were nearly twice as many females as males in the sample.

Sample Description on Power Bases and Power Outcomes.

I assessed gender differences on power bases and power outcomes using MANOVA analyses, and differences in marital satisfaction and parental contribution with ANOVAs. Assumptions held in all situations except the assumption of equal or nearly-equal cell sizes: as noted above, there were nearly twice as many females as males in every analysis. In the descriptions below, "egalitarian" refers to equal sharing of power, while "traditional" refers to gender-conventional divisions of power, in which the husband holds more power than the wife. "Traditional" power bases refer to beliefs that power should be divided gender-conventionally; "traditional" power outcomes include gender-traditional divisions of labor, and greater male influence in family decisions.

Power bases.

Religiosity. Higher scores on the religiosity scales reflected more religiosity. Participants reported high religiosity on both the RCI-10 and the PMIR-ID (Table 2). Average RCI scores closely matched those of 190 married Christian adults recruited from church congregations and a mid-Atlantic university ($M = 39.0$, $SD = 9.3$; Worthington et al., 2003); and those of 98 American Muslim young adults recruited from an American Muslim community organization ($M = 40.4$, $SD = 7.4$; Ahmed, 2009). Average PMIR-ID item scores were also within one standard deviation of the average item scores of Abu Raiya's (2006) sample of 340 Muslim adults (60.8% female, 53.9% North American residents, 32.2% married).

As noted earlier, the RCI-10 and PMIR-ID scores were standardized and summed to create a combined religiosity scale. There were no gender differences in this total religiosity score (F [1, 160] = 1.59, $p = .21$; Wilk's $\Lambda = .81$, partial $\eta2 = .01$).

Gender role ideology. Higher GRI scores indicated greater egalitarianism. GRI scores centered on the egalitarian end of the SRES scale (Table 2). Within this, average scores on the Marital and Parental GRI subscales were virtually identical. Average SRES-Marital and SRES-Parental scores were within a standard deviation of those obtained by Juhari (1997) from 97 Malay American Muslim couples. In her sample, husbands' average SRES-Marital was 69.28 ($SD = 6.75$), and SRES-Parental was 69.26 ($SD = 6.72$); wives' average SRES-Marital was 72.21 ($SD = 6.06$) and SRES-Parental was 71.93 ($SD = 7.04$).

Women in the present sample were more egalitarian than men in their marital GRI(F [1, 160] = 29.75, $p < .001$; Wilk's $\Lambda = .81$, partial $\eta2 = .16$) and parental GRI (F

[1, 160] = 5.51, *p* = .02; Wilk's Λ = .81, partial η2 = .03). The same gender difference was true for both subscales in Juhari's (1997) sample. Further, paired-sample *t*-tests indicated that, within the subsample of female participants, women tended to be more egalitarian on the SRES-Marital than on the SRES-Parental (*t*[109] = 3.08, *p* = .003). Men did not show significant differences between their SRES-Marital vs. SRES-Parental scores.

The connection between religion and gender role ideology. Participants agreed moderately with statements (scored from 1, "strongly agree," to 5, "strongly disagree") that "Islam prescribes specific family roles and/or tasks for men and women," (*M* = 2.41, *SD* = 1.12, *Mo* = 2) and "An important part of being a Muslim is taking on certain family roles and/or tasks that are specific to my gender," (*M* = 2.74, *SD* = 1.26, *Mo* = 2). They were more likely to disagree with the statement that "An important part of being a Muslim is not doing the family roles/tasks meant for the other gender," (*M* = 3.98, *SD* = 1.06, *Mo* = 5). The average index score indicated moderate overall agreement that religion and GRI were related (Table 2). Women scored higher on the three-item index than men (*F* [1, 160] = 7.29, *p* = .008; Wilk's Λ = .81, partial η2 = .04), suggesting that they were less likely to believe that gender roles were an important part of their religion.

Power outcomes.

As indicated earlier, scores on the power outcome variables ranged from zero to four, with higher scores indicating more power sharing (greater equality). Scores closer to zero indicated less sharing; examination of the Role Arrangement scores suggested that, when scores were closer to zero, participants were dividing power in a traditional

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manner, with men holding greater power and women holding less. In the Task Division domain, traditional scores (close to 0) meant that women were doing more of the onerous, repetitive household tasks while men did less. Traditional scores in the Decision-making Influence domain meant that women had less influence over decisions than men. In the Childcare domain, traditional scores meant that women did more childcare tasks than men.

A repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction determined that scores on the three power outcomes were significantly different (F [1.875, 311.326] $= 142.52$, $p < 0.001$). Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni corrections indicated that decision-making influence was significantly more egalitarian than household task division and childcare; childcare was significantly more egalitarian than household task division.

Task Division. Task division scores were the lowest (least egalitarian) of all three power outcomes (Table 2). Participants' average scores on the Task Division domain fell into the middle of the range, suggesting that they divided these household tasks in a moderately gender-traditional manner (Table 2). However, men were more likely than women to say that they divided these three tasks equally with their spouse (F [1, 165] $=$ 9.08, $p = .003$; Wilk's $\Lambda = .84$, partial $\eta2 = .05$). Himsel and Goldberg (2003) reported closely similar results on a comparable scale, including the gender difference in perceptions of task division, for their sample of predominantly Caucasian American married/partnered parents ($n = 172$).

Decision-making. Decision-making Influence scores were the highest (most egalitarian) of the three power outcomes (Table 2). Women had higher decision-making influence scores than men – in other words, they were significantly more likely than men to report that they shared decision-making equally with their spouse (F [1, 165] = 10.42, p = .002; Wilk's Λ = .84, partial $\eta2$ = .06). Brezsnyak and Whisman's (2004) sample of predominantly Caucasian American married adults (n = 57 couples) were similarly egalitarian in their responses to the WDW Influence domain, though they did not demonstrate the same gender difference.

Childcare. Scores on the Childcare domain fell in the middle of the range, suggesting moderate gender-traditionalism in tasks related to caring for the oldest child (Table 2). Similarly, Fulcher (2011) found that 150 Caucasian American mothers tended to report that they did more childcare tasks in comparison to their partners (M = 3.44-3.41, where 1 is "she does it all" and 5 is "divided evenly"; SD = 0.90-1.11). In the present sample, men were more likely than women to describe their division of childcare as egalitarian (F [1, 165] = 9.59, p = .002; Wilk's Λ = .84, partial $\eta2$ = .06).

Parental contribution. Only 21 participants (n = 15 women), 15% of those who responded to the question, stated that their parents/in-law helped them with any of the WDW tasks. These participants reported that their parents/in-law contributed the most to childcare (n = 17; Table 2), and very little to household task division (n = 19) or family decision-making (n = 18).

Marital satisfaction. Male and female participants equally reported high marital satisfaction (Table 2). Their scores were similar to those obtained by 5,315

predominantly Caucasian female participants in Funk and Rogge's (2007) study ($M = 61$, $SD = 17$).

Main Analyses.

To maintain parsimony in the data analysis, I conducted hierarchical regressions to assess the primary hypotheses in all situations where hypothesized predictors correlated with the outcome variable. Each regression included standardized predictors and interaction terms created by multiplying the standardized predictor with gender, coded 0-1 (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). In the first step of each regression, I entered demographic variables that correlated with the outcome variable as control variables. I entered gender and the predictor of interest in the second step, and the interaction term in the following step(s). I examined the F statistic to identify significant changes in R-square after each step, using a significance criterion of $p < .05$ (Aiken & West, 1991).

I examined standard regression assumptions (linearity, normal distributions of errors, independence of errors, homoscedasticity, and multicollinearity) via scrutiny of the following information: distribution of the outcome variables, predictors, and standardized residuals, scatterplots between outcome and predictor and between standardized predicted values and standardized residuals, the Durbin-Watson statistic, the conditioning index, Mahalanobis distance and Cook's distance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). All regressions met assumptions unless noted otherwise. I also screened each regression for residual outliers and cases that exceeded threshold values on indicators of influence (i.e., Mahalanobis distance, Cook's D). I conducted regressions with and without these residual outliers and overly influential cases. In all analyses, dropping

these cases simply strengthened the association between variables or made no substantial difference to results; therefore, I discuss only results obtained without the outliers.

Exploratory question 1: Relationships between power bases. Religiosity and GRI were bivariately related; participants' age and spouses' average income also correlated with GRI (Table 3). When entered as control variables in Step 1, age and spouse's income predicted 9% of the variance in GRI (Table 4). Religiosity and gender in Step 2 did not significantly improve the model; the same was true for the addition of the interaction term in Step 3.

In sum, this analysis answered Exploratory question 1 by indicating that religiosity and gender did not predict GRI for after accounting for the effect of demographic variables.

Research question 2: Relationships between power bases and power outcomes.

EQ2A. Pearson correlations indicated that religiosity did not correlate with any of the three WDW power outcome domains (household task division, family decision-making or child-care; Table 3). This persisted even after accounting for the effect of demographic variables (Tables 5-7). Therefore, this analysis suggested that religiosity and gender do not predict power outcomes.

RQ2B. The second part of RQ2 sought to identify whether GRI predicted power outcomes. Pearson correlations indicated that GRI correlated positively with household task division, family decision-making, and childcare (Table 3): in other words, as

egalitarianism increased in GRI, egalitarianism increased in power outcomes. Removal of outliers did not affect the results.

GRI and Household Task Division. The control variable, oldest child's age, predicted 1.9% of the variance in household task division (Table 8). GRI and gender significantly improved the model in the second step, increasing the amount of predicted variance to 10.2%. The interaction term did not significantly improve the model in step three. Overall, therefore, this regression indicated that egalitarianism in GRI predicted egalitarianism in household task division (i.e., equal power for men and women) after controlling for relevant demographic variables. Being female was associated with traditional task division (i.e. more power for men than for women), but gender did not moderate the relationship between GRI and task division.

GRI and Decision-Making Influence. Participants' income and spouses' income explained 6% of the variance in (log of) decision-making influence in the first step of the model (Table 9). Addition of gender and GRI in the second step improved the model, increasing the explained variance to 10.5%; only GRI was a significant predictor during this step. The addition of the interaction term did not significantly improve the model. Overall, therefore, this regression indicated that egalitarianism in GRI predicted egalitarianism in (log of) decision-making influence (i.e., equal power for men and women) after controlling for relevant demographic variables and after accounting for the effect of gender. Once again, however, gender did not moderate the relationship between GRI and decision-making influence.

GRI and Division of Child-care. Participants' age explained 6.2% of the variance in division of child-care (Table 10). Gender and GRI improved the model, increasing the explained variance to 18.6% in the second step. In the third step, the addition of the interaction term increased explained variance to 21.1%, but only gender and the control variable were significant predictors in this step. Overall, therefore, this regression indicated that GRI predicted child-care division after controlling for the effects of the control variable, such that increasingly egalitarian GRI was associated with increasingly egalitarian childcare division (i.e., equal power). As before, being female was associated with traditional division of child-care (i.e., more power for men than for women), but once again gender did not moderate the relationship between GRI and child-care division.

Summary of RQ2B. The results described above supported Hypothesis 2B in that egalitarian GRI consistently predicted egalitarian power outcomes. However, results did not support the prediction that gender would moderate this relationship.

