Axtell, Robert L.Koehler, Matthew2014-08-282014-08-282013-08https://hdl.handle.net/1920/8770Many have written about how the Common Law should evolve. The few attempts to demonstrate this empirically, however, have not found evidence that this evolution takes place. This study uses a representation of the Article III United States Federal Courts and an agent-based model to demonstrate that a judicial system may evolve while simultaneously emitting signals to the contrary by evolving via a punctuated equilibrium dynamic. The study then proceeds to demonstrate that agent-based modeling is a viable method for understanding the performance of judicial institutions. After reviewing concepts of jurisprudence and computational social science, the development of the model is discussed followed by a presentation of the results of the aforementioned experiments.160 pagesenCopyright 2013 Matthew KoehlerLawComputer sciencePolitical ScienceAgent-Based ModelingComputational Social ScienceJurisprudenceLegal InstitutionsDissertation