Revisiting the Constitution: A Case For Parliamentary System in Central Asia?

dc.contributor.authorAbdukadirov, Sherzod
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-16T15:11:20Z
dc.date.available2007-05-16T15:11:20Z
dc.date.issued2007-05-16T15:11:20Z
dc.description.abstractInstitutional design can impact the dynamics of power relations in authoritarian regimes. Under the presidential system in Central Asian states, the elite factions agree upon a presidential candidate before the elections and then ensure their candidate’s victory by manipulating the elections. As the cost of exclusion in this process is very high, every elite faction is forced to collude with the other factions. Under a parliamentary system, bargaining among the elites in selection of the head of state would occur after the elections as the elites would have to first secure parliamentary seats to be able to vote for the head of state. Such a process would reduce the stakes in each particular election, making it harder for the elites to manipulate elections yet safer to allow some opposition. Furthermore, the balance of power among the elites in parliament would be decided by the people, giving them a voice in the process.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1920/2449
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGMU School of Public Policy Doctoral Working Paper Seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseries0607-003en
dc.subjectInstitutional design
dc.subjectPresidential
dc.subjectParliamentary
dc.subjectCentral Asia
dc.subjectElections
dc.subjectSherzod Abdukadirov
dc.titleRevisiting the Constitution: A Case For Parliamentary System in Central Asia?
dc.typeWorking Paper

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