Modeling Behavior in Public Goods Experiments

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dc.contributor.advisorLevy, David M
dc.contributor.authorBennett, Paul Henry Malcolm
dc.creatorBennett, Paul Henry Malcolm
dc.date.accessioned2016-09-28T10:20:48Z
dc.date.available2016-09-28T10:20:48Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation analyzes the behavior of participants in the class of economics experiments known as public goods games. It is well established that most participants in public goods games do not play the Nash equilibrium of zero contributed to the public good initially. By initially I mean either the first round of a repeated game or the only round in a one-shot game. The goal of this dissertation is to explain the observed behavior and to develop models that predict it.
dc.format.extent87 pages
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1920/10406
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsCopyright 2016 Paul Henry Malcolm Bennett
dc.subjectEconomics
dc.subjectEconomic theory
dc.subjectAltruism
dc.subjectBet-hedging
dc.subjectExperimental economics
dc.subjectKelly Criterion
dc.subjectPublic Goods
dc.subjectReciprocity
dc.titleModeling Behavior in Public Goods Experiments
dc.typeDissertation
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorGeorge Mason University
thesis.degree.levelPh.D.

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