Research question 3: Relationships between power and satisfaction. The only demographic variable related to marital satisfaction was spouses' education – I entered this control variable in the first step of each of the following regressions. Outliers in this research question reduced the influence of the control variable, but had no effect on the variables of interest.

RQ3A. The first part of the third research question examined whether power outcomes predicted marital satisfaction, and whether gender affected these relationships. Pearson correlations indicated that all three power outcomes positively correlated to

marital satisfaction, such that increase in egalitarian division of power improved

satisfaction (Table 3).

Household Task Division and Marital Satisfaction. Spouses' education accounted

for 4% of the variance in (square root of) marital satisfaction (Table 11). Addition of

household task division and gender in the second step resulted in a significant model,

increasing the explained variance to 6%; however, gender was not a significant predictor.

Addition of the interaction term improved the model by increasing the explained variance

to 7.4%, but only the control variable remained significant in this step. Overall,

therefore, this regression indicated that egalitarian task division (i.e., equal power) was

associated with greater satisfaction after controlling for related demographic variables

and gender. Gender did not significantly affect marital satisfaction in this regression, nor

did it moderate the effect of household task division.

Decision-making Influence and Marital Satisfaction. Spouse's education

explained 2.1% of the variance in (square root of) marital satisfaction (Table 12). The

explained variance increased to 26.4% with the addition of decision-making influence

and gender: decision-making influence was significant, but gender was not. The

interaction term was non-significant in the third step, and did not increase the explained

variance. Overall, therefore, this regression indicated that increased equality in decision-

making influence (i.e., equal power) was associated with increased marital satisfaction,

after accounting for the effects of gender and the control variable. Again, gender did not

moderate the relationship between influence and marital satisfaction.

Childcare Division and Marital Satisfaction. Spouse's education explained 2% of the variance in (square root of) marital satisfaction (Table 13). In the second step, the addition of childcare division and gender increased the explained variance to 11.5%; child-care division was significant but gender was not. Addition of the interaction term did not significantly improve the model. Overall, therefore, this regression indicated that increased equality of childcare division (i.e., equal power) predicted greater marital satisfaction after accounting for gender and related demographics. Again, gender did not affect marital satisfaction, nor did it moderate the effect of childcare division.

All Power Outcomes and Marital Satisfaction. After accounting for spouse's education in step 1, the three power outcomes plus gender predicted 24.8% of the variance in (square root of) marital satisfaction (see Table 14). Only decision-making influence and childcare division had a significant effect on the outcome. Overall, this regression indicated that greater equality in decision-making influence and in childcare division predicted greater marital satisfaction after accounting for the effects of gender, related demographics, and household task division.

Summary of RQ3A. The regressions described above supported Hypothesis 3A in that egalitarian power outcomes consistently predicted increased marital satisfaction. However, in contrast to Hypothesis 3A, gender did not moderate this relationship. In addition, a fourth regression in which power outcomes were entered as simultaneous predictors of satisfaction indicated that only decision-making influence and childcare division predicted satisfaction – household task division did not play a significant role.

RQ3B. The second part of research question 3 examined whether GRI moderated the relationship between power outcomes and marital satisfaction, and whether this moderation varied in turn by gender. As such, the following regressions focus on interactions between power outcomes and GRI, power outcome and gender, GRI and gender, and a three-way interaction between power outcome, GRI, and gender. GRI correlated with power outcomes, as described above, though it was not related to marital satisfaction.

GRI as moderator of Household Task Division. The two-way interaction terms (task division by GRI, task division by gender, and GRI by gender) did not significantly predict (square root of) marital satisfaction above and beyond the effect of the variables in steps one and two (Table 15). The three-way interaction (task division by GRI by gender) was also non-significant in step four. Overall, therefore, this regression indicated that GRI and gender did not moderate the relationship between household task division and marital satisfaction.

GRI as moderator of Decision-making Influence. The two-way interaction terms (influence by GRI, influence by gender and GRI by gender), were not significant predictors in the model (Table 16). The three-way interaction was also not a significant predictor. This regression indicated, therefore, that GRI and gender do not moderate the relationship between decision-making influence and marital satisfaction.

GRI as moderator of Childcare Division. The two-way interaction terms (childcare by GRI, childcare by gender, and GRI by gender) were not significant predictors of (square root of) marital satisfaction (Table 17). The addition of the three-

way interaction term did not improve the model. This regression therefore indicated that GRI and gender do not moderate relationship between child-care division and marital satisfaction.

Summary of RQ3B. The three regressions above do not support Hypothesis 3B, in that they suggest that GRI does not moderate the effect of power outcomes on marital satisfaction.

EQ3C. The third part of research question 3 addressed the effect of religiosity on the relationship between power outcomes and marital satisfaction. Religiosity was unrelated to power outcomes and to marital satisfaction.

Exploratory question 4: Relationship between parents/in-laws' contributions and marital satisfaction. Only 21 participants (less than 10% of the total sample) reported that their parents/in-law contributed at all to power outcomes. Parental contribution did not correlate with marital satisfaction.

Discussion

This study examined the connection between American Muslims' marital power and their marital satisfaction, focusing on a sample of 219 married American Muslim individuals. The results contribute to existing literature on this community not only by imparting needed information about American Muslims' marital health, but also by drawing attention to the complex relationships between different types of marital power – some of which are particularly relevant to this community – and their effect on American Muslims' marital satisfaction.

I begin this discussion by briefly summarizing results, and then look deeper with comparisons to other samples and hypotheses about the reasons behind the results. I end with a discussion of the limitations of this study and the implications for future research and practice.

Summary of Results.

The present sample consisted of married American residents who identified as Muslims. The average participant was highly educated, had lived in America for over 20 years, and was in his/her mid-thirties. Corresponding to their average age, most participants had been married for approximately a decade, and over half had children under 18 years old. Roughly two-thirds were women, and two-thirds were of Asian background.

Both men and women in this sample reported high marital satisfaction. As may be expected, the divorce rate was correspondingly low. Men and women both expressed high religiosity and egalitarian GRI, though women reported significantly more egalitarian GRI than men. Women also expressed more egalitarian GRI in their role as a wife than in their role as a parent. Both men and women reported that they experienced a moderately traditional division of household task division and childcare division – in other words, that women did more of the onerous, repetitive household tasks and the childcare. Women were significantly more likely than men to report a traditional division of these tasks. Decision-making influence was significantly more egalitarian than household task division and childcare, and women were significantly more likely to report an egalitarian division of decision-making influence than men.

Regressions indicated that religiosity did not predict GRI or power outcomes. Egalitarian GRI, on the other hand, predicted egalitarian household task division, decision-making influence, and childcare.

Regressions also indicated that all three power outcomes significantly predicted marital satisfaction, such that egalitarian power outcomes predicted higher satisfaction. This was true for both genders. When accounting for all three outcomes together, decision-making influence and childcare division predicted satisfaction while household task division did not. GRI did not moderate the relationship between power outcomes and marital satisfaction.

Extended family played little to no role in the vast majority of this sample's power outcomes. Their involvement was unrelated to marital satisfaction.

Comparisons With Other Samples.

    Demographics.

This sample's young age is generally consistent with a nationwide randomized survey of American Muslims conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2007 ($n = 1{,}050$). Over half of adult American Muslims are between 18 and 39 years old, concluded the Pew Research Center (2007). The percentage of participants in this study who cared for children under 18 closely matched the percentage in the Pew study who had children in their households (59.6% in this sample vs. 59% in the Pew study).

Yet there are some notable demographic differences between this sample and that of the Pew study. First, the proportion of women in this sample (64.8%) exceeded the proportion of women in the Pew sample (46%). Second, although this sample's income approximated that of the Pew sample, 41% of which earns $50,000+ annually, the present sample was *far* more educated. Just over half of the participants, and just over half of their spouses, had completed a graduate degree, in comparison to 10% of American Muslims in the Pew study. This is a noticeable and important difference that colors all subsequent findings in this study: the conclusions discussed below pertain primarily to highly educated American Muslims.

    Trends in divorce and marital satisfaction. The divorce rate was 10% in this sample (including the few instances of separation and annulment). This rate is approximately half the rate of Alshugairi's (2010) sample, and only a third of the "nationwide" rate suggested by Ba-Yunus (2007; which is probably inflated). It almost

exactly matches that of the Pew Research Center's nationwide study (9.2% in this sample, versus 9% in the Pew study).

It is possible that this low divorce rate reflects the sample's high religiosity: participants were more likely than not to ascribe to a common belief among Muslims that they should avoid divorce. The same sample characteristic could explain why both men and women reported high marital satisfaction: they may have felt a disinclination to acknowledge any existing marital dissatisfaction because of the religious emphasis on unified families. The lack of correlation in this sample between religiosity and marital satisfaction, however, suggests that there is another explanation. Given that there was low variance in religiosity, this study may have failed to find an existing correlation, but an alternative is that this sample's low divorce rate and high marital satisfaction scores reflect genuine marital happiness.

If participants are indeed highly satisfied, then two situations are possible. One is that recruitment obtained a representative sample, and the state of marital health in the American Muslim community is not as dire as many community leaders and scholars fear. Previous research on American Muslims' marital satisfaction supports the latter suggestion (Alshugairi, 2010; Asamarai et al., 2008; Chapman & Cattaneo, 2013; Haque & Davenport, 2009; Shah, 2007). In other words, this study fits with the trend in American Muslim literature toward moderate to high marital satisfaction. If this is the case, community leaders' perceptions of increased marital distress in the American Muslim community may reflect an increase in individuals' *communication* of distress, not an increase in distress itself. American Muslims may feel more comfortable

acknowledging and discussing the difficult aspects of their marriages now than they did two or three decades ago.

The other possible explanation for participants' high marital satisfaction is that I sampled from one end of the satisfaction spectrum, and the sample is thus not representative of the majority. The high satisfaction and low divorce rate may well reflect the probability that individuals more often volunteer for a study of marriage when they are maritally satisfied and thus more willing than unsatisfied individuals to answer questions about their relationship.

Results differed from some other studies on this population (Alshugairi, 2010; Asamarai et al., 2008; Chapman & Cattaneo, 2013), and from numerous studies on the mainstream American population (e.g., Amato, Johnson, Booth, & Rogers, 2003; Corra, Carter, Carter, & Knox, 2009; Kamp Dush, Taylor, & Kroeger, 2008) in that men and women were equally satisfied with their marriages. The more common finding in the literature is that men are more satisfied than women. There are several possible explanations for this finding. It could mean that the gender trend in marital satisfaction does not hold true for American Muslims, and that previous studies on this population reported a relationship that is not representative of the American Muslim population. To support this, a handful of previous studies on American Muslims (Haque & Davenport, 2009; Shah, 2007) also did not find the gender trend, albeit with smaller sample sizes to draw on. American Muslim women may be more similar to American Muslim men than to non-Muslim American women in their reported levels of marital satisfaction – if so, it would be interesting to know whether this pattern persists across studies, and why it

exists, perhaps by studying matched samples of American Muslim women and non-Muslim American women. However, it is likely that the results once again reflect the sampling bias toward the end of the satisfaction spectrum that contains happy, highly educated spouses of both genders.

