Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution
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This collection contains ETD documents from the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution
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Browsing Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution by Subject "Afghanistan"
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Item Afghanistan Fatigue: Diasporic Narrations of Conflict Memory and Political MobilizationAyazi, Mena; Ayazi, Mena; Cobb, SaraWith Afghanistan re-gaining headlines in the media as the United States Government and Taliban insurgency hammer out a peace deal, a spike in domestic immigrant politics, and a rise in global recognition of the power of transnational diaspora politics, there lies a timely significance in understanding the state of the Afghan diaspora. This thesis unpacks the political agency of the Afghan-American community by offering insights into the relationship between the narrations of conflict memory and diasporic understandings of political agency, particularly in the context of the Afghan-American diaspora. In the process of researching and writing this thesis, the author conducted individual life story interviews and participant observation. This thesis is slated to be a reference and resource for diaspora research and networks.Item Civil-Military Cooperation: When The Military Drops Rifles and Picks Up Wrenches(2013-08-16) Jurkovic, Edi; Jurkovic, Edi; Simmons, Solon J.This pilot study explores civilian and military understanding of the procedures, role, and necessity of civil-military cooperation. It identifies obstacles to cooperation and divergent views between civilian humanitarian assistance organizations and the military on whether and how to overcome those obstacles. The study is designed to provide a new contribution to academic literature, which thus far has focused little on civil-military cooperation despite its record of success in peacebuilding and peacekeeping in post-conflict areas.Item How Might a Human Security Framework Increase the Probability of Resolving the Conflict in Afghanistan?(2015-02-02) Yaqub, Homayun; Yaqub, Homayun; Rothbart, DanielSince the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Afghanistan has seen an unprecedented level of intervention and assistance from the international community. This diverse set of actors that included foreign states, international organizations, and thousands of nongovernmental organizations brought with them often competing and conflicting agendas that sought to concurrently address nation building, counterterrorism, development and reconstruction issues. At the center of such activities were the Afghan people, who had already endured over 30 years of protracted conflict that began first with the invasion of the Soviet Union, a subsequent civil war, and control by the Taliban regime. An already war and conflict weary Afghanistan was now the site of an array of external objectives and initiatives that did not necessarily achieve their desired outcomes. Despite these significant resource investments, Afghanistan remains in conflict and its people still face acts of violence from an active insurgency. As individuals, and in this case the people of Afghanistan are at the center of concern, this thesis examines human security theory as a potential framework for resolving the conflict in Afghanistan. It is an analysis of this concept first popularized by the United Nations in 1994, and using Afghanistan as a case study, will seek to develop a conceptual framework that assesses actions in the country since 9/11 and determine their effectiveness if they could be modified under a more holistic human security strategy.Item The Critical Gap Between Local Versus International Perspectives on Security and Justice and Its Implications for the U.S.-Led International Intervention in Afghanistan, 2001-2006: Between State-Building and the Global War on Terrorism(2012-09-13) Nojumi, Neamatollah; Nojumi, Neamatollah; Avruch, KevinThis research examines the differences between the perceptions of the U.S.-led international intervention actors and the Afghan population, particularly in the area of security and justice over the period between 2001 and 2006. Understanding these perceptions was instructive in assessing their possible implications for U.S. engagement, and in evaluating the relationship of the U.S. engagement to the attitudes of the Afghan population. This study concluded, among other factors, that the critical gap between international and local perspectives of security and justice suggest that the failed and failing state notions as argued in the literature and enshrined in key U.S. national security documents proved too narrow to guide the intervention in Afghanistan. Lessons from Afghan history suggest that Afghan monarchs‘ and presidents‘ visions of centralization were more a romantic understanding of a modern nation-state. Recent historical accounts, as briefly stated in this study, suggest that Afghan leaders and their international backers often failed to understand the population, map their resources, and invest in the Afghan human capital. This tendency led the Afghan state elite to look outward to manipulate the environment that was available within the Great Game played between the Soviets and the U.S. during the Cold War as well as during the first six years of the post-Taliban era. The difference of perspectives on security and justice between international forces and the local populace during the first six years, as was assessed in this study, suggests that the inclusion of local narratives of host nations‘ cultures and politics may be a critical requirement for any future U.S.-led international intervention. This study concludes that relying on a narrow and highly generalized notion of failed and failing states was intellectually too thin of a basis upon which to wage an international intervention. In this direction, military interventions without a clear political strategy and adequate civilian resources will likely not win the war. A reasonable balance between the stated interests of the intervention actors and the basic needs of the locals must be attained, with the following points considered: (a) The U.S.-led counterterrorism objectives, without being transformed toward accommodating the basic needs of the local populations, failed to attain its objectives during the first six years of intervention; (b) A state centralization program in the area of security and justice is a failed model of polity and produces cultural violence, insecurity, and injustice; and (c) insurgency, corruption, and ethnic violence can be viewed as symptomatic outcomes of structural flaws that can be reinforced by cultural violence.