Jones, GarettShidiq, Akhmad Rizal2017-01-292017-01-292016https://hdl.handle.net/1920/10544In the first chapter, I show evidence of credit-market imperfection in Indonesia: investment spending is sensitive to firm cash flow. These imperfections are stronger for firms that are not politically connected to former president Suharto. This result generally holds for a variety of controls. This result also underscores the importance of political connections in providing firms with preferential access to the external financing commonly found in developing economies. The removal of Suharto from power in 1998 did not substantially reduce the value of a Suharto connection, and may have strengthened the value of such a connection. This highlights the possible durability of political connections in the credit market.
148 pagesenCopyright 2016 Akhmad Rizal ShidiqEconomicsBusiness groupFirmsIndonesiaPolitical connectionsDissertation