Trends in marital power. Participants in this study generally reported egalitarian GRI. This fits with previous studies that (quantitatively) found egalitarianism in their American Muslim samples (Chapman & Cattaneo, 2009; Juhari, 1997) over studies that (qualitatively) found traditional attitudes (Ali et al., 2008; Hassouneh-Phillips, 2001). This finding could reflect participants' long-standing membership in and connection to the American culture, where egalitarianism is more prevalent in policy and cultural attitudes than it is in collectivist cultures (Cooke, 2006; Gibbons et al., 1991; Olson et al., 2007). It almost certainly reflects participants' high level of education (Adam & Schewe, 2007; Damji & Lee, 1995; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Read, 2003), and suggests that, when religious American Muslims are highly educated, they prefer egalitarian GRI. This conclusion fits with Chapman and Cattaneo's (2009) and Juhari's (1997) samples, who were highly educated as well as egalitarian.

Women in this study were significantly more likely than men to report egalitarian GRI. This matches previously identified gender trends in American Muslim samples (Chapman & Cattaneo, 2009; Juhari, 1997), as well as in the mainstream American population (Bryant, 2003; Chia et al., 1994; Dasgupta, 1998; Gibbons et al., 1991; McHugh & Frieze, 1997; Morinaga et al., 1993; Olson et al., 2007; Steil, 2001). Women were also significantly less likely than men to report that gender roles were an important

part of being a Muslim. These findings appear to reflect the widespread theory that women have more to gain by being egalitarian. They are also an excellent reminder that religious teachings are interpreted in varying ways by different people – here, it appears that highly educated American Muslim women are more likely than highly educated American Muslim men to focus on egalitarian interpretations of Islam, and less likely than men to focus on gender as part of their religious beliefs.

Women's egalitarian GRI varied depending on the type of gender role in question. Although they were egalitarian in both marital and parental roles, they were significantly *more* egalitarian in relation to their role as a wife versus their role as a parent. This is the first finding of its kind in this population – Juhari (1997) did not report a similar pattern in her study using the SRES, and no other known studies have studied GRI in this nuanced way among American Muslim population. Yet there is a clear similarity between this finding and current American patterns of gendered behavior. It is now common and even expected that American women will be assertive and take on traditionally-male responsibilities such as working outside the home, but it is far less common and less acceptable for mothers to relinquish the majority of childcare to fathers (Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, & Robinson, 2012). These results suggest that highly educated American Muslim women are similar to their non-Muslim female counterparts in their relative prioritization of childcare over other married roles. This finding may also reflect men's reluctance or inability to take on more childcare responsibility, resulting in women's adjustment of their own expectations.

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Participants were more traditional on measures of power outcomes than on GRI. This reinforces the importance of measuring marital power in multiple ways. Specifically, on a scale of zero (completely gender-traditional division of power) to four (completely equally shared division), the average score was around two on scales examining division of household labor and childcare. Women were significantly more likely than men to report that they did more of the onerous, repetitive household chores, and more child-care. This fits with consistent findings of traditional power outcome distribution in the mainstream American population (Bartley et al., 2005; Coltrane, 2000; Greenstein, 2009) as well as the few, mostly qualitative reports of power outcome distribution in the American Muslim community (Ali, 1992; Carolan et al., 2000; Ross-Sheriff, 2001). It is notable that a relatively traditional distribution of household work and childcare holds true even though this sample is highly educated. This finding may be consistent with Ali's (1992) sample, most of which have "at least Bachelor degrees" (p.95). Carolan et al. (2000) did not clarify the education level of their respondents. In contrast, however, only 12% of Ross-Sheriff's (2001) sample of American Muslim women held graduate degrees.

In comparison to the moderately traditional division of household task and childcare, both men and women reported that their division of decision-making influence was significantly more egalitarian, with an average score of three. Given that American Muslim women's employment rates (as with non-Muslim American women) have increased over the past two decades (Read, 2002), they may have experienced a simultaneous shift in their inclination and ability to participate in family decision-making

that is evident in spouses' division of this power outcome. It may also be that husbands found it harder to hold on to decision-making power in comparison to housework and childcare power.

It is interesting to note that the greater equality in decision-making influence (compared to household task division or childcare) mirrors women's, but not men's, higher egalitarianism in marital GRI in comparison to parental GRI. If power outcomes are perceptions of "reality" while GRI is perception of "preferences," then *women's* preferences are mirrored in "reality" in the realm of decision-making. This could mean that highly educated women's relatively stronger preference for equal power as a wife (compared to their preference for power as a parent) shapes the distribution of decision-making power; also that women's preferences have *less* influence on the more concrete, time-consuming tasks involved in housework and childcare, compared to men's more traditional preferences in this regard. The research on non-Muslim American couples supports the latter half of this hypothesis (Steil, 2000).

Women in this sample were significantly more likely than men to perceive decision-making as equal (the reverse was true for the other two power outcomes). If decision-making *is* as equal as women described it, it may be that male participants were less likely to report equality in this area because they were reluctant to admit to relinquishing this aspect of their traditional role as the heads of the household. Alternatively, men may not have *perceived* that they relinquished decision-making influence. Conversely, women may have perceived more equality than actually present, because of a desire to be congruent with their own strong marital GRI.

Extended family contribution. In terms of outside influence on power outcomes, very few participants in this study reported that their parents/in-laws helped them with household, child-care, or decision-making tasks. I expected that more participants would endorse this item; yet this is the first known empirical evidence that (highly educated) American Muslim couples do not typically receive help from parents/in-laws to accomplish common family tasks. It contradicts the general assumption that extended family involvement in couples' daily life is higher in this community than it is in mainstream American culture. This finding could reflect the demographic of these participants: most were South Asian, and many parents/in-laws may thus have lived overseas. Further, their generally high socioeconomic status may have allowed them to hire help for the home. It could also reflect participants' acculturation to broader American norms, where extended family participation is less prevalent.

The relationship between power bases. Pearson correlations indicated a negative relationship between religiosity and egalitarian GRI in this sample, but this relationship disappeared in a regression after accounting for the effect of the control variable, spouse's income. Spouse's income only correlated with GRI for *male* participants, which suggests that it was important in the regression in as much as it reflected gender-egalitarian patterns of paid work. In other words, after accounting for the effect of women's paid work on GRI, level of religiosity did not predict GRI.

It is important to note that this sample tended to report high religiosity. Within the context of a highly educated sample, I suggest that high religiosity does not

necessarily mean traditional GRI, though this relationship was reported in several previous quantitative studies on American Muslims (Abu-Ali & Reisen, 1999; Chapman & Cattaneo, 2009; Read, 2003). Educated American Muslims may interpret religion in an egalitarian manner: in particular, American Muslims who are highly acculturated to Western norms are likely to have absorbed religious teachings from English sources and American imams, both of which are more likely to make egalitarian religious interpretations than non-Western sources. Further, in the context of an economy in which both partners need to work, American Muslims (like many others) may interpret religious teachings in ways that align with the need for dual incomes. If such contextual factors increase the variance in American Muslims' religious interpretations, studies are less likely to find a consistent effect of religiosity on GRI. In fact, the very meaning of religiosity may differ between highly educated, acculturated American Muslims, and their less-educated and/or less acculturated counterparts

The relationship between power bases and power outcomes.

Religiosity. Further supporting the suggestion that American Muslims interpret religious teachings about gender roles in various ways, results indicated that religiosity did not predict any particular power outcome among participants. This is different from studies showing that high religiosity predicts traditional division of household labor among non-Muslim Americans (e.g., Ellison & Bartkowski, 2002), but is consistent with findings showing that religiosity has little effect on non-Muslim Americans' marital decision making (Denton, 2004). Notably, however, Ellison and Bartkowski (2002) found that education level was partly responsible for their finding that highly religious

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participants were more traditional in their division of household labor – their religious participants tended to be less educated. This sample's combination of high education and high religiosity may have influenced the present study's finding that religiosity did not relate to power outcomes. It is not possible to compare the present findings to previous investigations of religiosity's effect on American Muslims' power outcomes; there are none. Overall, though, this study's results suggests that American Muslim religiosity does not relate to marital power among highly educated American Muslims.

Gender role ideology. In contrast to the lack of relationship between religiosity and power outcomes, egalitarian GRI correlated positively with all three power outcomes. Subsequently, egalitarian GRI predicted corresponding increases in the equality of household task division, decision-making influence, and childcare division in regressions, even after controlling for relevant demographic variables. This is consistent with previous research in the mainstream American population (Buunk et al., 2000; Shelton & John, 1996). These regressions found that gender did not moderate the effect of GRI, meaning that egalitarian GRI predicted egalitarian outcomes the same way for both men and women. This is contrary to the hypothesis posed earlier, that the relationship between GRI and power outcomes is stronger for men than for women because men have more ability to translate their beliefs into reality. This suggests that highly educated women may have as much influence as highly educated men in shaping power outcome division.

The relationship between marital power and marital satisfaction. I expected that egalitarian power outcomes would predict higher marital satisfaction, and results

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supported this hypothesis. All three power outcomes (household task division, decision-making influence, and childcare) correlated positively with marital satisfaction, and this relationship held in regressions after accounting for associated demographic variables. This lends credence to the hypothesis that power outcome division plays the same role in American Muslim marriages as it does in American non-Muslims' marriages, though again the present results apply primarily to highly educated American Muslims. This study is one of the few to examine this hypothesis. It also updates knowledge about American Muslim power outcomes by indicating that decision-making influence and childcare are more important than household task division for predicting marital satisfaction among highly educated American Muslims.

Given Ali's (1992) finding that American Muslim husbands were more satisfied when they didn't do any traditionally female tasks, as well as similar findings in the mainstream American literature, I expected that gender would affect the relationships between power outcomes and marital satisfaction in this sample. In other words, I expected that egalitarian outcomes would increase women's satisfaction but decrease men's satisfaction. However, results indicated that power outcomes affected marital satisfaction the same way for men and women. The literature on mainstream Americans contains mixed evidence for a moderating effect of gender, and so this study fits with the body of work indicating that well-educated American husbands are just as happy as wives with egalitarian power outcomes. These findings also suggest that, while they may not *prefer* egalitarian outcomes as much as women, educated American Muslim husbands' satisfaction with egalitarian power outcome division has increased in the 27

years since Ali gathered his data, which was also from educated American Muslims. As American Muslim women have increased their employment outside the home (Read, 2002), American Muslim men may well have found that, although they might like a little more traditionalism than their wives, their married lives are smoother if they pitch in around the house (Macfarlane, 2012).

I also expected that power bases would moderate the relationship between power outcomes and marital satisfaction: for example, that GRI would increase the positive relationship between egalitarian outcomes and satisfaction for women, and change the direction of the negative relationship for men. The present findings did not support this hypothesis. Once again, this may have been due to the restricted range on key variables, including GRI, religiosity, and education. These findings represent the first known investigation of the moderating effects of power bases on American Muslim marital power and marital satisfaction, and suggest that, among educated American Muslims, power bases are not a key factor in the connection between power outcomes and marital satisfaction. Further research should explore whether this finding varies across education levels.

Parents/in-laws' effect on power outcomes and marital satisfaction. One of the goals of this study was to examine the effect of extended family – namely, parents and in-laws – on marital satisfaction via their contribution to power outcomes. Very few participants indicated that their parents/in-laws contributed to power outcomes, and among those whose parents did contribute, there was no relationship between parental contribution and marital satisfaction. It appears as though American Muslim parents/in-

law generally do not participate in their married children's life in this way, and even when they do, it does not affect spouses' satisfaction with the marriage. It remains to be seen whether or not there is a different pathway by which parents/in-laws affect the spousal relationship; also whether there is a relationship between parents'/in-laws' contribution and marital satisfaction among less-educated American Muslims.

