Revisiting the Constitution: A Case For Parliamentary System in Central Asia?




Abdukadirov, Sherzod

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Institutional design can impact the dynamics of power relations in authoritarian regimes. Under the presidential system in Central Asian states, the elite factions agree upon a presidential candidate before the elections and then ensure their candidate’s victory by manipulating the elections. As the cost of exclusion in this process is very high, every elite faction is forced to collude with the other factions. Under a parliamentary system, bargaining among the elites in selection of the head of state would occur after the elections as the elites would have to first secure parliamentary seats to be able to vote for the head of state. Such a process would reduce the stakes in each particular election, making it harder for the elites to manipulate elections yet safer to allow some opposition. Furthermore, the balance of power among the elites in parliament would be decided by the people, giving them a voice in the process.



Institutional design, Presidential, Parliamentary, Central Asia, Elections, Sherzod Abdukadirov