Limitations.

  Skewed sample. The major limitation of this study is the skewed nature of this sample, because this affects the generalizability of these results. Comparison to nationwide samples such as the Pew study (Pew Research Center, 2007) suggests that the present sample is not representative of the broader American Muslim community, primarily in terms of education.

  The restricted characteristics of this sample emphasize the use of diverse recruitment strategies. For example, I encourage future investigators to recruit American Muslims from avenues that do not include religious organizations, to increase the chances that the sample varies in its religiosity. It may then be possible to identify effects of religiosity that were not visible in this study. For similar reasons, I encourage recruitment of participants with varying education and language background (which would require survey translation). This may require researchers to collect data in varying geographical locations. Another useful tactic would be to specifically recruit maritally distressed American Muslims (e.g., via the offices of American Muslim marriage and family therapists) and compare them to this maritally satisfied sample.

Length. The second major limitation of the study was its length. A quarter of this sample dropped out by the end of the study. Although multiple imputation is an effective strategy to address this concern, complete responses are better. I recommend that investigators who are interested in replicating this methodology reduce the time that participants needed to complete this study, by focusing on a subset of the questions asked in this study, and/or by presenting only factor-analyzed versions of all WDW domains.

Implications for research.

In this section, I review the various calls for research I have made throughout this discussion. Overall, this study has three main kinds of implications for future research: deliberate recruitment of different samples, further investigation of content, and new use of instruments.

Sample. Perhaps the most relevant step for further investigation is to replicate this study among American Muslims who are less educated than the present sample. For example, researchers could recruit from geographic regions that are distant from areas known to have high concentrations of highly educated residents. This step may shed light on the questions raised in this discussion about the effect of education on the connections between power bases, power outcomes, and satisfaction. It may also shed light on the meaning of religiosity in highly-educated versus less-educated American Muslim communities.

Given that very few participants received assistance from parents/in-laws on household, decision-making, or childcare tasks, it may be necessary to deliberately sample American Muslims who report involvement of parents/in-laws in the areas of

interest, in order to determine the effect of this involvement on marital satisfaction. In fact, researchers who sample from less-educated communities may accomplish this goal, as higher education may relate to less interaction with extended family, as individuals move away from home to pursue college education and career opportunities. Future research should also explore parents/in-laws' involvement in other aspects of couples' lives besides the power outcomes measured in this study. Interactions with extended family change over time – for example, it is quite likely that couples contribute more to their *parents'* household tasks as they and their parents grow older, as opposed to *receiving* help from parents when they are younger. As such, new samples could focus on obtaining responses from American Muslims in their forties or fifties.

Content. First, future studies should explore other aspects of marital health besides marital satisfaction – for example, marital commitment and marital distress – in order to add nuanced information about this population. Second, studies should gather more information about gender trends in marital satisfaction in the American Muslim community. This study did not find a difference between men's and women's satisfaction, but previous literature is divided on the subject, with a burgeoning trend that shows women are less satisfied. Why are American Muslim women in this study apparently more satisfied than non-Muslim American women, such that their satisfaction is no different than that of American Muslim men? One avenue for inquiry is whether religious, educated, and satisfied American Muslim women have more actual ability to affect power outcomes in their marriages in comparison to non-Muslim American women, so that outcomes accord with their GRI. Conversely, are American Muslim

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women getting more of the equality they want than non-Muslim American women, if American Muslim men are more egalitarian than non-Muslim American men?

Third, I call for more empirical contributions to the debate about whether religiosity is a type of marital power in the American Muslim community. This study suggests that religiosity does not affect marriages in the manner expected of a power base, possibly because of the sample's high education. In addition to examining religiosity as a power base among less-educated American Muslims as suggested above, further research could explore whether religiosity affects highly educated American Muslims' marriages in a different way, and whether its impact could be construed as a form of marital power (in other words, are there meaningful gender differences in how religiosity operates on marriage?).

Fourth, I suggest further in-depth exploration of the differences between American Muslim women's marital versus parental GRI. This study is the first of its kind to notice a difference between two different kinds of GRI endorsed by highly educated women. Does this finding hold elsewhere, and why do highly educated American Muslim women prefer egalitarianism more strongly in marital roles than in parental roles? Does it relate to the Islamic emphasis on the family unit, as hypothesized above?

Measurement. I used a factor-analyzed format of the WDW Task Division subscale in this study, in response to its poor performance in original form. This yielded nuanced information about the most onerous and repetitive household tasks. Future studies could use this technique to further understand power outcomes – perhaps by

factor-analyzing the other WDW subscales. It is also important to note that this is the first study in nearly 30 years to quantitatively assess power outcomes among American Muslims; researchers should try other forms of measurement of the same construct in order to improve the convergent validity of these findings.

Implications for practice.

I encourage practitioners and religious leaders in the American Muslim community (referred to below as "counselors") not to despair about the state of American Muslim marital health. Most of the recent research on American Muslim marriages suggests that satisfied spouses are the norm rather than the exception. Having said this, those who counsel distressed American Muslim spouses should remember several topics.

First, counselors should maintain a general awareness that there is indeed a relationship between power outcomes and marital satisfaction. Highly educated spouses with a traditional division of household labor, childcare, and decision making are more likely to express distress than those with an egalitarian division of these power outcomes. Counselors should inquire about a couple's daily task division, as well as their *expectation* for how this division should occur (i.e., GRI).

Women's generally higher egalitarian GRI relative to men is particularly relevant here, in the light of their generally lower power in terms of power outcome division. This discrepancy is likely to contribute to dissatisfaction, and is particularly important in educated American Muslims' women's role as a wife in comparison to their role as a parent. Also notable is the finding that men are more likely than women to believe there is a religious basis to gender role expectations. This may mean they are less willing to

concede power outcomes overall. Counselors may be able to help couples understand the differences in their gender role expectations and how these differences impact their daily life as well as their overall satisfaction with their relationship.

Counselors should continue to inquire about the role of extended family, particularly parents/in-law, in the life of the couple. However, they should not assume that extended family is involved, particularly for highly educated couples, given the current dearth of empirical information in this area.

Appendix A: Data Tables

Table 1 Variables included in the multiple imputation process

Variables (% of sample requiring imputation on this variable)	
[a] Gender (0%)	Task division full x Gender (8.68%))
[a] Age (0%)	Task Division factor x Gender (9.13%)
[a] Years In America (0%)	Decision-making x Gender (8.68%)
[a] Number of Previous Marriages (0%)	Childcare x Gender (11.87%)
[a] Years Married to Current Spouse (0%)	Task Division full x GRI (23.74%)
Age of Oldest Child (0.46%)	Task Division factor x GRI (24.2%)
Time Spent With Parents (0.91%)	Decision-making x GRI (23.74%)
Your Education (5.48%)	Childcare x GRI (27.4%)
Spouse's Education (5.48%)	Task division full x Religiosity (13.24%)
Participant's Average Income (5.48%)	Task Division factor x Religiosity (13.70%)
Spouse's Average Income (5.48%)	Decision-making x Religiosity (13.24%)
Marital Satisfaction: CSI-16 (24.66%)	Childcare x Religiosity (18.26%)
Religiosity: RCI-10 + PMIR-ID (5.94%)	Task Div. full x GRI x Gender (14.61%)
Total GRI: SRES Mar. + SRES Par. (23.74%)	Task Div. factor x GRI x Gender (15.07%)
WDW Task Division Factor vers. (13.7%)	Decision-making x GRI x Gender (14.61%)

WDW Task Division Full vers. (13.24%)	Childcare x GRI x Gender (17.35%)
WDW Decision-making influence (13.24%)	Task Div. full x Relig. x Gender (8.68%)
WDW Childcare (18.26%)	Task Div. factor x Relig. x Gender (9.13%)
Religiosity x Gender (3.65%)	Decision-making x Relig x Gender (8.68%)
GRI x Gender (14.61%)	Childcare x Relig. x Gender (11.87%)

[a] All participants responded to these demographic variables: therefore, these variables had no missing data and were used *only* as predictors in the imputation process. All other variables listed had missing data and thus were imputed *and* used as predictors.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the original (non-imputed) dataset

Scale (range)	Full Sample				Male				Female		
	n	M (SD)	Md	Mo	n	M (SD)	Md	Mo	n	M (SD)	Md	Mo
Religiosity												
RCI-10 (10-50)	206	39.70 (7.86)	41	41	72	40.29 (7.28)	41	50	134	39.39 (8.16)	41	41
PMIR-ID (0-25)	206	18.92 (4.3)	20	22	72	19.69 (3.71)	20	20	134	18.50 (4.54)	19.5	22
Total (standardized)	206	.00 (1.83)	.40	1.78	72	.26 (1.64)	.54	1.27	134	-.14 (1.91)	.25	1.78
GRI												
SRES-MAR (19-95)	169	74.97 (8.43)	75	75	58	70.97 (7.50)***	71	70	111	77.06 (8.15)***	76	75
SRES-PAR (19-95)	167	74.06 (10.45)	74	74, 81	57	71.91 (9.76)*	73	74	110	75.17 (10.66)*	75	70
SRES Total (38-190)	167	149.11 (17.72)	149	154	57	142.96 (16.04)***	144	149	110	152.30 (17.78)***	153	154
Relig.-GRI connection (3-15)	167	9.12 (2.76)	9	8	57	8.53 (2.97)**	8	8	110	9.43 (2.60)**	9	8
Power Outcomes												
Task Div. factor (0-4)	189	1.98 (1.14)	2	2	67	2.32 (1.08)**	2.33	2	122	1.80 (1.13)**	2	2.33
Decision-making (0-4)	190	3.21 (.72)	3.33	4	67	2.99 (0.74)**	3	3	123	3.33 (.69)**	3.58	4
Child-care (0-4)	179	2.20 (.88)	2.37	3.17	63	2.40 (0.74)**	2.55	2	116	2.09 (.94)**	2.19	2.5
Parental Contribution												
Task Division (0-5)	19	1.19 (1.1)	1.27	.00	6	1.36 (0.93)	1.30	0	13	1.11 (1.20)	1	0
Decision-making (0-5)	18	1.32 (1.37)	1	.00	6	1.63 (1.41)	1	1	12	1.17 (1.39)	.5	0
Child-care (0-5)	17	1.89 (.90)	1.8	1.67	6	1.85 (0.63)	1.8	1.07	11	1.91 (1.05	1.8	0
Marital Satisfaction												
CSI-16 (0-81)	165	60.27 (19.42)	66	72, 81	57	59.11 (19.73)	64	64	108	60.88 (19.32)	68	72

*p < .05 **p < .01 *** p <.001

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Table 3 Correlations for the original (non-imputed) dataset

	Gender	Age	Years in America	Number Previous Marriages	Years Married Current	Age Oldest Child	Your Education	Spouse Education	Your Income	Spouse Income	Religion GRI connection	Religiosity	GRI	Task Division	Influence	Childcare
Age	-0.25***															
Yrs in America	0.09	0.09														
Number Previous Marriages	-0.02	0.20**	0.02													
Years Married Current	-0.18**	0.90***	0.16*	0.002												
Age Oldest Child	-0.06	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.13											
Your Education	0.008	0.13	0.10	-0.04	0.07	-0.10										
Spouse Education	0.19**	-0.04	-0.001	-0.12	-0.03	-0.05	0.24***									
Your Income	-0.57***	0.17*	0.03	0.005	0.09	0.04	0.23**	-0.02								
Spouse Income	0.54***	-0.09	0.14	0.02	-0.04	0.08	0.11	0.34***	-0.27***							
Religion GRI connection	0.16*	-0.11	0.08	0.09	-0.12	-0.09	0.22**	-0.01	0.18*	-0.20**						
Religiosity	-0.10	0.06	0.03	0.003	0.12	0.12	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.18**	0.20*					
GRI	0.25**	-0.20**	0.10	0.05	0.17*	-0.07	0.03	0.000	0.002	0.26**	0.54***	0.20*				
Task Division	-0.22**	0.06	0.08	0.005	0.02	0.18*	0.06	-0.01	0.11	-0.04	0.14	-0.09	0.12			
Influence	0.23**	-0.09	0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.14	0.05	0.08	-0.18*	0.19*	0.10	0.02	0.19*	0.14		
Childcare	-0.17*	-0.28***	0.01	-0.14	-0.29***	-0.08	0.03	-0.001	0.10	-0.13	0.13	-0.02	0.18*	0.41***	0.21**	
Marital Satisf.	0.04	-0.09	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10	-0.24**	-0.04	0.22**	-0.16*	0.17*	-0.08	0.07	-0.06	0.17*	0.44***	0.33***

Note: n = 157-219

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$

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Table 4 The effect of religiosity on GRI, by gender

(Step) Outcome, Predictors	B ($SE\ B$)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df$_1$, df$_2$)	F for ΔR^2 (df$_1$, df$_2$)
(1) GRI			0.10	0.09	11.14 (2, 202)***	-
(1) Age	-2.88 (1.24)	-.17*				
(1) Spouse income	4.48 (1.26)	.25***				
(2) GRI			0.12	0.10	6.91 (4, 200)***	2.51 (2, 200)
(2) Age	-2.40 (1.32)	-.14				
(2) Spouse income	3.10 (1.47)	.17*				
(2) Religiosity	-1.14 (0.69)	-.12				
(2) Gender	3.96 (3.41)	.107				
(3) GRI			0.12	0.10	5.53 (5, 199)***	0.14 (1, 199)
(3) Age	-2.42 (1.32)	-.14				
(3) Spouse income	3.14 (1.47)	.18*				
(3) Religiosity	-0.91 (1.29)	-.09				
(3) Gender	3.96 (3.41)	.11				
(3) Religiosity x Gender	-.31 (1.54)	-.03				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting $n = 205$) and results pooled across the five

imputed datasets.

p < .05. **p* < .01. *** p < .001

Table 5 The effect of religiosity on household task division, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B (SE B)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Task Division**[a]			0.031	0.026	6.43 (1, 201)*	-
(1) Age oldest child	-.20 (.09)	-.17*				
(2) **Task Division**[a]			0.08	0.07	6.06 (3, 199)***	5.73 (2, 199)**
(2) Age oldest child	-0.212 (.08)	-0.19*				
(2) Religiosity	-0.03 (.05)	-0.04				
(2) Gender	-0.55 (.17)	-0.23**				
(3) **Task Division**[a]			0.10	0.08	5.49 (4, 198)***	3.53 (1, 198)
(3) Age oldest child	-0.23 (.08)	-0.21**				
(3) Religiosity	-0.16 (.089)	-0.25				
(3) Gender	-0.60 (.17)	-0.25***				
(3) Religiosity x Gender	0.19 (.10)	0.25				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting $n = 203$) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was the factor-analyzed version of the WDW-Task Division.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** p <.001

Table 6 The effect of religiosity on decision-making influence, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B *(SE B)*	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Influence**[a]			0.04	0.03	4.13 (2, 200)*	-
(1) Your income	-.01 (.01)	-.13				
(1) Spouse income	.01 (.01)	.12				
(2) **Influence**[a]			0.07	0.05	3.46 (4, 198)**	2.72 (2, 198)
(2) Your income	-.00 (.010)	-.03				
(2) Spouse income	.01 (.01)	.05				
(2) Religiosity	.004 (.01)	.07				
(2) Gender	.05 (.03)	.20				
(3) **Influence**[a]			0.08	0.05	3.29 (5, 197)**	2.45 (1, 197)
(3) Your income	-.004 (.01)	-.04				
(3) Spouse income	.004 (.01)	.03				
(3) Religiosity	-.01 (.01)	-.10				
(3) Gender	.05 (.03)	.20				
(3) Religiosity x Gender	.02 (.01)	.20				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting $n = 203$) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

p < .05. **p* < .01. *** p < .001

Table 7 The effect of religiosity on childcare division, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B ($SE\ B$)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Childcare**			0.07	0.07	15.51 (1, 198)***	-
(1) Age	-.245 (.07)	-.27***				
(2) **Childcare**			0.14	0.13	10.49 (3, 196)***	7.48 (2, 196)**
(2) Age	-.31 (.07)	-.34***				
(2) Religiosity	-.02 (.04)	-.03				
(2) Gender	-.49 (.14)	-.27**				
(3) **Childcare**			0.15	0.13	8.57 (4, 195)***	2.55 (1, 195)
(3) Age	-.31 (.07)	-.34***				
(3) Religiosity	-.11 (.07)	-.21				
(3) Gender	-.52 (.14)	-.28***				
(3) Religiosity x Gender	.12 (.08)	.20				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting n = 200) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

*p < .05. **p < .01. *** p <.001

Table 8 The effect of GRI on household task division, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B (*SE B*)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Task Division**[a]			0.02	0.02	5.26 (1, 216)*	-
(1) Age oldest child	-.17 (.08)	-.15*				
(2) **Task Division**[a]			0.12	0.10	9.26 (3, 214)***	11.03 (2, 214)***
(2) Age oldest child	-.18 (.08)	-.16*				
(2) GRI	.25 (.08)	.22**				
(2) Gender	-.64 (.166)	-.27***				
(3) **Task Division**[a]			0.12	0.10	7.08 (4, 213)***	0.60 (1, 213)
(3) Age oldest child	-.19 (.084)	-.17*				
(3) GRI	.31 (.16)	.28*				
(3) Gender	-.66 (.17)	-.28***				
(3) GRI x Gender	-.10 (.19)	-.07				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting *n* = 218) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was the factor-analyzed version of the WDW-Task Division.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** p <.001

Table 9 The effect of GRI on decision-making influence, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B ($SE\ B$)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Influence**[a]			0.07	0.06	7.76 (2, 210)***	-
(1) Your income	-.02 (.01)	-.16*				
(1) Spouse income	.02 (.01)	.17				
(2) **Influence**[a]			0.12	0.11	7.23 (4, 208)***	6.32 (2, 208)***
(2) Your income	-.01 (.01)	-.10				
(2) Spouse income	.01 (.01)	.07				
(2) GRI	.02 (.01)	.21*				
(2) Gender	.03 (.03)	.12				
(3) **Influence**[a]			0.12	0.10	5.87 (5, 207)***	0.51 (1, 207)
(3) Your income	-.01 (.01)	-.10				
(3) Spouse income	.01 (.01)	.07				
(3) GRI	.02 (.02)	.20				
(3) Gender	.03 (.03)	.12				
(3) GRI x Gender	.002 (.02)	.02				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting $n = 213$) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was log-transformed.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** p $< .001$

Table 10 The effect of GRI on childcare division, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B (SE B)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df$_1$, df$_2$)	F for Δ R^2 (df$_1$, df$_2$)
(1) **Childcare**			0.067	0.06	15.20 (1, 214)***	-
(1) Age	-.23 (.07)	-.26***				
(2) **Childcare**			0.20	0.19	17.46 (3, 212)***	17.42 (2, 212)***
(2) Age	-.26 (.06=)	-.28***				
(2) GRI	.25 (.08)	.28***				
(2) Gender	-.53 (.14)	-.29***				
(3) **Childcare**			0.23	0.21	15.44 (4,211)***	7.85 (1, 211)***
(3) Age	-.25 (.06)	-.28***				
(3) GRI	.06 (.15)	.06				
(3) Gender	-.48 (.14)	-.27***				
(3) GRI x Gender	.30 (.16)	.27				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting n = 216) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

*p < .05. **p < .01. *** p <.001

Table 11 The effect of household task division on marital satisfaction, by gender

(Step) Outcome, Predictors	B ($SE\ B$)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.05	0.04	9.92 (1, 210)***	-
(1) Spouse Education	-.28 (.10)	-.21***				
(2) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.07	0.06	5.50 (3, 208)***	3.19 (2, 208)*
(2) Spouse Education	-.28 (.11)	-.21*				
(2) Task Division[b]	-.22 (.10)	-.17*				
(2) Gender	-.10 (.21)	-.04				
(3) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.09	0.07	5.25 (4, 207)***	4.23 (1, 207)*
(3) Spouse Education	-.28 (.11)	-.21*				
(3) Task Division[b]	.02 (.19)	.01				
(3) Gender	-.05 (.21)	-.02				
(3) Task Div[b] x Gender	-.36 (.26)	-.22				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting $n = 212$) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was transformed using a reflect and square root transformation.

p < .05. **p* < .01. *** p <.001

Table 12 The effect of decision-making influence on marital satisfaction, by gender

(Step) Outcome, Predictors	B (*SE B*)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df$_1$, df$_2$)	F for ΔR^2 (df$_1$, df$_2$)
(1) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.03	0.02	5.34 (1, 203)*	-
(1) Spouse Education	-.21 (.11)	-.16				
(2) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.28	0.26	25.81 (3, 201)***	35.11 (2, 201)***
(2) Spouse Education	-.17 (.10)	-.13				
(2) Influence	-.74 (.10)	-.50***				
(2) Gender	.41 (.21)	.15				
(3) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.28	0.26	19.57 (4, 200)***	0.86 (1, 200)
(3) Spouse Education	-.170 (.10)	-.13				
(3) Influence	-.82 (.23)	-.56***				
(3) Gender	.41 (.22)	.15				
(3) Influence x Gender	.11 (.29)	.06				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting *n*=205) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was transformed using a reflect and square root transformation.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Table 13 The effect of childcare division on marital satisfaction, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B ($SE\ B$)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.02	0.02	5.22 (1, 208)*	-
(1) Spouse Education	-.21 (.11)	-.15				
(2) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.13	0.12	10.15 (3, 206)***	12.34 (2, 206)***
(2) Spouse Education	-.21 (.12)	-.15				
(2) Childcare	-.50(.15)	-.32**				
(2) Gender	-.27 (.27)	-.10				
(3) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.13	0.12	7.98 (4, 205)***	1.38 (1, 205)
(3) Spouse Education	-.21 (.12)	-.15				
(3) Childcare	-.36 (.31)	-.23				
(3) Gender	-.23 (.29)	-.08				
(3) Childcare x Gender	-.17 (.31)	-.10				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting $n = 210$) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was transformed using a reflect and square root transformation.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** p <.001

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Table 14 The combined effect of power outcomes on marital satisfaction

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B (*SE B*)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for Δ R^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.02	0.02	4.48 (1, 211)*	-
(1) Spouse Education	-0.19 (.11)	-0.14				
(2) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.28	0.26	16.44 (5, 207)***	19.06 (4, 207)***
(2) Spouse Education	-0.17 (.11)	-0.13				
(2) Task Division[b]	-0.03 (.09)	-0.02				
(2) Influence	-0.58 (.09)	-0.43***				
(2) Childcare	-0.26 (.11)	-0.20*				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting *n* = 213) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was transformed using a reflect and square root transformation.

[b] This predictor was the factor-analyzed version of the WDW-Task Division.

p < .05. **p* < .01. *** p <.001

Table 15 The effect of household task division on marital satisfaction, and the moderating effect of GRI on this relationship, by gender

(Step) **Outcome,** Predictors	B (SE B)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.03	0.03	7.31 (1, 205)**	-
(1) Spouse Education	-.24 (.11)	-.18*				
(2) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.07	0.05	3.51 (4, 202)**	2.20 (3, 202)
(2) Spouse Education	-.24 (.12)	-.18				
(2) GRI	.07 (.120)	.05				
(2) Task Division [b]	-.24 (.12)	-.17*				
(2) Gender	-.13 (.29)	-.05				
(3) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.11	0.09	4.27 (6, 200)**	5.46 (2, 200)**
(3) Spouse Education	-.22 (.11)	-.16				
(3) GRI	.09 (.12)	.06				
(3) Task Division [b]	-.03 (.21)	-.02				
(3) Gender	-.07	-.03				

Predictor	B (SE)	β	R^2	R^2_{adj}	F	ΔF
	(.27)					
(3) Task Div [b] x GRI	-.25 (.19)	-.15				
(3) Task Div [b] x Gender	-.35 (.29)	-.20				
(4) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.12	0.08	3.31 (8, 198)**	0.48 (2, 198)
(4) Spouse Education	-.23 (.12)	-.18				
(4) GRI	.14 (.19)	.11				
(4) Task Division [b]	-.04 (.24)	-.04				
(4) Gender	-.08 (.29)	-.03				
(4) Task Div [b] x GRI	-.27 (.37)	-.17				
(4) Task Div [b] x Gender	-.33 (.33)	-.18				
(4) Task Div [b] x GRI x Gender	.01 (.34)	.01				
(4) GRI x Gender	-.09 (.27)	-.06				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting n = 207) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was transformed using a reflect and square root transformation.

[b] This predictor was the factor-analyzed version of the WDW-Task Division.

*p < .05. **p < .01. *** p <.001

Table 16 The effect of decision-making influence on marital satisfaction, and the moderating effect of GRI on this relationship, by gender

(Step) Outcome, Predictors	B ($SE\ B$)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.02	0.02	4.67 (1, 193)*	-
(1) Spouse Education	-.19 (.19)	-.15				
(2) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.29	0.27	19.36 (4, 190)***	23.68 (3, 190)***
(2) Spouse Education	-.18 (.10)	-.14				
(2) GRI	.18 (.11)	.09				
(2) Influence	-.82 (.13)	-.52***				
(2) Gender	.45 (.22)	.17*				
(3) **Marital Satisf.**[a]			0.31	0.29	14.44 (6, 188)***	3.48 (2, 188)*
(3) Spouse Education	-.20 (.11)	-.16				
(3) GRI	.17 (.12)	.13				
(3) Influence	-.77 (.30)	-.49*				
(3) Gender	.47 (.22)	.18*				
(3) Influence x GRI	-.26 (.14)	-.15				
(3) Influence x Gender	-.11 (.37)	-.06				

	B (SE)	β	R^2	Adj. R^2	F	ΔF
(4) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.33	0.30	11.76 (8, 186)***	2.79 (2, 186)
(4) Spouse Education	-.20 (.11)	-.16				
(4) GRI	.09 (.19)	.07				
(4) Influence	-.86 (.35)	-.54*				
(4) Gender	.50 (.23)	.19*				
(4) Influence x GRI	-.68 (.47)	-.39				
(4) Influence x Gender	-.02 (.40)	-.01				
(4) Influence x GRI x Gender	.56 (.54)	.28				
(4) GRI x Gender	.04 (.21)	.02				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting n = 195) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was transformed using a reflect and square root transformation.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Table 17 The effect of childcare division on marital satisfaction, and the moderating effect of GRI on this relationship, by gender

(Step) Outcome, Predictors	B ($SE\ B$)	β	R^2	Adj R^2	F for model (df_1, df_2)	F for ΔR^2 (df_1, df_2)
(1) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.03	0.02	5.22 (1, 200)*	-
(1) Spouse Education	-.21 (.12)	-.15				
(2) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.12	0.10	6.66 (4, 197)***	6.99 (3, 197)***
(2) Spouse Education	-.20(.13)	-.14				
(2) GRI	.09 (.15)	.06				
(2) Childcare	-.45 (.15)	-.30**				
(2) Gender	-.31 (.31)	-.11				
(3) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.15	0.13	5.95 (6, 195)***	4.01 (2, 195)*
(3) Spouse Education	-.20 (.13)	-.15				
(3) GRI	.14 (.15)	.10				
(3) Childcare	-.25 (.27)	-.17				
(3) Gender	-.20 (.32)	-.07				
(3) Childcare x GRI	-.22 (.16)	-.14				
(3) Childcare x Gender	-.26 (.32)	-.14				

	B (SE)	β	R^2	ΔR^2	F	ΔF
(4) Marital Satisf.[a]			0.16	0.13	4.70 (8, 193)***	0.97 (2, 193)
(4) Spouse Education	-.20 (.130)	-.15				
(4) GRI	.14 (.21)	.10				
(4) Childcare	-.28 (.27)	-.19				
(4) Gender	-.22 (.31)	-.08				
(4) Childcare x GRI	-.43 (.23)	-.25				
(4) Childcare x Gender	-.25 (.31)	-.14				
(4) Childcare x GRI x Gender	.31 (.29)	.14				
(4) GRI x Gender	.01 (.28)	.01				

Note: Outliers were removed (resulting $n = 202$) and results pooled across the five imputed datasets.

[a] The outcome variable was transformed using a reflect and square root transformation.

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. *** p $< .001$

Appendix B: Recruitment letters

Recruitment Letter to Potential Distributors of Study to American Muslims

Salamalaikum [Name/Title],

I write to ask for your help in collecting data for my dissertation research.

Please consider distributing my study to [members of your listserv/ your personal or professional contacts who are Muslims living in North America].

My study seeks information about the characteristics of married North American Muslims; how they deal with family tasks and responsibilities; how other family members help them with these tasks and responsibilities; and how satisfied they are with their marriages. This study is a follow-up to my previous research, the All Dulles Area Muslim Society Marital Health Survey. This topic is a response to the community's concern about increasing Muslim divorce rates. I hope that my study will help us improve the happiness of married Muslims in America. More information about my study is included below.

You are under no obligation to complete this study yourself or to send it to anybody. If you are interested in distributing the study, please reply to me, and I will send you an email that you can forward to [your listserv/your contacts]. That email will contain the link to the study. This email contains information only for you.

I hope you are well; thank you for your interest in my work!

Aliya Razvi Chapman, M.A.
Doctoral Student in Clinical Psychology
George Mason University

Supervisor: Lauren Cattaneo, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Psychology Department
George Mason University

Recruitment Letter to American Muslim Participants

Salamalaikum,

My name is Aliya Razvi Chapman, and I am a student of clinical psychology at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. *[if relevant: You may remember that you participated in my 2009 study on marital health and gave me permission to contact you again for further research. I thank you for your time and attention to my research, and ---].* I invite you to participate in my research study on the marriages of North American Muslims.

My study seeks information about the characteristics of married North American Muslims; how they deal with daily family tasks and responsibilities; how other family members help them with these tasks and responsibilities; and how satisfied they are with their marriages. This study is a follow-up to my previous research, the All Dulles Area Muslim Society Marital Health Survey.

The goal of my research is to increase knowledge about North American Muslim families so that professionals (such as counselors and imams) may improve the quality of the services that they provide to American Muslim families.

I understand how important your time is, and so I offer you the opportunity to win one of **four $50 gift certificates to Amazon.com** to thank you for participating. You will be able to enter a drawing to win one of the gift certificates after completing the survey.

The survey should take you 10-20 minutes to complete. Please note that, in order to participate, you must be 1) Muslim, 2) married, and 3) currently living in America or Canada. Only one person per married couple should participate. If you choose to participate, your responses will be kept **completely private**. Your responses, including any identifying information, **will not be shared with anybody**. My research is not affiliated with any organization or group. Also, there is no requirement to participate.

If you are interested in participating, please click this link to access the study:
http://mres.gmu.edu/limesurvey/index.php?sid=29451&lang=en

Thank you again.

Aliya Razvi Chapman, M.A.
Doctoral Candidate in Clinical Psychology
George Mason University

Supervisor: Lauren Cattaneo, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Psychology Department
George Mason University

Appendix C: Informed Consent

Marriage in the North American Muslim Community

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH PROCEDURES
This research is being conducted to understand how marriages function in the North American Muslim community. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to describe yourself (e.g., your education, income level, and religiosity), how you and your partner divide family tasks and responsibilities; how other family members help you and your partner with these tasks and responsibilities; and how satisfied you are with your marriage. Participation should take you up to 20 minutes. Only one spouse per married couple should complete this study.

RISKS
There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this research.

BENEFITS
There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to help increase knowledge about Muslim families in North America. This knowledge will assist professionals in providing high-quality services to North American Muslims who seek help for family issues.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The data in this study will be confidential. Your name will not be placed on survey data. Nobody will be informed about who does or does not participate in the study. At the end of the survey, you will be asked to give your email address if you wish to enter a drawing for a gift certificate to thank you for your participation. If you agree to do this, your email address will be available to the researcher only. Your email address will be separated from your survey responses so that your responses cannot be linked to your identity. Your information will be kept in a secure location, and will not be sold or shared at any time. Your email address will be destroyed when the study is complete and a drawing has been conducted for gift certificates. While it is understood that no computer transmission can be perfectly secure, reasonable efforts will be made to protect the confidentiality of your transmission.

PARTICIPATION
In order to participate, you must be at least 18 years old, currently married, and identify as a Muslim. Only one person per married couple should complete this study. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. If you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study, there is no

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penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. There are no costs to you or any other party.

In order to thank you for your participation, you will be invited to enter your email address at the end of the survey for a chance to win one of four (4) $50 gift certificates to Amazon.com. Your email address will be kept secure as described above, and will not be sold or distributed in any way. Winners will be randomly drawn by the researcher once data collection is complete. You will be notified via email if you have won a gift certificate, which will be emailed at the address provided. The information that you provide for this drawing will be destroyed once the gifts have been mailed. The list of winners will not be published or posted in any way.

CONTACT

This research is being conducted by Aliya Razvi Chapman at George Mason University. She may be reached at arazvi@masonlive.gmu.edu for questions or to report a research-related problem. The faculty advisor for this project is Dr. Lauren Cattaneo. She may be reached at 703-993-4728. You may also contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research. You may print this page for your records.

CONSENT

□ I have read this form and agree to participate in this study

□ I do not wish to participate in this study

Version date: 01/08/2012

Appendix D: Measures

Demographics

What is your gender?
☐ Male
☐ Female

What is your age? _____

In which city and state do you live? _____

What is your ethnicity? (Please check all that apply.)

☐ White (Non-Hispanic, Non-Latino/a)

☐ Hispanic or Latino/a

☐ Asian (*please indicate which country in Asia):*

  _____

☐ Pacific Islander

☐ African-American or Black

☐ American-Indian or Alaska Native

☐ Other (*please state which ethnicity)*:

  _____

How long (in years) have you resided in North America? Please choose *only one* of the following:
☐ Less than one year
☐ 1 - 4 years
☐ 5 - 9 years
☐ 10 - 14 years
☐ 15 - 19 years
☐ 20 years or more
☐ My whole life

How many times were you married *before* your current marriage? (Please do not count your current marriage)
☐ None – this is my first marriage
☐ Once
☐ Twice
☐ Three or more times

If previous marriage How did your previous marriage(s) end? Please check all that apply:
☐ Divorce
☐ Legal Separation
☐ Annulment
☐ Death

How many years have you been married to your current spouse? _____

Do any children under age 18 currently live in your house under your and/or your spouse's care?
☐ Yes
☐ No

If Yes Please indicate the age of the *oldest* child who lives in your house with you now (Please include only children who are under your care or your spouse's care).
☐ Newborn up to one year old
☐ One year old up to two years old
☐ Two years old up to four years old
☐ Four years old up to nine years old
☐ Nine years old up to twelve years old
☐ Twelve years old up to nineteen years old

Do your parents or your spouse's parents live in your house with you now? Please check all that apply:
☐ My mother lives with us.
☐ My father lives with us.
☐ My spouse's mother lives with us.
☐ My spouse's father lives with us.
☐ None of our parents live with us.

If no parents in house How often do you see your parent(s) or your spouse's parent(s)?
☐ Several times a week
☐ Once a week

☐ Two or three times a month
☐ Once a month
☐ Less than once a month

If anybody else lives in your house with you now, please list them here. Do not include yourself, your spouse, your children, your parents, or your spouse's parents: _____

What is your highest education level? Please choose *only one* of the following:
☐ Some high school
☐ Completed high school
☐ Some college (undergraduate)
☐ Completed college (undergraduate)
☐ Some graduate education
☐ Completed graduate degree

What is your spouse's highest education level? Please choose *only one* of the following:
☐ Some high school
☐ Completed high school
☐ Some college (undergraduate)
☐ Completed college (undergraduate)
☐ Some graduate education
☐ Completed graduate degree

Do you currently earn an income? Please choose *only one* of the following:
☐ Yes
☐ No

       If yes What is your average annual income? (Please do not count any income earned by anybody except you) Please choose *only one* of the following:
☐ Under $15,000
☐ $15,000 - $24,999
☐ $25,000 - $39,999
☐ $40,000 - $54,999
☐ $55,000 - $69,999
☐ $70,000 - $84,999
☐ $85,000 - $99,000
☐ $100,000 or above

Does your spouse currently earn an income? Please choose *only one* of the following:
☐ Yes
☐ No

If yes What is your spouse's average annual income? (Please do not count any income earned by anybody except your spouse) Please choose *only one* of the following:

☐ Under $15,000
☐ $15,000 - $24,999
☐ $25,000 - $39,999
☐ $40,000 - $54,999
☐ $55,000 - $69,999
☐ $70,000 - $84,999
☐ $85,000 - $99,000
☐ $100,000 or above

Power bases

Religiosity

I often read books and magazines about my faith.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
I make financial contributions to my religious organization.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
I spend time trying to grow in understanding of my faith.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
I enjoy spending time with others of my religious affiliation.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
Religious beliefs influence all my dealings in life.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and reflection.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
I enjoy working in the activities of my religious organization.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me
I keep well informed about my local religious group and have some influence in its decisions.	Not at all true of me	Somewhat true of me	Moderately true of me	Mostly true of me	Totally true of me

Please circle the answer that best indicates your reaction to each the following statements.

How often do you pray?	Never	A few times a year	Several times a month	Several times a week	Most of the times the 5 daily prayers	Five times a day or more
How often do you fast?	Never	Few times in life	Few days of the month of Ramadan each year	Half to all the month of Ramadan each year	The whole month of Ramadan each year	Other religious days or sunnah fasts in addition to Ramadan
How often do you go to the mosque?	Never	A few times in my life	A few times a year	A few times a month	About once or twice a week	Once a day or more
Except in prayers, how often do you read or listen to the Holy Qura'n?	Never	A few times in my life	A few times a year	A few times a month	About once or twice a week	Once a day or more
Except in prayers, how often do you engage in d'iker or tasbih?	Never	A few times in my life	A few times a year	A few times a month	About once or twice a week	Once a day or more

Gender Role Ideology

The following are statements about men and women. Read each statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with it. We are not interested in what society says, and there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your *personal opinions.*

Each statement has five response options. For each statement, choose the one option that best describes your opinion. Be sure to answer every statement.

A wife can be just as capable as a husband when it comes to fixing simple plumbing and electrical problems.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

Either the husband, the wife, or both can decide where the family will live.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
When a couple gets divorced, it is generally the husband's fault.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Husbands and wives should be equally responsible for the care of their aging parents.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The husband should represent the family in community affairs.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Things work out best in a marriage if a husband stays away from housekeeping tasks.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Both the husband's and wife's earnings should be controlled by the husband.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
If birthday cards and gifts are to be sent on time, then the wife must take responsibility for them.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
When both husband and wife work outside the home, housework should be equally shared.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Husbands are better able to manage the family's social calendar.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Husbands are able to be more independent than their wives.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
A marriage will be more successful if the husband's needs are considered first.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Most wives are able to handle the family finances as well as their husbands.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
A husband has to be more willing than a wife to adapt in a marriage.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
If a woman is as smart as her husband, the marriage will not work.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
A wife's career should be of equal importance to her husband's.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
A wife is just as qualified as a husband to decide what car to buy.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Wives are better able than husbands to send thank you notes for gifts.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Only the wife is qualified to decide how much a family must spend on food and clothing.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
If one wants to be sure that a child gets shots and vaccinations, the responsibility should be given to the	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

mother, not the father.

Statement					
A husband and wife should spend equal time raising the children	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Fathers should be more concerned than mothers about whom their teenager is *spending time with.*	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
It should be the responsibility of both parents to write to their child when the child is away from home (e.g., at camp or college).	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Parent-teacher conferences should be attended by both the father and the mother.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Preparing children for bed should be the joint responsibility of the mother and father.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Keeping track of a child's activities should be mostly the mother's task.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The mother is more qualified than the father to choose *summer activities* for the children.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Mothers, rather than fathers, should be responsible for deciding what television programs a child may watch.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Mothers are better able than fathers to buy a child's school clothing.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Mothers and fathers should share the responsibility of taking children to the doctor or dentist.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Children would have fewer problems if fathers, rather than mothers, were responsible for child-rearing.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Fathers are better able than mothers to give their children a proper *religious* education	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The father, rather than the mother, should give teenage children permission to use the family car.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Fathers are better able than mothers to decide the amount of a child's allowance.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The mother should be in charge of getting children to after-school	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

activities.

Fathers and mothers should have an equal obligation to spend time playing with their children.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Fathers are not able to care for their sick children as mothers are.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Fathers should be as responsible as mothers to hire a babysitter when the couple goes out for the evening.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

Islam prescribes specific family roles and/or tasks for men and women.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
An important part of being a Muslim is taking on certain family roles and/or tasks that are specific to my gender.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
An important part of being a Muslim is not doing the family roles/tasks meant for the other gender.	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree

Power Outcomes

All couples develop ways of dividing family household tasks, family decision-making, and the caring and rearing of children if they are parents. The following pages ask you to describe how these areas are divided in your family. Although other people may help you in these areas, for now please consider only the portion of each task or decision that is completed by you and your spouse

Task division

Please show how you and your partner divide the family tasks listed here, using the numbers on the scale below. Although other people may help you with these tasks, for now please consider only the portion of each task that is completed by you and your spouse

[*Participants respond to items A through M on the following Likert scale:*]

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Neither of us do this	She does it all				We both do this about equally				He does it all

A. Planning and preparing meals
B. Cleaning up after meals
C. Repairs around the home
D. House cleaning
E. Taking out the garbage
F. Buying groceries, household needs
G. Paying bills
H. Laundry: washing, folding, ironing
I. Writing letters/making calls to family and friends
J. Looking after the car
K. Providing income for our family
L. Caring for plants, garden, yard
M. Working outside family

Decision-making

Please show how much influence you and your partner have in the family decisions listed here, using the scale below. Although other people may help you with these decisions, for now please consider only the portion of each decision that is made by you and your spouse.

[*Participants respond to items A through L on the following Likert scale:*]

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Neither of us do this	She does it all				We both do this about equally				He does it all

A. How we spend time at home
B. How we spend time out of the house
C. Deciding which friends and family to see, and when
D. Deciding about vacations: when, where, expenses
E. Deciding about major expenses: house, car, furniture
F. Deciding about financial planning: insurance, loans, taxes, plans for saving, etc.
G. Deciding when and how much time both partners should work outside the family
H. Initiating lovemaking
I. Determining the frequency of lovemaking
J. Deciding about religious practices in our family
K. Deciding about involvement in community activities
L. Deciding how people should behave toward one another in our family

M. In your relationship with your partner, who would you say has the influence in decision-making?

Woman has more   Man has more   We have about equal influence

Child-Care

Please show how you and your partner divide the tasks related to caring for your <u>first child</u>, using the numbers on the scale below. Although other people may help you with these tasks, for now please consider only the portion of each task that is completed by you and your spouse. [*For childless/pregnant participants:* If you do not have a child, please tell us how you think it <u>would</u> be if you <u>did</u> have a child]

[*Participants respond to the list that corresponds to the age of their oldest child, using the following Likert scale:*]

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Neither of us do this	She does it all				We both do this about equally				He does it all

Newborn up to 1 year	1 year up to 2 years	2 years up to 4 years	4 years up to 9 years	9 years up to 12 years	12 years up to 19 years
A. Deciding about the baby's feeding schedule	A. Deciding about our child's meals	A. Deciding what our child should or should not eat	A. Reading to our child	A. Reading to our child	A. Talking to our teenager about life issues, books, politics, etc
B. Feeding the baby	B. Mealtimes with our child	B. Preparing meals for our child	B. Preparing meals for our child	B. Preparing meals for our child	B. Preparing meals for our teenager
C. Changing the baby's diapers; dressing the baby	C. Changing our child's diapers; dressing our child	C. Changing our child's diapers; dressing our child	C. Choosing our child's clothes	C. Dressing our child	C. Deciding on clothes purchases for our teen
D. Bathing the baby	D. Bath time with our child	D. Cleaning or bathing our child	D. Cleaning or bathing our child	D. Cleaning or bathing our child	D. Supervising our teen's hygiene or cleanliness
E. Deciding whether to respond to the baby's cries	E. Deciding whether to respond to our child's cries	E. Deciding whether or how to respond to child's crying	E. Deciding whether or how to respond to child's crying	E. Deciding whether or how to respond to child's crying	E. Deciding whether/how to respond to our teen's distress

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Newborn up to 1 year	1 year up to 2 years	2 years up to 4 years	4 years up to 9 years	9 years up to 12 years	12 years up to 19 years
F. Responding to the baby's crying in the middle of the night	F. Responding to our child's crying in the middle of the night	F. Getting up at night with our child	F. Getting up at night with our child	F. Getting up at night with our child	F. Monitoring our teen's bedtime
G. Taking the baby out: walking, driving, visiting, etc.	G. Taking our child out: walking, driving, visiting	G. Taking our child out: drives, parks, walks, visits, playgrounds	G. Taking our child out: drives, parks, walks, visits, playgrounds	G. Taking our child out: drives, parks, walks, visits, playgrounds	G. Driving our teen to activities, lessons, etc.
H. Choosing toys for the baby	H. Choosing toys for our child	H. Choosing toys for our child	H. Choosing toys for our child	H. Choosing toys for our child	H. Choosing teen's activities, hobbies
I. Playing with the baby	I. Playtime with our child	I. Playing with our child; reading to our child	I. Playing with our child	I. Playing with our child	I. Doing recreational things with our teen: hikes, sports, movies, etc.
J. Doing the baby's laundry	J. Doing our child's laundry	J. Doing our child's laundry	J. Doing our child's laundry	J. Doing our child's laundry	J. Doing our teen's laundry
K. Arranging for baby sitters or child care	K. Arranging for baby sitters or child care	K. Arranging for baby sitters or child care	K. Arranging for babysitters or childcare	K. Arranging for babysitters or childcare	K. Discussing/ reinforcing when teen should be back at home
L. Dealing with the doctor regarding the baby's health	L. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	L. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	L. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	L. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	L. Dealing with teen's medical or dental needs
	M.	M. Consoling our child	M. Getting our child to and from school	M. Getting our child to and from school	M. Getting our teen to and from school
		N. Tending to our child in public: restaurants, visiting, shopping, playgrounds	N. Tending to our child in public: restaurants, visiting, shopping, playgrounds	N. Tending to our child in public: restaurants, visiting, shopping, playgrounds	N. Helping when teen has problems with siblings, friends, teachers
		O. Setting limits for our child	O. Setting limits for our child	O. Setting limits for our child	O. Setting limits for our teenager

Newborn up to 1 year	1 year up to 2 years	2 years up to 4 years	4 years up to 9 years	9 years up to 12 years	12 years up to 19 years
		P. Disciplining our child	P. Disciplining our child	P. Disciplining our child	P. Disciplining our teenager
		Q. Teaching our child	Q. Teaching our child	Q. Teaching our child, including homework help	Q. Helping/consulting about homework
		R. Picking up after our child	R. Picking up after our child	R. Picking up after our child	R. Picking up after our teenager
		S. Arranging our child's visits, play with friends	S. Arranging our child's visits, play with friends	S. Arranging our child's visits, play with friends	S. Monitoring who teen spends time with
		T. Helping when our child has a problem with playmates/siblings	T. Helping when our child has a problem with playmates/siblings	T. Helping when our child has a problem with playmates/siblings	

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Contribution of Parents/In-Law

Do your parents or your spouse's parents contribute to any of the family, decision-making, or childcare tasks that were listed above?
☐ Yes
☐ No

If yes Which of your parents or your spouse's parents contribute? Please check all that apply
☐ My mother
☐ My father
☐ My spouse's mother
☐ My spouse's father

If yes Here are the lists of tasks again. For each task to which your parents or your spouse's parents contribute, please check the option that best describes how much they contribute. If they do not contribute to the particular task, skip that item.

Task Division

[*Participants respond to items A through M on the following Likert scale:*]

Does not contribute	Contributes very little	Contributes somewhat	Contributes often	Contributes very often	Does it all
0	1	2	3	4	5

A. Planning and preparing meals
B. Cleaning up after meals
C. Repairs around the home
D. House cleaning
E. Taking out the garbage
F. Buying groceries, household needs
G. Paying bills
H. Laundry: washing, folding, ironing
I. Writing letters/making calls to family and friends
J. Looking after the car
K. Providing income for our family
L. Caring for plants, garden, yard
M. Working outside family

Decision-Making

[*Participants respond to items A through L on the following Likert scale:*]

Does not contribute	Contributes very little	Contributes somewhat	Contributes often	Contributes very often	Does it all
0	1	2	3	4	5

A. How we spend time at home
B. How we spend time out of the house
C. Deciding which friends and family to see, and when
D. Deciding about vacations: when, where, expenses
E. Deciding about major expenses: house, car, furniture
F. Deciding about financial planning: insurance, loans, taxes, plans for saving, etc.
G. Deciding when and how much time both partners should work outside the family
J. Deciding about religious practices in our family
K. Deciding about involvement in community activities
L. Deciding how people should behave toward one another in our family

Childcare

[Participants respond to the list that corresponds to the age of their oldest child, using the following Likert scale. If no child, they respond to the Newborn scale and, as before, are asked to consider the list as if they had a child]

Does not contribute	Contributes very little	Contributes somewhat	Contributes often	Contributes very often	Does it all
0	1	2	3	4	5

Newborn up to 1 year	1 year up to 2 years	2 years up to 4 years	4 years up to 9 years	9 years up to 12 years	12 years up to 19 years
M. Deciding about the baby's feeding schedule	M. Deciding about our child's meals	O. Deciding what our child should or should not eat	A. Reading to our child	A. Reading to our child	A. Talking to our teenager about life issues, books, politics, etc
N. Feeding the baby	N. Mealtimes with our child	P. Preparing meals for our child	B. Preparing meals for our child	B. Preparing meals for our child	B. Preparing meals for our teenager
O. Changing the baby's diapers; dressing the baby	O. Changing our child's diapers; dressing our child	Q. Changing our child's diapers; dressing our child	C. Choosing our child's clothes	C. Dressing our child	C. Deciding on clothes purchases for our teen
P. Bathing the baby	P. Bath time with our child	R. Cleaning or bathing our child	D. Cleaning or bathing our child	D. Cleaning or bathing our child	D. Supervising our teen's hygiene or cleanliness
Q. Deciding whether to respond to the baby's cries	Q. Deciding whether to respond to our child's cries	S. Deciding whether or how to respond to child's crying	E. Deciding whether or how to respond to child's crying	E. Deciding whether or how to respond to child's crying	E. Deciding whether/how to respond to our teen's distress
R. Responding to the baby's crying in the middle of the night	R. Responding to our child's crying in the middle of the night	T. Getting up at night with our child	F. Getting up at night with our child	F. Getting up at night with our child	F. Monitoring our teen's bedtime

S. Taking the baby out: walking, driving, visiting, etc.	S. Taking our child out: walking, driving, visiting	U. Taking our child out: drives, parks, walks, visits, playgrounds	G. Taking our child out: drives, parks, walks, visits, playgrounds	G. Taking our child out: drives, parks, walks, visits, playgrounds	G. Driving our teen to activities, lessons, etc.
T. Choosing toys for the baby	T. Choosing toys for our child	V. Choosing toys for our child	H. Choosing toys for our child	H. Choosing toys for our child	H. Choosing teen's activities, hobbies
U. Playing with the baby	U. Playtime with our child	W. Playing with our child; reading to our child	I. Playing with our child	I. Playing with our child	I. Doing recreational things with our teen: hikes, sports, movies, etc.
V. Doing the baby's laundry	V. Doing our child's laundry	X. Doing our child's laundry	J. Doing our child's laundry	J. Doing our child's laundry	J. Doing our teen's laundry
W. Arranging for baby sitters or child care	W. Arranging for baby sitters or child care	Y. Arranging for baby sitters or child care	K. Arranging for babysitters or childcare	K. Arranging for babysitters or childcare	K. Discussing/reinforcing when teen should be back at home
X. Dealing with the doctor regarding the baby's health	X. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	Z. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	L. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	L. Dealing with the doctor regarding our child's health	L. Dealing with teen's medical or dental needs
		AA. Consoling our child	M. Getting our child to and from school	M. Getting our child to and from school	M. Getting our teen to and from school
		BB. Tending to our child in public: restaurants, visiting, shopping, playgrounds	N. Tending to our child in public: restaurants, visiting, shopping, playgrounds	N. Tending to our child in public: restaurants, visiting, shopping, playgrounds	N. Helping when teen has problems with siblings, friends, teachers
		O. Setting limits for our child	O. Setting limits for our child	O. Setting limits for our child	O. Setting limits for our teenager
		P. Disciplining our child	P. Disciplining our child	P. Disciplining our child	P. Disciplining our teenager
		Q. Teaching our child	Q. Teaching our child	Q. Teaching our child, including homework help	Q. Helping/consulting about homework

	R. Picking up after our child	R. Picking up after our child	R. Picking up after our child	R. Picking up after our teenager
	S. Arranging our child's visits, play with friends	S. Arranging our child's visits, play with friends	S. Arranging our child's visits, play with friends	S. Monitoring who teen spends time with
	T. Helping when our child has a problem with playmates/siblings	T. Helping when our child has a problem with playmates/siblings	T. Helping when our child has a problem with playmates/siblings	

Marital Health Outcome

1.   Please indicate the degree of happiness, all things considered, of your relationship.

Extremely Unhappy	Fairly Unhappy	A Little Unhappy	Happy	Very Happy	Extremely Happy	Perfect
0	1	2	3	4	5	6

2.   In general, how often do you think that things between you and your partner are going well?

All the time	Most of the time	More often than not	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
5	4	3	2	1	0

3.   Our relationship is strong.

Not at all True	A little True	Somewhat True	Mostly True	Almost Completely True	Completely True
0	1	2	3	4	5

4.   My relationship with my partner makes me happy.

All the time	Most of the time	More often than not	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
5	4	3	2	1	0

5.   I have a warm and comfortable relationship with my partner.

All the time	Most of the time	More often than not	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
5	4	3	2	1	0

6.   I really feel like part of a team with my partner.

All the time	Most of the time	More often than not	Occasionally	Rarely	Never
5	4	3	2	1	0

7.   How rewarding is your relationship with your partner?

Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Mostly	Almost Completely	Completely
0	1	2	3	4	5

8.   How well does your partner meet your needs?

Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Mostly	Almost Completely	Completely
0	1	2	3	4	5

9.   To what extent has your relationship met your original expectations?

Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Mostly	Almost Completely	Completely
0	1	2	3	4	5

10.   In general, how satisfied are you with your relationship?

Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Mostly	Almost Completely	Completely
0	1	2	3	4	5

For each of the following items, select the answer that best describes *how you feel about your relationship.* Base your responses on your first impressions and immediate feelings about the item.

11.	INTERESTING	5	4	3	2	1	0	BORING
12.	BAD	0	1	2	3	4	5	GOOD
13.	FULL	5	4	3	2	1	0	EMPTY
14.	STURDY	5	4	3	2	1	0	FRAGILE
15.	DISCOURAGING	0	1	2	3	4	5	HOPEFUL
16.	ENJOYABLE	5	4	3	2	1	0	MISERABLE

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Biography

Aliya Razvi Chapman graduated from Fairfax High School, Fairfax, Virginia, in 2002. She received her Bachelor of Arts from George Mason University in 2006, and her Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology from the same institution in 2009. She expects to receive her Doctorate of Philosophy in Psychology from George Mason University in 2014. She currently works as a Staff Counselor at Virginia Tech's Thomas E. Cook Counseling Center.